Those who have been following international headlines for the past year can observe the increased prevalence of discussions on nuclear weapons, including between the United States and North Korea. In the margins of the discussions, the law and policy discussions around nuclear non-proliferation become very relevant. After all, the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are very clear.Footnote 1 “Studies have shown that the detonation of nuclear weapons would cause widespread death, injury and damage, especially if it occurred in or near a populated area.” There would be extensive casualties from severe burns and blunt force trauma that would occur in the moments after the detonation, as a result of blast effects and the release of thermal radiation.Footnote 2 As such, most communities would not necessarily have the capacity to enact appropriate response mechanisms.Footnote 3 “[A]ssessments undertaken by the ICRC have highlighted that there is a lack of capacity in most countries and at the international level to adequately respond to a nuclear detonation, and to provide assistance that would benefit a substantial portion of survivors in the aftermath.”Footnote 4 Amid these considerations, the first-ever nuclear ban treaty, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Treaty), was negotiated in the halls of the UN headquarters in New York.Footnote 5 Before analyzing the Treaty itself, a word on how it came about and the legal framework that preceded it.
Between 2013 and 2014, a series of humanitarian conferences were held in Norway, Austria, and Mexico where the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons were analyzed.Footnote 6 In 2016, the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on nuclear disarmament “recommended, with widespread support, the convening, by the General Assembly, of a conference in 2017, open to all States, with the participation and contribution of international organizations and civil society, to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination…”Footnote 7 Many governments and international actors also called the OEWG recommendation “as a breakthrough in the international discourse on nuclear disarmament because it reflects a clear call to begin negotiations and it has wide support.”Footnote 8
In October 2016, the General Assembly adopted the resolution that created the mandate to “negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination” and highlighted the significance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).Footnote 9 Per the resolution, the first round of negotiations was scheduled from March 27 to 31, 2017, and the second round from June 15 to July 7, 2017.Footnote 10 The Ambassador of Costa Rica to Geneva, Elayne Whyte, presided over the conference. As an observer of the negotiations, it was noted that the March process served as an important platform for negotiating states to exchange their views and that the technical negotiation took place in June and July.
As this author analyzed in greater detail in a previous publication,Footnote 11 setting the tone of the negotiations were the negotiating states, the mandate, and the timing. The negotiating parties included non-nuclear-weapon states and states that belonged to a nuclear-free zone. Nuclear-weapon states and states that belonged to a military alliance did not participate in the negotiations, except for the Netherlands, which was the only NATO member to participate. In regard to timing, there was only one week for exchange of views and about three weeks of technical negotiations, a tight time frame for a delicate issue with a lot of potential pushback. These were the first negotiations on nuclear disarmament since the mid-1990s, when the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was negotiated. Finally, it is important to note that the General Assembly resolution mandated that a prohibition treaty be negotiated (as opposed to a comprehensive nuclear-weapon convention, which has also been the subject of many discussions). A prohibition treaty would arguably not be as time-consuming and in principle would be simpler to negotiate than a comprehensive convention.
The Treaty was finally adopted on July 7, 2017, with 122 votes in favor, 1 against, and 1 abstention.Footnote 12 It opened for signature on September 20, 2017, and at the time this article was written, fifty-seven states had signed it, but only seven had ratified it.Footnote 13 As per Article 15(1) of the Treaty, it will enter into force ninety days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited. Before getting into the provisions of the Treaty, a quick look at the existing legal framework on nuclear disarmament is needed.
The NPT is probably one of the most important instruments to shape the legal architecture of nuclear disarmament efforts. Entered into force in 1970, the NPT prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons among those that have them and prohibits the acquisition and manufacture among those that do not have them (Article 1). It also mandates that parties “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race . . . and to nuclear disarmament” (Article 6). While a great step forward, the NPT has had its challenges, including the political divisions and pushback among parties that have slowed down, and at times even curtailed, the progress of the NPT.
The CTBT, which bans nuclear explosions, was signed in 1996 but has not yet entered into force.Footnote 14 There have also been regional nuclear-free zones in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Africa that have advanced the discourse. For example, the Treaty of Tlatelolco established a Latin American and Caribbean regional bloc that allows the “use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities” and prohibits “[t]he testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons” (Article 1).
Moreover, in 1996, the International Court of Justice issued an Advisory Opinion, in which it held unanimously that “[t]here is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of threat or use of nuclear weapons.”Footnote 15 It also held unanimously that “[a] threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51 is unlawful.”Footnote 16 It held (by eleven votes to three) that international law does not include a specific prohibition on nuclear weapons either.Footnote 17 It also held by seven votes to seven that “in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”Footnote 18
With all this in mind, the Treaty is grounded on the recognition that nuclear weapons can pose a threat to global health, environment, food security, and development; the obligation to comply with obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law; and the “recogni[tion] that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons constitutes an important contribution towards the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons, including the irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons, and determin[ation] to act towards that end.”Footnote 19 The Treaty also recalls the obligation to engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations in good faith, and the standing of the NPT and the CTBT in the nuclear disarmament regime.Footnote 20
Under Article 1, the Treaty provides for the prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, and possession of nuclear weapons, including their transfer, receipt, use, and threat of use. While Article 2 obligates states parties to declare whether they have ever or are continuing to own, possess, or control such weapons, Article 4 obligates the cooperation with a competent authority to verify that states parties that owned, possessed, or controlled weapons (after the day the Treaty was adopted) have eliminated them before the Treaty enters into force. In addition, the universal vision of negotiating parties is evident in Article 12, which states that “[e]ach State Party shall encourage States not party to this Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty, with the goal of universal adherence of all States to the Treaty.” That the Treaty is supposed to build on, and not replace or supersede, existing instruments is also operationalized in Article 18, under which “[t]he implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty.”
Overall, it can be argued that the Treaty provides for what its mandate calls for—the prohibition of nuclear weapons. It also recognizes the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and the need for a stronger legal framework.
On the one hand, the Treaty provides another step forward in nuclear disarmament in that it brings together like-minded voices from different regions. On the other hand, the Treaty does not reflect the voices of the nuclear-weapon states, which in turn raises questions as to its significance. How significant is the Treaty if it is missing the participation of the parties whose involvement is key to achieving its outcome? At the same time, the Treaty reflects its standing among other nuclear disarmament treaties like the NPT and CTBT.Footnote 21 It reiterates existing commitments in preambular paragraphs and builds on them by calling for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in operative paragraphs, as discussed above.
While the Treaty still leaves out some important legal issues (especially around the legality of nuclear weapons as is) it can be viewed as renewing commitments from the 1990s amid present-day security challenges. After all, the international security challenges have evolved significantly since the 1970s, when the NPT was adopted.
In conclusion, there are treaties like CTBT that have yet not entered into force, as discussed above. (add cite to CTBT again). Thus, how significant the Treaty will be depends on its entry into force and subsequent implementation.Footnote 22
This text was reproduced and reformatted from the text available at the United Nations website (visited March 14, 2018), http://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8.
United Nations
A/CONF.229/2017/8
United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination
New York, 27-31 March and 15 June-7 July 2017
Agenda item 9
Negotiations, pursuant to paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 71/258 of 23 December 2016, on a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
The States Parties to this Treaty,
Determined to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any use of nuclear weapons, and recognizing the consequent need to completely eliminate such weapons, which remains the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again under any circumstances,
Mindful of the risks posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons, including from any nuclear-weapon detonation by accident, miscalculation or design, and emphasizing that these risks concern the security of all humanity, and that all States share the responsibility to prevent any use of nuclear weapons,
Cognizant that the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed, transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations, and have a disproportionate impact on women and girls, including as a result of ionizing radiation,
Acknowledging the ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament and the urgency of achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world, which is a global public good of the highest order, serving both national and collective security interests,
Mindful of the unacceptable suffering of and harm caused to the victims of the use of nuclear weapons (hibakusha), as well as of those affected by the testing of nuclear weapons,
Recognizing the disproportionate impact of nuclear-weapon activities on indigenous peoples,
Reaffirming the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law,
Basing themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, the rule of distinction, the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack, the prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and the rules for the protection of the natural environment,
Considering that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules of international humanitarian law,
Reaffirming that any use of nuclear weapons would also be abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience,
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,
Recalling also the first resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, adopted on 24 January 1946, and subsequent resolutions which call for the elimination of nuclear weapons,
Concerned by the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, and the waste of economic and human resources on programmes for the production, maintenance and modernization of nuclear weapons,
Recognizing that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons constitutes an important contribution towards the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons, including the irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons, and determined to act towards that end,
Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
Reaffirming that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,
Reaffirming also that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which serves as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, has a vital role to play in promoting international peace and security,
Recognizing the vital importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime,
Reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of the internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament,
Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of its States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Recognizing that the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men is an essential factor for the promotion and attainment of sustainable peace and security, and committed to supporting and strengthening the effective participation of women in nuclear disarmament,
Recognizing also the importance of peace and disarmament education in all its aspects and of raising awareness of the risks and consequences of nuclear weapons for current and future generations, and committed to the dissemination of the principles and norms of this Treaty,
Stressing the role of public conscience in the furthering of the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, other international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, religious leaders, parliamentarians, academics and the hibakusha,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1 Prohibitions
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
(a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
(c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
(d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
(f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
(g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
Article 2 Declarations
1. Each State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, not later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for that State Party, a declaration in which it shall:
(a) Declare whether it owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party;
(b) Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), declare whether it owns, possesses or controls any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(c) Notwithstanding Article 1 (g), declare whether there are any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such declarations received to the States Parties.
Article 3 Safeguards
1. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply shall, at a minimum, maintain its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations in force at the time of entry into force of this Treaty, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.
2. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply that has not yet done so shall conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)). Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. Each State Party shall thereafter maintain such obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.
Article 4 Towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons
1. Each State Party that after 7 July 2017 owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for it, shall cooperate with the competent international authority designated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Article for the purpose of verifying the irreversible elimination of its nuclear-weapon programme. The competent international authority shall report to the States Parties. Such a State Party shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.
2. Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), each State Party that owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices shall immediately remove them from operational status, and destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties, in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State Party's nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities. The State Party, no later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, shall submit this plan to the States Parties or to a competent international authority designated by the States Parties. The plan shall then be negotiated with the competent international authority, which shall submit it to the subsequent meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval in accordance with its rules of procedure.
3. A State Party to which paragraph 2 above applies shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence no later than the date upon which implementation of the plan referred to in paragraph 2 is completed. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months after the date of initiation of negotiations. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. Following the entry into force of the agreement referred to in this paragraph, the State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a final declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article.
4. Notwithstanding Article 1 (b) and (g), each State Party that has any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State shall ensure the prompt removal of such weapons, as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties. Upon the removal of such weapons or other explosive devices, that State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article.
5. Each State Party to which this Article applies shall submit a report to each meeting of States Parties and each review conference on the progress made towards the implementation of its obligations under this Article, until such time as they are fulfilled.
6. The States Parties shall designate a competent international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programmes, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. In the event that such a designation has not been made prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for a State Party to which paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article applies, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene an extraordinary meeting of States Parties to take any decisions that may be required.
Article 5 National implementation
1. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty.
2. Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.
Article 6 Victim assistance and environmental remediation
1. Each State Party shall, with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, without discrimination, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion.
2. Each State Party, with respect to areas under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, shall take necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of areas so contaminated.
3. The obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be without prejudice to the duties and obligations of any other States under international law or bilateral agreements.
Article 7 International cooperation and assistance
1. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties to facilitate the implementation of this Treaty.
2. In fulfilling its obligations under this Treaty, each State Party shall have the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties.
3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties affected by nuclear-weapons use or testing, to further the implementation of this Treaty.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the victims of the use or testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
5. Assistance under this Article may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or on a bilateral basis.
6. Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it may have under international law, a State Party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices shall have a responsibility to provide adequate assistance to affected States Parties, for the purpose of victim assistance and environmental remediation.
Article 8 Meeting of States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Treaty, in accordance with its relevant provisions, and on further measures for nuclear disarmament, including:
(a) The implementation and status of this Treaty;
(b) Measures for the verified, time-bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, including additional protocols to this Treaty;
(c) Any other matters pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this Treaty.
2. The first meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of the entry into force of this Treaty. Further meetings of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on a biennial basis, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties. The meeting of States Parties shall adopt its rules of procedure at its first session. Pending their adoption, the rules of procedure of the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, shall apply.
3. Extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be convened, as may be deemed necessary, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at the written request of any State Party provided that this request is supported by at least one third of the States Parties.
4. After a period of five years following the entry into force of this Treaty, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a conference to review the operation of the Treaty and the progress in achieving the purposes of the Treaty. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene further review conferences at intervals of six years with the same objective, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties.
5. States not party to this Treaty, as well as the relevant entities of the United Nations system, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organizations, shall be invited to attend the meetings of States Parties and the review conferences as observers.
Article 9 Costs
1. The costs of the meetings of States Parties, the review conferences and the extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be borne by the States Parties and States not party to this Treaty participating therein as observers, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the circulation of declarations under Article 2, reports under Article 4 and proposed amendments under Article 10 of this Treaty shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
3. The cost related to the implementation of verification measures required under Article 4 as well as the costs related to the destruction of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and the elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, including the elimination or conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, should be borne by the States Parties to which they apply.
Article 10 Amendments
1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of a proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the proposal shall be considered at the next meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first.
2. A meeting of States Parties or a review conference may agree upon amendments which shall be adopted by a positive vote of a majority of two thirds of the States Parties. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted amendment to all States Parties.
3. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party that deposits its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment 90 days following the deposit of such instruments of ratification or acceptance by a majority of the States Parties at the time of adoption. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other State Party 90 days following the deposit of its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment.
Article 11 Settlement of disputes
1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties' choice in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. The meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute, including by offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time limit for any agreed procedure, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 12 Universality
Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty, with the goal of universal adherence of all States to the Treaty.
Article 13 Signature
This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States at United Nations Headquarters in New York as from 20 September 2017.
Article 14 Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States. The Treaty shall be open for accession.
Article 15 Entry into force
1. This Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
Article 16 Reservations
The Articles of this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.
Article 17 Duration and withdrawal
1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events that it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect 12 months after the date of the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that 12-month period, the withdrawing State Party is a party to an armed conflict, the State Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Treaty and of any additional protocols until it is no longer party to an armed conflict.
Article 18 Relationship with other agreements
The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty.
Article 19 Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Treaty.
Article 20 Authentic texts
The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Treaty shall be equally authentic.
DONE at New York, this seventh day of July, two thousand and seventeen.
