The broad-scale retreat from ‘subject-centred’ thinking within theology and the human sciences over the past half-century, and the embrace instead of more hermeneutically structuralist orientations, has often left ethical discussion in a kind of quagmire. For while other broad areas of concern, like aesthetics, phenomenology or even knowledge-theory, not to mention specific doctrinal focuses, may have been able to accommodate themselves well to the new hermeneutical standard for enquiry (a standard which Gadamer succinctly defines as ‘the art of avoiding misunderstandings’), it is impossible for ethics to remain true to itself as a fundamentally hermeneutical discipline. The reason for this, of course, is that as an inherently normative and indeed prescriptive discourse, not only must ethics be able to go well beyond the aspirations merely of ‘avoiding misunderstandings’; it must also as prescriptive be essentially ‘subject-centred’, in order to be able to address genuinely the concerns about human obligation and responsibility which define it. And this is precisely the problem. For today, whenever ethics does seek to locate itself as something ‘subject-centred’ within theology or the non-theological social disciplines, it often encounters – quite understandably, and for all the well-known legitimate reasons – a basic hostility to this fundamental condition for its own possibility.
An important part of what makes Rachel Muers's Keeping God's Silence such a valuable and distinctively productive enterprise is the fact that Muers herself finds virtually the same ‘subjectivity’ dilemma at the very centre of contemporary debates on feminist identity; and she is then able to use this overlap to speak to the broader problem of metaethics in uniquely constructive ways. Muers frames the parallel dilemma in feminism as follows: ‘On the one hand, there is [within feminism] the call to reject the notion of the “subject” as agent of speech and action, as the product of a masculinist world view; on the other hand there is the claim that a strong notion of subjecthood is essential to the project of women's liberation’ (p. 65). What the book achieves then, under the descriptive title of ‘a theological ethics of communication’, and in a certain feminist dialogue with specific aspects of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's thought, is in its best parts something imaginatively original and even rather courageous. For while most other theological engagements with ethics today can tend to tread the currently much safer territory around themes of hospitality, gift, solidarity and so on, Muers dares to break with these by now often overworked trends, and to redirect moral questioning with a freshly sharpened feminist attentiveness back into the ‘older’, but for ethics still unavoidable, challenges of human subjectivity and agency.
I do not mean to leave the impression that the book is ‘about’ human subjectivity per se. It is rather, as the title clearly expresses, about God, especially God's silence, and then further, the human ‘keeping’ of this silence. Yet is it precisely this human ‘keeping’ of God's silence that now becomes the centre for newly re-envisioned dispositions of subjectivity: dispositions which allow the language of obligation and responsibility to be spoken genuinely and with the appropriate force while avoiding the old errors of patriarchalism and dogmatism. Specifically then, what is this silence of God which is to be kept? It is not in the first place the silence of mystical theology, which is again primarily a silence predicated on difference. The silence that God keeps, Muers contends, is instead above all a listening silence. God listens, and ‘God's listening is integral to understanding who God is’ (p. 15).
I venture just two modest critiques. First, the book is at its best when its focus and attentiveness remain theological. Forays into broader applications of theological insights onto non-theological political and ethical discussions can seem somewhat forced. Second, while the overall non-systematic approach stands the project in good stead, in terms of allowing for an engaging and readable presentation, the book could have benefited from a stronger critical development of its own best ideas. The second half especially, which does not quite match the imaginative strength of the first, might have been more valuably given over to a more rigorously constructive ethical treatment of such promising ideas as ‘resurrection silence’ and the resurrection as a ‘place to stand’. There can instead be a tendency to ‘float’ such ideas as potentially fruitful, followed by a few overgeneral remarks which, in their lack of specific content, can have the effect of weakening rather than strengthening the overall impact. But I stress these are only minor criticisms, and there is more than enough here to make this not only valuable and inspiring reading but a potentially important contribution to contemporary discussions in theological ethics.
