This book is the first comprehensive examination of the Middle East policy of John F. Kennedy's administration. It concentrates primarily on Egypt and Israel but also discusses Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Yemen. In addition, the book deals with the policy discussions within and advice given by the U.S. Department of State, Department of Defense, and National Security Council regarding these countries. Not included in this study are Turkey (which at this time fell under European policy), the British-influenced and/or controlled Persian Gulf states, and Aden.
According to Summit, Kennedy had a “three-pronged plan” for the Middle East: to maintain the stability of traditional regimes (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait) while encouraging them to commit to gradual reforms; to draw Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser closer to the West; and to settle the Palestinian refugee problem, which was seen as the key to calming tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors (pp. 34, 240–42). The results during Kennedy's short tenure in office were mixed, and the Middle East states were able to manipulate the United States—and its superpower rival, the Soviet Union—for their own interests.
Summit begins the book with a brief summary of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower's Middle East policies. These presidents differed from Kennedy in their views of neutrality as analogous to alliance with the Soviet Union and of regional nationalism as detrimental to U.S. interests. Subsequent chapters make good use of papers from the Kennedy Presidential Library, while the last chapter—a brief overall assessment of Kennedy's policies and legacy—draws on papers from the presidential library of Lyndon B. Johnson. Otherwise, Summit relies on a mix of published U.S. government documents, the memoirs of both American and Middle Eastern leaders and officials, and numerous academic works. She contends that Kennedy's “overtures toward the [Middle East] area . . . laid a foundation for Lyndon Johnson's approach toward the region.” By the time of Kennedy's assassination, American policy “was reverting to familiar patterns” due in large part to Nasser's continued involvement in Yemen's civil war, ideological divisions within the Arab world, and the U.S. decision to sell Hawk missiles to Israel, partly as an incentive to cooperate on the Palestinian-refugee problem (p. 221).
Summit shows that Kennedy emphasized economic development and political reform in the Middle East rather than military assistance. Such policies were a means to gain support for American initiatives in the region and to counteract domestic unrest and communist activities or Soviet influence. Although Kennedy was critical of the idea of Israel developing nuclear weapons, according to Summit, he could not get the Israelis to agree to adequate inspections of the Dimona site. In general, he favored a balanced approach to the Arab–Israeli conflict and to the struggle between conservative and Arab nationalist governments in the Middle East. Political circumstances eventually forced Kennedy to choose sides, however, and his successor Lyndon Johnson proved even more sympathetic to Israel and distrustful of the Arab nationalists, as well as less focused on the Middle East in general due to his preoccupation with the Vietnam War. The U.S. sale of Hawk missiles to Israel during Kennedy's tenure was the beginning of what developed into an alliance between the two countries. Meanwhile, Kennedy never pressured the shah of Iran to institute democratic reforms because even he was more concerned with that country's position as a military ally. As for Saudi Arabia, the United States needed its oil resources and thus allowed it to pay lip service to reform. At the same time, Kennedy's food and economic aid to Egypt did not dissuade Nasser from becoming more deeply involved in Yemen or from receiving Soviet assistance.
The only other recent study dealing exclusively with the Kennedy administration's Middle East policy is Warren Bass's Support Any Friend: Kennedy's Middle East and the Making of the U.S.–Israel Alliance (2003). Although Bass focuses primarily on the Arab–Israeli conflict, he does give considerable attention to U.S. relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan and the impact of the Yemeni Civil War on these ties. In comparison with Summit, Bass provides more introductory information on the policies of Truman and Eisenhower and a similar amount of information on Kennedy's legacy. He also provides a comparison of Kennedy's policies with those of Johnson. Bass contends that the Palestinian-refugee situation was never much of a priority for the Kennedy administration because it was thought to be unmanageable. Unlike Summit, Bass consults the British Public Records Office and the Israel State Archives and conducts interviews. He nevertheless comes to conclusions similar to Summit's on most of the important issues.
Although there have been some important academic works published in recent years on American relations with the Middle East (see Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945 and Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present) and on bilateral relations with specific countries (see Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia and James A. Bill's much older book, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy and American–Iranian Relations), these works only offer a chapter at best on the Kennedy administration's policies in the region. Summit offers less than that with regard to Iran but significantly more on Egypt and Saudi Arabia (if one includes coverage of the Yemeni Civil War). She also deals with less studied areas such as Lebanon and Kuwait and is more thorough in her discussion of Israel.
Summit's book is well written and documented and is useful for U.S. foreign-policy and Middle East specialists, university students, and the general public. The appendix offers a “Cast of Characters” section that is quite informative, yet there is a mistake regarding King Abdullah of Jordan; he was assassinated in 1951, not 1952.
