Disasters are often described and managed as discrete events, such as pandemics, explosions, economic shocks, or armed conflicts. Yet in many fragile settings, crises do not occur in isolation. They overlap, interact, and amplify one another across social, economic, infrastructural, and health systems. This pattern has increasingly been described as a polycrisis, in which multiple crises become causally entangled through shared vulnerabilities, cascading effects, and feedback loops.Reference Homer-Dixon, Renn and Rockstrom 1 –Reference Rakowski, Schaan and van Klink 3 Under such conditions, disaster preparedness depends on the preservation of operational capacity across repeated shocks while maintaining the ability to respond to them.
Lebanon provides a compelling case through which to examine this problem. Since late 2019, the country has faced a succession of major crises, including economic collapse, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Beirut Port explosion, prolonged infrastructure and supply instability, and renewed conflict-related pressures extending into early 2026.Reference Abiad, Herrgard and Hilal 4 –Reference Nuwayhid, Zurayk and Sibai 8 These shocks also unfolded alongside broader social immobility, “displacement in place,” and mounting concern that the country’s health sector was entering a prolonged phase of structural deterioration, not a temporary emergency.Reference Ali 9 –Reference Saad, Mina and Helou 11 These events unfolded within an already fragile political and service-delivery environment, placing sustained pressure on health care institutions and emergency response systems.Reference Abiad, Herrgard and Hilal 4 , Reference Turnberg, Zivot and Cutler 12 – 15
Existing literature has documented important components of this period, including health workforce attrition, medication shortages, hospital strain, and the response to individual mass-casualty incidents.Reference El Sayed 16 –Reference Nemr, Moussallem and Nemr 21 However, these crises have more often been studied separately than as interacting shocks that progressively altered the country’s disaster preparedness and emergency response capacity over time. A longitudinal synthesis is needed to understand how each crisis increased demand and how repeated shocks eroded the workforce, infrastructure, logistics, coordination, and recovery processes required for effective response. These crises also unfolded within a predominantly private and hospital-centered health care system characterized by fragmented financing, substantial reliance on out-of-pocket expenditure, and variable coordination between public and private actors.Reference Aoun and Tajvar 5 , Reference Moussallem, Zein-El-Din and Hamra 22 The system’s dependence on imported medications, medical supplies, and fuel further increased its vulnerability to currency depreciation and procurement disruption.Reference Bank 6 , Reference Bou Sanayeh and El Chamieh 23 Together, these structural features influenced routine access to care and limited the ability of institutions and public agencies to finance, coordinate, and sustain emergency response.Reference Aoun and Tajvar 5 , Reference Moussallem, Zein-El-Din and Hamra 22 , Reference Bou Sanayeh and El Chamieh 23
Accordingly, this narrative case study examines Lebanon’s cascading crises from January 2019 through early 2026 and analyzes their implications for disaster preparedness and emergency response. The study was designed as a targeted narrative synthesis rather than an exhaustive systematic review. We synthesized peer-reviewed literature and institutional reports across key operational domains, with the aim of identifying how repeated crises degraded response capacity and what lessons this experience offers for fragile and conflict-affected settings.
Methods
Study Design
We conducted a narrative case study of Lebanon’s cascading crises from January 2019 through early 2026, combined with a targeted literature synthesis of peer-reviewed articles and institutional reports. A narrative case study approach was selected because the objective was not to estimate pooled effect sizes, but to examine how sequential and overlapping shocks interacted over time to influence disaster preparedness and emergency response capacity in a single national setting. This approach was also suited to integrating heterogeneous sources, including hospital-based mass-casualty reports, health-systems analyses, workforce studies, public health reports, and conceptual literature on polycrisis and health-system resilience. January 2019 was selected as the beginning of the study period because it marked the onset of Lebanon’s contemporary polycrisis, during which worsening economic and political instability accelerated and culminated in nationwide protests and financial collapse later that year. This starting point allowed the analysis to capture the full sequence of crises and their cumulative effects on the health system.
Conceptual Framework
Polycrisis theory shaped how evidence was interpreted, not which operational domains were used to organize it. It directed attention to interactions among crises instead of treating each event as an independent exposure. Specifically, the synthesis examined four mechanisms associated with crisis entanglement: shared underlying vulnerabilities, cross-sector dependencies, cascading effects, and feedback loops. Sources were analyzed for 2 things: the direct effects of individual crises, and evidence that one crisis altered the health system’s ability to withstand, respond to, or recover from subsequent shocks.
The operational domains were derived from three sources: the World Health Organization’s Health Emergency and Disaster Risk Management (Health EDRM) Framework, 24 the WHO health-system building blocks, 25 and the domain structure used in the national assessment of hospital disaster and emergency preparedness in Lebanon.Reference Al-Hajj, Abou-El-Hassan and Khalil 26 These were then refined iteratively against recurring themes in the Lebanon-specific literature: surge capacity was broadened beyond hospital response to encompass prehospital, primary care, and referral functions; communications were grouped with governance and coordination, reflecting their joint failure during mass-casualty events; and adaptation and institutional learning were added to the health information domain.
Within this framework, we distinguish preparedness—the plans, protocols, command structures, and training established in advance—from emergency readiness, the staffing, supplies, power, communications, and physical capacity actually available when a shock occurs. The distinction is central to the analysis, because a system may retain formal preparedness while its readiness declines, and it is readiness that determines what can actually be mobilized at the moment a shock occurs. Capacity erosion was accordingly defined as the cumulative weakening of the workforce, infrastructure, supplies, financing, coordination, and information systems on which readiness depends. Recovery interruption was defined as the occurrence of a subsequent shock before institutions or systems had restored staffing, logistics, infrastructure, governance capacity, or organizational learning following a previous crisis.
Data Sources and Search Strategy
A targeted literature search was conducted using PubMed, Scopus, and Embase, supplemented by searches of institutional websites, including those of the World Health Organization and World Bank. Search terms combined “Lebanon” with terms related to economic crisis, COVID-19, Beirut Port explosion, armed conflict, displacement, health care workforce, hospital preparedness, mass-casualty incidents, emergency medical services, medication shortages, electricity, health-system governance, health-system resilience, and disaster preparedness. Reference lists of highly relevant publications were also screened to identify additional sources.
Sources were organized into 2 broad categories. Crisis-defining sources described major events or structural crises affecting Lebanon during the study period, including economic collapse, COVID-19, the Beirut Port explosion, electricity and fuel instability, medication shortages, escalating hostilities, displacement, and the September 2024 pager incident. Health-system and preparedness sources described the effects of these crises on workforce capacity, service delivery, hospital and nonhospital surge capacity, prehospital care, primary care, governance, communications, surveillance, logistics, and institutional resilience.
Primary empirical studies, multicenter reports, and institutional assessments were prioritized when available. Brief reports, research letters, and commentaries were included selectively when they provided direct operational observations, contemporaneous descriptions of emerging events, or information not yet available in more comprehensive empirical studies. These sources were used primarily for contextual or event-level interpretation and were not treated as equivalent to primary research evidence.
This search strategy was purposive and not exhaustive. The synthesis therefore does not represent every publication concerning Lebanon during the study period; relevant work may be absent either because it was not retrieved by the targeted search or because it did not inform the operational domains examined.
Eligibility and Source Selection
Sources were included if they: addressed Lebanon directly; described a crisis, health-system condition, or operational consequence relevant to the period from January 2019 through early 2026; and contributed evidence concerning disaster preparedness, emergency response, health-system function, displacement, continuity of care, or interactions among overlapping crises.
Earlier sources were included selectively when they described structural features necessary to interpret crisis-era preparedness, including health-system financing and privatization, physician distribution, emergency medical services, primary health care capacity, hospital preparedness, or prior health-system resilience.
Sources were excluded when they did not materially inform the study question or analytical framework, focused on Lebanon without addressing health-system or emergency-response implications, duplicated evidence already represented by a more comprehensive source, or did not contribute meaningful information to the operational domains examined.
Data Extraction and Thematic Organization
The authors reviewed the included sources and extracted information using 5 operational domains:
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1. Health care workforce capacity, including migration, staffing shortages, burnout, workplace violence, training disruption, and specialty or geographic maldistribution.
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2. System-wide surge capacity, service delivery, and patient flow, including emergency department overload, triage, operating room and intensive care access, prehospital services, primary care, referral pathways, continuity of essential services, interfacility transfer, and care for displaced populations.
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3. Supply-chain and infrastructure reliability, including medications, consumables, fuel, electricity, oxygen, imaging, facility damage, and other resources required to maintain essential services.
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4. Governance, communications, and coordination systems, including public-private coordination, institutional command activation, internal communication, emergency medical services interface, interagency coordination, crowd management, and documentation systems.
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5. Health information, learning, and adaptation mechanisms, including surveillance, mortality tracking, patient registration, after-action review, debriefing, institutional learning, and adaptation across repeated events.
For each source, we extracted the crisis or structural condition described, the health-system level involved, the operational challenges reported, relevant interactions with other crises, and the lessons or implications for preparedness.
Analytic Approach
Analysis combined deductive and inductive thematic approaches. The 5 operational domains provided an initial deductive structure. Within each domain, findings were compared across crises, institutions, and levels of the health system. Inductive review was then used to identify recurring relationships across domains and crises. This process generated 2 cross-cutting interpretive themes: capacity erosion and recovery interruption.
Results
Overview of the Crisis Sequence
From 2019 through early 2026, Lebanon experienced a sequence of overlapping crises that affected both population needs and the health system’s ability to respond. These included the COVID-19 pandemic, the Beirut Port explosion, deepening economic collapse, worsening electricity and fuel instability, medication shortages, escalating hostilities, and the September 2024 pager-related mass-casualty incident, with continued conflict-related strain into 2025 and early 2026 (Table 1; Figure 1).
Major cascading crises in Lebanon and their implications for emergency preparedness and response, 2019-early 2026

Table 1. Long description
Columns: crisis; period; main health-system effects; preparedness implications. Eight rows. Economic collapse (late 2019 onward): salary erosion, workforce migration, medication shortages; loss of baseline capacity. COVID-19 (2020 onward): higher occupancy, workforce strain; reduced reserve capacity. Beirut Port explosion (August 4, 2020): mass casualties, hospital damage, emergency department overload; weak triage, tracking, command and documentation. Electricity and fuel instability (2021–2023, persisting): threats to power, oxygen, imaging, communications; energy redundancy needed. Medication and supply shortages (2020 onward): treatment interruption. Escalating hostilities (2024 onward): casualties, displacement, insecurity; narrowed recovery. Pager-related mass-casualty incident (September 2024): ocular, facial and upper-extremity trauma; whole-hospital mobilization and backup communications needed. Post-conflict strain (2025–early 2026): preserving capability between crises.
Abbreviation: COVID-19, Coronavirus disease 2019.
Timeline of cascading crises and their implications for emergency preparedness and response in Lebanon, 2019-2026.

Figure 1 Long description
A horizontal timeline runs left to right from 2019 to 2026. Eight labelled boxes with icons appear in chronological order: economic collapse (late 2019 onward); COVID-19 pandemic (2020 onward); Beirut Port explosion (August 4, 2020); medication and supply shortages (2020 onward); electricity and fuel instability (2021–2023); escalating hostilities and conflict-related strain (2024 onward); pager-related mass-casualty incident (September 2024); and ongoing hostilities and mass displacement (2025–early 2026). A bracket spanning the whole timeline points down to a box headed “Cumulative system effects across the timeline”, listing workforce erosion, recurrent hospital surge stress, supply chain fragility, energy and infrastructure instability, communication and coordination vulnerabilities, and interrupted recovery between shocks. It ends: “Overall consequence: progressive reduction in disaster preparedness and emergency response capacity.”
National assessments suggest that important preparedness vulnerabilities existed before or during the early phases of the polycrisis. A national evaluation of hospital disaster and emergency preparedness identified variability in planning, training, communication, surge arrangements, and institutional preparedness across Lebanese hospitals.Reference Al-Hajj, Abou-El-Hassan and Khalil 26 A qualitative assessment of the COVID-19 response similarly described fragmented governance, limited coordination, and challenges aligning public and private actors.Reference Moussallem, Zein-El-Din and Hamra 22 These findings indicate that later crisis-related failures occurred within a system that already had significant institutional and governance limitations. Recurring vulnerabilities and preparedness implications across the 5 operational domains are summarized in Table 2.
Operational domains affected across Lebanon’s cascading crises and recurring preparedness implications

Table 2. Long description
Columns: domain; vulnerabilities; consequences; preparedness implications. Five rows. Workforce capacity: migration, salary collapse, burnout, workplace violence caused staffing shortages; retention, protection and training continuity are priorities. Surge capacity and patient flow: emergency department crowding, triage, operating room and imaging bottlenecks, weak patient tracking, fragmented prehospital care caused overload; surge planning should span the whole system. Supply chain and infrastructure: medication shortages, fuel and electricity insecurity, damaged facilities caused treatment interruption; redundancy in power, fuel and consumables is central. Communications and coordination: internal breakdowns, fragmented EMS, variable command activation; clear command, redundant communications and paper fallbacks needed. Health information and learning: limited disaster-compatible documentation, uneven after-action review; debriefing, drills and resilient tracking needed.
Abbreviation: EMS, Emergency medical services.
Health Care Workforce Capacity
Multiple sources described substantial strain on Lebanon’s health workforce during the study period. Recurrent themes included physician emigration, nurse migration, staffing shortages, worsening geographic and specialty maldistribution, salary collapse, and declining retention of trained personnel.Reference Kawa, Abisaab and Abiad 20 , Reference Nemr, Moussallem and Nemr 21 , Reference Abou-Abbas, Hassan and Al Mounajed 27 –Reference Doghman, Saba and Bakhach 30 Additional pressures included burnout, disruption of training environments, and workplace violence, particularly in emergency care settings.Reference Abou-Abbas, Nasrallah and Yaacoub 31 –Reference Khoury, Zeeni and Ibrahim 33 These crisis-era workforce losses appear to have deepened pre-existing structural imbalances in physician distribution and supply that had been described in Lebanon before the current polycrisis period.Reference Kassak, Ghomrawi and Osseiran 34
System-Wide Surge Capacity, Service Delivery, and Patient Flow
Evidence concerning surge capacity extended beyond hospital bed availability. Hospital-based studies of the Beirut Port explosion and the 2024 pager incident reported rapid casualty influxes, emergency department crowding, triage challenges, pressure on operating rooms, imaging services, and intensive care, and difficulty with patient tracking and inpatient flow.Reference Gebran, Abou Khalil and El Moheb 17 , Reference Hitti, Cheaito and Kazzi 18 , Reference Hallal, Andraos and Saad 35 –Reference Saad, Slaiby and Chalhoub 40 Several reports noted that mildly injured patients arrived in large numbers early, while more severely injured patients accumulated later, complicating prioritization and throughput.Reference Gebran, Abou Khalil and El Moheb 17 , Reference Hitti, Cheaito and Kazzi 18 , Reference Saad, Slaiby and Chalhoub 40 Specialty-specific reports also identified substantial operative, orthopedic, ophthalmologic, hand, and radiologic burdens during major events.Reference Saad, Slaiby and Chalhoub 40 –Reference Hassanpour, Hosseinpour and Shakerisefat 43
At the system level, crisis-related demand also affected prehospital services, primary care, referral pathways, vaccination, chronic disease management, medication access, mental health services, and care for displaced populations.Reference Ali 9 , Reference Saad, Mina and Helou 11 , Reference Jaber Chehayeb, Kala and Abou Ghannam 19 , Reference Bhattarai, Bhusal and Barone-Adesi 44 –Reference Tandon, Rouhana and Rahme 51 These pressures reduced the ability of the health system to absorb sudden demand while maintaining routine and essential services. International emergency medical team reports further suggested that external assistance was variably matched to local needs and had to adapt to a setting where trauma demand coexisted with COVID-19, displacement, chronic disease burden, and broader system stress.Reference Hagon and Dumont 52 –Reference Wolff, Shankiti and Salio 54
Supply-Chain and Infrastructure Reliability
Supply instability was a recurring theme across the reviewed literature. Medication shortages, rising unaffordability of essential drugs, and disrupted access to imported pharmaceuticals were widely reported.Reference Jaber Chehayeb, Kala and Abou Ghannam 19 , Reference Bou Sanayeh and El Chamieh 23 , Reference Bou Sanayeh, El Chamieh and Khattar 45 , Reference Eid, Jabbour and Moujaes 46 Infrastructure-related stressors included electricity cuts, generator dependence, fuel insecurity, and direct damage to hospital facilities and stocks during the Beirut blast.Reference Mjaess, Karam and Chebel 7 , Reference Wolff, Shankiti and Salio 54 , Reference Yuan 55 These disruptions reduced emergency readiness directly, since power, consumables, oxygen, and diagnostic capability determine what a facility can mobilize at the moment a surge begins, irrespective of the preparedness plans it holds. The period was described as one of generalized health care deterioration, with chronic infrastructural fragility and macroeconomic collapse undermining the system’s ability to recover reserve capacity.Reference Fleifel and Abi Farraj 10 , Reference Ibrahim 56
Governance, Communications, and Coordination Systems
National and institutional studies described fragmented governance, uneven preparedness capacity, variable coordination between public and private actors, and limitations in unified system-level planning. During mass-casualty events, reported operational problems included internal communication breakdowns, registration bottlenecks, crowd-control difficulties, challenges activating hospital command structures, and limitations in interdepartmental coordination.Reference Hitti, Cheaito and Kazzi 18 , Reference Kerbage, Haddad and Zoghbi 39 , Reference Al-Hajj, Ghamlouche and Nasser AlDeen 57 , Reference Nakhle, Abou Khater and Mouawad 58 Lebanon’s predominantly private and hospital-centered service-delivery structure allowed individual institutions some operational autonomy, but also complicated standardized preparedness, equitable resource allocation, and coordinated national response.Reference Aoun and Tajvar 5 , Reference Moussallem, Zein-El-Din and Hamra 22 , Reference Al-Hajj, Abou-El-Hassan and Khalil 26
The broader prehospital context was also relevant, as Lebanon’s Emergency Medical Services (EMS) system has been described as fragmented and volunteer-based, with variable coordination and limited integration.Reference El Sayed and Bayram 47 This interpretation is consistent with broader evidence from low- and middle-income countries, where prehospital emergency systems frequently remain fragmented, under-resourced, and weak in information exchange.Reference Bhattarai, Bhusal and Barone-Adesi 44 Later analyses of the pager incident emphasized the importance of backup communications, flexible command structures, and simplified workflows during unusual mass-casualty events.Reference El Sayed 16 , Reference Hitti, Bou Akl and El Zahran 37 , Reference Saad, Slaiby and Chalhoub 40
Health Information and Learning Mechanisms
Evidence related to health information systems was mixed. Some studies documented adaptive surveillance capacity, including national COVID-19 mortality surveillance and prior communicable disease monitoring under humanitarian strain.Reference Abou-Abbas, Nasser and Baaklini 59 , Reference Farah, Saleh and Abou El Naja 60 However, hospital-based mass-casualty reports frequently described limitations in electronic documentation, patient registration, and disaster-compatible tracking systems.Reference Gebran, Abou Khalil and El Moheb 17 , Reference Hitti, Cheaito and Kazzi 18 , Reference Hallal, Andraos and Saad 35 Several authors recommended structured debriefing, after-action review, and realistic disaster drills to strengthen preparedness for future events.Reference El Sayed 16 , Reference Hitti, Bou Akl and El Zahran 37 , Reference Nakhle, Abou Khater and Mouawad 58 The importance of robust surveillance and burden estimation is also supported by broader calls to strengthen cancer surveillance and health information quality in settings where crisis can distort planning and service prioritization.Reference Ghanem and Cherfane 61
Discussion
This review suggests that Lebanon’s experience from 2019 through early 2026 is best understood as a cascading polycrisis in which successive shocks interacted to degrade the foundations of emergency response. Consistent with polycrisis theory, the major crises affecting Lebanon were linked through shared structural vulnerabilities, cross-sector dependencies, and feedback effects between economic instability, infrastructure failure, health-system strain, and insecurity.Reference Homer-Dixon, Renn and Rockstrom 1 –Reference Rakowski, Schaan and van Klink 3 In practical terms, this meant that each new event occurred in a system already weakened by the one before it (Table 3).
Recurring preparedness challenges identified across Lebanon’s cascading crises, 2019-early 2026

Table 3. Long description
Columns: challenge; example from Lebanon. Six rows. Repeated shocks degraded baseline capacity before the next event: economic collapse, pandemic strain and later conflict reduced readiness before subsequent emergencies. Workforce loss reduced emergency readiness: physician and nurse migration, burnout and workplace violence weakened staffing. Mass-casualty response was constrained by patient flow bottlenecks: Beirut blast and pager incident reports described emergency department overload, registration challenges and operative bottlenecks. Infrastructure fragility undermined response: power instability, fuel shortages and damaged facilities affected hospital function. Communications and documentation systems were vulnerable under stress: reports identified communication failures and limits of electronic systems during mass-casualty incidents. Lessons were generated but not always consolidated before the next shock: similar operational problems recurred across separate incidents.
Two cross-cutting dynamics appear to define this period. The first is capacity erosion. The literature repeatedly showed deterioration in the workforce, supply chains, infrastructure reliability, and operational coordination needed for emergency readiness. Outmigration of physicians and nurses, worsening maldistribution, unsafe and demoralizing working conditions, and disruption of training all reduced the human resource base available for surge response.Reference Kawa, Abisaab and Abiad 20 , Reference Nemr, Moussallem and Nemr 21 , Reference Abou-Abbas, Hassan and Al Mounajed 27 –Reference Doghman, Saba and Bakhach 30 At the same time, medication shortages, reduced affordability, electricity instability, fuel insecurity, and hospital infrastructure damage narrowed the material margin within which hospitals could function safely during crises.Reference Bank 6 , Reference Jaber Chehayeb, Kala and Abou Ghannam 19 , Reference Bou Sanayeh and El Chamieh 23 , Reference Bou Sanayeh, El Chamieh and Khattar 45 , Reference Yuan 55 These were not peripheral stressors. They directly shaped whether hospitals could staff emergency departments, run imaging and operating rooms, preserve cold chains, maintain communications, and absorb sudden mass-casualty loads.
The second recurring dynamic is recovery interruption. Lebanon did not move through a predictable cycle of shock, stabilization, recovery, and reform. Instead, new crises repeatedly arrived before institutions could rebuild stocks, restore staffing, repair damaged infrastructure, or institutionalize lessons from prior events. The Beirut Port explosion occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic and deepening economic collapse.Reference Mjaess, Karam and Chebel 7 , Reference Hallal, Andraos and Saad 35 The pager incident then occurred in a health system already weakened by years of workforce attrition, supply instability, and conflict-related pressure.Reference El Sayed 16 , Reference Helou, Weinstein and Kalaji 36 –Reference Kalaji, Nakhle and Weinstein 38 , Reference Saad, Slaiby and Chalhoub 40 This interrupted recovery cycle is important because it separates preparedness from readiness. Lebanese institutions largely retained their disaster plans, protocols, and command structures across this period, but the readiness those plans presuppose (staffed rosters, stocked pharmacies, reliable power, functioning communications, available operative capacity) was progressively depleted between shocks. Preparedness is therefore not only the possession of plans; it is the preservation of the functioning capability those plans require.
The event literature helps clarify how these structural pressures manifested operationally. Hospital reports from the Beirut blast and pager incident consistently described the same bottlenecks despite differing mechanisms of injury and scale.Reference Gebran, Abou Khalil and El Moheb 17 , Reference Hitti, Cheaito and Kazzi 18 , Reference Hitti, Bou Akl and El Zahran 37 , Reference Kerbage, Haddad and Zoghbi 39 , Reference Nakhle, Abou Khater and Mouawad 58 This consistency across otherwise different incidents suggests that the dominant vulnerabilities were not event-specific. They reflected recurring weaknesses in patient flow architecture, low-redundancy logistics, and command-and-communication function under stress. Lebanon’s experience therefore reinforces that disaster performance depends as much on the resilience of operational systems as on clinical expertise.
The findings also show that baseline health-system fragility and disaster preparedness are inseparable. Studies of childhood vaccination, primary care, physician supply, and surveillance all indicate that the effects of crisis extended well beyond acute trauma response.Reference Saad, Mina and Helou 11 , Reference Doghman, Saba and Bakhach 30 , Reference Hemadeh, Kdouh and Hammoud 48 , Reference Ismail, Tomoaia-Cotisel and Noubani 49 , Reference Abou-Abbas, Nasser and Baaklini 59 Delayed cancer care, drug unaffordability, disrupted chronic disease management, and rising mental health burden all point to the same broader conclusion: a system struggling to maintain essential everyday services has less reserve capacity for extraordinary events.Reference Eid, Jabbour and Moujaes 46 , Reference Kassab, Hachem and Raad 50 , Reference Tandon, Rouhana and Rahme 51 , Reference Jomaa, Ouaijan and Nasreddine 62 , Reference Osseis, Habib and Al Rachid 63 This broader fragility also operated through social constraint and displacement, whereby worsening financial collapse limited mobility, depleted coping assets, and narrowed households’ ability to seek care or relocate away from risk.Reference Ali 9 , Reference Saad, Mina and Helou 11 In fragile settings, disaster preparedness cannot be treated as a stand-alone emergency management function detached from financing, workforce retention, pharmaceutical policy, and infrastructure stability.
The structure and financing of Lebanon’s health system also shaped the effects of the polycrisis. The prominent role of private hospitals and providers allowed some institutions to adapt independently and mobilize resources rapidly, but it also complicated system-wide coordination, equitable resource allocation, and the implementation of unified preparedness standards. Financial collapse simultaneously weakened the purchasing power of hospitals, public agencies, health care workers, and patients. In this setting, privatization was not inherently synonymous with poor preparedness; rather, the combination of fragmented governance, unstable reimbursement, import dependence, and limited centralized coordination reduced the ability to mobilize resources consistently across institutions and regions.Reference Aoun and Tajvar 5 , Reference Moussallem, Zein-El-Din and Hamra 22 , Reference Bou Sanayeh and El Chamieh 23
At the same time, the literature does not describe total system failure. Some adaptive capacities persisted. Hospitals improvised surge spaces, deployed whole-hospital mobilization, and modified triage processes during major incidents.Reference Hallal, Andraos and Saad 35 , Reference Hitti, Bou Akl and El Zahran 37 , Reference Kerbage, Haddad and Zoghbi 39 National surveillance capacity also showed adaptability during the COVID-19 period despite severe constraints,Reference Abou-Abbas, Nasser and Baaklini 59 echoing earlier work describing resilience in parts of Lebanon’s health system under refugee-related strain.Reference Farah, Saleh and Abou El Naja 60 , Reference Ammar, Kdouh and Hammoud 64 More recent local resilience analyses similarly suggest that even under compound crisis conditions, some subnational health-system functions retained the capacity to absorb and adapt, though under increasingly narrow operating margins.Reference Yamout, Khalil and Raven 65 These examples matter because they suggest that preparedness in polycrisis settings should not be framed only in terms of deficits. It should also identify and reinforce the system features that remain functional under pressure: decentralized adaptation, practical triage modifications, local leadership, and simple fallback workflows.
Several implications for preparedness emerge from this synthesis. First, in fragile settings, workforce preservation is preparedness policy. Retention incentives, training continuity, protection of health care workers, task-sharing, and targeted support for understaffed regions are not secondary reforms; they are central to maintaining surge capacity.Reference Nemr, Moussallem and Nemr 21 , Reference Abou-Abbas, Hassan and Al Mounajed 27 , Reference Dankar, Yazbik-Dumit and Ammar 29 , Reference Khoury, Zeeni and Ibrahim 33 Second, energy, fuel, and supply redundancy should be treated as emergency response infrastructure, not merely administrative or procurement concerns. A disaster plan cannot function if core consumables, power, imaging capability, oxygen support, or communications are unreliable.Reference Jaber Chehayeb, Kala and Abou Ghannam 19 , Reference Bou Sanayeh, El Chamieh and Khattar 45 , Reference Yuan 55 Third, surge capacity should be understood as a system-wide capability rather than solely as the ability of hospitals to expand emergency department or inpatient capacity. Preparedness must account for personnel, physical space, supplies, prehospital transport, primary care, referral pathways, public health functions, continuity of chronic disease management, and the needs of displaced populations and receiving communities. Hospitals in contexts with fragmented prehospital systems still require scalable internal surge designs that assume incomplete field coordination, large volumes of self-transported casualties, and prolonged throughput stress.Reference Gebran, Abou Khalil and El Moheb 17 , Reference Hitti, Cheaito and Kazzi 18 , Reference Hallal, Andraos and Saad 35 , Reference El Sayed and Bayram 47 However, hospital surge will remain constrained if patients cannot access medications, primary care, transport, follow-up, or functioning referral networks outside the hospital. This need was particularly evident in the later conflict phase, when institutional and media reporting alike described how already fragile services were further disrupted by violence and insecurity. 14 , 15 , 66 Fourth, redundancy in communications and documentation is critical. Several reports support the use of simplified workflows, paper-based fallback systems, clear command activation, and realistic drills that reflect degraded operating conditions.Reference El Sayed 16 , Reference Hitti, Bou Akl and El Zahran 37 , Reference Nakhle, Abou Khater and Mouawad 58 , Reference El Sayed, Chami and Hitti 67
Lebanon’s recent experience shows that repeated adaptation without structural recovery can sustain response in the short term but still produce long-term degradation. That lesson may be relevant to other fragile and conflict-affected settings where disaster planning remains too event-centered and insufficiently focused on preserving capability between crises.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, it was conducted as a targeted narrative synthesis and was not intended to identify every publication concerning Lebanon during the study period. The purposive and iterative search strategy may therefore have resulted in omission of relevant evidence, particularly studies not indexed in the databases searched or published outside the English-language peer-reviewed literature.
Second, source selection was guided by relevance to the analytical domains and the crisis-interaction framework, introducing the possibility of author judgment and selection bias. Third, the included evidence was heterogeneous and included retrospective hospital studies, qualitative research, institutional assessments, brief reports, research letters, and selected commentaries.
Fourth, no universal risk-of-bias tool was applied because of the diversity of source types. Fifth, evidence was denser for highly documented events, particularly the Beirut Port explosion, than for slower-moving or more recent crises, including displacement and the cumulative effects of prolonged conflict. Finally, because the crises overlapped temporally and influenced one another, the effects of individual shocks could not always be isolated. These limitations constrain claims of comprehensiveness and causality but do not preclude identification of recurring operational patterns across events and sectors.
Conclusion
Lebanon’s experience from 2019 through early 2026 illustrates how repeated and interacting crises can progressively narrow disaster preparedness and emergency response capacity by eroding the workforce, destabilizing logistics and infrastructure, and interrupting recovery between shocks. The main lesson is not simply that fragile systems suffer more during disasters, but that preparedness itself becomes a moving target when the conditions required for response are being steadily depleted. In such environments, preserving operational capability between crises may be as important as responding effectively during the crisis itself.
Data availability statement
All data analyzed in this study are derived from the cited publicly available sources.
Author contribution
C.S. conceived the study design. C.S. drafted the manuscript. C.M. and M.H. contributed to literature review, critical revision of the manuscript, and interpretation of the disaster medicine implications. All authors reviewed and approved the final version of the manuscript.
Funding statement
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Competing interests
None.
