a The Fourth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee

The Fourth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee was held in Beijing from 15 to 18 September. The main business of the session was to deliberate a draft “Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Certain Important Questions Regarding Strengthening and Improving Party Building under the New conditions.” The meeting was scheduled to review the Party's experience of party building since 1949 and give a thorough analysis of the new situation and the challenges facing it (XHNA, 15 Sept.).

According to a communiqué published after the session (full text in XHNA, 18 Sept.) the session was attended by 194 full and 163 alternate members of the Central Committee, as well as a number of non-voting delegates taken from members of the Discipline Inspection Committee and local grassroots activists. Hu Jintao, as General Secretary, presided over the session and delivered the work report. The draft decision was introduced by Xi Jinping and the session considered and adopted the decision. There were no appointments announced, although there had been some speculation that Xi Jinping might be made a Vice Chairman of the Central Military commission.

The communiqué fully affirmed the Party's work since the last Plenum and noted the numerous achievements over the past year.

The main focus of the meeting was on party building and this was described as an undertaking of profound and far-reaching significance. It was the underpinning for effectively addressing the impact of the global financial crisis and maintaining the calm, steady and relatively fast development of the economy. The key to running China's affairs well lay with the Party, and the communiqué noted the historic transformations of China since the Party was established. Currently the “world is going through a period of major development, major metamorphosis and major adjustment.” The international financial crisis was exerting a profound and far-reaching impact, the international balance of power was changing and the confrontation between ideas and cultures on a global scale was showing new characteristics. All this presented new challenges and opportunities for China's development. Under these new circumstances it was essential for the Party to further strengthen and improve its own building in order to be able to realize the grand blueprint laid out by the last Party Congress.

The communiqué assessed that the standards of governance and leadership in the Party were generally appropriate for the burdens it was shouldering, but there were still many problems that did not meet the requirements of the new circumstances and were seriously weakening its creativity, rallying power and combat effectiveness. They must be watched with a wary eye and solved promptly. The challenges posed by governance, by reform and opening up, by the market economy, and by the external environment were complex and grim. The Party must enhance its sense of crisis and innovate to form a strong nucleus of leadership for the process of developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Top priority should be given to ideological and theoretical building; comprehensive ideological building, organizational building, work-style building, institutional building, and building of anti-corruption and clean governance were necessary. The Party needed to become a Marxist ruling party that serves the interests of the public and governs for the people.

The session mapped out an agenda of building the Party orientated on Marxist study in order to elevate the whole people's ideological and political understanding; to adhere to and improve democratic centralism; to actively develop inner party democracy; to deepen the reform of the personnel system for officials; do a good job at grassroots level; and to conduct the anti-corruption struggle in greater depth.

Inner-party democracy was described as the life of the Party, and centralization and unity were the guarantee of its strength. Inner-party democracy should be promoted, taking the protection the democratic rights of members as the essential requirement. It was necessary to perfect the Party's leadership system, protect the democratic rights of Party members, perfect the Party Congress system and inner party elections, perfect the decision-making mechanism for inner party democracy and safeguard the centralization and unity of the Party.

Selection of Party cadres should adhere to democratic, open and completive processes in order to bring outstanding talent to the fore. But it was still imperative to keep to the principle of cadre management by the Party. Cadres should be younger, better educated and more competent. Appointment criteria needed to stress both ability and moral integrity. The grassroots organizations were the foundation of the Party's work. It was necessary to push ahead with innovation in the work of grassroots organization, and build a contingent of high-quality leaders at these levels.

The session noted that the Party's conduct as a ruling party bore directly on its success or failure. It was imperative to promote closer links to the masses and the style of criticism and self criticism. Firmly opposing corruption was a major political task that the Party should attend to at all times. It was imperative to grasp the long-term, complex and arduous nature of this struggle.

Looking ahead, it noted that the economy was showing signs of stabilizing and turning for the better. But world recovery would be a slow and tortuous process, and the foundation for China's economic recovery was not yet stabilized or balanced. China needed to prioritize maintaining the calm, steady and relatively fast development of the economy, continuing a proactive fiscal policy and a moderately easy monetary policy.

Finally it noted that making a success of ethnic work was of great significance to safeguarding and developing the fundamental interests of the people. It was necessary to keep a firm grip on this work, accelerate the economic and social development of the minority areas, and effectively crack down on “splittist” activities to develop a socialist interethnic relationship characterized by equality, solidarity, mutual help and harmony.

The full text of “The Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Certain Important Questions Regarding Strengthening and Improving Party Building under the New Conditions” was published in RMRB on 28 September.

b Party and Political Affairs

RMRB published an editorial on 30 June to mark the 88th anniversary of the Party on 1 July. It noted the magnificent historical journey the Party had undertaken to guide the Chinese people on to the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics and facilitate the bright prospects of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. It pointed in particular to the Sinicization of Marxism over the past 88 years. It said that the history of the Party was the history of the unremitting struggle for independence, liberation and prosperity of the Chinese nation and for the freedom, democracy and happiness of the Chinese people.

Major changes had been taking place recently in the world, China and the Party, and the present era was one of unprecedented opportunities and challenges. China still aspired to being a well-off society of a higher level by 2050 when modernization would have basically been realized. In the face of these challenges and the need to maintain a stable and fairly fast pace of economic development, Party members should take the scientific development concept as their guide and successfully exercise and wield power for the people (XHNA, 30 June).

According to figures published by the RMRB ahead of the anniversary, membership of the Party had grown to 75.93 million at the end of 2008, up from 74.15 million at the end of 2007. However, the increase was significantly lower than the 2.78 million new members that joined in 2006. In the year of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC the report compared today's membership figures with those of 1949; the Party has grown in size by 16 times; the proportion of female members has grown from 11.9 to 21 per cent; the proportion of members from China's 55 ethnic minorities from 2.5 to 6.5 per cent. The report also stated that 19.5 million people applied to join the Party in 2008 (XHNA, 30 June).

Ahead of the 88th anniversary, President Hu Jintao chaired the Politburo's 14th “collective study session” which focused on inner-Party democracy. Hu called for more variety in the forms of inner-Party democracy including more openness and participation in the decision-making process, greater transparency in Party affairs and more involvement of Party members in evaluating official's performance. Hu also called for the implementation of the system allowing representatives to Party congresses at all levels (which usually meet in full only once or twice in their terms of office) to be given a say in Party decision-making throughout their tenure (XHNA, 30 June).

The Fourth Plenum of the Party's Central Discipline Inspection Committee was held in Beijing on 19 September. It was attended by 118 members of the Committee. It studied the documents of the Fourth Plenum, in particular studying the Party's work style and its efforts on dealing with corruption. The session discussed and passed the report delivered by He Guoqiang on “conscientiously implementing the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th CCP Central Committee and deeply pushing the improvement of Party style, the construction of a clean government, and the anticorruption struggle.” It released a communiqué (full text in XHNA, 19 Sept.). The session held that Party building was an important magic weapon with which the Party guides its great cause and wins victories. It urged discipline inspection and supervision departments throughout the country to study the spirit of the Fourth Plenum, strengthen party spirit and party discipline, improve anti-corruption education and building clean government. There should be a tightening up of cadre-selection procedures to get rid of practices such as begging for, buying or selling official positions, and bribery at elections It was necessary to improve the education, supervision, reform, and the setup of new systems at the same time as resolutely punishing corruption.

Clean government should be developed along with anti-corruption work. Discipline and supervision departments at all levels should conscientiously implement

Leading cadres should report their housing and investment situations and the jobs of their spouses and children, and it was necessary to strengthen the management of the public servants whose spouses and children are residing abroad. There should be rules and systems to oppose corruption, advocate administrative honesty, raise the institutionalization of anticorruption work and the construction of clean government.

c Standing Committee of the National People's Congress

The Tenth Session of the 11th National People's Congress (NPC) was held in Beijing from 24 to 27 August. It was presided over by Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee.

The agenda included deliberation of a State Council Report on climate change, an Amendment to the Renewable Energy Law, a Law on the People's Armed Police, a draft resolution on the amendment of laws, and a Law relating to the administration of government functions.

The Law on the People's Armed Police (PAP) was the first formal regulation of this 680,000-strong body. The draft included new provisions on what was meant by “incidents threatening social security,” and tightened up the procedures for mobilizing the PAP, removing the authority to do so from provincial level to the central government. There were also certain restrictions on their powers such as banning illegal searches or detention of citizens (XHNA, 24 Aug.).

The resolution on climate change submitted to the Session said that China “as a developing country” will firmly “maintain the right to development,” and opposes “any form of trade protectionism disguised as tackling climate change.” It said that developed nations should “take the lead in quantifying their reductions of emissions” and honour their commitments to “support developing countries with funds and technology transfers.” “Since the Industrial Revolution, the activities of mankind, especially economic activities of developed nations during their industrialization process, have become a major reason for climate change.”

China would promote a “comprehensive, effective and continuous” implementation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, and make new contributions to the protection of global climate. China would adhere to “the basic framework” set up in the UNFCCC and the Protocol, agreed on in 1997 by the majority of the international community, and the principles of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” proposed in the convention, as well as “sustainable development” (XHNA, 25 Aug.).

The Session agreed an overhaul of existing legislation updating and revising 141 provisions in 59 different laws (XHNA, 27 Aug.)

The Session also approved the dismissal of two deputies to the National People's Congress. They were Xu Zongheng, the former mayor of Shenzhen who had been sacked for serious disciplinary violations, and Liu Youjun, the former Director of Guangdong provincial Department of Labour and Social Security (XHNA, 27 Aug.)

The meeting also heard a report from the State Council on the implementation of the national economic and social development plan since the beginning of the year, and a further report on the development and adjustment of the economic structure. It held that the 7.1 per cent GDP growth in the first half of the year showed sound momentum, and that the policies adopted by the government had been timely and correct (XHNA, 27 Aug.)

d Preparations for National Day

The Chinese government made every effort to ensure that the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China on 1 October would go smoothly and without a hitch. Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, told a meeting on social stability that local authorities should step up their efforts to address people's complaints and maintain social stability ahead of the 60th anniversary. He said it was important to rectify specific areas and social sectors with slack management, poor social services and weak public security measures so as to reduce inharmonious elements. Education on patriotism, national unity and rule of law should be promoted among the people so as to create a united and positive environment (XHNA, 13 Aug.). The State Council met on 28 August to discuss further measures to ensure the stability and success of National Day (XHNA, 28 Sept.).

From 15 September to 8 October, during the National Day period, Beijing will enforce the following security measures:

• • security checkpoints at 200 major road junctions in and out of Beijing; every car and person will undergo security checks, except ambulances and police cars;

• • passengers on long-distance passenger buses to Beijing must register their names and show their identity cards before buying tickets;

• • suspended postal service for liquid items. Post and delivery of all goods to Beijing must be registered with the contact details and identity cards of the consignor and consignee; all cargo to Beijing must be opened for inspection;

• • real-name registration required for the purchase of hazardous chemicals; strict controls on the transport of hazardous materials as well as petrol sales;

• • radio activities without an official permit banned to ensure uninterrupted National Day celebrations;

• • armed night patrols in cities in six regions surrounding Beijing (Hebei, Tianjin, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Shandong);

• • 190 search dogs to be used to search for explosives, searches in the Tiananmen area and other large venues, and searches of floats;

• • the flying of kites, pigeons and all sports recreational or advertising flying activities;

• • at least five hotels situated on the parade route on Chang'an Avenue to close for four days. Others hotels will be banned from using hotel rooms facing Chang'an Avenue.

(XHNA, 6 Sept., Traffic Management Bureau website, Beijing, in Chinese 9 Sept.; Ming Pao, Hong Kong, 4 Sept.; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology website, Beijing, in Chinese 3 Sept.; Radio Free Asia website, Washington DC, in Chinese 11 Sept.; ZXS, Beijing, in Chinese 15 Sept.).

e Xinjiang

Large-scale ethnic unrest broke out in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, on 5 July resulting in at least 140 deaths and 816 injuries, according to initial reports from the official media. The violence was said to have started when people gathered at the Grand Bazaar to protest the deaths of two Uyghurs in ethnic clashes in Guangdong province on 26 June. An overnight curfew was declared in parts of Urumqi and lifted at 8 am on 7 July (XHNA, 7 July). The first reports were very sparse, stating merely that an unknown number of people gathered in Urumqi attacking passers-by and setting fire to vehicles, and that police had rushed to the scene to maintain order (XHNA, 5 July). Subsequently more details were released of lives lost and damage done, in what was evidently intense and widespread rioting. Chinese media claimed that it was a premeditated and organized violent crime, instigated from abroad by Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uyghur Congress. Nur Bekri, Head of the Regional Government, made a televised speech in which he attributed the disturbances directly to Kadeer and her accomplices. He claimed that on the evening of 4 July some people had begun spreading stories on the internet relating to the brawl between Uyghur and Han workers in Guangdong on 26 June in which two young Uyghurs had been killed. This had led to “outlaws” gathering in the streets of Urumqi on Sunday who had then undertaken violent acts of “beating, smashing, looting and burning.” He said that the authorities in Guangdong were investigating that incident which had been triggered by a sexual assault by a Uyghur worker on a Han woman (XHNA, 6 July).

The Chinese media played up strongly the terrorist angle from abroad, noting that in the past two years Xinjiang had been the source of a number of terrorist incidents. These included an attack on police by terrorists on 4 August 2008 in Kashgar in which 17 people were killed and 15 injured. This was alleged to have been intended to sabotage the Beijing Games. On 10 August, a string of explosions in supermarkets, hotels and government buildings occurred in Kuqa County, killing a security guard and a civilian and injuring two police officers. On 7 March 2008, an attempted attack on a passenger plane with explosives was thwarted by police. This attempt was stated to have been masterminded by Eastern Turkestan Separatists from abroad. In the first half of 2008, five terrorist rings were broken up in Xinjiang and 82 suspects detained (XHNA, 6 July).

Stories of the disturbances and the aftermath dominated the Chinese press, highlighting the damage done to Han Chinese and their businesses and livelihoods. By 7 July the reported number of the dead had risen to 156, and it was later increased to 197, with 1,600 injured. On 5 August the authorities stated that 156 of those killed had been innocent civilians, of whom 134 had been Han Chinese, 11 Hui, 10 Uyghur and one Manchu. Twelve others had been shot while committing violence or other criminal acts. The identities of the remainder had yet to be determined (XHNA, 5 Aug.).

Further protests occurred on 7 July and were witnessed by foreign reporters who were being shown round the scene by the authorities (XHNA, 7 July). The Party Secretary of Xinjiang Autonomous Region, Wang Lequan, went on television on 7 July to place the blame for the disturbances firmly on outside forces and to reassure the populations that the situation was firmly under control. He was quoted as urging local people to avoid further ethnic confrontation, saying that it was completely unnecessary for Han Chinese to have taken to the streets in an attempt to confront Uyghurs during the disturbances (as the authorities had the situation well in hand). “Everybody should keep a clear mind. We should target hostile forces at home and abroad instead of the brothers and sisters of different ethnic groups.” He made it clear that those held responsible would be dealt with severely (XHNA, 7 July).

In an attempt to calm the situation, the Governor of Xinjiang, Nur Bekri, gave a detailed exposition of events in Shaoguan on 26 June. He said that an alleged sexual assault on a young Chinese female worker on 25 June had led to a fight between Uyghurs and other workers in the Xuri toy factory in the early morning on June 26. The authorities had moved quickly to damp it down and to investigate the causes. Senior leaders in both Guangdong and Xinjiang had shown personal concern for the victims of the fighting and were determined to get to the bottom of it. He described the incident as a “typical public order incident” clearly differentiating it from the riots in Urumqi which had been deliberately used by the “three forces” to stir up local people in order to foment ethnic violence (XHNA, 6 July). Xinhua reported on 7 July that those responsible for the fighting in Shaoguan had been arrested. Fifteen people, including only two Uyghurs, were detained, 13 for the fighting and two for spreading rumours on the web that the young woman had been raped (XHNA, 7 July).

Chinese news agencies alleged concrete proof that the riots had been masterminded from abroad by Rebiya Kadeer. Police were said to have intercepted a number of phone calls directing “mobs” to “stage the violence.” In selected excerpts from these calls, reported by Xinhua, Rebiya Kadeer was quoted as saying “something will happen” in a call to her younger brother in Urumqi (XHNA, 6 July). The Party Secretary of Urumqi, Li Zhi, described the disturbances as the worst riots since 1949 and said that those responsible would be punished severely. The city was placed under curfew again on the night of 7 July (XHNA, 7 July). In the aftermath of the disturbances, Chinese media increasingly turned to vilifying Rebiya Kadeer in strong and highly emotive language. She was likened to the Dalai Lama, who she was said to claim as her spiritual mentor, in appearing to follow a peaceful path but actually stirring up violence by sowing discontent among the Uyghurs and inciting hatred of the government and of other ethnic groups (RMRB, 7 July). Chinese condemnation of her was sparked again by an article in the Wall Street Journal on 8 July in which she had put her version of events. Both the official press and Chinese internet bloggers were outraged by the article (XHNA, 13 July). Chinese complaints about distorted Western press reporting of the situation in Xinjiang and attempts by reporters to manufacture stories were widespread, some seeing it as a manifestation of the West's anti-China ideology (ZTS, 15 July). The Chinese authorities granted unusual access to foreign news organizations wishing to cover the rioting. According to local officials over 100 of these organizations had visited Urumqi and a special press centre was established in a downtown hotel (XHNA, 8 July). This contrasted with the lack of access afforded in Lhasa in 2008.

Leaders at all levels made it clear that ringleaders would be severely treated. In the first few days over 1,000 suspects were detained, and in subsequent investigations a further 253 individuals were detained, many of whom were said to have been turned in by local residents (XHNA, 29 July). On 2 August, the authorities announced that a further 319 individuals had been detained by Urumqi police (XHNA, 2 Aug.). By 4 August, the total number detained was said to be 718 (XHNA, 4 August). The next day the authorities announced that they had detained an intelligence agent working for the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). He was named as Kurban Khayum, a cook in a Guangzhou Restaurant, and was alleged to have been spreading rumours exaggerating the death toll of the unrest and violence in Shaoguan. He had allegedly been tasked by the WUC to find out how many people had died in Shaoguan and had sent in misleading information which had helped trigger the violence on 5 July (XHNA, 5 Aug.).

Immediately after his return from Italy, President Hu convened a meeting of the Politburo to discuss issues relating to the rioting. The meeting described attaining stability in Xinjiang as the most important and pressing task, and announced that those responsible would receive severe punishment in accordance with the law. The Politburo discussed the “profound” political background to the disturbances and described it a serious violent crime which was organized and masterminded by the three forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism at home and abroad (XHNA, 9 July). Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, visited Urumqi on 9 July and called on police and army units on duty there to enforce the law justly and to “crush any attempt by hostile forces from home and abroad” (XHNA, 9 July). He then went on to visit Kashgar and Hetian. He was accompanied by Wang Lequan, Party Secretary of Xinjiang, and Meng Jianzhu, Minister of Public Security (XHNA, 11 July). Public Security Minister, Meng Jianzhu, paid another visit to Xinjiang from 21 to 24 July, mainly visiting elements of the various security forces deployed to “maintain social stability.” He noted the need to implement the spirit of the recent enlarged Politburo Standing Committee Meeting and the important instruction given by General Secretary Hu Jintao (XHNA, 24 July). Xu Caihou, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, visited PAP units in Xinjiang in late July, and another Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Guo Boxiong, visited military units there (XHNA, 27 and 31 July).

A further incident was reported to have taken place on 13 July when two men were shot by security guards and one injured outside a mosque in Urumqi. According to the Imam of the mosque, one of the men had been attempting to interrupt a service to call for jihad (XHNA, 14 July). In early August, the Chinese announced that security forces had foiled five organized terrorist attacks in Xinjiang in Urumqi, Kashgar, Aksu and Ili. A number of suspects had been captured along with quantities of guns, knives, explosive and material advocating violence and terrorism (XHNA, 3 Aug.).

By August, the authorities were concerned to demonstrate that life was returning to normal. On 7 August, it was reported that a batch of 189 young women workers had left Xinjiang to find work in factories in Eastern China, the 23rd such group this year from Jiashi County near Kashgar. About 19,000 people had left Jiashi County for work elsewhere in China since 2006 (XHNA, 7 Aug.). Foreign Diplomats from 26 countries were taken on a five-day tour of Xinjiang in early August (XHNA, 12 Aug.).

The series of visits by senior leaders culminated in a visit by President Hu in late August. He was reported as saying in Urumqi on 25 August that the local authorities should pay attention to reform and development as well as to ethnic unity. He said that the key to work in Xinjiang lay in properly handling the relations between development and stability in the region (XHNA, 25 Aug.). Hong Kong press reports claimed that he had arrived on 22 August and had spent his time mainly in and around Urumqi visiting Party and government officials, calling on units involved in dealing with the unrest and visiting victims and their families. The reports also suggested that Wang Lequan, Party Secretary of Xinjiang, would be replaced (Ming Pao [Hong Kong], 25 Aug.). Xinhua reported at length on his speech on 25 August to assembled party and government officials. He said that

On the riots, he said that

But he claimed that total victory had been won and that the facts proved that

He concluded that there were three main fronts on which work needed to continue in the future: taking economic development as the central task, safeguarding overall social stability and enlisting all ethnic groups to make joint efforts for common prosperity (XHNA, 25 Aug.).

Police reported on 16 September that a further “terrorist” cell had been discovered in Aksu and six people captured with quantities of materials for making explosives. They were alleged to have made more than 20 devices since the riots on 5 July and to be planning to use them to carry out terrorist attacks (XHNA, 16 Sept.).

Considerable publicity was given to the meeting between Wen Jiabao and a Uyghur farmer on 14 September. Wen invited Hashim Dawat to his office in Zhongnanhai to talk about rural conditions in Xinjiang and the effects of the rioting in Urumqi. Hashim Dawat had first met Wen when he visited the earthquake region of Bachu County in 2003 in which Hashim Dawat had lost five of his family. Hashim Dawat was in Beijing attending an awards ceremony for model workers and had written to Wen reminding him of their previous meetings. Wen Jiabao was quoted as saying it was heartrending to see people losing their lives and properties in the riots. He added that all ethnic groups were inseparable and of one family (XHNA, 16 Sept.).

A new wave of demonstrations broke out in Urumqi following what were alleged to have been widespread syringe attacks on passers-by. Over 1,000 people demonstrated in one area of Urumqi on 2 September and similar demonstrations were reported from other parts of the city. Local police were said to have detained at least 15 people suspected of making attacks with hypodermic syringes (XHNA, 3 Sept.). The attacks apparently began around 20 August and by 2 September, 476 people were reported to have been attacked in this way (ZXS, 4 Sept.). The Hong Kong press reported that tens of thousands of Han Chinese had demonstrated in Urumqi demanding protection from the syringe attacks, and including some calls for the dismissal of Wang Lequan for failing to take resolute measures to deal with the unrest (South China Morning Post website, 4 and 5 Sept.). On 3 September, Li Zhi Party Secretary of Urumqi said on television that 825 people had been detained as a result of the rioting in July and 239 arrested, of whom 51 would be put on trial and severely punished. He asked citizens not to be alarmed by the syringe attacks which he said were part of the enemies' plot to stir up social disorder. He said that the authorities would crush all plots and would provide a peaceful and harmonious social environment for the people (ZXS, 4 Sept.). Further demonstrations on 3 September were dispersed with tear gas and the authorities announced a ban on all unauthorized demonstrations in Urumqi on 4 September. It was later reported that five people had died, two of them innocent civilians and 15 had been injured as a result of the latest demonstrations. By 4 September, the situation was said to be under control, with only minor demonstrations reported (XHNA, 4 Sept.). In an effort to reassure the population that all was under control, it was announced on 3 September that 15 individuals had been detained in connection with these attacks and four suspects had been prosecuted and would be given heavy sentences. The Minister of Public Security, Meng Jianzhu, travelled to Xinjiang on 4 September to take charge of the efforts to control the situation. By 4 September the number of people who had been admitted to hospital claiming to be victims of these attacks had risen to 531. They were from Han, Uyghur and other ethnic groups. A separate report noted that those detained for being attackers were all Uyghur (XHNA, 4 Sept.). No serious demonstrations were reported on 5 September and the situation was said to be calm by the authorities. They also announced initial prosecutions of four individuals said to have been in involved in stabbing incidents. All were Uyghur, two had allegedly threatened a taxi driver with a syringe to get money to buy drugs, one stallholder admitted having stabbed a woman in the buttocks with a pin, and one other man was said to have injured police with a syringe containing an unknown drug when he was detained (XHNA, 5 Sept.). Medical analysis of some of those injured ruled out the possibility of radioactive substances, toxic chemicals, or virulent pathogenic microbes, such as anthrax, being used. The relevant samples were sent to Beijing for further tests (XHNA, 6 Sept.).

Li Zhi, Party Secretary of Urumqi, was abruptly dismissed on 5 September along with the Head of the Municipal Public Security Bureau, Liu Yaohua. No explanation was given for the dismissal. Li was replaced by Zhu Hailun who had been Secretary of the Xinjiang Party Committee's Political and Legal Committee, a key public order post (XHNA, 5 Sept.). The new Party Secretary addressed a meeting of city officials on 6 September. He called on them to be bold and enterprising in the face of difficulties, and have the courage to take up responsibility. He said that they had to “remove what the people dislike and give what the people want” and take this as their motto and code of conduct. He noted that the situation in Urumqi was now under control but the burdens remained heavy; there was still a long road ahead for safeguarding stability, promoting harmony and accelerating development (XHNA, 6 Sept.).

It was also announced that 7,000 officials would be sent to 110 communities around Urumqi to help ease panic and tension (XHNA, 6 Sept.). The first trials of those charged over syringe incidents were completed on 12 September. The cases were heard in the Urumqi Municipal Higher People's Court and were over in three hours. According to Xinhua, the courts appointed lawyers to defend the accused. The stallholder who had assaulted a woman was sentenced to 15 years and the two drug addicts who had robbed the taxi driver were sentenced to ten and seven years respectively (XHNA, 12 Sept.). By 15 September, a total of 75 suspects had been detained in 36 separate cases, 16 of which were in Urumqi, 13 in Hotan, two in Turfan, two in Kashgar and one each in the Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Aksu and Altay. But it was admitted that isolated case were still occurring, and the police pledged to intensify the fight against these criminals (XHNA, 15 Sept.). A further four persons were sentenced to prison terms of between eight and fifteen years on 17 September for “spreading hyped toxic substances” (XHNA, 17 Sept.).

On 11 September the Urumqi public security authorities announced that the special task force charged with investigating the 5 July incident had filed 956 cases for prosecution and investigation, requested the arrest of 295 individuals involved in 175 cases, approved the arrest of 237 individuals in 139 cases, and prosecuted 51 persons in 14 cases (ZXS, 11 Sept.). On 25 September the Urumqi Procuratorate announced that it had started the prosecution of six cases from the July riots involving 21 suspects and charges including homicide, arson and robbery. The cases were:

• • alleged intentional homicide and arson committed by Abdukerim Abduwayit;

• • alleged intentional homicide, arson and robbery committed by four suspects whose leader was Gheni Yusup;

• • alleged intentional homicide, arson, robbery and intentional damage to properties, committed by 11 suspects led by Ahmatjan Moming;

• • alleged intentional homicide, robbery and arson committed by Alim Metyusup and Tayirejan Abulimit;

• • alleged intentional homicide and arson committed by Azizijan Yasin;

• • alleged intentional homicide committed by Han Junbo and Liu Bo (XHNA, 25 Sept.).

The Information Office of the State Council published a White Paper titled “Development and Progress in Xinjiang” on 21 September. The document, a lengthy explanation and justification of China's policies in Xinjiang, contained seven sections:

Chinese press commentary on the paper concentrated on showing how “East Turkestan” forces had seriously disrupted Xinjiang's development and progress. It traced the history of the “East Turkestan” concept back to the 19th century, and gave a short and colourful version of the separatist activities in the first half of the 20th century. After 1949, Xinjiang had “entered a new stage” but the separatist forces persisted in carrying out clandestine actions. In the 1990s they turned to terrorist violence, and their terrorist nature was eventually recognized by the world. In 2002 the UN Security Council had added the East Turkistan Islamic Movement to its list of terrorist groups. The World Uyghur Congress was set up in 2004, and since then separatist forces had plotted and organized a number of separatist and sabotage actions. Their activities had caused serious economic harm to Xinjiang especially in 1997 and 1998 and again in the rioting of July (XHNA, 21 Sept.).

The State Council Information Office published a further White Paper on 27 September on its policy towards the ethnic minorities (full text in XHNA, 27 Sept.). It was the third such paper after earlier ones in 1999 and 2005. The document was entitled “China's Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups,” and came in seven sections:

It was a comprehensive outline of Chinese government policy towards the ethnic minorities. Introducing its publication, Xinhua noted that “[t]he Chinese government resolutely opposes all foreign interference in the country's internal ethnic affairs under the excuses of ethnicity, religion and human rights” (XHNA, 27 Sept.).

China reported that its embassy in The Hague had been attacked and damaged on 7 July by supporters of the Xinjiang separatists. The Chinese flag was burned and bricks and stones were thrown at the embassy breaking its windows. Similar demonstrations occurred outside the Chinese consulate in Munich. The Chinese protested strongly in both countries and demanded that adequate protection be given their missions (XHNA, 7 July).

Widespread international concern at the rioting and the handling of it was voiced. The Turkish Foreign Minister said on 7 July that “Turkey pursues the developments with concern and sorrow and assesses what it could do on the matter (Turkish News Agency, Anatolia, 7 July). The Turkish government continued to urge the Chinese to investigate the incident and Xinhua noted that the foreign ministers of the two countries had held a telephone exchange on the subject (XHNA, 13 July). Song Aiguo, a former Ambassador to Turkey, was sent as a special envoy on 13 July to “fix negative effects on relations” of the troubles in Urumqi (Anatolia News Agency, 18 July).

A special representative from the Turkish Prime Minister visited China from 30 August. He was scheduled to have meetings with the Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and with Premier Wen Jiabao, and to visit Xinjiang. Yang said that the visit indicated Turkey's political will to further its relationship with China and said that China was ready to co-operate with Turkey in combating terrorism. He said that the rioting in Urumqi was neither ethnic nor religious; it was an incident plotted and organized by the East Turkestan separatist forces inside and outside China (XHNA, 30 Aug.).

A senior Iranian cleric was reported to have condemned the “mass murder and suppression of Muslims in China's Xinjiang” (Iranian Labour News Agency, 12 July). On 17 July, Rafsanjani, Chairman of the Expediency Council said at Friday prayers that

In the weekly press conference on 14 July, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman condemned certain unnamed countries for providing support to extremist groups in Xinjiang. The same report noted that the US State Department had acknowledged that a US organization, funded by Congress, was providing grants to the World Uyghur Congress (XHNA, 14 July).

The South China Morning Post reported that an Algerian offshoot of Al Qaeda had called for attacks of Chinese installations and workers across North Africa. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that China was keeping a close eye on developments and making joint efforts with relevant countries to take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of Chinese citizens (SCMP, 14 July).

The Chinese withdrew their entries from the Melbourne Festival following the organizers' decision to show three films about Xinjiang and to invite Rebiya Kadeer to the festival. Chinese government representatives put intense pressure on the organizers to withdraw the invitation and cancel the showings (XHNA, 22 July). The Australian Ambassador was summoned on 31 July to receive solemn representations against the visit (XHNA, 31 July). Kadeer also visited Japan and met with a number of politicians, which was strongly protested by the Chinese (XHNA, 13 August).

Xinhua reported that Rebiya Kadeer had met with some scepticism when she addressed the European Parliament in Brussels on 1 September, and a number of European MPs were quoted as having questioned some of her assertions and positions (XHNA, 2 Sept.). Rebiya Kadeer visited the Czech Republic on 10 September, despite strong protests from the Chinese, to attend the conference on Peace Democracy and Human Rights staged by the Forum 2000 Foundation which the Dalai Lama also attended (CTK News Agency in English, Prague, 10 Sept.).

f Tibet

China announced that the opening of the first direct flights from Beijing to Lhasa would take place on 10 July. This was said to be in order to help promote tourism in Tibet. Previously, all air travel to Tibet had to go via Chengdu (XHNA, 1 July).

The Chinese press on 5 July denounced reports that the Dalai Lama had suggested that his successor should be chosen by a democratic method as totally ridiculous, and against the traditions and conventions of Tibetan Buddhism. A living Buddha of the Kagyu Sect was quoted as saying that the selection procedures should be in line with historical and religious conventions and the incarnation should be approved by the Chinese Government. This followed televised remarks by the Dalai Lama on 21 June, in which he said that a leader should be democratically elected after his death. Xinhua quoted him as saying “today, it is clear to the whole world that democracy is the best system despite its minor negativities” (XHNA, 5 July).

According to Radio Australia, the Chinese Government had reacted angrily to a group of Australian Parliamentarians visiting the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala, the first such visit by an Australian group of this type. They were received by the Dalai Lama who thanked them for their support. The Chinese Embassy in Canberra described it as interference in China's internal affairs (Radio Australia, Melbourne, 2 July). In similar vein, the Chinese protested strongly against the visit to Dharamsala by a number of Nepali MPs. The Nepal Government issued a statement on 5 July reconfirming its commitment to a one-China policy following the visit. It also made it clear that Nepal would not tolerate “anti-China activities” that might harm relations between the two countries, following reports Tibetan exiles planned to demonstrate in Kathmandu on 6 July, the Dalai Lama's birthday (XHNA, 5 July).

Chinese press reports condemned the decision of the city of Warsaw to confer honorary citizenship on the Dalai Lama, saying that the decision violated minimum international moral and legal principles (XHNA, 30 July).

China announced its resolute opposition to the invitation to the Dalai Lama to visit Taiwan in the aftermath of Typhoon Morakot. A spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office repeated China's standard charges that he was engaged in separatist activities under the banner of religion. It described the invitation by some DPP figures as clearly nothing to do with disaster relief, and rather a plot to sabotage the hard earned good situation in cross-Strait relations (XHNA, 27 Aug.).

The Czech news agency announced that the Dalai Lama would be visiting Slovakia and the Czech Republic from 8 September. He was visiting Slovakia to receive a prize for non-violent struggle for human rights, and in Prague he would attend Forum 2000, a conference organized by Vaclav Havel (CTK News Agency, Prague, in English 4 Sept.). Slovak officials would not be meeting him (SITA website, Bratislava 4 Sept.).

The Chinese government objected to the Dalai Lama's expressed intention to visit Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh in November, but the Indians made it clear that there were no restrictions on the Dalai Lama's travels within India (Press Trust of India, 12 Sept.).

China responded to reports that three senior US officials, including White House adviser Valerie Jarrett and Under Secretary of State Maria Otero, who has been designated special co-ordinator for Tibetan Affairs, had met the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala by saying that China was opposed to any meetings between foreign officials and the Dalai Lama, and that China was opposed to any force using the issue to interfere in China's internal affairs. In response to a question about a possible meeting between the Dalai Lama and President Obama, the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman said that the US was very clear about China's position on the issue (XHNA, 15 Sept.).

g Economic Affairs

Figures released for economic performance in June continued to show some signs of recovery. The Purchasing Managers' Index was up 0.1 per cent to 53.2 per cent in June, following a slight fall in May. Similarly the Output Index was up to 57.1 percent and the Purchasing Price Index was up to 57.8 percent (the seventh straight monthly increase). GDP figures for the second quarter were expected to increase to about 8 per cent growth, following two consecutive falls from 9 per cent in the third quarter of 2008, to 6.8 per cent in the fourth quarter, and 6.1 percent in the first quarter of 2009. Wen Jiabao said on 17 June that China's economy had now begun to recover steadily (XHNA, 1 July). Further positive figure were released on 3 July when it was announced that China's power generation rose by 3.59 per cent in June after eight months of decline (XHNA, 3 July).

On 16 July it was announced that the Chinese economy grew by 7.9 per cent in the second quarter, thanks to massive pump priming and record lending. Chinese industrial output grew 10.7 per cent in June, and industrial output growth in the first half-year was 7 per cent (compared to 16.3 per cent the previous year). A spokesman for the National Bureau of Statistics said that positive factors were increasing and the economy was on the way to recovery, but warned that the revival was not on a solid footing (XHNA, 16 July). On 26 July the Chief Economist of the Bureau said that although the economy was showing signs of recovery, it was in a critical phase and faced huge uncertainties both at home and abroad. There was a shortage of overseas orders, and China's exports had fallen 21.8 per cent in the first half of the year. Imports had also fallen 25.4 per cent (XHNA, 26 July).

Industrial output rose by 10.8 per cent in July (a slight increase on the previous month but still considerably lower than a year earlier). Heavy industrial output rose 11.3 per cent, and light industry was up 9.2 percent. Coal output rose 14.8 per cent from a year earlier to 260 million tonnes, and crude oil output dropped 0.3 per cent to 16.14 million tonnes. Steel output climbed 12.6 per cent to 50.68 million tonnes. Power generation increased 4.8 per cent (XHNA, 11 Aug.). China's foreign trade showed small signs of an upturn with a month on month increase of exports in July, but they were still 23 per cent down on a year-on-year basis.

Unemployment in urban areas was 4.3 per cent at the end of June according to the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, a slight increase from 2008 (4.2 per cent). Sixty-eight per cent of college graduates had found jobs so far, about the normal rate. The Ministry described these figures as better than expected (XHNA, 24 July).

The Bank of Communications announced that the economy was projected to grow by 8.5 per cent in 2009. The third quarter would be 9 per cent and this would rise to 9.8 per cent in the last quarter (XHNA, 1 Aug.).

China's industrial output rose 8.1 per cent in the first eight months from the same period last year, according to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology on 25 September. The growth rate was 7.6 percentage points lower than that in the same period last year, but 1.1 percentage points higher than that in the first half year. In August, China's industrial output expanded 12.3 per cent year on year. The growth rate was the largest since September last year when the global economic slowdown hit China (XHNA, 25 Sept.).

Premier Wen Jiabao told a meeting of finance bureau directors that China needed to stay with its proactive fiscal policy in order to support the economic recovery despite “grim” fiscal conditions (XHNA, 23 July). Chinese leaders continued to sound regular warning notes against over optimism and the need to continue with the stimulus polices. President Hu said on 23 July that the country should continue with its present policies and this was echoed by Premier Wen on 27 July when he said that China should stick with its proactive fiscal policy and relatively easy monetary policy. He was still giving a very similar message in August during a trip to Zhejiang when he said that there were still many uncertain factors ahead, despite both the national economy and the international situation making positive changes. He warned that the recovery was still unstable and warned against blind optimism (XHNA, 24 Aug.). The Finance Minister, Xie Xuren, said that government policies, which included increased government investment, tax cuts and subsidies for those on low incomes, had successfully stimulated the economy. There had been a 33.5 per cent increase in fixed asset investment in the first half of the year, the highest level for five years. Fiscal revenue fell by 2.4 per cent in the first six months, while expenditure rose by 26.3 per cent (XHNA, 23 July).

Premier Wen reiterated China's commitment to continuing on its current course when he met the visiting President of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, on 1 September. He noted that the world economy had shown signs of stabilization but thought recovery would be a slow, tortuous and complicated process. He described China's macroeconomic policies as in keeping with reality, strong, timely and effective. China was in a crucial period of stabilization and there would be no change of policy. He noted that the root cause of the global economic imbalance was the imbalance in development. He called on the international community to show concern for the developing countries through increasing assistance, reducing and exempting of debts, opening up markets and transferring technology (XHNA, 1 Sept.).

h Health

By the end of June, China had registered 867 cases of swine flu and no deaths (XHNA, 1 July). China continued with its strict policy of containment and quarantine for any suspected outbreak of swine flu. The State Council again discussed measures to deal with the infection on 3 July. Premier Wen Jiabao said that inspection and quarantine measures should be strengthened, and highlighted the need for health education and the guidance of public opinion in fighting the disease (XHNA, 3 July).

On 6 July Health Ministry officials suggested that it would not be long before the number of locally generated infections of A/H1N1 flu would overtake the number of those imported from abroad. As of 6 July, China had 1,040 registered cases. The numbers would mean a change in the measures that China was adopting to cope with the outbreak. Minor cases of infection would no longer be hospitalized and the contacts of those infected would be observed at home rather than subjected to special quarantine measures (XHNA, 6 July).

Numbers of those infected continued to rise steadily but not spectacularly. As of 7 August, the total number of confirmed cases had reached 2,264, of whom 2,122 had recovered and no deaths or serious cases had been reported. In contrast, Hong Kong had reported a total of 5,208 cases by the same period (XHNA, 7 Aug.).

The Ministry of Health confirmed on 11 September that the swine flu virus was now spreading from the cities to the rural areas and from the coastal provinces inland. There was a new pattern of large-scale group infection rather than isolated cases and most new cases were now domestic rather than imported from overseas. By 10 September the total number of cases registered in China was 6,968 (XHNA, 11 Sept.) and it had risen to 11,722 by 18 September (XHNA, 21 Sept.).

China announced that it had ordered 7.3 million doses of locally developed swine flu vaccines from Sinovac and Hualan Biological Engineering Inc, both of which were issued licences to produce the vaccine on 4 September. The vaccine would be reserved for use by the state rather than going on general sale. Sinovac claimed it would be able to produce five million doses by 1 October and Hualan 13 million (XHNA, 4 Sept.). Vaccinations started in Beijing with students due to take part in the National Day celebrations (XHNA, 21 Sept.). China issued a new circular on measures to deal with swine flu on 10 September (highlights in XHNA, 10 Sept.).

i Social and Legal Affairs

The Supreme People's Court issued a document calling on courts across the country to play a greater part in helping resolve disputes between the government and the people in order to “prevent mass incidents and maintain social harmony amid the global financial crisis.” Many such disputes had arisen recently as the government had had to take a number of measures to ensure economic growth which had inevitably impacted adversely on some people, and led to an increase in disputes on labour security, and land disputes arising from new investment projects. These all needed to be addressed properly. Attempts to “form local protectionism and monopoly of industries in the name of tackling the crisis” should be resisted, but courts should also support the government's measures to tackle the crisis in line with the laws of the country (XHNA, 6 July).

Xinhua reported on 4 July that 72 bus drivers in Yunnan had gone on strike against the private transportation company that employed them. Previously, the company had hired them and their vehicles but had begun to implement a new policy of buying its own vehicles and hiring drivers only. The existing drivers feared that they would lose their livelihoods, and also complained about the high management fees charged by the company. Xinhua reported that the local government had sent a group of ten local officials to the region to mediate. By 6 July the workers were back at work (XHNA, 4 and 6 July).

On 5 July fighting broke out between villagers in Qiannan Buyi-Miao Autonomous Prefecture in Guizhou and construction workers building a new motorway through the region, with over 200 people taking part on each side. Eleven people were injured (XHNA, 6 July).

Xinhua reported that two thirds of the taxi drivers in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province, had gone on strike on 28 July in protest against rising rental fees charged by the owners of the vehicles (XHNA, 28 July). Taxi drivers in Mudanjiang in Heilongjiang province were reported to have been on strike for over a week over local government plans to reform the operating system (XHNA, 29 July).

Xinhua reported that more than 100 Africans had surrounded the Kuangquan Police Station in Guangzhou on 15 July to protest against the alleged death of an African stallholder. According to Xinhua, there had been no deaths. The protests had followed a police check up on a shopping mall in which two African men, both of whom were alleged to have overstayed their visas, were injured, one of them very seriously after falling over four metres from a building (XHNA, 16 July).

Hong Kong sources reported that over 30,000 steel workers from the Tonghua Iron and Steel works in Jilin province had fought with police over a proposed takeover by a private company. In the rioting, the General Manager of Tonghua was beaten up and later died of his injuries (Hong Kong Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 25 July). The story was quickly picked up in the official Chinese media. Xinhua reported that around 1,000 workers had been involved in the protest against the proposed merger of the steelworks with the Jianlong Heavy Machinery Group. Those involved were said to be mainly workers who might lose their jobs in the reshuffle and retired workers. Some workers had assaulted the General Manager after he had announced that 25,000 of the 30,000 employees might lose their jobs (XHNA, 27 July). Subsequent Chinese press reports denied that as many as 30,000 could have been involved as this was far in excess of the number of employees of the plant. Since the demonstration, the authorities had ordered a halt to the merger and production had been resumed at the works (XHNA, 28 July). Official commentary published on 29 July noted that it was essential to safeguard the legal rights and interests of workers when state run enterprises were being reorganized and restructured.

Xinhua reported that there had been mass demonstrations by steelworkers in Linzhou, Henan province, against the takeover of the state-owned Linzhou Steel Corporation by a private company Fengbao Iron and Steel Co Ltd. They were demanding higher redundancy compensation and the settlement of unpaid wages during the plant's restructuring. A government mediation team ordered a temporary halt to the merger and the crowds dispersed (XHNA, 15 Aug.).

Fourteen people were reported to have been formally arrested over the disturbances in Shishou City in Hubei in June for disrupting public order and traffic, (see “Quarterly Chronicle,” CQ 199, p. 855). These included the brother and cousin of Tu Yuangao, the chef whose death had been the proximate cause of the riots. The authorities maintained that he had killed himself (XHNA, 4 Aug.). On 25 July the Party Secretary of Shishou and the Head of the Public Security Bureau were both sacked for “mishandling a mass incident;” they had failed to act promptly to deal with the rumours that led to the riot (XHNA, 25 July).

Xinhua reported that hundreds of local people in Jiaoyang Township in Fujian had protested outside the local government headquarters and blocked roads on 17 September because of pollution caused by the local Huaqiang Battery Factory. At least four local children had been found with high levels of lead in their blood. The government ordered the local environment protection bureau to step up its inspections of the plant (XHNA, 17 Sept.). Subsequent reporting revealed that 121 children out of 287 tested had excessive levels of lead in their blood. The Government closed the plant in question and claimed to be working to meet the reasonable demands of the victims, including covering the medical costs for lead poisoning treatment and tests for children living within 600 metres of the plant. This was one in a series of lead poisoning cases; others were reported from Shaanxi, Hunan and Yunnan (XHNA, 26 Sept.).

Hong Kong sources reported that Xu Zhiyong, a civil rights activist and founder of the civil rights group Gongmeng, had been detained by police on 27 July. Another non governmental organization, the Yirenping Centre, was also raided by police for illegal publishing (SCMP website, 31 July). According to Japanese press reports, Xu Zhiyong was formally arrested on 18 August on charges relating to tax evasion with respect to his organization Gongmeng (Kyodo News Service in English, 18 Aug.). In an unusual move he was granted bail on 24 august (SCMP website, 24 Aug.).

Hong Kong sources reported that three prominent dissidents would shortly go on trial. They had all come to the notice of the authorities for their outspoken criticism of and investigation into shoddy building works after the Sichuan earthquake, and were variously charged with subverting state power, vilification of the party and government, and obtaining state secrets. They were Huang Qi and Tan Zuoren from Sichuan and Gao Quan from Nanjing (Hong Kong Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 5 Aug.). Hong Kong sources reported that Xie Changfa had been sentenced to 13 years in prison for writing articles criticizing jerry-built projects in Sichuan. He had been detained in 2008, tried in April 2009 and finally sentenced on 1 September. He had been leader of the Workers Autonomous Federation in 1989 and served three years re-education through labour (Information Centre for Human Rights and /democracy, Hong Kong, 1 Sept.).

Kyodo News Agency reported that the prominent human rights activist Liu Xiaobo had been detained for a further two months in later September (Kyodo News Agency. 24 Sept.).

j Hong Kong and Macau SAR

Du Qinglin, Director of the Party's United Front Work Department, accompanied by Chen Yunlin of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait, visited Hong Kong from 28 July ostensibly to take part in the inauguration of the Hong Kong Branch of the Taiwan Reunification Council. It was reported that he would also be listening to views on Hong Kong's economic development and constitutional reform (The Standard website, 29 July). In his speech to the opening ceremony, Du said that Hong Kong should publicize its experience of “one country, two systems” as an example to Taiwan (SCMP website, 31 July).

The Chief Justice of Hong Kong, Andrew Li, sought early retirement. His notice was accepted by the Chief Executive Donald Tsang on 2 September, effective from 31 August 2010. He was quoted as saying that he believed his early retirement was in the best interests of the judiciary (XHNA, 2 Sept.).

Fernando Chui, former Secretary for Culture in Macau, was formally endorsed as the next Chief Executive of the Macau Special Administrative Region by the Election Committee on 26 July. Chui received 282 votes in favour from the 300-strong Election Committee, with 14 blank ballots and one abstention. He was the sole candidate having being nominated earlier by the same Committee with 286 votes (RTHK Radio 3, Hong Kong, 26 July). He was formally appointed by the State Council on 10 August. Premier Wen Jiabao said that the election had been fully in line with the Basic Law of the Macau SAR, and showed that he was widely recognized and supported by Macau people from all walks of life. His appointment would be conducive to Macau's long-term stability and development (XHNA, 10 Aug.).

Elections were held for Macau's Legislative Council on 20 September for a legislature of 29 seats (12 directly elected, ten indirectly elected and seven to be appointed by the Chief Executive). A total of 122 candidates contested the direct election, but there was no voting for the indirect elections as the number of candidates corresponded exactly with the number of seats (XHNA, 20 Sept.).

a Diplomatic Tours

b Countries, Territories and Regions