Rüdiger Gerlach's published dissertation deals with the development of social policies at the Volkswagen Company in the Federal Republic of Germany and at the state-owned enterprise Sachsenring in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) between the 1950s and the 1980s. The aim of the monograph is twofold: first, to depict the changes that transformed occupational social policies in postwar divided Germany, and second, to determine the differences and commonalities between the case studies as parts of two different political systems. For this purpose, the book is structured chronologically, in three distinct time periods, with a summarizing chapter that underlines the comparative aspects. In the first section, covering the first two postwar decades, the author points to the striking similarities in the two companies’ social policies that revolved around providing decent living conditions for their employees. To tackle postwar misery, such policies focused on food provision and housing. Both companies developed active policies to stop the high fluctuation within the workforce and to strengthen employees’ ties to the company. In subsequent years, however, the economic revival in the Federal Republic made material compensation obsolete, and these policies were gradually replaced by cash bonuses.

A fundamental structural difference set the two companies apart: at Volkswagen, the level of welfare provisions was set by the company's management, while in the GDR it was determined by central authorities. Volkswagen's managing director, Heinrich Nordhoff, insisted that the company pay the bonuses and fringe benefits to employees voluntarily. His concept of welfare was located somewhere between a paternalistic gift and an incentive for workers to accept the hardships of repetitive assembly-line production. In the GDR, plant managers had far less freedom to shape welfare policies; however, they were able to influence how the overall guidelines were implemented on the shop floor in order to avoid social conflicts over scarce resources. In addition, social policies in the East and West differed significantly in the treatment of female workers. Between 1949 and 1965, Volkswagen prohibited the hiring of married women. At Sachsenring, in contrast, all women were encouraged to seek employment in the automotive industry.

By the mid-1960s, the GDR had overcome postwar economic recession, and social provisions improved. The book moves next to the period of 1966 to 1975, discussing the economic improvements at Sachsenring amid lingering shortages of provisions. Benefits continued to concentrate on the provision of food and housing, childcare, and recreation, but were better financed and more effectively organized than in the previous decades. Gerlach points to the inconsistencies of the East German welfare system, which, despite growth in social expenditure for social purposes, still maintained inequalities between economic sectors and workers. Industrial plants in heavy industry (mainly coal mines and steelworks) entered a special economic program that ensured their workers better welfare provisions. Sachsenring was never included in this program and was limited by the allocated resources. Furthermore, at Sachsenring the so-called technical intelligencia (engineers and management) received extended material privileges—a policy that seemed to contradict the socialist principle of social equality. To better understand these inconsistencies within and among state socialist enterprises, the author could have drawn on the large body of literature on Stalinist and post-Stalinist work relations in the Soviet Union—especially Stephen Kotkin's Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (1995) and Donald Filtzer's Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II (2002)—because these were typical features of state socialist welfare systems dating back to the interwar Soviet Union.

In the case of West Germany, Gerlach points out that the nature and scope of welfare policies on the shop floor changed dramatically during the 1960s. The previously voluntary motivation to provide social benefits turned into cases of social and labor rights stipulated in collective wage agreements. As a result, special benefits were granted irrespective of the economic performance of the enterprise. These changes were enforced because trade unions had gained more legal and symbolic power in the company, as management realized that many production goals would remain unfulfilled without the full cooperation of staff. In this respect, the situation was similar to that of Sachsenring, where an informal pact between management and employees existed to fulfill plan requirements. Extra shifts and flexible working output were rewarded with high social benefits. Another aspect in which the two companies’ social policies became more alike was the relation of those policies to the overall welfare system. As in the GDR, the federal government in Bonn increased the regulation of welfare provisions, providing a new legal framework that restricted the autonomy of Volkswagen.

During the decade from 1975 to 1985, both companies witnessed a dramatic decline in social spending, triggered by different circumstances. At the beginning of this period, social expenditures rose in both companies to reach unprecedented levels, only to be undercut by Volkwagen's international relocation of production facilities and a renewed economic recession in the GDR. To avoid causing open social conflicts, the management at Volkswagen cut social expenses by outsourcing production units to low-income countries. The East German authorities did not dare to reduce social expenditures, but the quality of services provided declined visibly. In the concluding chapter, Gerlach summarizes the common features of the welfare policies of these two different political and institutional systems. First, both companies enforced similar policies to compensate workers for the labor-intensive assembly lines and to ensure a smooth production process. Second, once benefits were introduced, management had a hard time revoking them. And third, the expansion of state-sponsored welfare not only made certain provisions on the shop floor obsolete, but also tightened governmental control.

The monograph is well structured and reads well. The author's choice of source material at company, district, and national levels is broad and fits the purpose of the book to locate the welfare policies of two companies within their respective national welfare systems. An equal amount of space is given to the discussion of both case studies, enabling a balanced comparison. The book's contribution to business history lies primarily in its comparative aspect: it shows that in spite of inherent differences between market capitalism and planned economies, welfare policies in these two cases had similar functions and were implemented through long and ongoing bargaining processes between employees, management, and state officials.