This is perhaps not a ‘handbook’ in the conventional sense. The potential range of the topic is immense. Both Classics and cognitive theory are large, multi-disciplinary endeavours, the latter fast-growing, and in principle one could mix and match any possible combination of the two domains. Moreover, the field covered is still quite young. For both reasons the editors have correctly decided not to offer so much a rationalisation of the field as what they rightly label ‘a snapshot of current work being undertaken’. That said, their introduction does a heroic job of at least situating the individual contributions in the broader cognitive landscape, usefully summarised for classicists.
The collection is edited by two of the preeminent figures in the field and a rising star. The individual contributors show a good mix of gender and levels of seniority; the majority are based in the United States, but there are significant European contributions as well. The individual papers represent a wide variety of different cognitive approaches and classical subject matters, though not necessarily in ‘balanced’ fashion. The overwhelming preference here is for discussion of literary texts, followed by works of fine art and theatrical performance, and then perhaps one about what might be called ‘events’ (ch. 15, Jacob L. Mackey on religious rituals; but see also below). The editors have, I think, been broadly true to the state of the field here, but seeing the proportions laid out like this suggests to me the need for more work on events/practices and on more workaday objects (some of the latter already being conducted under the rubric of cognitive archaeology).
Similarly, and similarly reflective of the field, the contributions draw on a wide range of cognitive theory, but again unevenly so. There is not, for instance, much appeal to neurophysiology or neurochemistry, nor to artificial intelligence work. (The papers grouped under ‘artificial intelligence’ in the volume are very interesting work on what are productively thought of as ancient conceptions of artificial intelligences, but they do not — and need not — have much contact with the modern field of AI.) In this respect, however, the status quo is probably for the best. Within the volume, most appeals to neuroscience offer physical explanations for results that were already visible and meaningful to cognitive psychology (Anne-Sophie Noel's essay on Greek tragedy, ch. 18, is a partial exception). Indeed, without the pre-existing framework, the biology fairly clearly would be of no value to the classical projects here. They provide the wrong level of explanation; it is the emergent properties of the psychology that are relevant.
It would be impossible (and largely useless) to review such diverse contributions individually. I do, however, want to look at two in some detail because they raise issues about the general project of applying scientific theory to humanistic projects. Rutger J. Allan (ch. 3) offers an account of the ‘immersive’ character of Homeric style, its tendency ‘to make the listener feel as if mentally present in the world of the story’ (59). The general observation about Homeric enargeia is, of course, an old one, but the term ‘immersion’, not typical in Classics, instead draws in a modern literature on how such experiences are crafted narratologically. He offers a brief theoretical account followed by a detailed specimen reading of Calypso's cave (Od. 5.59–73). I am not a Homerist, but this seemed to me both convincing and enlightening; that is, the theoretically predicted features really seem to do the work they were supposed to. An outcome of this that struck me was that the cognitive theory was in a sense optional. Had Allan introduced immersion as a metaphor rather than a technical reference, the article would probably still have been just as persuasive. In fact, since the article could have been written without reference to cognitive theory, presumably the whole project could have been executed without it. I raise this point, however, to insist that it is not an objection. In this case, cognitive theory is valuable primarily as a heuristic device (as we conventionally use ‘theory’ more generally). Even if the theory-free version were possible, it would not actually be likely. Secondarily, the cognitive perspective makes an individual reader's intuitions more plausible as general claims (as we generally expect from comparative evidence in other forms). More generally, the status of cognitive theory as ‘scientific’ rather than, say, philosophical or anthropological does not necessarily have much bearing on how it is useful to us, and we should think about its application accordingly.
The project of Günther Schörner's paper (ch. 23) is to interpret sculptural depictions of animal sacrifice from Roman Asia Minor. He is troubled by the fact that previous readings have seen them ‘only … as a means for representation in a purely political and social discourse’ while ‘neglect[ing] religious content completely’ (373). He then draws on some current thinking in the cognitive history of religion to suggest that the underlying rituals (indeed ritual in general) tend to resist ordinary individual cognitive processing, and that the resulting cognitive ‘depletion’ makes participants susceptible to having meanings filled in by various kinds of collective interpretations. The ancient representations are then read as taking advantage of this phenomenon to impose a wide variety of different meanings on whatever rituals were at hand. But it is worth noting that in practice his meanings end up including things like ‘reflection of the social order and … the social hierarchy of the polis’ and ‘the function of the festival for … finding [marriage] partners’ (378–9). That is, the representations are moves in political and social discourse. The relationship between the historical and cognitive arguments, both interesting in their own right, seems distant here. In contrast to Allan's paper, the theory here does not seem to have directed attention to any features in the evidentiary record that would otherwise go unnoticed. (It perhaps suggests that the stakes of discourse around ritual are higher than they otherwise would be.) And, looking from the other direction, the classical examples could well be instances of what would be predicted by the theory, but they are not secure enough to provide evidence for the general claim. There is no error in yoking an interesting piece of Classics to an interesting, topically adjacent bit of cognitive insight, but we do probably want to take care that at least one is really contributing to the other.
This is a timely volume in at least two ways. First, the field is now diverse enough that the mere act of reflecting that is useful. This is a good opportunity for scholars not previously interested to see if there is something for them in cognitive theory (and here again the introduction should prove particularly valuable). Second, however one might feel about my specific reflections above on the broader project of cognitive Classics, the field has now reached a point where those kinds of issues need to be addressed, and the present volume gives us a valuable tool for doing that. I hope this volume finds the audience, particularly beyond those already working with cognitive theory, that it very much deserves.
