1. Introduction
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 has become one of the most well-studied and widely debated examples of institutional change. Recent debates about the Glorious Revolution have focused on the thesis put forward by North and Weingast (Reference North and Weingast1989) that the constitutional changes initiated by the revolution created a credible commitment to responsible fiscal policy and secure property rights that led to a financial and then an industrial revolution. Part of the debate has revolved around the degree to which the empirical evidence is consistent with the argument that significant changes resulted from the revolution. Analyses of asset prices (Clark, Reference Clark1996), and interest rates (Sussman and Yafeh, Reference Sussman and Yafeh2006), for example, failed to provide evidence of significant changes attributable to the Glorious Revolution. Wells and Wills (Reference Wells and Wills2000), however, conclude that the effect of Jacobite activity on prices in capital markets is consistent with North and Weingast. In addition to arguments about evidence, there have also been arguments about the extent to which the North and Weingast (Reference North and Weingast1989) story sufficiently incorporates significant explanatory variables. Caruthers (Reference Caruthers1990) argues that the stop of the Exchequer, religious conflicts, and the development of party politics all need to be incorporated into the analysis, and Klerman and Mahoney (Reference Klerman and Mahoney2005) make the case that changes in the judicial system were more significant than changes in the legislative system.
We join the second part of the debate by arguing that current analyses of the institutional changes associated with the Glorious Revolution have largely neglected one of the central issues: constraining the states’ ability to employ force. Barzel (Reference Barzel2002) and Humphrey (Reference Humphrey2004) consider the state's ability to employ force in regard to the Glorious Revolution, but use it as motivation for theoretical rather than empirical inquiry. The relative neglect of the state's ability to employ force in the recent analyses of the Glorious Revolution is somewhat surprising since the state has often been defined in terms of its ability to employ force. English political philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke regarded the ability to use force to protect the rights of citizens as the essential quality of the ruler. Weber defined the state as a ‘human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory’ (quoted in Gerth and Mills, Reference Gerth and Mills1946: 78). Many economists and political scientists continue to define the state in terms of its ability to employ force. Douglass North, for example, has defined the state as ‘an organization with a comparative advantage in violence’ (North, Reference North1981: 21). Margaret Levi regards the attempt to ‘monopolize the concentrated means of violence within a given territory’ as an essential characteristic of the state (Levi, Reference Levi1988: 1). Bates et al. (Reference Bates, Grief and Singh2002) model the state as a specialist in violence but not a monopolist. For them ‘people retain control over the means of coercion, and it is their threat to revert to violence, should others defect, that supports order along the equilibrium path’ (Bates et al., Reference Bates, Grief and Singh2002: 600). A state with the ability to employ force can protect the rights of citizens, but as Itai Sened observes, ‘once a state's enforcement agency is installed, there is usually nothing to stop it from using its monopoly over the use of force against those that have installed it’ (Sened, Reference Sened1997: 38). Thus, the states's ability to employ force gives rise to a fundamental political dilemma: ‘how to ensure that government has sufficient power to tax and to provide security while inhibiting government from predation on the population it is supposed to be serving’ (Levi, Reference Levi2006: 7). A state with the ability to employ force can be both the solution and the problem for providing security to its citizens.
Effort to constrain the state's ability to employ force during the Glorious Revolution focused on control of the army. One of the grievances listed against James II in the Bill of Rights in 1689 was the raising and keeping of a standing army in peacetime without the consent of Parliament. The Bill of Rights went on to declare that keeping a standing army in time of peace without the consent of parliament was illegal. The question of a standing army in peacetime was rendered moot by the War of Grand Alliance (1689–1697), but the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) revived the question and led to the standing army debates of 1697 to 1699. The debates addressed three questions. Would the King have a standing army during peacetime? How large would that army be? And, most important, who would decide the first two questions: the King or Parliament?
Analysis of the standing army debates adds another dimension to our understanding of the Glorious Revolution by showing how participants attempted to implement institutional arrangements to constrain the state's ability to employ force without impairing the state's ability to provide protection. Their debates also provide an illustration of the role of uncertainty in institutional choice. People on both sides of the debate were Whigs. They were supporters of the Glorious Revolution; they agreed on the supremacy of Parliament and the need for the Crown to establish a credible commitment to not act arbitrarily and unilaterally. Both sides believed that individuals respond in predictable ways to changes in incentives, that different institutional arrangements create different sets of incentives, and, therefore, that different institutional arrangements lead to different outcomes. In addition, both sides agreed that one of the constraints they faced was the need to provide adequate security from external threats. They disagreed, however, about the best institutional arrangement to achieve these objectives. On one side of the debate were those who believed that a standing army was essential to the security of the country and that it did not present a significant threat to liberty. On the other side of the debate were those who believed that a citizens' militia could provide adequate protection from external threats and that a standing army would pose a significant threat to their liberty. Uncertainty about the effects of the different institutional arrangements was compounded by changes in military technology and international relations.
The outcome of the debates is generally viewed as a political victory for the opponents of the standing army, who succeeded in considerably reducing its size. In the long run, however, the outcome supported the advocates for a standing army. Advocates of the standing army argued that it was not a threat because the Bill of Rights gave Parliament the ability to control both the existence and the size of a standing army in peacetime. By reducing the size of the army against the wishes of the King, Parliament had demonstrated this control.
2. Background of the standing army debates
Conflicts between Parliament and the Stuart monarchs involved both royal prerogatives and religion. The Stuart kings had a long history of raising taxes, maintaining a standing army, and creating monopolies against the wishes of Parliament, but the precipitating event of the revolution was related to religion. James’ appointments of Catholics to offices were tolerated while his only heir was his Protestant daughter, Mary. But in June 1688 a son was born to the King, raising the possibility of a Catholic heir. Less than a month later a group of nobleman requested that William of Orange, Mary's husband, invade Britain to insure a Protestant succession. William, who had already begun to plan an invasion, quickly complied with their request and landed with 21,000 troops. He offered to let James remain if he agreed to terms that would insure a Protestant succession, but James refused and fled to France.
John Toland, one of the participants in the standing army debates, noted that ‘Tho I commonly use the word England in its proper sense, yet I sometimes understand by it all the British Dominions’ (quoted in Hoppit, Reference Hoppit2000: 243). Great Britain, composed of England, Scotland, and Wales, was united under one monarch when James VI of Scotland became James I of England. Scotland, however, retained its own parliament until the Act of Union in 1707 formally established a single nation of Great Britain with a single parliament. In addition, one could include Ireland and the American colonies as part of the ‘British Dominions’. Although it was the English parliament that they had to deal with, it was this wider British Dominion that William and Mary came to rule over. Thus, ‘the Glorious Revolution was never merely English; it was British, European and imperial’ (Hoppit, Reference Hoppit2000: 243). In this paper, we try to use the words England and Britain in their proper sense; however, the reader should keep in mind the broad use of the word England, referred to by Toland, when reading quotes from the standing army debates.
After William invaded, Parliament called for a Convention Parliament. In 1689, the Convention Parliament passed the Bill of Rights to legalize the succession to William and Mary. The Bill of Rights listed the grievances against James II and the rights of the people that future kings were expected to recognize. The Bill of Rights became one of the essential documents of the English Constitution.
Article VI of the Bill of Rights declared, ‘That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of Parliament, is against law.’ The king could have a standing army under his command, but only with the approval of Parliament. Article VI was an innovation intended to provide for defense while protecting liberty. How this innovation would work out in practice would not, however, be determined for nearly a decade. Article VI dealt with a standing army in peacetime, and in 1689 England entered into the War of Grand Alliance against France. The question of a standing army in peacetime was rendered moot. Not until 1697, when the Treaty of Ryswick was signed, did it become possible to assess what Article IV would mean in practice.
The first trial of Article VI as a credible commitment mechanism arose after 10 September 1697. It produced a schism in the Whig party. The moderate Whigs concluded that Article VI was a sufficient bulwark against the tyrannical use, by the king, of a peacetime standing army, and the radical Whigs concluded that a member of Parliament's vote for or against cooperation with the king was an imperfect substitute for the traditional check on monarchs – a citizen's musket. Both parties inundated Parliament and the streets of London with their pamphlets outlining their theories. The battle, which raged for two years, boiled down to a choice: who should have recourse to violence – amateur or professional soldiers?
At the end of the War in 1697, William commanded an army of more than 50,000 men. He insisted that maintaining a strong standing army was necessary for national defense. The Whig party split over what should be done with the army. On one side were those who stood with William and believed that a standing army was essential for security. Prominent among the ranks of these ‘moderate Whigs’ were John Somers, Daniel Defoe, and Mathew Prior. On the other side were those who believed that a standing army was an unacceptable threat to liberty. To them, a militia, in conjunction with the Channel and the navy, could provide sufficient protection for the country. These ‘radical Whigs’ included John Trenchard, Walter Moyle, Andrew Fletcher, John Toland, and the Reverend Samuel Johnson. The two sides made their cases in Parliament and continued the debate outside of Parliament, distributing their arguments in widely read pamphlets.
When Parliament met in 1697, the standing army was one of the first issues addressed. Outside of Parliament, the radical Whigs pushed the argument against a standing army. Inside Parliament, opposition to a standing army was pushed forward by coalition of Whigs and Tories, referred to as ‘The New Country Party’ (Schwoerer, Reference Schwoerer1974: 78). Just seven days after the opening of Parliament in December 1697 a resolution was introduced to reduce the size of the army to its 1680 level. After four hours of debate, the resolution was passed. Over the next two years, opponents of the standing army would make additional attempts to reduce the size of the army.
3. The subject of the debates
Both moderates and radicals recognized the importance of providing for Britain's defense. It was generally agreed that they would enjoy peace only as long as Louis XIV believed that the cost of further hostilities outweighed the benefits. Consequently, they agreed that Britain must signal to Louis XIV that the costs of violating the Treaty would be high. Not surprisingly, the argument was made most forcefully by the Whigs who supported a strong standing army. Daniel Defoe, for instance, observed that the current peace had only been obtained by means of ‘war and valor of arms’, and he declared that, ‘nothing but the reputation of the same force’ could preserve that peace (Defoe, Reference Defoe1697: 22).
Although the focus was on Louis XIV, the problem was more general. The country needed a strong military not because of any particular wickedness on the part of any particular prince of any particular state, but because weakness created too much of a temptation. John Somers (Reference Somers1697: 2) explained that ‘it is no reflection on any of the neighboring princes when I conclude that their faith is not so absolute a security, but that we must help them to be true to their word by showing them that they are not like to gain much by breaking it’. Foreign princes were not considered as good or evil, but as rational decision makers. The matter at stake was not whether any particular king was good or evil, rather it was about how to establish conditions that would make any rival king's cost–benefit calculus weigh against invasion.
A peacetime standing army, however, may tempt a king to use violence at home if it benefited him. This is the most fundamental problem created by a standing army. Indeed, because this opportunity would exist not just for William but for any future king as well, the problem of a standing army was a constitutional one. The moderates and radicals shared a belief that their task was to create rules that would apply to all future monarchs, not just rules tailored to the current monarch, because, as the moderate Whig John Somers phrased it, ‘what is done to one king, who deserves it, and will manage it faithfully will be made an argument to do the same for another king that has neither merit nor capacity to entitle him to so entire a confidence’ (Somers, Reference Somers1697: 4). The radical Whig John Trenchard concurred that, ‘if the Parliament gives the best king a standing army, the worst king shall hereafter claim and have it’ (Trenchard, Reference Trenchard1697a: 10). Moreover, given the numerous examples of kings employing state-sponsored violence for self-interested ends, Daniel Defoe declared that the moderates understood why the radicals would cry that ‘no forces at all are to be kept up in pay, no men to be maintained whose profession is bearing arms, whose commission is to kill and slay’ (Defoe, Reference Defoe1698a: 2).
Although Defoe understood the radical position, he regarded it as a dangerous one. Consequently, the role of a standing army split the two camps. From the radical Whig side, John Trenchard (Reference Trenchard1697a: 7) declared that the debate between the two factions was not about whether England should use weapons to check the Louis XIVs of the world, but ‘in whose hands these weapons should be put’. Defoe (Reference Defoe1698a: 2) concurred that: ‘The only point in which our opinions may perhaps differ is whether we ought to maintain so considerable a force at land as will be sufficient to make a stand against an invasion; or whether the militia can be made so considerable that we may trust it at home, as well as to our fleets abroad and be safe in this.’ The choice was between putting weapons in the hands of a militia or a standing army.
4. The argument against a standing army and for a militia
To the radical Whigs, the evidence that a standing army was a threat to liberty was plain to see for anyone who cared to look. History, they argued, clearly demonstrated that a king with a standing army was incapable of credibly committing to the protection of liberty. They advised their readers to simply look across the channel to see the evidence. John Trenchard (Reference Trenchard1697a: 7) observed that on the continent most states were ‘overrun with oppression and slavery, where the lives, estates and liberties of the people are subject to the lawless fancy and ambition of the prince’. He went on to ask his readers how it was that ‘these unhappy nations have lost that precious jewel Liberty, and we as yet preserved it?’ He answered that ‘their miseries and our happiness proceed from this, that their necessities or indiscretion have permitted a standing army to be kept amongst them and our situation . . . hath as yet defended us from it’. Trenchard declared that ‘to know whether a people are free or slaves, it is necessary to ask only whether there is an army kept amongst them’ (Trenchard, Reference Trenchard1697a: 14). To the radical Whigs, the correlation between tyranny and a standing army was far from coincidental; it was a direct outcome of the incentives created by a the establishment of a standing army. First, members of a standing army had an incentive to do what the king wished, even if it diminished liberty. Second, the existence of a standing army lowered the cost of using violence against his subjects. Third, leaders of a standing army had an incentive to promote war.
The difference between a standing army and a militia was often phrased in terms of the quality of the men. Or, as the radical Whig John Toland (Reference Toland1698: 17) phrased it, ‘Is it safest, to trust arms continually in the hands of ignorant, idle, and needy persons, or, only when there is occasion for it, in the hands of sober, industrious, and understanding freemen?’ Toland's phrasing of the question clearly contains his answer, but underlying this hyperbolic rhetoric there was an understanding of how different institutions created different sets of incentives.
The only incentive for soldiers in a standing army was to follow orders. Andrew Fletcher (Reference Fletcher1697: 23) explained to his readers that professional soldiers ‘have nothing to lose, nor any other tie to engage their fidelity, than the inconsiderable pay of 6-pence a day’. Soldiers in a standing army, necessarily, had an incentive to do whatever the king commanded, as long as they got paid. Carrying this logic even further, a standing army could become an instrument with which rivals within and outside the state could fulfill their designs. Recognizing the ‘chain of dependence’ that exists among the rank and file and their commanders, Trenchard (Reference Trenchard1697a: 29) claimed that ‘if two or three of the chief officers . . . [are] offere[d] a better market . . . we shall have another . . . revolution’. The king's rivals, by simply outbidding him, could purchase the loyalty of the generals and thereby capture the army's interest. Furthermore, radical Whigs believed that professional soldiers ‘having no other profession or subsistence to depend upon’ have an incentive ‘to stir up the ambition of princes and engage them in perpetual quarrels’ (Trenchard Reference Trenchard1697a: 29). A standing army could be a significant source of instability.
In contrast to the members of a standing army, the members of a militia had an incentive to do what the king said only so long as it was consistent with their own interests. The militia had the strongest of incentives to protect liberty. As John Trenchard (Reference Trenchard1697a: 23) explained:
There can be no danger from an army where the nobility and chief gentry of England are the commanders and the body of it are made up of the freeholders . . . unless we conceive that the nobility and gentry will join in an unnatural design to make void their titles to their estates and liberties . . . [this] is a ridiculous proposition.
No arrangement could be more incentive compatible than one in which men had the means to protect their own liberties.
To the radical Whigs it was their duty to establish institutions that would protect liberty. The characteristics of the institutions were the central issue and the characteristics of particular individuals were irrelevant. They were willing to concede that if William III could live forever, ‘we ought in common prudence to abandon all thoughts of self-preservation and wholly to rely on his care and conduct’; however, because he was not immortal ‘we ought not to entrust any power with him which we don't think proper to be continued to his successor’ (Trenchard Reference Trenchard1697a: 9). Trenchard (Reference Trenchard1697a: 10) went on to explain that Englishmen, before choosing which path to follow, must ask themselves the following question: ‘What are like to be consequences of a [standing army] in future reigns?’ To answer this question, he again turned to the historical experience and informed his readers that, ‘in all ages and parts of the world, a standing army has been the never-failing instrument of enslaving a nation’ (Trenchard Reference Trenchard1697b: 6). Because they could not know what a future king might be like, it was necessary to ‘deal with them as we do children and mad men, that is, take away all weapons by which they may do either themselves or others injury’ (Trenchard Reference Trenchard1697a: 20). For posterity's sake, they proclaimed, William's standing army must be disbanded.
This was a reasonable policy to pursue because the radical Whigs believed that Britain was in the unique position of being able to reject a standing army with little cost in terms of weakened national defense. The geography of Britain provided it with the opportunity to preserve liberty at home, while preventing foreign invasion. Because of the English Channel, the militia in conjunction with a strong navy could signal to Louis XIV the futility of an attempt to attack Britain. The willingness to accept the existence of a strong standing navy illustrates that the standing army debate was far more than an extension of the debates about fiscal policy.
Protection from both external rivals and tyranny at home could be achieved by placing the instruments of violence in the hands of citizen-soldiers. Citizen-soldiers, who take up their arms only when occasion calls, can check the king's incentive to use his authority to infringe on liberty. The militia in conjunction with the English Channel and England's navy, could provide an adequate threat to diminish Louis XIV's incentive to invade. William's standing army, they declared, must be fully disbanded. A return to the citizens’ militia, they argued, would redistribute ‘power’ in such a way that England's ‘parchment’ would no longer be threatened.
5. The argument for a standing army
The moderate Whigs estimated that the cost of rejecting a standing army, in terms of a weaker national defense, would be high and the cost of accepting a standing army, in terms of the threat to liberty, would be low. They believed that rejection of a standing army would make it impossible to send a credible signal to other nations. In addition, they believed that acceptance of a standing army in peacetime no longer posed a threat to their liberties.
To the moderate Whigs, the radical Whigs’ advocacy for the citizen soldier as the only acceptable manifestation of state-sponsored violence arose from a failure to recognize the significance of changed circumstances. While the radical Whigs turned to history to provide evidence for their case, the moderate Whigs emphasized the changes in circumstances that made the lessons of history no longer applicable. Daniel Defoe (Reference Defoe1698a: 3) stated:
in order to state the case right, we are to distinguish first between England formerly and England now . . . England now is in sundry circum-stances different from England formerly, with respect to the manner of fighting, the circumstances of our neighbors, and of ourselves; and these are some reasons why a militia are not and . . . cannot be made fit for the uses of the present wars.’
John Somers (Reference Somers1697: 4) went so far as to concede that, ‘if we were in the same condition in which we and our neighbors were an age ago’, then ‘I should reject the proposition [of a standing army in times of peace] with horror’. However, Somers (Reference Somers1697: 4) continued, because England was no longer ‘in the same condition’, a citizens’ militia no longer provided a sufficient deterrent to rivals and a peacetime standing army no longer threatened English liberties.
The moderate Whig's argument for a standing army had four elements. First, because of changes in military technology and organization, a militia could no longer compete with a standing army as an effective fighting force. Second, because the country that was taking the fullest advantage of these changes in the practice of war was Britain's neighbor and enemy, France, they had no choice but to adopt the modern practices themselves. Third, because the threat from France was so great, Britain had to form alliances for mutual protection; it needed to maintain a standing army to participate in these alliances. Fourth, because of Article VI and the increased strength of Parliament, a standing army was no longer a threat to liberty.
Chief among the changes in circumstances were the changes in military technology and organization associated with a standing army. ‘Now’, John Somers (Reference Somers1697: 4) declared, ‘war is become a science and arms an employment’ and ‘all of our neighbors keep standing forces, troops of veteran experienced soldiers’. Formerly, a citizens’ militia, in addition to being a sufficient check against tyranny, was a sufficient bulwark against invasion; yet, under these ‘circumstances’, a military establishment officered by amateurs and manned by part-time soldiers is incapable of supplying protection. Daniel Defoe (Reference Defoe1698b: 14) tried to explain the changing nature of warfare to his readers:
War is no longer an accident, but a trade, and they that will be anything in it must serve a long apprenticeship to it: human wit and industry has raised it to such a perfection; and it is grown such a piece to manage, that it requires people to make it their whole employment; the War is now like the Gospel, men must be set apart for it; the Gentlemen of the Club may say what they please, and talk of fine things at home, of the natural courage of the English, but I must tell them, courage is now grown less a qualification of a soldier than formerly; ‘tis necessary too, but Management is the principle Art of War.’
The citizens’ militia, they argued, was no longer capable of efficiently coordinating and motivating state-sponsored violence. The weaknesses of the militia arose from its decentralized structure (52 autonomous county militias managed by a Lord lieutenant and his deputy lieutenants), unprofessional leadership, outdated weaponry and tactics, and part-time soldiers. Survival, they concluded, required an organizational innovation – namely, a standing army.
Britain might have been able to neglect these changes in military practices were it not for the fact that their nearest neighbor was taking the fullest advantage of them. They declared that, ‘our next neighbor [France] is the power fullest of all’ (Somers Reference Somers1697: 4). Somers judgment was one that the historian William H. McNeill (Reference McNeill1982: 124) concurred with when he explained that, ‘the larger resources that the French king had at its command gave the Bourbon monarchy the capacity to eclipse any rivals, simply by putting larger and better trained armies into the field’. John Somers (Reference Somers1697: 7) explained that if it were not for France's standing army, Britain might still be able to depend upon a militia, but that a militia was no match for such a standing army:
I do not doubt but they are much the best in the world, and if they had a militia to deal with I should doubt little of the decision. But you and I have seen armies too much not to know the difference that is between troops that have been long trained, who have learned the art and are accustomed to the discipline of war, and the best bodies of raw and undisciplined multitudes. The whole method of war is now such that disciplined troops must prove a very unequal match to much greater numbers of men.
Consequently, he concluded, ‘it is thereby made necessary; we must either be preserved by [a standing army], or if [we fail to adapt] we must perish by it’ (Somers, Reference Somers1697: 8). Nations were forced into the same sort of Prisoners' Dilemma that Hobbes viewed as the source of conflict among men. Each was forced to seek more power not because he ‘cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well that he hath at present, without the acquisition of more’ (Hobbes, Reference Hobbes1904: 63).
Furthermore, the moderates argued that the threat from France was so great that no single nation, even with a standing army, could effectively repel it. Security from France required not only a standing army, but alliances with other countries possessing standing armies. ‘Here is one neighbor grown so great for all the rest’ that solitary defiance, by single states or kingdoms, is insufficient – ‘to mate him several must join for mutual assistance’ (Somers, Reference Somers1697: 16). Therefore, in order to maintain the peace it is necessary that the nation maintain its leagues and confederacies. Maintaining these leagues and confederacies could not only ensure victory in the event of war, but assure that war never reached British shores. Defoe (Reference Defoe1698a: 5) pointed out to his readers that with such alliances they could, ‘carry the war into your enemies country and always keep it out of your own’, and that you should, therefore, ‘defend your confederate's country to make it a barrier to your own’. The need to participate in mutual defense pacts made a standing army not just desirable, but necessary.
A standing army was essential to participate in mutual defense pacts because such pacts placed nations ‘under certain stipulations and agreements with what strength and in what places to aid and assist one another’ (Defoe, Reference Defoe1698a: 5). Credible performance of these stipulations made it necessary, advised Defoe (Reference Defoe1698a: 5), ‘to have always some troops ready to send to the assistance of those confederates if they are invaded’. Contrary to the radical Whigs, who in the event of a breach say ‘send our militia’, the moderate Whigs answered, ‘[f]irst the king cannot send them to go; and secondly, if he could, nobody would accept them, and if they would go and would be accepted of, they would be good for nothing’ (Defoe Reference Defoe1698a: 6). Without ‘forces to assist a confederate’, England would be unable to signal to its allies its ability to fulfill the obligations of the alliance; consequently, Defoe (Reference Defoe1698a: 6) questioned whether any state would ‘value our friendship, or assist us if we wanted it?’ Without the assistance of our allies, Louis XIV may conclude that it is worthwhile for him to renege on the articles of the peace. To Defoe (Reference Defoe1698a: 7) ‘the reputation and influence the English nation has had abroad’ depended on having a standing army at all times.
One side of the moderate Whig's argument for a strong standing army was that the cost of not having a standing army would be unacceptably high. The other side of their argument was that the radical Whigs drastically overestimated the threat of tyranny created by a standing army. They did not simply regard a standing army as a necessary evil, but instead argued that there was no evil to it at all. They did not accept that there must be a tradeoff between protection from abroad and liberty at home, because another change in circumstances had overthrown this tradeoff. Article VI of the Bill of Rights, the political innovation that transferred sovereignty over the sword from the king to Parliament, was argued by the moderate Whigs to be the most significant alteration in circumstances that distinguished England ‘formerly’ from England ‘now’.
With Article VI, the moderate Whigs believed that they could adopt a standing army without threatening their liberties. Defoe (Reference Defoe1698a: 9) argued:
In the claim of right, presented to the present king and which he swore to Observe . . . it is declared . . . that the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be by consent of parliament is against law.
Per Article VI, the existence and size of a standing army in times of peace was determined by cooperation between the king and Parliament; the king requested and Parliament either granted or denied his request. To Parliament, Defoe (Reference Defoe1698a: 12) explained:
the whole nation has left the case, to act as they see cause; to them we have committed the charge of our liberties, nay the king himself has only told them his opinion [for the number of soldiers], with the reasons for it . . . and the article of the claim of right is left in full force: For this consent of Parliament is now left the whole and sole judge, whether an army or no army, and if it votes an army, ‘tis left still the sole judge of the quantity, how many or how few.
Parliament's prerogative to raise or disband an army counteracted the threat of tyranny. Parliament would convene every year to exercise its authority and decide whether to maintain a standing army and if so of what size. Somers (Reference Somers1697: 3) further explained:
The state of affairs both at home and abroad being every year to be considered in Parliament, that so any such force may be either increased, lessened, or quite laid aside, as they shall see cause.
Every year, the moderate Whigs indicated, Parliament would in a sense put its collective finger to the wind and gauge the ‘foreign threats, domestic threats, the state of our liberties and our allies’ and ‘calculate whether they had remained constant, strengthened, or weakened’ (Somers Reference Somers1697: 14). Consequently, Parliament, with its authority to make adjustments, if warranted, to the strength of English forces, would ‘not consent to a larger army than they can so master, as that the liberties or the people of England shall never be in danger from them’ (Defoe Reference Defoe1698a: 10).
Ultimately, the moderate Whigs concluded, Article VI introduced an alternative mechanism by which citizens can check the king's incentive to employ state-sponsored violence as an opportunistic strategy – the ballot box. With their votes for or against their representatives in Parliament, citizens could directly influence public policy; for example, representatives who failed to faithfully represent the preferences of their constituents, with respect to the annual settling of the military establishment, would fail to be re-elected and vice-versa. Defoe (Reference Defoe1697: 12) proclaimed:
We who are Englishmen have the least reason of any people in the world to complain of any of our laws, or of any public affairs because nothing is or can be done, but I and every individual freeholder in England do it ourselves, we consent to it, and tacitly do it by our representatives in the Parliament; and since then our liberties, aye our lives are committed to them . . . [so] if [Parliament] think it fit to continue 50,000 men, there is no doubt but they will find ways so to keep them at their dispose, that even that army shall be the preserver of our liberties, not the destroyer of them and to [Parliament] let us leave it.
After 1688, the use of state-sponsored violence hinged upon cooperation between the king and Parliament; in essence, the moderate Whigs claimed, sovereignty over England's military establishment devolved from the king to English citizens. Article VI presented English citizens with an opportunity to simultaneously lay down their muskets, align the king's interests with their own, and signal to Louis XIV the futility of breaching the Peace of Ryswick.
In the end, the moderate Whigs returned to the fundamental conflict between security from foreign powers and security from tyranny at home. The ability to successfully defend the country was a function of the ‘power’ of the prince. This ‘power’, in turn, depended on his ability to coordinate and motivate individuals who specialize in ‘that unhappy trade, which is now become so universal’, professional soldiering (Defoe Reference Defoe1697: 7). If England chooses to, ‘keep your king so weak that he may always be afraid of you, and he will never provoke you to hurt him’, then ‘we must never pretend to bear any reputation in the world: no nation would value our friendship or fear to affront us’. Neither ‘our trade abroad would be secure, nor our trade at home’; England, he argued, would certainly ‘perish’ at the hands of nations that endow their king with such ‘power’ (Defoe, Reference Defoe1697: 7 and 22)
6. The outcome of the standing army debates
The outcome of the standing army debates is generally perceived as a loss for William and his supporters. The significance of the issue is illustrated by the promptness with which Parliament turned to it after hostilities ceased. The Treaty of Ryswick was signed in September of 1697, and the issue of a peacetime standing army soon came to center stage. According to the historian Henry Horwitz, the standing army question was ‘the principal public controversy in late 1697’ (Horwitz Reference Horwitz1977: 224). The parliamentary session that began 2 December 1697 was, in the words of Julian Hoppit, ‘long and contentious’; and ‘the tone was set early on over the standing army controversy’ (Hoppit Reference Hoppit2000: 156). In December 1697, Parliament voted to cut William's army to 8,000 men (Hoppit, Reference Hoppit2000: 156). In 1698, Parliament voted to reduce the army further to 7000, and, in 1699, it voted against William maintaining his Dutch Guards (Schwoerer, Reference Schwoerer1974: 157).
There is no doubt that William regarded the reduction in the army as a major setback. Lois Schwoerer described the standing army conflict as the ‘most complex and emotion-filled issue between the House of Commons and William (Schwoerer, Reference Schwoerer1966: 74). She concluded that no issue occupied more of the King's time and energy in the final years of the seventeenth century. William argued that the nation would be inadequately protected and even drafted a letter of abdication (Hoppit, Reference Hoppit2000: 159). He did not, however, abdicate. He did attempt to maneuver around the limitations imposed by Parliament. He kept about 5,000 men as marines, rather than members of the army, transferred some troops to the West Indies and retained others in Ireland. In all, the total number of soldiers in 1698, including those stationed abroad, appears to have been around 30,000 (Schwoerer, Reference Schwoerer1966: 88). Nevertheless, William officially recognized Parliament's authority and discouraged members of the army from responding to the debates. In the end, his ability to work around the restrictions set by Parliament was limited by the need to turn to Parliament for funding of the army.
Ironically, although the outcome was a political loss for William and the other supporters of the standing army, in the long run it provided support for their arguments. Parliament's actions on the army ultimately provided support for a standing army in part because their actions did not go nearly as far as the rhetoric of the debates. The debates focused on the existence of a standing army, with opponents arguing that any standing army was a threat to liberty. The actions of Parliament, however, focused on the size of the standing army. They showed that Britain could maintain a standing army and that Parliament could retain its control over the size of that army.
Over time concerns about the threat of tyranny waned as Parliament successfully exerted its control over the size of the army. Episodes of peace tended to produce a reduction in the size of the army, but over the course of the eighteenth century the size of the peacetime army trended upward (Brewer, Reference Brewer1988: 25).
Fears of the army's threat to the authority of Parliament also appear to have been diminished by the increasing overlap between the members of the two organizations. From 1715 to 1790, the percentage of men in the House of Commons who were also military men increased from 9.3% to 14.7%. According to Brewer, ‘the presence of military men in parliament was a sign not of the militarization of government but of the permeation of the military by civilian politics’ (Brewer Reference Brewer1988: 44–45). The leaders of the army were the same men that sat in Parliament, and they had the same interests. In the late eighteenth century, Adam Smith noted that, ‘Where the military force is placed under the command of those who have the greatest interest in the support of the civil authority, because they have themselves the greatest share of that authority, a standing army can never be dangerous to liberty’ (Smith, Reference Smith1976: 229). The standing army was not only controlled by the members of Parliament as the moderate Whigs had suggested, it was led by members of Parliament.
7. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is not to replace a ‘financial revolution’ story of the Glorious Revolution with a ‘military revolution’ story of the Glorious Revolution. Ultimately, an attempt to claim that one or the other is more important obscures more than it enlightens because the issues were intertwined. It is, however, the case that many people at the time regarded the state's ability to employ force as a central issue that needed to be directly addressed as well as influenced through the budgetary process.
A state with the ability to employ force can enhance welfare by providing protection against both internal and external predation. But a state with the ability to employ force can became the predator itself. How can people obtain the benefits of political order without incurring the cost of despotism? Although recent analyses of the Glorious Revolution have tended to focus on financial issues, the standing army debates show that constraining the state's ability to employ force was also a prominent concern. Furthermore, the standing army debates shed light on the difficulty of achieving this balance.
There was certainly conflict between those who would attempt to constrain the King and the King who did not wish to be so constrained. But the debates reflect another problem as well: a fundamental uncertainty about the effects of different institutional arrangements. Opponents of a standing army argued that experience showed that a standing army inevitably led to tyranny. Proponents of the standing army, however, argued that experience could not provide a guide because of fundamental changes in circumstances. Specifically, they argued that Parliament had a degree of control over the existence and size of the army that it had not possessed before and that changes in military technology and international relations had increased the need for a standing army in peacetime. They argued that changed circumstances meant that the past could not be a guide to the costs and benefits of a standing army. Time would prove the advocates of the standing army correct, but it is clear that this was impossible to ascertain beforehand.
In describing the effects of the Glorious Revolution, Mancur Olson wrote that ‘people in England in due course came to have a relatively high degree of confidence that any contracts they entered into would be enforced and that private property rights, even for critics of the government, were relatively secure’ (Olson, Reference Olson1993: 574). The history of the standing army debates suggests the importance of the phrase ‘in due course’. Changes in the institutions governing the armed forces were associated with considerable uncertainty. It took time for people to develop confidence that the new institutional arrangements would protect them from tyranny and from foreign attack. The gradual development of confidence is consistent with other recent work on the Glorious Revolution. Confidence in the new regime increased as the Jacobite threat waned, judicial independence increased, and Whig control of parliament was solidified (Wells and Wills, Reference Wells and Wills2000; Klerman and Mahoney, Reference Klerman and Mahoney2005; and Stasavage, Reference Stasavage2002). Like these studies, our analysis of the standing army debates suggests the significance of uncertainty about the effects of institutional change and the consequent difficulty in creating credible commitments through institutional change.
