It is always a pleasure to be asked to review an excellent new monograph, and Giancarlo Casale's The Ottoman Age of Exploration is a fine contribution to Ottoman history and to studies of the Indian Ocean world. Based primarily on Turkish and Portuguese published sources and Ottoman archival documents and maps, the book is a narrative history of the 16th-century Ottoman–Portuguese naval conflict for control of the spice trade in the Indian Ocean. In the course of documenting and analyzing this prolonged struggle, Casale offers illuminating insights into Ottoman strategic thinking, economic policies, naval tactics, and cartography. The book also implicitly raises interesting questions about Ottoman-centric historiography, Ottoman economic interests, and ultimately the meaning of the term “exploration” in the 16th-century world.
Without diminishing Casale's achievement in any way, let me say at the outset that as one who first viewed the Islamic and Indian Ocean worlds from the beach at Calicut (now Kozhikode), the important southwest Indian entrepôt and center of the Indian spice trade, it is no surprise to read about Ottoman naval actions that spanned the Indian Ocean from the Red Sea to Atjeh in Sumatra. Nor is it novel to read about besieged Muslim mercantile communities in the Indian Ocean welcoming Ottoman forces as they assaulted Portuguese bases and challenged Portuguese imperial presumptions. Zayn al-Din al-Maʿbari's late 16th-century Arabic history, Tuhfat al-Mujahidin fi baʿdi Ahwal al-Purtukaliyyin (A Gift to the Holy Warriors in Respect to Some Deeds of the Portuguese), describes in detail the Portuguese attempt to forcibly seize control of the spice trade and portrays it as an assault on Islam. Casale is meticulous in crediting earlier Turkish and Western scholarship on this subject, especially Salih Özbaran's use of Portuguese and Ottoman sources in his seminal studies of this conflict.
Casale's signal achievement is his meticulous and comprehensive narrative of the ways in which Ottoman knowledge of and policy toward Indian Ocean trade began and then evolved following Sultan Selim's conquest of Egypt in 1516. As the author points out, this is the Ottoman “age of exploration,” exemplified by Piri Reis’ famous atlas and navigational guide, Kitab-ı Bahriye (The Book of the Sea), the first Ottoman cartography to contain information on the Indian Ocean and “the single greatest work of Ottoman geography and cartography ever produced” (p. 37). Patronized by Ibrahim Pasha, who became grand vizier in 1523 and arrived in Egypt in 1524, Piri Reis consulted, among other sources, Portuguese sea charts and an Arabic map of India. The latter was undoubtedly based on the Arabs’ detailed knowledge of the entire Indian Ocean and its monsoon winds, as is exemplified by Ahmad ibn Majid al-Najdi's work translated by G. R. Tibbetts under the English title Arab Navigation in the Indian Ocean Before the Coming of the Portuguese (London: The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland, 1971). As Casale notes, Ibrahim Pasha himself may be said to have initiated this “age of discovery” in the Indian Ocean with his appointment of the corsair, Selman Reis, who was ordered to repair the decrepit Mamluk fleet in Jiddah and propose how it might be used. Selman's report suggested, among other possible Ottoman targets, the strategic Portuguese bases at Hormuz, Goa, and Malacca.
In brief, therefore, Casale's title, The Ottoman Age of Exploration, refers to the Ottomans’ projection of power into the Indian Ocean as part of their economic goal to counter the Portuguese blockade of non-Portuguese shipping and restore the vitality of the Indian Ocean spice-trade route through the Red Sea to Cairo. The author also characterizes this effort as the “Ottomans’ tenacious pursuit of empire in the Indian Ocean” (p. 201). In the course of narrating this history, Casale effectively personalizes Ottoman policy decisions and military actions by offering fascinating insights into the individuals involved, which makes this well-written monograph all the more compelling. As someone generally familiar with the outline of events in this era, I especially appreciated Casale's lucid analysis of Ottoman commercial policies in Egypt, designed to provide long-term profits from the spice trade, his discussion of the “Indian Ocean faction,” which pressed for continued Ottoman aggression in the region, and his information about the naval strategy of Sefer Reis, who developed effective, winning naval tactics and used them successfully against the Portuguese. Ottoman relations with Atjeh, which are well known to Indian Ocean scholars, are also usefully explained here in their economic, military, and religious dimensions and related to overall Ottoman policy, which is not a subject familiar to students of Southeast Asian history.
In the course of reading such a wide-ranging study, certain issues inevitably arise, which I raise here in the spirit of continuing the discussion that Casale has so effectively stimulated. One issue has to do with the Ottoman-centric focus of this work. It is after all an Ottoman history, but as such, it does tend to overemphasize Ottoman achievements in at least two ways. In discussing the Ottoman–Portuguese confrontation, no mention is made of the two powers’ disparate resources and radically different geographies. In the 16th century, Portugal probably had a population of fewer than one million, which is easily twenty times less than the Ottoman population after the conquest of Egypt. One does not have to like the Portuguese or overlook their systematic barbarism to be impressed with their achievements, given their resources. Whereas the Ottomans controlled territories bordering on the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese had to supply their bases and fleets by sailing around Africa. It is astonishing that they could sustain this effort and, in the early 17th century, still have the ability to destroy an Atjehnese fleet. The Ottoman achievement might not seem so impressive if the striking contrast in the populations and geographies of these two powers was mentioned.
Another issue is that the work accepts, sometimes with a slightly skeptical tone, Ottoman views of their influence among Indian Ocean Muslims. To return again to Calicut, which was the focal point of the Indian Ocean spice trade, Ottoman sources—and sometimes Casale as well—suggest that the Ottomans exerted a powerful influence over the reigning Calicut rajas and their Muslim subjects, due to Ottoman attacks on the Portuguese and to the money Ottomans gave to “the mosques of twenty-seven cities located in the Indian port of Calicut for the Friday sermon” (p. 148). Perhaps the Ottoman governor-general of Egypt did for a time send money to Muslim congregations there, as is indicated in a 1576 document, but Zayn al-Din, in his late 16th-century Arabic history cited previously, pays little attention to the Ottomans and dedicates his work not to the Ottoman sultan but to the Muslim ruler of Bijapur in the Indian Deccan region. Casale expresses skepticism of an earlier Ottoman report that the Hindu raja of Calicut showed a willingness to convert to Islam in exchange for Ottoman help against the Portuguese, and he is right to do so. There are no known traces of Ottoman influence in Calicut mosques today, although it is worth mentioning that the Indian-Muslim Khilafat movement from 1920 to 1922 did stimulate a rebellion of Muslims in the Calicut region, which has left a poorly understood trace of late Ottoman influence in at least one local village. An interesting question connected to this is why the Ottomans, if they sought to establish an empire in the Indian Ocean, did not establish a base at Calicut. An anti-Portuguese Hindu raja ruled over a large and once prosperous Muslim mercantile community there, and the Ottomans could have constructed vessels in the shipyards located just south of the city, where lavish supplies of hardwoods were in plentiful supply.
On a more general note, Casale's work raises a question about the use of the term “exploration” in the context of the Ottomans’ Indian Ocean activities. The term implicitly suggests equivalence between Ottoman actions in the Indian Ocean and European voyages of discovery. Now, economic motives were uppermost in generating European voyages, with religion a significant secondary element for the crusading states, Portugal and Spain, whose voyages were also state sponsored. Economic and religious factors, as well as state sponsorship, are also distinctly visible in Ottoman actions in the Indian Ocean. The Ottomans do not seem to have been intoxicated, however, with the mystique of discovery, perhaps because they already understood the basic facts of the geography and commerce of the Indian Ocean immediately upon their conquest of Egypt, if not earlier. After all, Karimi merchants, who had traded in Calicut and elsewhere and then retreated back to Cairo following Portuguese assaults, would have wanted to supply such information. The Ottomans appear to have had limited economic/military goals in the Indian Ocean and to have lacked the intellectual or cultural interests exhibited both by the Chinese, in the remarkable voyages dispatched by the Ming emperors between 1403 and 1431, and by some early Portuguese visitors.
In terms of economic interests, it is striking that the Ottomans never seem to have attempted to extend their voyages to China, where they could have gained direct access to Chinese silks. The Ottomans were perennially concerned to ensure their access to and if possible control of the trade in Iranian silk thread and cloth, which was an important element in the Ottoman export economy. Their contact and then alliance with the Atjehnese must have put them in contact with and given them knowledge of Chinese markets. Ottomans’ intellectual or cultural interests also appear to have been limited, although this may reflect my own lack of familiarity with Ottoman sources. To take the Chinese case first, Ma Huan's description of the Ming-era voyages in his 1433 work Ying-Yai Sheng-Lan (The Overall Survey of the Ocean's Shores) includes not only political and economic information but also extensive descriptions of local cultures, as in his account of Calicut's politics, economy, and culture. On the Portuguese side, Duarte Barbosa, an early 16th-century Portuguese factor or commercial agent in Kerala, wrote an extensive and well-informed account of local society, The Book of Duarte Barbosa, which is the earliest European ethnography of a particular Indian subculture. Like the Ottomans, the Chinese and the Portuguese had political and economic interests in the city and the surrounding region, but both Ma Huan and Barbosa exhibited an intellectual curiosity that transcended those interests.
This leads me back to one of the book's final sections dealing with Ottoman geography and cartography, which Casale refers to as the “intellectual dimension of the Ottoman Age of Discovery” (p. 185). This part of the book led one blurb writer to say that the text reveals that the Ottoman conquest of Egypt eventually “led Ottomans on an intellectual journey through the previously unknown world of medieval Arab scholarship.” Casale does not put things in quite such hyperbolic terms. He does, however, demonstrate that new geographic/cartographic manuscripts were produced in the empire beginning in the 1560s, including syntheses of Arab geographical learning. Casale relates this to the increased involvement of Ottoman merchants with Indian Ocean trade in this period. As an example of the latter, he cites one Ibn Kereki, a merchant who enriched himself during ten years spent in India. Some of these texts included ethnographic information, and from Casale's description they seem to reflect a broader interest in India and the Indian Ocean region than had existed in the early 16th century, when geographic works were only produced with state patronage.
The unanswered question in this book is what these maps and charts represent in this “Ottoman Age of Exploration,” beyond an increased public or mercantile interest in practical geographic knowledge. Do they signify a deepening pride in Ottoman naval power? Do they reflect a burgeoning interest in discovery, a kind of preprinting Ottoman Hakluyt phenomenon? If these texts do indicate “expanding Ottoman horizons” in the Suleymanic and post-Suleymanic eras, what lasting effect did they have on Ottoman society? Did they reflect some kind of profound intellectual gestation, similar to the effect that New World and Asian discoveries had in Europe? The curious thing about late 16th-century geographic and cartographic texts, or at least those mentioned by Casale, is that they appear to have been synthetic compendiums of earlier Arab and Ottoman knowledge. No comparable much less superior geography to Piri Reis’ monumental work seems to have been produced during the second half of the 16th century despite Ottoman adventures in the Indian Ocean. Why, therefore, did Ottomans appreciate old knowledge rather than publicize new discoveries?
By the end of the 16th century, when Mehmed Ashik's 1,000-page geographic compendium of Ottoman and Arab geographical knowledge appeared, the Ottoman adventure in the Indian Ocean had come to a close. As the Dutch and British replaced the Portuguese as the most formidable European maritime powers, the Ottomans withdrew to the Mediterranean. Thus perhaps the increased production of these works represents a kind of wistful nostalgia of the type well known in Britain after the dissolution of her empire. And possibly the Ottoman–Portuguese struggle in the Indian Ocean can be classified not as an “Age of Discovery,” at least in any transformative cultural or intellectual sense, but as just another arena of Ottoman military expansion during the intoxicating era of burgeoning Ottoman power.
