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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2004
When the first edition of The Conquest of Smallpox was published in 1977, Peter Razzell intended it as a contribution to the heated debates over the causes of population growth in Britain between circa 1750 and circa 1840. A quarter century later, in a world stricken by the AIDS epidemic, Razzell's research on the history of smallpox has acquired new relevance as an historical study of the first major infectious disease to come under human control—smallpox—barring its revival at the hands of terrorists. Thus, the new edition can be reviewed from two perspectives. The first concerns how its arguments have fared in the quarter century since it first appeared; and the second involves what it tells us about the importance of economic constraints on limiting the diffusion of an effective medical innovation.
At the time the first edition appeared it had long been assumed that British population growth in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was mortality led, and that medical advances contributed to declining mortality. One such medical advance was inoculation (later vaccination) for smallpox. Razzell boldly argued that this one innovation alone accounted for most of the decline in mortality. Unfortunately for Razzell, at just that time Thomas McKeown began receiving attention by denying that medical progress had anything to do with the early decline in British mortality. Instead, mortality-driven population growth was a product of economic growth, rising per capita incomes and better nutrition.
To complicate matters further, Anthony Wrigley and Roger Schofield presented evidence that British population growth in the eighteenth century was fertility led, not mortality led. As a result, Razzell's book on smallpox was marginalized from the start by two rival interpretive perspectives.
But time passes and things change. As Razzell notes in his “Introduction to the New Edition,” McKeown's arguments have been heavily criticized, and Wrigley and Schofield's fertility estimates remain just that—estimates in search of solid evidence. Meanwhile solid evidence for an early mortality decline continues to accumulate.
Obviously it is time to reevaluate the demographic importance of inoculation for smallpox in the last half of the eighteenth century, as well as vaccination in the early nineteenth century. As the author reminds us, with the apparent retreat of bubonic plague by 1700, smallpox became Britain's most deadly epidemic disease and a leading cause of death. Very possibly it took one out of ten lives in eighteenth-century Britain. Therefore any innovation that could prevent recurrent outbreaks, or reduce their intensity, was bound to have a major impact on mortality.
But with commendable honesty, Razzell reviews the research carried out after 1977 and shows that it has not verified the dominant importance of smallpox inoculation and vaccination. The decline in mortality between circa 1770 and 1840 affected both infants and adults, but smallpox was primarily a childhood disease, especially in Northern England. Because almost no adults were struck by smallpox in the North, other factors must have been at work as well. Thus far, the age-specific mortality data for children between ages five and 15 years of age, when most inoculation and vaccination took place, are too sparse and inconclusive to settle the matter. Not surprisingly Razzell concludes that more research is needed.
The author now sees mortality-led population growth as part of a more generalized process of medical innovation, which included better personal hygiene and the rebuilding of houses. Why either form of change, hygiene or housing, should be considered a medical innovation is not explained. Clearly, more thought is needed, as well more research.
Nevertheless Razzell's book remain a valuable contribution to the history of epidemic disease and its control in Western Europe, if only because of the attention he pays to the critical role of economic factors in disease control. His research demonstrates that even when the technology is available, and officials are interested in applying it, costs can check the diffusion of a life-saving innovation.
Inoculation was introduced into Britain by the leading physicians and surgeons who treated the royal family. To minimize the dangers associated with inoculation (it required insertion of smallpox matter from an infected, but recovering person, into the bloodstream of someone not yet exposed) the royal physicians made inoculation into an elaborate and expensive procedure. Between 1720 and 1750 inoculating a single person cost about 26 pounds, roughly twice the annual salary of a single agricultural laborer. Such high costs meant that parish poor law officers could not even think of paying a physician to inoculate the entire parish even if they wanted to. (The whole parish had to be inoculated in order to prevent a few newly inoculated persons from spreading the disease to the rest). That meant that each time an epidemic broke out the dead poor had to be buried, and the sick poor provided with nursing or medical care. Because smallpox disabled a certain number of survivors, the parish had also to provide them with long-term support.
In the l750s, roughly 30 years after inoculation was introduced, an innovative surgeon named Sutton bucked the medical establishment and simplified the procedure. Costs fell dramatically, and mass inoculation began. Between 1750 and 1800, even before vaccination replaced inoculation (after l800) smallpox ceased to be a leading cause of death in Britain, even if it did not disappear altogether.
Smallpox and AIDS are both infectious diseases transmitted from person to person, the former by air and the latter by sexual contact (as well as blood transfusions). Then as now both diseases terrified vulnerable populations, inspired intensive medical research and led to public heath campaigns. In both cases the first effective means for controlling the disease was developed for the rich or, later, for rich countries, so that in the case of AIDS the cocktail of retroviral drugs now available costs many times more than the annual income of an ordinary person in a poor country.
Although Razzell does not draw parallels between his history of smallpox and the current history of AIDS, any imaginative reader can do so. For that reason alone a book published almost three decades ago is still well worth reading, although the author himself no longer agrees with his own earlier arguments.