How did democratic regimes in the ancient world mobilize their citizens to resist and defeat the threat of tyrannical and oligarchical coups? In this excellent book, classicist David Teegarden argues that the answer can be found, at least in part, in the fascinating case of antityranny legislation—legislation that, in short, exhorted democratic citizens to kill tyrants. Teegarden’s study offers the first comprehensive account of such anti-tyranny legislation, while also attempting to explain just how it may have worked in practice to preserve democratic regimes in antiquity. Drawing on the work of Timur Kuran (on revolutionary action) and Michael Chwe (on common knowledge), the book offers a model for the ways in which such legislation sought to solve the revolutionary coordination problems that tyrants and oligarchs could exploit in attempting to overthrow democratic regimes.
In the book’s first chapter, Teegarden explicates this model by demonstrating how the earliest piece of anti-tyranny legislation—the Decree of Demophantos passed in Athens in 410 b.c.—arose as a response to the oligarchic coup of 411 b.c. Through a careful reading of Thucydides’ account of the events leading up to the coup, he contends that oligarchs were able to exploit a “revolutionary coordination problem”—namely, that individuals are unlikely to mobilize to defend the regime unless they can be assured that others will join them—by means of a campaign of fear, intimidation, and violence; in Thucydides’ words, pro-democrats were “powerless because of their lack of knowledge of one another” (quoted on p. 40). Such “pluralistic ignorance” is the product of the fact that individuals living within an authoritarian state will falsify their preferences in order to avoid the potential cost of publicly expressing their opposition to the regime in power. While individual preference falsification thus inhibits revolutionary action through the generation of pluralistic ignorance, it also explains, according to Kuran, how mobilization can emerge. Each individual, he posits, possesses a particular “revolutionary threshold,” determined by the percentage of the population that would need to stop falsifying its preferences and oppose the regime, for that individual to do the same. Within any “threshold sequence”—that set of individual revolutionary thresholds in a particular regime—there exists the possibility of a revolutionary cascade; those with a relatively low revolutionary threshold may act first, thus meeting the revolutionary thresholds of others, who then also act, and so on. In Athens in 411 b.c., it was the assassination of the oligarchic leader Phrynichos that provided the spark that ignited the “revolutionary bandwagon” that led to the restoration of the democracy through a popular uprising.
According to Teegarden, the Decree of Demophantos, passed in the aftermath of the democratic restoration, sought to capitalize on what Athenian democrats learned from both their inability to prevent the coup and its eventual defeat. It did so by creating what the author terms a “tyrannicide incentive package” that sought to ensure, in the event of a subsequent coup, that a new “tyrant-slayer” would act and spark another revolutionary bandwagon. First, the decree states that anyone who overthrows the democracy in Athens or holds any office during the period when the democracy has been overthrown is declared to be an enemy of the Athenians and can be killed with impunity, thus attempting to assuage the potential tyrant-slayer that he will not be liable to prosecution for his actions. Second, the decree requires all Athenian citizens to publicly swear an oath that each of them will, insofar as he is able, kill anyone who overthrows or attempts to overthrow the democracy; the oath reiterates the Athenian commitment to holding any tyrant-killer guiltless, and it further stipulates rewards for the successful tyrant-killer or for the family and descendants of anyone who dies in the attempt. For Teegarden, while the decree itself served to make credible the commitment of Athenian pro-democrats to defend their regime in the event of a coup, the oath generated common knowledge of that credible commitment. Drawing on the work of Michael Chwe, Teegarden offers a plausible reconstruction of the oath ritual and demonstrates how it would have generated the common knowledge necessary to solve the revolutionary coordination problem. Taken together, the decree and the oath thus sought to facilitate collective action in defense of the democratic regime of Athens by lowering the revolutionary thresholds of pro-democrats, making it more likely that someone would “move first” and attempt to kill the tyrant and that others would mobilize in the wake of his actions. Conversely, it also sought to make the possibility of any future oligarchic coup less likely by raising the revolutionary thresholds of potential tyrants/oligarchs, making credible the commitment of pro-democrats to mobilize to resist the overthrow of the democratic regime. Subsequent chapters apply this basic model to other anti-tyranny legislation to demonstrate how this strategy was adopted and adapted by Athens and other democratic city-states at the end of the Classical and early Hellenistic periods.
As with the work of Josiah Ober (see Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens, 2008), Teegarden’s book illustrates the benefit of applying the tools of contemporary social science to the study of democracy in the ancient world. It also demonstrates how an analysis of ancient democratic institutions and practices can provide fertile ground for democratic theorizing. In particular, the anti-tyranny legislation analyzed in this book provides an intriguing example of what one might call a democratic response to emergency politics. First, such legislation posits the continued existence of the democratic regime and the force of its laws even in the event of a successful oligarchic coup; it thus asserts the persistence of the rule of law and the subjection of those who orchestrated the coup to its strictures. Second, such legislation avoids the concentration of emergency powers in the hands of one individual or a few (in contrast with, for example, the use of the dictatorship in the Roman Republic). Rather, it sought to preserve democracy through the collective action of the dēmos; in this sense, anti-tyranny legislation, at least in Athens, can be viewed as attempting to recreate the revolutionary action that Ober has argued (“The Athenian Revolution of 508/7,” in The Athenian Revolution, 1999, pp. 32–52) was a necessary condition for the creation of Athenian dēmokratia.
While Teegarden himself does not develop these lines of argument in Death to Tyrants! it is a testament to the richness of the material discussed and the deftness with which it is analyzed that it provides such fertile ground for those working in other disciplines. Along similar lines, the author begins with a “factional and power-based” understanding of ancient dēmokratia as the power of the multitude to impose their will; here again one can find the resources for developing a better theoretical understanding of Athenian dēmokratia that may well be implicit in such anti-tyranny legislation. In short, Teegarden has written an excellent book that not only makes a clear contribution to the field of Classics but also deserves a wide readership by anyone interested in ancient democracy and its relevance for contemporary democratic theory.
