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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 September 2005
This is the best general introductory volume on contemporary Iran that I have read. The range and relevance of issues covered by the book is impressive without being convoluted, and the lucid prose and masterly synthesis never befuddles the reader. For nonspecialist readers who seek to understand the dynamics of contemporary Iranian society but feel intimidated by the complexities of its recent history, or are aggravated by the repetitive and often superficial musings of the existing journalistic and academic literature, no better single volume can be recommended. However, this slim book is beneficial not only to the general reader or the undergraduate student. Virtually every page has an insightful comment or a critical bit of new information to excite even specialists who are well familiar with the author's previous work or with the current state of development of Iranian society.
This is in large part due to the author's experience and deep familiarity with contemporary Iran. Bernard Hourcade headed the French research institute in Tehran (IFRI) during the difficult years of the revolution, the Iran–Iraq War, and the postwar reconstruction, from 1978 to 1993. He regularly visits and is currently in the process of issuing an updated version of his excellent Atlas d'Iran, initially published in 2000 (previously reviewed by this reviewer for Iranian Studies), and an even more original and critically important Atlas de Téhéran, to be published in the near future.
Hourcade's intimate familiarity with the difficult complexities of Iran's postrevolutionary history serves him well in this volume, which covers an impressive range of subjects in a very accessible manner. Various chapters deal with the impact of Iran's physical geography on its history and social culture: the historic roots of Iran's penchant for insularity and its sense of exceptionalism, the making of the modern state, the paradoxical impact of oil revenues in shaping political culture, the rise of new elites and middle classes after the Iran–Iraq War and the revolution, and so on.
The focus of this book is postrevolutionary Iran. The book's subtitle, “The New Identities of a Republic,” captures Hourcade's thrust: the Islamic Republic is not a democracy yet, but it is a functioning republic, where regular elections shape the political landscape, and the entire population has entered the mainstream of the political and social life. The revolution was a rupture that transformed all aspects of social life—mental, material, and institutional—and led to the rise of new social actors. These new social actors include women and young people but also provincial populations, ethnic and religious minorities, new middle classes, and new political elites. The political Islam that mobilized the population in 1979 was an innovative use of religion by a popular movement that was profoundly nationalist and antiimperialist. After twenty-five years of turbulent history, the republic populated by the “sons and daughters of Khomeini” has become what is fundamentally a “post-Islamist society.” This post-Islamist Iran is now seeking to settle into a domestic political equilibrium, however difficult, and to integrate and reassert its place in its geographic neighborhood.
Within the English-language academic and journalistic literature, the Iranian revolution is generally theorized as either a revolt of traditionalist Islam ending in a “theocracy” of clerical rule, a backlash against a too rapid authoritarian modernization that proved indigestible for a still “traditional” society, or a consequence of the discrepancy between a rapidly developing economy and a rigid political superstructure. Hourcade offers an alternative and, in my opinion, more convincing argument that sees the 1979 revolution as a rupture aimed at creating a modern and mass-based polity by a rebellious population that was already “modernized” (the literate and the urbanized) and was resolved to enter the mainstream of its national history, from which it was being systematically excluded by the course of development adopted by its political elites. From this perspective, the history of postrevolutionary Iran is written as if the whole population had a role in it, and not simply the new Khomeinist ruling elites or a putatively homogeneous “clerical class.” What is of real value is that Hourcade makes this argument by empirically analyzing, in a brief but still substantial manner, the concrete institutional, cultural, and material transformations that Iranian society has undergone.
Hourcade emphasizes the tremendous cost borne by the whole Iranian population during these very difficult, and often violent and oppressive, twenty-five years. His analyses of the changes in power relations between the provinces and the capital, the shifting politics of ethnicity and cultural identity, and the changing institution of the family and gender roles are illuminating. The scrutiny of the increasing role of university education, and of accumulation of cultural capital as a general strategy of upward mobility pursued by new middle classes, whether secular or close to the regime, is excellent and could have been written only by someone intimately familiar with the troubled history of the subject. The same can be said about his analysis of the horrendous costs of the “cultural revolution” of 1981–83 and of the subsequent educational strategies of the Islamic Republic.
The book does have a number of minor shortcomings. The bibliography is inadequate for anyone wishing to pursue serious further readings, especially by specific topics covered in the book. The list of websites specializing in Iran is a welcome addition, but it is outdated and has surprising omissions. These and other minor flaws notwithstanding, this is an excellent volume on Iran that can greatly benefit students, interested scholars, journalists, and—dare I add in the present highly disturbing geopolitical situation?—American policymakers.