The stated goals of Narnia and the Fields of Arbol are threefold: to argue that C. S. Lewis's fiction has an environmental vision that “has gone largely unnoticed” (42), to bridge gaps in the environmental movement, and to show that Lewis's “worldview provides a strong and objective basis for healthy environmentalism” (44). The second and third goals account in some measure for the authors' focus on Lewis's fiction, which they believe has a wider appeal than his nonfiction. The book defends “a certain Christian view of ecology” (44). This defense is for ecologically disengaged Christians fond of Lewis and for non-Christians who care about ecology but blame Christianity for our environmental problems.
These are fine goals enlisted in the service of a very dubious project. Intuiting the dangers, the authors note the important connections—“extending well beyond a romantic concern for forests and trees”—between the massive deforestation in The Last Battle and the clear-cutting of Bracton Woods in That Hideous Strength. Those connections, rightly regarded as “profound and prophetic[,] … are the focus of this book” (21). They also mark the field of inquiry, which is limited to the Chronicles of Narnia and the Space Trilogy.
Dickerson and O'Hara prepare for their analysis with a brief survey of their enemies. They dispense with nonsense credibly if not splenetically, and also with a careful effort to establish that nature, as Lewis wrote, is not “a mere datum” but “an achievement” (40)—that is, a living being.
That remark is cited in one of the book's better chapters, “What He Thought about Everything,” a competent summary of Lewis's beliefs regarding nature. Lewis “understood all the disciplines as having a real connection to nature” and “would have thought it absurd to attempt to develop an intellectual discipline that had no connection to some view of the natural world” (20). The authors also understand the importance of Lewis's conversion to that view of nature, which improved upon “his earlier pre-Christian interpretation of Platonic spirituality.” “You don't see Nature,” Lewis wrote in a letter of 1943, “till you believe in the Supernatural: don't get the full, hot, salty tang of her except by contrast with pure water from beyond the world” (37).
Three chapters on the Chronicles follow, and, unfortunately, they proceed by dilettantish tricks of criticism. The first begins with a discussion of Wendell Berry's Jayber Crow, the purpose of which is to show that we see “many of the same ideas at work” in The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe: Edmund, like Troy Chatham, “easily believes flattery” (49) and “imagines ‘what sort of palace he will have’ (much like Troy's big farm office)” (50). The string of logic, apparently tacit, is that Wendell Berry is an environmentalist, that one of Lewis's characters resembles one of Berry's, and that, therefore, Lewis is an environmentalist.
Similarities between these two characters are certainly worth noting. However, the effect of this critical move is to shake the reader's confidence in what follows, and what follows is often as strategically daft. In Prince Caspian, there are many Old Narnians
who profess a belief in Aslan but don't always behave in ways consistent with that belief. … Put in terms of ecology, then, Lewis might be suggesting that a belief in Aslan provides a transcendent basis for morality, and more to the point of this book, for healthy environmental practices, but that many unbelievers have the same healthy practices (even if they don't share the same objective basis), while many believers (who ought to have healthy practices) fail to live out the principles of belief (69).
It is difficult to countenance this facile translation of ideas, but that is the principal means by which the authors tease environmentalism out of the Narnia stories. Ideas are “put in terms of ecology” that Lewis “might be suggesting”—in a book that claims to ask not what Lewis “would have thought about ecology, nature and environmentalism” but what he “actually did think about these things” (42). Thus, as we come to the end of the chapters on Narnia and meet with the admission that there is very little about agriculture in the first six books, we are hardly converted by this timid claim: “[I]n The Last Battle we do get our first mention of a market where Narnians can go and find food… What kind of market, we don't know, but we suppose a sort of farmer's market, which can be a sign of a healthy agrarian community” (125–26).
Can be?
It is certainly true that a doctrine of nature runs through the Chronicles. However, the method here of drawing it out is contrived and tiresome, especially given the many clumsy sentences that should not have passed peer review or copy editing. I instance but one: “Nature was a good thing to have been, something of great value to have loved, and thus its end is worth mourning” (148). This is dreadful English.
Nonetheless, there is reason to endure the offenses: what we call “environmental issues” were certainly a concern for Lewis in the Space Trilogy, especially in That Hideous Strength. Dickerson and O'Hara adequately historicize Out of the Silent Planet and make plain one of its salient purposes: the re-enchantment of nature: “What Lewis hoped people would listen to in this fictionalized account is the idea of plenitude, that is, that the cosmos is not empty but full” (168). They also praise Perelandra, which they rightly regard as being “rich with ecological significance” and useful in analyzing “at least certain forms of contemporary deep ecology” (183, 184). Perelandra refuses “biocentric egalitarianism” and maintains the necessary “ontological gap” between the human and nonhuman that makes talk of “human moral responsibility” possible (185).
The promise of a discussion of That Hideous Strength, which provides the closest thing to an environmental vision that Lewis ever proffered in fiction, keeps a reader trudging. The authors note the disruptions in nature that occur in the novel, such as the clear-cutting of Bracton Woods. By contrast, they offer representations of a healthy ecology, including the careful gardening at St. Anne's and the concord there among the people and the animals.
However, here again, the central problem that bedevils this book presents itself: how to frame Lewis's thought in environmental terms. For the central difficulty—that Lewis never really spoke the language of environmentalism—still obtains
What he did speak was the language of the traditionalist, which in its way amounted to a conservatism that properly encompassed—but did not make as its primary concern—conservation. That Hideous Strength attempted in fiction what The Abolition of Man attempted in nonfiction. Indeed, an important idea appears in nearly identical form in both books: “Man's power over Nature means the power of some men over other men with Nature as its instrument” (223). However, the authors do not make any real gesture to frame the discussion in terms of Lewis's great distrust of progress. They do not really bring this distrust to bear until about midway through the book—in a brief discussion of Lewis's critique of applied science, which on Lewis's account reverses tradition: whereas tradition tells us to conform our desires to nature, applied science proposes to conform nature to our desires.
However, this is the real point. Lewis distrusted the aims of the modern liberal project inaugurated by the likes of Francis Bacon, who would treat nature as a prisoner and torture secrets out of her. Only from within this larger frame of reference can any form of ecology be deduced from Lewis's work. That Dickerson and O'Hara are only dimly aware of this makes it difficult to feel enthusiastic about their book.
