Maziar Behrooz has stated that the goal of his study is twofold: first, to document the history of communism in Iran during the thirty years between the 1953 coup and 1983, “when the last legal communist organizations were banned”; and second, “to provide an analysis of how and why the movement disintegrated in the 1980s.” (p. xv)

To meet these goals, Behrooz has organized this book in four chapters, with an Introduction and an Appendix that provides a chronology of the events between 1941 and 1983. The first three chapters mainly cover the first stated objective, which is a detailed study of the thirty-year history of the communist organizations in Iran. In Chapter 4, Behrooz competently implicates specific factors in the failure of the left in Iran. The book was written at the time of the total demise of the left, not only in Iran, but also on a global scale. This obvious disposition is therefore reflected in the author's critical point of view toward the left.

Behrooz clarifies that the thirty-year period included the history of three generations of the left in Iran. During the first period, the Tudeh Party developed from a collection of intellectuals to a mass party and a serious force with an impressive following among the workers. The party played a leading role in all three major workers' unions, which at one time included 75 percent of the labor force in Iran. The Tudeh Party also succeeded in placing three ministers in the cabinet. To this strength the party military networks within the armed forces should also be added. Regarding this fact of the vast influence of the Tudeh Party, particularly among the working class, it seems that Behrooz contradicts himself when he writes, “Perhaps the factor most instrumental in the Marxist defeat was the failure of the movement to create a strong base among the working class of Iran, which communists saw as vital to their plans” (p. 147). This conclusion stems from the fact that Behrooz posits a common basis for the failure of the left in all periods, while the reasons were actually dissimilar in the various stages.

Behrooz correctly indicates that the Tudeh Party's policy reliance on the Soviets kept it passive at the time of the coup in 1953. I would add that, considering the influence of the party and the popular support of the National Front among various social strata, the coup forces could easily have been defeated.

Behrooz emphasizes that the reliance of the Tudeh Party on the Soviets was so intense that the Comintern actually outlined the policies that the party was supposed to follow. This strategy, which considered the interests of Iran as a shadow of the interests of the Soviet Union, should be considered the most important factor in the Tudeh Party's failure in Iran. For a few years after the coup, sporadic resistance by party members continued but did not last long, and in 1958 it vanished when Khosrow Roozbeh was executed.

The second generation of the left included organizations such as the Fadaiyan Guerrillas and the Marxist–Leninist mujahedin, Tudeh splinter groups such as the Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh Party (ROTPI) (originally organized as the Tudeh Youth Organization), and a few regional organizations among the Qashqa

i tribe and in Kurdistan. Although all of these groups were angry at the Tudeh Party's politics, they were still influenced by the party's Stalinist legacy and mentality. This period coincided with the Sino-Soviet split and the emergence of Maoism, which caused an international split in many communist parties, including the Tudeh Party. Bijan Jazani, one of the leading theorists and founders of the Fadaiyan guerrillas, suggested that “the Iranian movement not take sides” (p. 60). However, to avoid the unresponsiveness that characterized the Tudeh Party, this group adapted the strategy of armed struggle, which caused them to remain confined within their own underground cells, isolated from the masses and fragmented from society. Surely, this was not the same factor that caused the Tudeh's failure.

With regard to the third period, Behrooz discusses the role of the leftist organizations before, during, and after the revolution and their final defeat. During the revolution in 1978–79, all of the leftist organizations resurfaced. However, Behrooz points to several factors responsible for the failure of the left after the revolution. These included the “relentless repression of the state” and the leftist's falling in the trap of the “anti-imperialist paradigm” that the Soviet Union had advocated for a long time. After the Tudeh Party caused a split in the Fadaiyan, the largest leftist organization, the pro-Soviet groups who were left, such as Tudeh and the Fadaiyan Majority, allied themselves with the ultra-reactionary ruling clerics and their associates. They took harsh and hostile positions against nationalist and liberal-oriented groups such as Nehzat Azadi, as well as against all other communist groups. Thus, Behrooz states, “After June 1981, the [Tudeh] party and the [Fadaiyan] Majority joined in the repression of those opposed to the IRI [Islamic Republic of Iran], a strategy which without doubt had many repercussions, the most important of which was to tarnish the hard-earned image of Marxism among the population” (p. 146). I would prefer to say something like, “Cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran” rather than they “joined in the repression” of those opposed to the IRI, for despite their cooperation both the Tudeh Party and the Fadaiyan Majority were infiltrated by the IRI. Siding with the IRI was part of the strategy of dividing the world between the Soviet and U.S. blocs, but the Tudeh wrongly saw the IRI as an anti–imperialist force. Instead, the anti–American position of the IRI was rooted in the anti–Western hysteria of Islamist fanaticism that felt stung by historical defeat.

Behrooz also refers to the “poverty of philosophy” among Marxists in Iran as a reason for their failure. This could be challenged by a reference to the victorious Islamist groups in Iran that were not philosophically inclined. They succeeded, rather, by a blind ideology. “Poverty of philosophy” is a relative concept and cannot really serve as a measurement for the defeat of political parties. Furthermore, this lack of philosophical thinking was not limited to the Iranian Marxists; it was in fact a universal characteristic that stemmed from the dogmatic, Stalinist mentality that equated the West with imperialism and considered liberalism the enemy of socialism.

I found Rebels with a Cause a rich, useful book with a great deal of remarkable and unbiased analyses. I strongly recommend this book to all who have an interest in the history of the left in Iran and to those researching the failure of communist movements around the world.