The Central Intelligence Agency. The name carries such a weight to it. Former President Lyndon Johnson once said that the CIA “is made up of boys whose families sent them to Princeton but wouldn't let them into the family brokerage business.” Indeed, the CIA's reputation as an agency of intelligent yet potentially mysterious people precedes it. Nowhere was this more evident than in CIA dealings in Southeast Asia, where a litany of operations, including the controversial Operation Menu and Operation Freedom Deal, transformed the region considerably and had the adverse effect of contributing to the rise of three communist regimes. While CIA dealings in Vietnam tend to take the spotlight, covert operations in the “sideshow” of the Indochina conflict, Cambodia, remains unexplored terrain. Enter The Cambodian Wars by former policy analyst and deputy director of the Asian Studies Center in Washington DC, Kenneth Conboy, who has composed the first study of CIA operations in Cambodia, and the first English-language analysis of the nation's non-communist resistance. The author builds on his previous works, Spies and Commandos (2000) and The CIA's Secret War in Tibet (2002), specifically, to argue that the CIA became “a pragmatic and attractive alternative” (p. xii) for support for anti-communist forces in Cambodia, notably the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF, 1979–1993).
The book consists of 18 chapters that take us through two eras of CIA involvement in Cambodia: the Civil War years (1970–1975) and the Reagan–Bush Presidencies (1981–1991). The first chapter is among the most comprehensive yet concise summaries of the history of what we call Cambodia today, from Funan to Angkor to Cambodge. Indeed, Conboy's “baptism by fire” approach introduces the reader to integral regional history and politics with expert precision. Another noteworthy part is Chapter 3, in which he discusses the events that contributed to the rise of Lon Nol, a man who US ambassador John Dean described as “not intelligent,” unable to “think logically and must be led by the hand through a chain of reasoning” (p. 41). Chapter 7 explores the marriage of convenience of several conflicting Cambodian Parties to counter the Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), which was responsible for ousting the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK); yet the marriage was short-lived, as communist and anti-communist (KNPLF) factions broke apart until coming together as the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Chapter 9, aptly named “Pyhrric victories,” explores clashes between the CPK and PAVN, and the trials and tribulations that antedated the CGDK's formation. Intriguingly, Conboy reveals that in “late 1984, CIA Director [William J.] Casey was looking to increase the total amount of nonlethal support [for Cambodian anti-communists] to $12 million a year … [yet] the CIA was handling $250 million in covert aid for the Afghan Mujahedeen during that fiscal year” (p. 182). This move to rebuff the Soviet advance into Afghanistan had prompted Jimmy Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski only five years earlier to make an about-face and support the Khmer Rouge after its 1979 ouster from Phnom Penh. Yet this financial incongruity shows a shift away from committing the US to fighting communism in the region rather than the inverse. Conboy's conclusion is less a traditional conclusion, per se, and more an assessment of CIA affairs in Cambodia. His claim that CIA operations, though “vexing,” had “seen Soviet expansionism on mainland Southeast Asia checked, America's regional friends and allies reassured, the Khmer Rouge spent, and the Cambodian noncommunists left with a foothold to build upon” (p. 332), is fair in accounting for some valuable gains, though some problems emerge with regard to the legacy of such decisions.
Importantly, Conboy's study contributes to an emergent trend in scholarship on contemporary Cambodian history that re-evaluates the extent to which foreign powers influenced politics and policies in Cambodia. Andrew Mertha's Brothers in Arms (2014), for instance, argued persuasively that while Chinese advisers had active roles before the CPK takeover, Beijing ended up as the subordinate Party, figuring less prominently thereafter. Conboy takes a similar approach, drawing from interviews with ex-agency operatives, military attachés, and KPNLF veterans to show that despite the CIA's concerted efforts to support anti-communist resistance, it failed to mount a worthy challenge. While he succeeds at outlining the various limitations and successes of CIA initiatives, the all-important role of China required more attention. Conboy acknowledges that China benefited most of all from developments in Cambodia, as it “dispatched its long-promised shipment of weapons to the KPNLF” (p. 153). Indeed, Beijing sought to benefit from politics in the region, as per usual. Yet this was an opportunity that, for one reason or another, Conboy sought to acknowledge yet not expand upon. Conboy also raises a Spockian eyebrow by stating that although ex-Khmer Rouge commander Hun Sen's political ascendancy came with “eroded” political freedoms and widespread corruption imminent, which made it “hard to rate Cambodia as an unqualified success story … there was ample reason to see the glass as half-full” (p. 332). Indeed, the author is correct to state that the situation improved when compared to the brutal CPK genocide. But this author finds it difficult to find the glass “half full” in light of Hun Sen's decades-long dictatorial rule of Cambodia through means of violence, repression, media censorship, corruption, intimidation, and most recently, accusations of his role in the murder of beloved political critic Kem Ley.
Altogether, Conboy's The Cambodian Wars is a detailed and thoroughly researched book that fills an important yet oft-overlooked gap in contemporary Cambodia studies. The author's attention to detail is commendable, showing his erudite approach to the topic of geopolitics, while his diverse source base makes for a very engaging read that is accessible to the expert and non-expert alike. This work is certainly compulsory material for anyone who wishes to get a fuller picture of US–Southeast Asia relations during the Cold War, and it allows us to understand more deeply the nature of Cambodian politics since 1993.
