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Power, Scepticism and Ethical Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2015

Thomas Pink*
Affiliation:
Kings College, London
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Abstract

It is often thought that as human agents we have a power to determine our actions for ourselves. And a natural conception of this power is as freedom – a power over alternatives so that we can determine for ourselves which of a variety of possible actions we perform. But what is the real content of this conception of freedom, and need self-determination take this particular form? I examine the possible forms self-determination might take, and the various ways freedom as a power over alternatives might be constituted. I argue that though ordinary ethical thought, and especially moral blame, may be committed to our possession of some capacity for self-determination, the precise nature of this power is probably ethically underdetermined – though conceptions of the nature of the power that come from outside ethics may then have important implications for ethics.

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Papers
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2015