Certain practitioners in politics, and some who contemplate that art somewhat more objectively, remain fascinated by Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971) even some four decades after his death. Among practitioners, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been linked to that theologian. And, evidence from a more contemplative vocation, the late CUNY historian John Diggins (1935–2009), in the period leading up to his death, attended to his manuscript of essays centered on Niebuhr.
Of course, many works are published posthumously. And the task of review is complicated in such cases by the fact that, even where the manuscript was complete, the author may not have intended the work to be published in quite the form that it was left. Indeed, Robert Huberty's foreword (viii) confesses to his own arrangement (at least of essay order) for this publication of Diggins.
That said, the aspirations of any eminent author's literary executors to publish are understandable. In this instance they seem encouraged by a question posed by Diggins (ix) in the face of contemporary attention to Niebuhr: Why do politicians and academic commentators turn now to such a theologian? The answer may be considered to have its source in Diggins's conviction: “Niebuhr always said the knowledge of God found its validity in human experience. For a half century he would offer us his observations on the state of society and the nature of politics, taking us into the heart of history, where the self is revealed” (34; see also 12, 36, 51–52, 105–8).
Now, Diggins has been considered to be among the most philosophical of contemporary historians. That is just as well given this focus on Niebuhr, a demanding conceptual thinker. Somewhat ironically from that perspective, in Niebuhr's conception “religion begins not with reason and thinking but with the self and its anxieties” (15). And, “ex-Catholic” (viii) by conviction, Diggins presents as a comprehending scholar in this field. That is, from a deeply informed perspective he has found Niebuhr to be theologically astute and politically relevant in an age imploring the articulate commentariat to provide an understanding of the state of distress suffered by humanity under our current polities. So, let me now reflect on Diggins's offering from the perspectives of Niebuhr's theology and politics; Diggins's task, of course, involved clarity about Niebuhr through hermeneutic of his work.
First, Niebuhr's theology. And here a caution that applies occasionally in the book should be registered. It is necessary to be alert to the possibility that, without clear notice, what Diggins presents is his own view or even the opinion of another scholar, rather than that of Niebuhr. For example, Diggins refers (2) to Judaism as a prophetic religion that envisions God present in history; but he also states (3) that in Judaism there is no Fall. Here the note given by Diggins (119) does not refer to Niebuhr, but rather to a 1951 publication by a Jewish scholar. Given that Niebuhr was Judaeo-Christian by confession, and that he reflected deeply on original sin (see 61, 64, 71, 79, 80, 81, 99, 112–13, 116), this needs a little more finesse than Diggins provides here. That is, the significance of the Fall for Judaeo-Christianity means that it would have been most useful had Diggins at this early point (2–3) imported and expanded the note that he later provided in commentary on original sin and its significance for Niebuhr (124). There, Diggins considered that, for Niebuhr, “even though the concept was ‘historically and symbolically correct,’ it proved a stumbling block to the modern mind.”
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that Niebuhr is not easily comprehended and interpreted. And there Diggins is provocative. Importantly, Diggins's exegesis of Niebuhr extends profoundly to God's identity. From Niebuhr's “Coherence, Incoherence, and Christian Faith” (Journal of Religion 31, no. 3 [1951]), Diggins notes with some extravagance that “In Niebuhr's account, God has an eternal identity crisis, for the Creator does not know who he is, whether sovereign and rational or contradictory and incoherent” (29). Perhaps; but in his 1951 article Niebuhr concluded: “the ultrarational pinnacles of Christian truth, embodying paradox and contradiction and straining at the limits of rationality, are made plausible when understood as the keys which make the drama of human life and history comprehensible” (159). So what might Niebuhr be understood to have meant in this seminal, if esoteric, theological article? Diggins should have addressed this question directly: his project, a contemporary conceptual appreciation of Niebuhr, would seem to require it. (The issue has been addressed robustly in, for instance, Robin W. Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism [Cambridge University Press, 1995]; notably, for his own manuscript on Niebuhr, Diggins did not refer to that publication.)
Second, Niebuhr's politics. Here let me focus on only one policy matter: nuclear weapons and the justification of their use. Diggins presents a Niebuhr convinced that pacifism was dubious in religion and dangerous in politics (2). And Niebuhr's “voice” was to guide America through World War II, the Cold War, and Vietnam (5). Critically, however, Niebuhr's position was highly nuanced: “Niebuhr opposed the moral terms by which the Cold War came to be defined, and if he drew upon religion for political purposes, it was to foster skepticism and self-scrutiny, not to encourage arrogant self-assertion and rituals of righteousness” (6).
Niebuhr's conviction here (Moral Man and Immoral Society) is that patriotism transmutes individual unselfishness into national egotism (63). But while he initially denounced Truman's decision for the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Niebuhr acknowledged that those bombings had saved lives (64). There Niebuhr would find contemporary assent within the Christian religious tradition including, recently, Wilson D. Miscamble (The Most Controversial Decision [Cambridge University Press, 2011], 123). And one aspect of an answer to Diggins's question (Why Niebuhr now?) then resonates deeply. Given his offerings, Niebuhr continues to be relevant insofar as the perplexing moral issue of nuclear weapon possession and use (historic and potential) remains current (62–67, 72–74, 78, 88, 90, 95–96).
In conclusion, this is an impressive but brief (117 pages of text) posthumous collection of essays. Nevertheless, to succumb to the obvious temptation for any reviewer here, and as is prophesied in Huberty's foreword (viii), it must be said that an editor might have made many useful suggestions to Diggins (had he been able to see this work through that process). Some details are suggested above; but broader issues might also be registered. Consider the following. Diggins did not die until January 2009. By then, McCain (in 2007) is considered to have celebrated Niebuhr as a paragon of clarity about the costs of a (morally) good war. (Indeed, subsequent to Diggins's passing and without mentioning Niebuhr, Obama was thought to have faithfully reflected the theologian in his December 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech.) It would have been fascinating to hear commentary from Diggins concerning McCain. And it could have assisted Diggins in further explicating the contemporary relevance of Niebuhr's politico-theological thought. If such counterfactual speculation is not unfair here, explication of that type would certainly have extended the book's appeal to an even wider audience.
