Risk is everywhere in today's scholarship. Across the twentieth century, economic theories of risk have often been tied to insurance and investment strategies. New models of risk aversion emerge from behavioral economics and psychology to animate game theory and to elaborate the understanding of rational choice. Now, historians have begun to explore the subject too. Sharon Ann Murphy's prize-winning 2011 history of the life insurance industry, Investing in Life: Insurance in Antebellum America (Johns Hopkins) took a business historian's approach to the crucial financial intermediary. In 2013 Arwen Mohun published Risk: Negotiating Safety in American Society (also Johns Hopkins), which uses methods and approaches more common to historians of technology. Both authors pay considerable attention to the legal and institutional histories that defined and mediated risks from nature, from industry, and from culture and behavior. Jonathan Levy's book, on the other hand, occupies a rising historical subdiscipline called the History of Capitalism, whose practitioners often provide deep philosophical studies more in the style of cultural than economic history. Freaks of Fortune is no exception: an intellectual examination of the changing meaning and importance of risk, as capitalist behavior and a capitalist economic system took command in the first hundred-odd years of U.S. history.
The book follows a broad chronology of the nineteenth century, beginning with the origins of “risque” in the context of overseas trade. Marine insurance provides the author's lens for “double commodification,” in which “the owner of a commodity in motion” upon the seas was “the proprietor of a financial ‘Risque,’” which had its own existence in trade (pp. 32–33). Levy provides examples of this early form of risk especially from the slave trade, including both the 1781 slave ship Zong and the disputes over the liability for slaves jettisoned by the crew, and an insurrection aboard the Creole in 1841. From these cases, he finds an emerging role of risk in capitalist life. Freedom meant self-ownership of both one's person and the risks of one's life—another case of double commodification. After establishing this definition, the concepts of self-ownership and double commodification animate Levy's analysis of life insurance and fraternal associations and the freedman's bank; of farm mortgages and futures markets and the Great Merger Movement. All rely on the double commodification in which the object is one commodity, and the risk of losing that object becomes another.
The chapter “Trading the Future” provides in microcosm Levy's view of capitalism's history. He traces a business history that begins with merchants shipping goods around the world in a relatively blind ignorance of market conditions, ventures that waited months to reveal results, and moves on to the near-instantaneous transmission of price information that telegraphy afforded. That relationships ameliorated some of the earlier risk is noted, but Levy emphasizes the use of language involving providence and fate in merchants’ correspondence and accounts. As information flowed more rapidly and freely, Levy uses the speculator's voice to explain the purposes of futures trading (to hedge, to smooth price volatility, and to allow users of commodities to price the cost of their raw materials in line with the value of their finished goods) and also that of the Populist farmer (that the trade in fictitious goods was fantasy that drove down farmers’ prices). This chapter, like the rest of the book, abounds with insight on the increasing abstraction of markets from the goods their participants traded, but leaves open the question of whether financial derivatives have “led to greater risk management or… to greater market volatility” (p. 263).
Among the compelling threads that stitch together Levy's disparate institutions and events is the development of the individual as a mobile and flexible economic actor who owns himself and risks his stability on an uncertain future. At the same time as individualism explains the history of capitalism, so does the development of “risk communities” (p. 22), especially the push toward general incorporation laws and the rise of Big Business at the turn of the last century. Fraternal associations are another example, but the “trusts” form Levy's climactic example. The story of risk's emergence and spread therefore has a “double arc” with two eventual results: “a new individualism and a new corporate financial system” (p. 13). The first has a moral quality, as people assumed responsibility for their financial destiny rather than relying on providence. The second institutionalized risk and “became the reserves of new probabilistic, statistical explanations of future change” (p. 4). In stitching together financial obligations, risk “belong[ed not] only to individuals but also to society” (p. 267).
The appendix contains tables that trace assets, balances, and memberships in life insurance companies, fraternal associations, and the freedman's bank. In addition, Levy fully employs southern history into his analysis (a region sometimes ignored by historians of American capitalism), which allows him to tie freedom to the concepts of self-ownership and risk management. Levy develops a powerful and multivalent language for discussing the shift from providence to self-ownership, from shipping goods to incorporating enterprise. The “economic chance-world” (p. 90) he studies is the one most modern humans occupy, and our strategies for dealing with risk have historical roots as deep as risk itself. We are all the “freaks of fortune” in his title, and Levy teaches us how and why we became them.
