Political communities face questions about the rights and duties their citizens ought to have, with respect to each other and between citizens and the state. Yet one of the most familiar conditions of modernity is a plurality of reasonable beliefs about what constitutes a good life and what ends are worth pursuing; we also must deal with conflicting evidence and uncertainty about the facts bearing on the resolution of normative controversy. Footnote 1 In light of this disagreement, how can large-scale modern communities establish the conditions under which people can live together, cooperate on mutually beneficial projects, and even flourish? The answer is that the community can rely on legitimate procedures for establishing permissions, obligations, and rights that may be asserted in the name of society as a whole as a way of disentangling social from individual judgments about what people ought to do. Footnote 2 As Scott Shapiro has argued in Legality, that function of law represents its moral aim. Footnote 3 The same functional account implies a moral aim for the legal profession. If the law complex and esoteric, as it will likely be in a modern industrialized society, a specialized social role will exist for experts who help others understand what rights and duties they have under the laws of their society, and who structure transactions, assert legal rights, and advise citizens on how to comply with the law. If the law has the moral aim of enabling co-existence in the face of uncertainty and disagreement, then the moral aim of the legal profession is to secure for individuals the social goods established by positive law, as contrasted with first-order moral goods such as justice or the protection of rights. Footnote 4
This is the rough outline of an account of legal ethics that begins with considerations of political liberalism and democratic legitimacy, and emphasizes the moral value of socially determined—that is, positivist—legal entitlements. What we may call positivist legal ethics has established itself as an alternative to approaches that take individual moral agency as the starting point and regard law’s claim of authority with great skepticism. Footnote 5 Recently, however, critics have expressed doubt about the viability of the positivist legal ethics project. Footnote 6 Perhaps surprisingly, the principal objection of critics is not to the claim that the law has a moral aim. Rather, the objection is that the interpretation of law, by lawyers in the course of representing clients, is necessarily a process that cannot be separated from moral reasoning. The law has the moral aim of settling disagreement, but there will always be a certain amount of play in the joints, so to speak. The law that applies to clients may be capable of bearing several plausible interpretations. Making the problem worse, the law that applies to lawyers, which seeks to constrain what they do on behalf of clients, may itself be capable of bearing more than one plausible interpretation. Thus, critics argue, the law cannot displace morality in the practical reasoning of lawyers, because there may frequently be an open question of whether a creative or aggressive interpretation of law—that applies either to clients or lawyers—is justifiable in a particular case. This discretion requires lawyers to make a moral judgment because the exclusionary effect of law extends only to those situations in which it is capable of guiding the agent’s practical reasoning. If legal judgment necessarily implicates moral judgment, then positivist legal ethics is incoherent.
This paper aims to show, first through a brief history of the debate in theoretical legal ethics, and then through some hypothetical cases, that positivist legal ethics can be saved from charges of incoherence or circularity. Doing so requires grounding the duties and permissions of lawyers, including those regulating the interpretation of legal norms, on considerations related to the ideal of the rule of law. Law systematically purports to create certain types of reasons for action. Footnote 7 It establishes the possibility of a distinctive type of justification that can be given for one’s actions. To say something is legally permitted is not necessarily to say it is morally permitted; that is the core thesis of legal positivism. Footnote 8 It is to say, however, that the legal institutions of a society have achieved at least a provisional resolution of the question of what must or may be done in a particular instance. From the point of view of some abstract entity like “society as a whole” or “the political community,” it is now permitted or prohibited to do X. Someone who is attracted to the ideal of the rule of law would make two normative claims: First, that it is a good thing for a political community to resolve disagreement and conflict using procedures that take competing views into account, resolve them in the name of the community as a whole, and create general, public, accessible reasons that may be given by community members as a justification of actions that affect other citizens. The second claim is that lawyers ought to refrain from undermining the rule of law in their representation of clients. For now this is rather abstract, but this paper is intended to make this conception of legal ethics more concrete, and to fortify it against some of the objections that have been leveled against it.
I.
The central question for legal ethics is how a lawyer can justify doing an act that, if performed outside the context of a professional role, would call for moral condemnation. Charles Fried famously started his defense of the lawyer’s role by asking, “Can a good lawyer be a good person?” Footnote 9 David Luban quotes the English Whig historian Thomas Babington Macaulay (who had trained as a lawyer) archly observing the willingness of a lawyer, “with a wig on his head, and a band around his neck, [to] do for a guinea what, without those appendages, he would think it wicked and infamous to do for an empire.” Footnote 10 The inquiry has been expressed differently, but always comes down to the relationship between the requirements of morality that every person, as a moral agent, must respect, and the duties that follow from one’s adoption of a professional role with characteristic ends and values. Until about the 1970’s, there were few systematic attempts to answer this question, at least until the publication of Richard Wasserstrom’s paper, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, Footnote 11 which set the terms of the debate for the next 30 years. Wasserstrom made role-differentiated morality central to legal ethics. Professional roles create a kind of separate moral universe, he argued, in which a person occupying that role may, or must, put aside considerations that would otherwise be relevant if not decisive in practical deliberation. Footnote 12 Roles and role-differentiated obligations and permissions are a pervasive feature of ethics. Footnote 13 Parents, for example, may prefer the interests of their own children, even if other children have more urgent needs. Footnote 14 The problem is not that lawyers are subject to role-differentiated obligations, but that these obligations lack the right connection to more general moral considerations.
Luban’s analysis of this problem became the conventional wisdom in the field following the publication of his 1988 book, Lawyers and Justice. He argued that any action performed within a professional role must be given a moral justification all the way down, showing that the relevant institution, such as the legal system, is justified, and so is the specific role (lawyer) within it, the duty that requires the action, and the action itself. Footnote 15 Failure at any stage of this four-step chain of justification leaves the professional without an excuse for having violated impartial moral demands. For decades scholars valiantly tried to provide a justification that satisfied Luban’s fourfold challenge. Charles Fried, for example, emphasized human freedom and subjectivity as the source of value. Footnote 16 From this perspective, certain individuals—family members and close friends—become important, constitutive aspects of a person’s life. Seeing the world from one’s subjective perspective includes having concern for people with whom we share a common narrative and relationships of love and friendship. It follows that it may be permissible to favor the interests of those with whom we are in particularly close, personal relationships over the well-being of humanity as a whole. From this account of the importance of friendship it is supposed to follow that professional “friends,” otherwise known as lawyers, are permitted to favor the interests of their clients over those of the loose aggregation of interests known as “society” or “the common good” and also over any particular third parties whose interests are harmed by the lawyer’s actions—witnesses who are humiliated, opposing parties who lose a just claim due to the lawyer’s exploitation of technicalities and loopholes, and so on. Footnote 17
The trouble with Fried’s argument is that the ordinary moral notion of friendship cannot do the work Fried wants it to. Duties and permissions within friendship relationships arise from a long shared history of concern for one another’s well-being, and this shared history presumably would not arise between a morally decent person and a repugnant one. When there is a shared history between friends, each adopts the other’s interests as his or her own; indeed, this feature of friendship is central to Fried’s identification of the friend’s interests with the agent’s own well-being. If the lawyer and client really are friends, the lawyer should be morally accountable for the client’s ends. Footnote 18 Moreover the client owes no duties to the lawyer, making the relationship an odd kind of one-way friendship. Fried may respond, of course, that the lawyer-client relationship is an artificial type of relationship, so that the lawyer is the client’s “special purpose” friend. If this is response, however, Fried is vulnerable to the objection that a bought-and-paid-for companion or advocate is better analogized to either a prostitute or a mercenary Footnote 19 —neither of which is a morally appealing relationship to which to draw analogies.
This is how arguments tended to proceed in the first generation of philosophical legal ethics, with ordinary morality taken as the starting point. In response to Luban’s demand for a moral justification all the way down, the defenders of lawyers’ role-differentiated duties and permissions looked for a principle that connects with ordinary moral values such as loyalty, autonomy, Footnote 20 or human dignity, Footnote 21 and tried to show how it entails duties and permissions within the lawyer’s professional role. It was assumed that professional roles must be transparent to analysis in moral terms. Scholars tended to accept Arthur Applbaum’s conclusion that in professional ethics, “[r]oles cannot filter out morally pertinent preconventional descriptions of acts and actors.” Footnote 22 With lawyers’ actions described in preconventional terms, such as harassment, humiliation, lying, or cheating, Footnote 23 the burden of justification was substantial, and the conclusion of theorists at least was that much of what lawyers take for granted as their professional ethical obligations is unjustified in moral terms. This conclusion did not sit well with practicing lawyers and some legal scholars, who argued that the philosophical critics of legal ethics attack a caricatured description of the lawyer’s role. Footnote 24
More theoretically, returning to Applbaum’s principle, some began to posit that roles actually can change the morally pertinent descriptions of actors and actions. Footnote 25 Consider the much-discussed example of the abusive questioning, by lawyers representing the manufacturer, of plaintiffs in the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device products liability litigation. Footnote 26 Certain high-risk sexual practices were an alternative causal explanation for the pelvic inflammatory disease suffered by the plaintiffs, which they attributed to a design defect in the contraceptive device. Defense lawyers therefore asked highly embarrassing questions about the plaintiffs’ sexual histories and practices at the women’s depositions. Is the best description of the situation—i.e., the most apt description for ethical analysis—either (1) taking a deposition in a products liability action in order to discovery evidence that would exonerate the manufacturer from liability, or (2) a man asking a woman creepy and intrusive questions about her sexual practices? In Applbaum’s terms, (2) is the preconventional description of the act, but many of the morally relevant features of the act are best described by (1). If it were not for the lawsuit and discovery mechanisms provided by the rules of civil procedure, the conversation likely never would have taken place. It was the occurrence of a legally cognizable injury, and the filing of a legal demand for redress, that furnished the occasion for the conversation in which embarrassing questions were asked. The description of lawyers as creepy men asking intrusive questions persists, but it is not the description that best captures the morally relevant features of the situation.
The insight that conventional practices can change the most pertinent description of events is a familiar one, Footnote 27 but it had broader implications for philosophical legal ethics. In the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, a second generation of scholarship in the field began to emerge, critical of the insistence of Wasserstrom, Luban, Applbaum, and others that role-differentiated morality demanded a justification in ordinary moral terms. Footnote 28 In what has come to be known as the “jurisprudential turn” in legal ethics, Footnote 29 scholars grounded their inquiry not in ordinary moral considerations, but in the role lawyers play in the legal system, and the role the legal system plays in society. Understood as a branch of political philosophy, legal ethics proceeds from the standpoint not of individual moral agents but of political communities. As the following section briefly recounts, the development of this second generation of legal ethics coincided with developments in jurisprudence that linked the authority of law to its capacity to resolve social controversies that otherwise would remain intractable due to empirical uncertainty and value pluralism.
II.
Human beings are disputatious yet sociable creatures. Footnote 30 We seek to live together in relative harmony, organize things, and achieve ends that require large-scale planning and coordination. For example, the community may want to attend to its natural resources, like clean air and drinking water, and protect them from pollution. The pervasiveness and intractability of disagreements about basic normative and empirical issues, however, suggests that a project as basic as caring for the environment is likely to bog down in conflict from the outset. How much pollution should be allowed, given that some emissions are the necessary by-product of energy production? Who should pay to mitigate or clean up pollution? Should people who are injured by environmental contamination have a right to seek redress against the polluter? Our hypothetical society may be unable to agree on the substantive answers to those questions, but it may be possible to reach agreement on a procedural mechanism for addressing them. Each citizen of the society may reasonably agree to accept the rules made by a representative legislative body, chosen in fair elections after a process of free and open debate over the pressing issues in the community—in other words, positive law. Idealized though this picture may be, it captures the moral appeal of a type of political liberalism that emphasizes neutral procedures as a means of resolving conflicts and enabling cooperation against a background of deep divisions over fundamental questions about the good, the right, and the just.
Scott Shapiro has given this sort of functional account of the nature of law, analogizing the law to a large-scale plan. Planning is necessary where a community’s problems are “so numerous and serious, and their solutions so complex, contentious, or arbitrary, that nonlegal forms of ordering behavior are inferior ways of guiding, coordinating, and monitoring conduct.” Footnote 31 Around the time Shapiro’s work in general jurisprudence was achieving prominence, several legal ethics scholars proposed a similar functional story to explain the lawyer’s ethical role. Footnote 32 The lawyer’s ethical obligations are derivative of the function of the law. If the role of the law is to secure the social goods of solidarity, peaceful coexistence, and planned, coordinated action, then the role of the legal profession should be to help the legal system perform its function. That means, for one thing, providing access to the entitlements that the law has assigned to citizens. A negative implication is that lawyers should not refuse to assist clients in ascertaining and exercising their legal entitlements because of a morally based disagreement with the client’s objectives. Because the function of the law is to establish at least a provisional resolution of normative controversy to enable mutually beneficial cooperative projects among citizens, it cannot be the case that ascertaining the content of law will require re-engaging with the controversy that the law was meant to settle. Footnote 33 A lawyer should not be what Luban calls a “moral activist,” and refuse to provide fully zealous representation where the lawyer has moral qualms about the client’s ends. Footnote 34
Positivist legal ethics claims that, just as the pluralism, disagreement, and settlement story explains the nature and function of law, it also explains the role obligations of legal officials, including not only legislators and judges, but also lawyers representing clients, whether as advocates in litigation, transactional planners, or advisors. The functional account of the legal system entails several principles of professional ethics for lawyers, connected with the role of lawyers as intermediaries between citizens and the rights allocated to them by the institutions and procedures of the legal system. First, because the content of many laws is likely to be technical and difficult to access without expert assistance, lawyers should understand their role as helping their clients obtain that to which they are entitled under the community’s scheme of legal rights and obligations. Footnote 35 As agents of their clients, the most fundamental role of lawyers is to serve as an instrument through which the client exercises his or her lawful rights—a non-pejorative sense of being a tool or mouthpiece of the client.
Second, because the law is the means by which political communities enable cooperation on mutually advantageous projects notwithstanding pluralism and disagreement, lawyers must not permit their actions in the course of representing clients to be influenced by their own views about controversial matters. Footnote 36 A lawyer can offer the client extra-legal moral or other advice, Footnote 37 just the same as anyone else can, but the core of the lawyer’s function is to facilitate access to those entitlements that are actually recognized by the positive law of the community. The lawyer’s sincere belief that the applicable law is foolish or unjust is irrelevant to the lawyer’s duties as a representative of the client. Refusal to assist the client in obtaining that to which she is lawfully entitled would be a type of disrespect for the client’s status as a fellow citizen of a pluralistic society.
Finally, lawyers should not be subject to criticism in ethical terms for representing clients whose objectives are unjust, as long as both the client’s ends and the means by which the lawyer achieves them are lawful. The principles of justice are themselves subject to reasonable disagreement. Footnote 38 The role of lawyer is therefore to serve as a means for citizens to cooperate on projects that they regard as just, with the assumption that others may have a different view about the justice of their ends. According to the ethics of their professional role, lawyers should not interpose their own views about justice, because these are assumed to be in conflict; it follows that others should not subject lawyers to ethical criticism on the grounds that they are assisting clients in accomplishing unjust ends, or using unjust means to accomplish those ends.
In the classic case of Zabella v. Pakel, Footnote 39 the defendant in a breach of contract case admitted that he owed a debt to the plaintiff; the statute of limitations had run, however, providing an opportunity for the defendant to avoid what he conceded to be a moral obligation to repay. Moreover, the once-impecunious defendant’s business had prospered, and the formerly prosperous plaintiff had fallen on hard times. Assume for the sake of discussion that the defendant was, in fact, morally obligated to repay what he had borrowed from the plaintiff. Trying to get out of performing an obligation that is owed to another has a name in ordinary moral life—cheating. Footnote 40 If refusing to plead the statute of limitations would be required, on balance, by otherwise applicable moral considerations—say, because the client admits he owes the debt, can easily pay it, and the opposing party is badly in need of funds—then a lawyer bears a weighty burden of justifying the principle of professional ethics that would require the lawyer to follow the client’s instructions and assert the limitations defense. Yet it would be difficult to find a practicing lawyer who would feel the slightest moral qualm about pleading the statute of limitations as a ground for dismissal of the plaintiff’s action to collect on the debt. Footnote 41 The criticism, if there is to be any, should be on procedural rules, not the lawyers who employ them (although most lawyers tend to think statutes of limitation are a good thing, as they block the litigation of stale claims).
Second-generation legal ethicists have likewise generally found Zabella to be an easy case. Footnote 42 From the point of view of public ethics, including the ethics of the lawyer’s role, what matters is that the legal system has established a scheme of rights, duties, and permissions—which collectively can be referred to as legal entitlements Footnote 43 —specifying the circumstances under which one person can force another to rectify a wrong. The lawyer’s role is not to be a moral advisor or, as an actual friend to the client (not Fried’s artificial, “special purpose” friend). Rather, it is to serve as the client’s agent, in the legal sense of someone who is empowered to act on behalf of the client in ways that the client is unable himself or herself to do. Lacking expertise in the technical apparatus of the law, the defendant would be unable, without professional assistance, to realize the benefit of a socially established limit on the obligation to repay a debt. The lawyer’s ethical role is therefore to make available the entitlements established by positive law, and thereby help the law to achieve its moral end. The moral end of the law, on the functional story, is to establish within political communities a framework of rights and duties that people can use in their dealings with one another, permitting relatively stable, frictionless interactions and long-term relationships, even in the face of what would otherwise be uncertainty and conflict. It does so by standing in the place of reasons that would otherwise be decisive for its subjects. Footnote 44 A lawyer who might feel qualms about pleading the statute of limitations should recognize, on this account, that the reasons underlying the evaluation of the client’s act as cheating have been preempted by the client’s legal entitlement to avoid the debt after a certain amount of time.
III.
Several jurisprudentially-minded legal ethics scholars have recently challenged this tidy account. Footnote 45 They question whether a conception of ethical lawyering can be tightly linked to the capacity of the law to settle normative controversy. Their objection proceeds in several steps:
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1. The content of the client’s legal entitlement, which it is the lawyer’s ethical role to advise the client about, defend in litigation, and implement through advice or transactional planning, is determined by substantive and procedural law (including, e.g., the statute of limitations), as well as by the facts learned through investigation and discovery. In addition to the client’s enticements, the lawyer herself has legal rights, duties, and permissions, which comprise the law governing lawyers. These include the rules of professional conduct as well as applicable duties established by tort, contract, agency, and procedural law. So, for example, the lawyer has not only a permission but an obligation to assert the statute of limitations defense in Zabella. This obligation follows from the client’s entitlement plus the duty of lawyers to provide loyal, competent services for clients. Footnote 46
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2. Positivist legal ethicists want to say that the lawyer’s ethical role is given only by the lawyer’s entitlements under the law governing lawyers. Ethically speaking, the lawyer should do no more and no less than she is legally required to do by the legal requirements of the role. Of course, part of the content of the lawyers’ duties are given by the client’s entitlements. (Lawyers must exercise reasonable competence and diligence to assert and protect their clients’ entitlements.) In Zabella, however, if the client has an entitlement to assert the statute of limitations, then a complete account of the lawyer’s ethical obligations is given by that entitlement plus the requirements of the law governing lawyers to be a faithful agent and follow the client’s lawful instructions. Nothing more is ethically required—certainly not serving as a “wise counselor” or moral activist seeking to dissuade the client from avoiding repayment of the debt. Footnote 47
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3. Importantly, however, law and facts are not static, given things. Their content depends, to some extent, on the interpretive attitude a lawyer or judge takes toward them. Positivist legal ethics wishes to ground the ethical obligations of the lawyer in the law itself. But there is no non-circular way to specify the interpretive attitude that lawyers ought to take toward the law and the facts that constitute the entitlements of the client and the lawyer. Perhaps the law governing lawyers establishes some constraints on how far a lawyer may go in pushing the boundaries of the client’s legal entitlements. However, these rules themselves require interpretation, and there is no way to avoid an infinite regress if one wishes to root a lawyer’s ethical obligations with respect to interpretation in a legal rule. (This is really just an application of the Hartian commonplace that rules do not determine their own application. Footnote 48 ) While the application of the statute of limitations in Zabella is straightforward, requiring no interpretive judgment by the lawyer, Zabella is a poor example for that reason. There are many other situations in which a lawyer must exercise judgment to determine how to interpret the law establishing either the client’s entitlements or her own.
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4. Therefore, there must be some principles of legal ethics that do not have their sources in the legal entitlements of clients and lawyers. The most plausible source of these principles is in first-order morality, including considerations of justice (does corrective justice require that the defendant repay the plaintiff?) or other moral principles such as non-deception and the protection of human dignity. There can be no such thing as positivist legal ethics if a lawyer must, or even may, refer to these considerations when considering what is owed to a client.
The following three hypotheticals, all based on actual cases, illustrate the problem raised by critics of positivist legal ethics. In each case, the critique aims to show that something, beyond social-source-based positive law, is required to provide normative guidance to lawyers. There are legal entitlements with respect to both clients and lawyers in these cases, and while the law governing lawyers may furnish some guidance concerning the interpretation of client entitlements, it cannot without vicious circularity inform the interpretation of the lawyer’s duties.
The Wrongful Conviction . Footnote 49 A security guard was murdered and another guard seriously injured during the robbery of a store. The surviving guard identified two men, Logan and Hope, as the perpetrators. A week later, a man named Wilson was arrested for an unrelated crime, the murder of two police officers in the same city. Hope heard through jailhouse gossip about the arrest of Wilson, and told his lawyer that he had committed the robbery with Wilson, not Logan. Hope’s lawyer communicated this information to Wilson’s lawyers, who went to see Wilson at the jail. Wilson confessed to his lawyers that he had committed the robbery with Hope, and that he had in fact shot the security guards. Wilson declined to make a statement to the police, but his lawyers prepared an affidavit summarizing his statement, which they kept in a locked safe. Meanwhile, not knowing of Wilson’s admission of responsibility, prosecutors filed murder charges against Logan and Hope. Based on the testimony of the surviving guard, both were convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. Wilson was convicted in a separate trial of murdering the two police officers and was sentenced to two life sentences without possibility of parole. The lawyers were aware of this outcome.
What should Wilson’s lawyers do with the knowledge that an innocent person will be spending the rest of his life in prison for a crime committed by their client? Rule 1.6 of the rules of professional conduct for lawyers applicable in the jurisdiction provides as follows:
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation…. A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm… Footnote 50
In light of this rule, what should the lawyers do? There is no question that the information contained in the affidavit, learned from their client, is “information relating to the representation” protected from disclosure by the duty of confidentiality. Despite the lawyers’ best efforts to convince Wilson to consent to disclosure of the affidavit containing his statement that he committed the restaurant robbery and murders, he has consistently refused to do so. The lawyers therefore wonder whether the bodily harm exception stated in section (1), above, permits disclosure.
One might argue that Logan’s continued imprisonment constitutes “substantial bodily harm,” as he is quite corporeally stuck in prison, and therefore disclosure of Wilson’s confession could prevent Logan’s bodily harm. There is no case or ethics opinion anywhere interpreting the bodily harm exception to apply to wrongful imprisonment. Footnote 51 On the other hand, there is no authority clearly stating that the exception does not apply in these circumstances. The interpretive attitude one takes toward the bodily harm exception makes all the difference to whether Wilson’s lawyers are permitted to disclose their client’s secret and free Logan from prison.
Gentlemen Don’t Read Each Other’s Mail . Footnote 52 A lawyer is representing one of the parties to a transaction. She receives a draft of one of the agreements, prepared by opposing counsel, as an electronic file in a common format. Being somewhat more computer savvy than many of the lawyers in her office, she quickly realizes that the document retained all its metadata—that is, hidden date including editorial comments and previous versions of the document made by other users. After a bit of clicking around, she discovers a number of comment balloons that remained in the document. Some of them were written by another party to its lawyer, and contain information about the party’s bottom-line positions regarding aspects of the transaction that are still being negotiated. In other words, the opposing party has given the lawyer a peek at its confidential playbook, and this will be quite advantageous to the client in the upcoming round of negotiations. Must the lawyer notify opposing counsel of his error? May she share the newly discovered confidential information with your client?
There are numerous bar association ethics opinions on the use of metadata, and they are all over the place. Footnote 53 There is an analogous body of law regarding inadvertent waiver of the attorney-client privilege by, e.g., mistaken inclusion of confidential documents in a massive shipment of production documents in discovery. While a few jurisdictions adhere to Wigmore’s “Crown Jewels” approach, Footnote 54 in which the disclosure of confidential communications is per se evidence that the disclosing party failed to use reasonable care to protect them, most jurisdictions follow a contextual, rule-of-reason analysis and consider the extent of precautions taken in light of the importance of the documents. Footnote 55 But of course waiver of the privilege is one thing and use of confidential information quite another. In fact most authorities do not collapse the duties of the receiving lawyer in this case into the analysis of privilege waiver. The Model Rules do instruct the receiving lawyer to “promptly notify” the lawyer who inadvertently transmitted the metadata-containing document, but punt to “other law beyond the scope of these Rules” the question of whether the receiving lawyer may take a peek at the metadata or use it to the advantage of her client. Footnote 56
The lawyer consults with other lawyers in her firm, who report that they find the idea of peeking at inadvertently disclosed confidential information to be distasteful. A senior partner reminded the lawyer that Henry Stimson, Secretary of State under Herbert Hoover, said that “gentlemen do not read each other’s mail.” He asked how reading the metadata would be different from rummaging through opposing counsel’s briefcase while she and her client were outside in the hallway during a deposition. (The lawyer suspects that the senior partners in the firm are really thinking, “there but for the grace of God go I,” because they had no idea until this issue arose that there was any such thing as metadata.) Nevertheless, the most guidance the lawyer is able to locate in the jurisdiction is a bar association opinion that says a lawyer should consider a variety of factors in deciding whether to use inadvertently disclosed metadata, including “the judgment of the lawyer, the particular facts applicable to the situation, [and] the lawyer’s view of his or her obligations to the client.” Ultimately the decision should be made “through the exercise of sensitive and moral judgment,” based upon “common sense, reciprocity and professional courtesy.” Footnote 57
The Scrivener’s Error . This example was introduced by David Luban, which in turn comes from his friend who is a mergers & acquisitions partner at a large law firm in New York City. Let’s call the partner David as well. The partner was closing a deal, and the lawyer on the other side prepared the draft of one of the parties’ agreements. That lawyer goofed: the draft he prepared bore no resemblance to the deal that the parties had agreed to orally, and it was hugely advantageous to David’s client and disadvantageous to the drafting lawyer’s client. It was, in other words, a deadly scrivener’s error in favor of David’s client.” Footnote 58
To set up the ethical issue for David, assume two additional facts. First, under the law applicable to the transaction, the scrivener’s error would not affect the enforceability of the agreement; that is, the party whose lawyer made the mistake could not later claim mistake of fact or some other ground to invalidate the agreement. Second, assume the client has been fully informed and considered the reputational impact of sticking the other side with the erroneous document. The client is well aware that this may complicate the commercial relationship and make future dealings more difficult, but it believes the advantage it obtains as a result of the mistake is worth that risk. The only real guidance provided by the rules of professional conduct for lawyers is in Rule 1.2(a), which gives the client the authority to specify the objectives of the representation, but presumptively locates the authority to make tactical, means-based decisions with the lawyer, stating only that the lawyer “shall consult with the client as to the means by which [the client’s ends] are to be pursued.” Footnote 59 But surely the decision to exploit an error that would be “hugely advantageous” to one’s client lies on the boundary between ends and means. It is not something within the core of the lawyer’s authority, such as deciding how many depositions to take or what arguments to raise in a motion. It is closer to the penumbra between the lawyer’s and the client’s sphere of authority.
Luban reports that his friend “corrected the error without telling the client. In fact, he believes that every decent lawyer he knows in every large law firm in New York would do the same…. In his view, fair dealing with others is part of the discretion that goes with the lawyer’s role.” Footnote 60 What does one think about the lawyer’s decision?
IV.
The challenge these cases present for positivistic legal ethics is not that one could not imagine what the law has to do with the lawyer’s ethical obligations. The problem is, rather, that the law appears to run out just where the ethical rubber hits the road—when it comes to specifying the interpretive attitude that lawyers ought to take with respect to the law applicable to their clients’ situation and particularly to the law governing lawyers. To put it differently, what the law permits is itself the ethical question that needs to be addressed. The rights and duties of lawyers may vary depending on whether lawyers interpret the law broadly or narrowly, aggressively or holistically, formalistically or purposively, as Holmesian bad men or good citizens concerned to comply with the law, approach closely to the line or stay well on one side, Footnote 61 etc. There are some clear cases and bright lines—bribing witnesses is not allowed, for example—but there is a huge gray area in which one could easily imagine different results for the client following from different lawyer interpretive attitudes regarding the available law and facts. Indeterminacy in the law governing lawyers threatens an infinite regress that would undermine the resort to law to settle normative disagreement about what rights and duties citizens ought to have. The source of the constraint on lawyers’ conduct in the representation of clients must therefore be located in some extra-legal value or end, and cannot be rooted solely in the content of the law governing lawyers.
Take the metadata and scrivener’s error cases. On way one of looking at it, they pose a question about the vision of professionalism that we presuppose when lawyers are dealing with legal rights and duties. Should an ethical lawyer take advantage of her adversary’s mistakes? The critics of positivist legal ethics make a simple, but powerful argument at this juncture: Since the law itself does not determine the interpretive attitude that lawyers should adopt, something else must, and why should that “something else” not be morality? Footnote 62 A conception of the ethics of the lawyer’s role can build in morality in the form of a prescribed interpretive attitude which instructs lawyers to resolve gaps and ambiguities in the law in a way that best comports with their obligations as moral agents. Why is the right question therefore not whether decent people would peek at someone else’s confidential information?
Positivist legal ethicists would respond that there is law on point, which resolves what would otherwise be a question about which people can reasonably disagree. Footnote 63 There may be ambiguities in the law, and no right answer, but that does not mean there is no law that bears on the resolution of the matter and at least rules out some potential courses of action. One might argue, for example, that the clear trend in privilege-waiver cases and the Federal Rules of Evidence in the direction of a contextual analysis of the effect of inadvertent disclosure reflects a recognition by the law that all parties, and the court, are better off in the long run if mistakes do not have catastrophic consequences. The flexible, balancing approach is intended to permit inadvertent disclosure to be unwound, to the extent possible, if the disclosing party used reasonable care and promptly sought return of the documents. This is a kind of purposivist interpretive attitude which differs from a more narrow, perhaps formalist interpretive attitude that would reason from the absence of a clear, on-point prohibition of peeking at metadata to a conclusion that the lawyer must do so when it is to her client’s advantage.
But there is still arguably discretion involved in the application of law, and to note its existence calls to mind Dworkin’s assault on Hart’s positivism. In an early and important paper, Dworkin argued that Hart’s theory of law, which emphasizes the social “pedigree” of law, cannot account for the way judges actually decide cases. Footnote 64 According to Dworkin, Hart’s rule of recognition permits judges to identify some norm as law only on the basis of its manner of enactment or development—e.g., a statute enacted by a legislature or the holding of a judicial opinion. But judges consider more than the pedigree of a norm; they also take account of “a sense of appropriateness developed in the profession” that identifies certain moral principles as bearing on the proper resolution of legal disputes. Footnote 65 In his famous example of Riggs v. Palmer, Footnote 66 the named heir in a will murdered the testator, his grandfather. The court conceded that the will, and therefore the bequest to the murdering heir, were valid under the applicable statute, which set out certain formal requirements for wills. But the court went on to deny the murderer the bequest, reasoning that all laws are constrained by certain fundamental maxims such as, “[n]o one shall be permitted to … take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.” While it may be possible for a Hartian positivist to modify the rule of recognition to identify these maxims as being part of the law, Footnote 67 doing so does not meet the force of Dworkin’s criticism, because he contends that it is the content of the maxim, not its social source, that makes it relevant to judges and other participants in the legal system.
According to Dworkin, judging is a moral act, and a judge should be concerned to reach the decision that accords with principles of justice, not merely social sources of law. Dworkin later developed the argument that the judges in the murdering-heir case were not merely identifying the social sources of law, but interpreting the law in light of background principles of justice. And interpretation is a morally freighted activity. Discussing the case in Law’s Empire, Dworkin said that the court in Riggs v. Palmer implicitly adopted a theory of statutory meaning, which was that “judges should construct a statute so as to make it conform as closely as possible to principles of justice assumed elsewhere in the law.” Footnote 68 Judges, according to Dworkin, should understand their role as contributing to the integrity of a political community. A community characterized by integrity is one in which members treat one another as governed by a coherent set of moral principles—a “common scheme of justice”—to which all are committed by their citizenship in the community. Footnote 69 The community is governed by shared principles, “not just by rules hammered out in political compromise.” This means that judges have an obligation to look beyond the “particular decisions their political institutions have reached” (identified by their social sources or pedigree), and consider the underlying “scheme of principles those decisions presuppose and endorse.” Footnote 70 A judge, then, should decide on the outcome and give reasons to support it based on “the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice.” Footnote 71
Dworkin is preoccupied with judges—so much so that his critics charge him with confusing a theory of the nature of law with a theory of adjudication Footnote 72 —but the reference to the “community’s legal practice” is tantalizing for a critic of positivist legal ethics. Luban, for example, appeals to a sensus communis of at least one segment of the practicing bar to explain his reaction to the metadata and scrivener’s error cases: “I think the reaction was that, dammit, peeking at metadata or exploiting the scrivener’s error is wrong, and the client isn’t entitled to windfalls obtained by the lawyer doing something wrong.” Footnote 73 But notice something important from the client’s point of view. The content of the client’s legal entitlements are necessarily linked to the lawyer’s ethical position with respect to the interpretive attitude to be assumed. On the functional account of law offered by positivist legal ethics, the lawyer’s duties are supposed to be derivative of the client’s legal entitlements, not vice-versa. The sensus communis to which Luban appeals should be perfectly irrelevant from the client’s perspective, unless it bears on the content of the client’s legal entitlements. The client is, in some sense, at the mercy of the lawyer’s own ethical commitments, and perhaps also the collective ethical commitments of all the decent lawyers in New York City.
Similarly, in the wrongful conviction case, perhaps Wilson, who confessed his involvement in the crime for which Logan was imprisoned, has an insufficient ground for complaint against his lawyer for disclosing the confidential information. This would only be the case, however, if Dworkin is right in thinking that the law does prescribe a right answer to the lawyer’s question of whether disclosure is permissible. Dworkin wants to locate the relevant moral principles within the law, so that a well-reasoned judicial decision will be one that shows the political community in its best light. Which resolution of the wrongful conviction case would show the political community in its best light? Well … people disagree. On the one hand, it seems obviously correct that a good legal system would not tolerate wrongful convictions. If information establishing the wrongfulness of a conviction comes to the attention of a judge, a prosecutor, or a defense attorney, then any one of these actors, as an “officer of the court,” should seek to rectify the conviction. Footnote 74 In this case, however, we are concerned with the obligations of a lawyer representing a client in connection with a different criminal proceeding. There is a long history in the common law of protecting lawyer-client confidentiality, both with the evidentiary attorney-client privilege and with rules of professional conduct imposing strict obligations of confidentiality on attorneys. Footnote 75 Notwithstanding Jeremy Bentham’s attack on the privilege as being useful only to guilty clients, Footnote 76 modern courts and commentators are pretty well united around the view, articulated by the Supreme Court in Upjohn v. United States, Footnote 77 that the privilege “promotes broad[] public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice” by encouraging “full and frank communications” between attorneys and clients, so that attorneys will be able to “know all that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking representation.” Footnote 78
These are two competing moral conceptions of the rationale underlying attorney-client confidentiality (including both the privilege and the professional rule of confidentiality) and its exceptions. Some would favor an exception permitting disclosure in this case; others would prefer a near-absolute duty of confidentiality. This is exactly the sort of disagreement that gives rise to the need for law in the first instance. In this case, however, the ambiguity pertains to the law establishing the lawyer’s duties, as a representative, advisor, and advocate. Positivist legal ethics thus encounters a bootstrapping problem: It informs lawyers that their ethical obligation is to assert and defend client legal entitlements, but there is an unresolved question concerning the scope of lawyers’ legal rights and duties that bear on this ethical responsibility. The existence of discretion threatens the capability of the law to function as an authority in this case, excluding the reasons that otherwise would bear on the resolution of the matter.
V.
The way out of this indeterminacy and potential regress is to return to foundations. The functional approach to law must be supplemented by some of the observations concerning the value of legality associated with Lon Fuller and the legal process school, but developed more recently in jurisprudence by Jeremy Waldron and David Luban. Footnote 79 The important insight from Fuller is that the value of the rule of law is intimately connected with the dignity of the subjects of law. Fuller’s procedural “inner morality of law”
embodies a fundamental point about the way in which the systems we call ‘legal systems’ operate. They operate by using, rather than suppressing and short-circuiting, the responsible agency of ordinary human individuals. Ruling by law is quite different from herding cows with a cattle prod or directing a flock of sheep with a dog…. The publicity and generality of law look to what Henry Hart and Albert Sacks called ‘self-application,’ that is, to people’s capacities for practical understanding, for self-control, and for the self-monitoring and modulation of their own behavior, in relation to norms that they can grasp and understand. Footnote 80
This passage suggests a deep connection between the rule of law and human dignity, which is the underlying foundational value supporting both a conception of the nature and function of law, and also of the role obligations of legal officials. The claim here is that governing under law should be understood as an institutional process of determining or applying public norms—established in the name of society as a whole—to citizens, and that when lawyers participate in this process, they must do so in a way that respects (1) the agency and capacity for self-control of the citizens to whom they apply, i.e. clients; and (2) the content that was established in the name of society as a whole.
How does this approach make a difference to the analysis of the hypothetical cases? It is all well and good to talk in general terms about respecting the self-governing agency of citizens, but what exactly does that entail for lawyers who must grapple with ambiguities in the law that prescribes their own rights and duties when representing clients? Positivist legal ethics is characterized by several practical prescriptions for lawyers representing clients.
First, respect for the rule of law directs lawyers not to adopt a natural law or Dworkinian approach to interpretation. A straightforward appeal to what seems to be the just outcome of the various cases is impermissible. A good legal system should seek to avoid unjust convictions, gentlemen don’t read each other’s mail, and so on, but in each of these cases the focus must always be on recovering, as accurately as possible, the content of law pertaining to the lawyer’s duties. As is so often the case, there may be quite a bit more determinacy in the law than appears initially. For example, the voluminous caselaw on inadvertent privilege waivers reveals a trend toward refusing to penalize counsel for mistakenly disclosing confidential information (in order not to further increase the cost of privilege reviews in discovery). A lawyer may therefore argue by analogy that the law disfavors giving opposing parties access to confidential metadata, even if it could have been scrubbed from the document. The important thing is that the lawyer be seeking social sources for the norms that inform the ethical obligations of the role, and a reasoned elaboration of what they require in a particular case. Footnote 81 Creative lawyering is permissible, but it must always be distinguished from all-things-considered reasoning about what justice requires.
Second, a significant degree of legal determinacy is possible because the law possesses what might be called systematicity or immanent rationality. Footnote 82 It is something that it “can present itself to its subjects as a unified enterprise of government that one can make sense of” as a “public resource that members of the public may make use of—not just for understanding or as an intellectual exercise, but in argument.” Footnote 83 Law has autonomy and self-sufficiency as a normative system; it is distinct from politics and first-order morality. There is something distinctive about making a legal argument, as distinct from an argument about social policy. Any teacher of first-year law school subjects can appreciate the difference between trying to figure out the best resolution of the law with respect to some point and reasoning from the ground up, as it were, to a conclusion about what a just society ought to do about some issue. Coherence and immanent rationality is equally a feature of the law governing lawyers, and there is no reason to think that, in principle, reasoning through to a conclusion about what the law permits or requires is different for lawyers applying the law to themselves. Lawyers should, however, be aware of the problem of motivated reasoning and seek to rely on systems and procedures (such as second-partner reviews and consultations with in-house counsel) to avoid making self-interested judgments about the content of applicable law.
It may be that respect for the systematicity or immanent rationality of law will require lawyers to adopt an interpretive attitude that keeps them from getting too close to the line. In the wrongful conviction case, for example, one could certainly make an argument that the bodily-harm exception to confidentiality should apply when a person’s body is locked up in prison. What is wrong with this argument is not that it lacks a certain linguistic plausibility, but that it is utterly inconsistent with the larger corpus of law relating to professional secrecy, which is notably resistant to expanding existing confidentiality exceptions. Footnote 84 The interpretive attitude that defers to the best account of existing law, as opposed to pressing a plausible but strained interpretation, is mandated by the same underlying considerations of legality and legitimacy that orient the lawyer’s ethical role toward the client’s legal entitlements in the first place.
Here is also where the adoption of a positivist or Dworkinian theory of law actually makes a great deal of difference. A Dworkinian might argue that an interpretation of the confidentiality exception permitting disclosure in the wrongful conviction case actually shows the political community in its best light, and thus that is right way to interpret existing law. A positivist, by contrast, would have to conclude (albeit reluctantly) that, even though the result may be morally unjust, the most coherent interpretation of the social sources bearing on confidentiality—including cases, ethics opinions, drafting history of the rules, and so on—is that disclosure is not permissible. Thus, the following question can be seen as presenting a false binary choice between mechanical rule-following and the situationally sensitive exercise of judgment:
Do we want lawyers primarily following rules as their guides for ethical professional behavior? Or would it be preferable for lawyers to make ethics choices in reliance on their character, virtues, and skills of moral discernment and deliberation, aside from the following of a rule? Footnote 85
There is moral discernment and deliberation in the following of a rule (including, as here, the confidentiality rule and exceptions), but the relevant moral values are those such as legality and respect for the agency of citizens, not the sort of political-moral values like justice and fairness upon which Dworkin relies.
Third, the foundational value picked out by Fuller, Waldron, and Luban, which is also a major theme in the work of second-generation legal ethics theorists, is the dignity and agency of citizens. From this it follows that, in close cases, the lawyer’s role ought to be understood as facilitating the participation by clients in the legal system. This means, for one thing, that moral responsibility for actions taken by the lawyer in a representative capacity ought to be located with the client—provided, of course, that the client is fully informed and participates in the decision. Note the morally freighted language used to describe some of these choices, such as whether to “exploit” an adversary’s error, or whether to “peek” at confidential metadata. If something arguably sleazy but likely legally permissible is going on, it should be the client’s decision whether to instruct the lawyer to engage in the conduct, and one principle of the lawyer’s role ethics should be to follow the instructions of clients. Where the best interpretation of positive law is that the conduct in question is legally impermissible, then the lawyer retains the authority to refuse to follow the client’s instructions. Footnote 86 Where the interpretation of law is up for grabs, however, there is nothing unethical about deferring to the client’s instructions. One need not go as far as Daniel Markovits in believing that respect for the dignity of clients requires lawyers to adopt an attitude of “negative capability”—refraining from casting judgment on one’s client’s ends, effacing oneself, “being in uncertainty,” “remaining content with half knowledge,” and “maintaining no identity of [one’s] own.” Footnote 87 A great deal of lawyering should involve not being content with half knowledge, thoroughly investigating the facts, and then providing candid legal advice to one’s client, even if it is unwelcome. Footnote 88 However, if the lawyer has conducted adequate legal and factual research and has thoroughly discussed the matter with the client, there is nothing wrong with deferring to the client’s wishes regarding how to proceed in light of any remaining ambiguities in the law.
Facilitating client participation in the legal system also means keeping in mind that the law seeks to influence the practical reasoning of citizens. When trying to work out what the law requires, a citizen—often with the assistance of a lawyer—is engaging in a process of rational deliberation. People (and entities advised by people) who are the subjects of the law must be capable of being guided by it. To provide guidance to rational agents, the law must be something which one may make sense of. For something to be intelligible in this way, it must represent a principled elaboration of a social problem and its solution. In many cases this will require reference to the sense and purpose that gives meaning to the law. It is frequently impossible to know the boundaries of a legal rule without having some idea of the concerns the rule was meant to address. These underlying normative considerations may take shape only in context, as a rule is situated within a complex body of doctrine established for some purpose, or for a set of purposes, some of which may be contradictory.
VI.
The circularity problem identified by critics is a real challenge for positivist legal ethics. Using the law itself to establish constraints on what lawyers permissibly may do for clients is a promising strategy for specifying the role obligations of lawyers only on an ancient, discredited “mechanical jurisprudence” picture of law. Some further argument is required to specify the interpretive attitude that lawyers should take toward the law. Fortunately that argument can be given with reference to the same political ideals and values that inform the pluralism and settlement story given by second-wave legal ethics scholars to explain the centrality of the legal entitlements of clients to lawyers’ ethics.
It is important to get this right not only within theoretical legal ethics, but as part of a broader general jurisprudential project that takes seriously the role of lawyers as law-interpreters, law-appliers, and essentially private law-givers to their clients. Lawyers are sometimes said to be quasi-public officials, or to mediate between their clients and the state. Too much scholarship in analytic jurisprudence tends to assume tacitly that the legal system works by transmission of the law from an authoritative institution to citizens, the subjects of the law, who perceive and either comply with or disobey the law. Sophisticated legal philosophers know that reality is more complex—Hart, in fact, trained and practiced as a barrister and brought a notably lawyerly cast of mind to his work in jurisprudence Footnote 89 —but the absence of lawyers from theorizing about the operation of a legal system is still noteworthy. No one today believes in mechanical jurisprudence, but legal philosophers too often talk about the law, the rule of recognition, the sources thesis, etc., without considering how the legal profession might function as an intermediate institution between the state and citizens. The cases discussed here show the centrality of legal ethics in establishing the rights and duties of citizens—a point which should be taken up within jurisprudence.
