Given the enormous and still expanding contemporary literature devoted to the analysis of freedom, one might reasonably expect diminishing marginal returns to have long since set in, and thus that the prospects yet another book-length contribution would yield valuable new insights correspondingly dim. Fortunately, Lawrence Hamilton’s Freedom Is Power defies such expectations. One reason for its success, no doubt, is that the author’s central motivation is practical rather than theoretical. Starting from a deceptively simple concrete question—Are South Africans after apartheid free?—Hamilton constructs a rich and complex account of political freedom capable of answering it in a satisfactory manner. Another reason, however, might be that the book is really about something other than freedom, a suggestion to which this review returns at the end.
After posing his central problematic in the introduction, Hamilton proceeds to review and critique existing theoretical accounts of freedom. Liberal and Marxist conceptions are expeditiously dispatched in Chapter 1 before he turns toward the more promising neorepublican conceptions in Chapter 2. Various iterations of the latter, associated especially with the works of Hannah Arendt, Philip Pettit, and John McCormick, are explored and mined for insight. Although none in the end proves fully satisfactory, Hamilton’s own account of “real modern freedom” is perhaps best seen as building on the core republican idea that the fundamental antonym to freedom is domination. The meat of the book follows in Chapters 3 through 5, which discuss domination, freedom, and representation, respectively. (Chapter 6 applies the overall approach to the problem of exercising popular control over the economy: This relatively short but intriguing chapter might have benefited from further development.)
Following the groundbreaking writings of Pettit in particular, it has become standard in contemporary republican circles to define domination as arbitrary power. One person or group, on this view, dominates another to the extent that the former has the uncontrolled ability to interfere with the activities or choices of the latter; securing the latter’s freedom, accordingly, requires that we either remove or control the relevant ability of the former. Taking this way of thinking about domination and freedom as our starting point, we can fruitfully characterize Hamilton’s work as resting on two crucial moves. First, he urges that we expand our conception of domination to include not merely situations in which one social agent wields direct arbitrary power over another but also various forms of structural disadvantage, many of which might be more or less unintentional. Thus, a state of domination is any situation in which “power relations are skewed in such a way that some individual or group cannot identify, express, or satisfy their needs or interests” (p. 81). Second, he defines freedom not merely as the absence of domination so defined, but specifically as having the power to resist, avoid, or overcome such states of domination oneself: Real modern freedom, in other words, is empowerment.
Both moves, of course, have been encouraged by others: the first by Iris Young, for example, and the latter by Cécile Laborde. The novelty here consists in their being brought together in a single complex conception of what it means to enjoy freedom in the fullest possible sense. The resulting account lacks elegance, perhaps, but this is only to be expected. Many diverse circumstances and conditions give rise to states of domination, and so it follows that a wide range of specific powers will be necessary in resisting them. Hamilton highlights, in particular, the power to overcome personal obstacles, the power to determine who governs one’s society, the power to resist community discipline, and the power to control one’s economic and social environment.
From here, Hamilton moves on the relationship between freedom and domination, on the one hand, and political representation, on the other. This discussion, in Chapter 5, is perhaps the most novel aspect of the book, for the literatures on freedom and representation are not often linked together in such depth. Considerably simplified, the argument runs more or less as follows. Under modern multilayered and interconnected socioeconomic conditions, it follows inevitably that our freedom as individuals will be heavily conditioned by circumstances we can hope to control only through group agency. But group agency is not automatic; groups can only act as groups through representation. (This is basically an updated version of Hobbes’s insight that “the people” do not exist as such, except insofar as they are constituted by a sovereign representative.) For representation to generate group agency, however, actual representatives must have discretionary independence from their constituents; otherwise the former would merely reproduce the discordant voices of the latter. It follows, paradoxically, that my freedom as an individual essentially depends—contra Pettit and the neorepublicans—on my sometimes submitting to the arbitrary power of my representatives. Only in this way, for example, can I hope to exercise any degree of control over the economic environment under which I live.
Broadly speaking, there are two ways one might respond to this line of argument. On the one hand, various internal challenges could be pressed. Pettit might claim that it is simply not true that group agency can be constituted only through discretionary representation. Groups might overcome various internal collective-action problems through appropriately structured deliberative procedures, for instance. Granting that the will of the group so determined will inevitably be executed by some duly appointed representative, we need not suppose that any discretionary powers are required for the latter to do so. Even if Pettit concedes this point, he might alternatively claim that discretionary powers need not be arbitrary in the relevant sense: There are many different forms of control, including, for instance, what he terms invigilation. Thus, group members might grant their representative discretionary authority to act in their name, but always subject to the proviso that this authority is revocable if and when it is exercised in a manner they deem inappropriate. The power of the representative in a case like this is suitably controlled, Pettit would argue, and thus not arbitrary.
On the other hand, one might take a step back and reconsider Hamilton’s conception of real modern freedom as empowerment. Tempting as it is to equate freedom and power, such an approach carries certain dangers. It is interesting to note that these dangers are very clearly articulated by none other than Friedrich Hayek (not otherwise an altogether reliable guide in such matters). Imagine that by submitting ourselves to the absolutely unfettered authority of our representatives, we are able to fully impose our collective will on our economic environment. Economic hardship is thereby eliminated, but so too are many opportunities for personal choice. Is this a real gain? Perhaps so. But on the freedom-as-empowerment account, it would seem that we merely trade one domain of freedom for another, just as good. Unfortunately, it is no help—and possibly some hindrance—when it comes to the very serious and difficult challenge of balancing competing values to merely call them different aspects of the same thing. Accordingly, it might be most enriching to read Freedom Is Power as a study of empowerment, not freedom. But however one chooses to read it, it is worth reading.
