Most accounts of the fiscal system of Louis XIV's France will eventually come to a point where the author, in the midst of attempting to explain just how baroque and confused the system truly was, throws up his or her hands and assures the reader that the costs were tremendous. It is rare to come away from these experiences feeling as if one actually understandsthe origins of the costs. In The Financial Decline of a Great Power, Guy Rowlands explains the fiscal system of France during the period of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) and he does not throw up his hands. Rowlands provides an exhaustive account and exhibitsa deep understanding of the financial machinery of the Bourbon war machine. He describes in detail the interactions between self-interested fiscal agents and the sometimes corrupt, sometimes incompetent, and sometimes unlucky policymakers of Louis XIV. This descriptive detail is valuable in its own right to the student of early-modern France interestto understand how, for example, a rescription worked (and why, more often than not, it didn't). Beyond describing the financial institutions, however, Rowlands develops the thesis that the principle-agent problems that were inherent in the relationship between fiscal agents and the crown were worsened by the stress placed on the system by the huge costs of fighting much of Europe at the beginning of the eighteenth century (pp. 9–10).
The book is laid out in three parts. Part I explains how the geopolitical situation in Europe at the end of the seventeenth century combined with a string of often misguided policy decisions by Louis XIV and his ministers to place France in the quagmire that was the War of the Spanish Succession. This sets the stage for Part II in which the quasi-private nature of the fiscal system is described in detail. Rowlands’ expertise shines brightly as he describes the incredibly complex workings of how revenues were collected and, when that didn't suffice, loans were acquired. He also details the stopgap solutions, such as the manipulation of the coinage, to which the King's men often had to resort when taxing and borrowing didn't cover expenditures. Part III details the mechanics of how revenues were actually distributed to the various parts of the war machine. This is the most original section of the book and contains a wealth of detail based on Rowlands’ own archival research. It also makes vital arguments in support of his thesis thatincreased war spending exacerbated theinformation asymmetries and principal agent problems inherent in the fiscal system. For example, the monarchy simply didn't have the resources to monitor the vast internal flows of funds and, asthese flows increased due to the war, accountsbecame even more difficult to reconstruct (p. 147).
Rowlands suggests that all the waste and fiscal confusion he describes mattered because it directly contributed to an adverse settlement of the War of the Spanish Succession (p. 175) and, in the longer term, contributed to the decline of France as the superpower of the age (p. 157). In evaluating the first claim, as a non-specialist in early-modern military history, I would liked to have known more about the alternative hypotheses to fiscal shortfalls as a contributing factor to the lack of success in the War. It also would have been helpful to have more comparisons with England, as Rowland does in some places (e.g., p. 134), or another comparable country. This would have made it easier to evaluate the relative importance of the fiscal shortcomings.
With regards to the second, bolder claim that the creation of the large debt (p. 236) was responsible for the decline of France as a superpower, I would also have welcomed a more thorough discussion. It wasn't until 75 years after the War before fiscal crisis finally contributed to political revolution in France (and within 20 years of that revolution, French armieshad conquered much of Europe). Rowlands’ makes the compelling argument that the debt mattered because it allowed self-interested fiscal agents to permanently capture rental streams and thereby lock-in a dysfunctional fiscal system. But this wasn't the first time a French government had run up a huge debt. Why was this time different? Why was it, as Rowlands claims, that “…a continuation of the fisco-financier system was probably essential…” (p. 237)? Furthermore, it is not as if the monarchy was unaware of these issues. In response to them, it was continually investing in fiscal and legal capacity during the eighteenth century. Rowlands himself claims that corruption was lower under the administration of Louis XIV than previously (pp. 205–6). Thus, an interesting tension implied by Rowlands’ thesis is that, while semi-private fiscal agents became more entrenched as a result of the War of the Spanish Succession, this very entrenchment also created incentives for the monarchy to continue to invest in the fiscal and legal capacity that would allow itto better monitor and discipline these agents. Furthermore, as Tocqueville observed (The Old Regime and the Revolution in France. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998: Book II, ch. 8), it was this extension and strengthening of the institutions of the absolute monarchy during the eighteenth century that turned the minds of the French towards reforming the system. It could be that the relationship between the capture of the fiscal system and the revolution was more complicated than government inefficiency.
The Financial Decline of a Great Power is a welcome contribution to the study of French fiscal history during the period of the War of the Spanish Succession. It should be read by anyone interested in how war, combined with weak state institutions, can exacerbate the classic public choice problems associated with self-interested government agents. While the book does not offer a complete theory of how these fiscal problems ultimately lead to revolution or decline, Rowlands succeeds in doing the necessary, and extremely difficult, work of explaining how the fiscal system evolved during this very important period in French history.
