By attending to the dramatic structure as well as the historical and cultural context of Plato's Republic, recent scholars have contested the traditional view of it as an antidemocratic, antirhetorical, antipoetic dialogue which champions authoritarian rule by philosopher kings. While building on this new literature, James Kastely's lucid, erudite, and engaging book offers the most extensive treatment to date of the rhetorical character of the dialogue's defense of justice, and of the integral relationship between this kind of philosophical rhetoric and the needs of a democratic polity.
Like John R. Wallach, Arlene Saxonhouse, Danielle Allen, David Roochnik, and Christopher Rowe, Kastely's argument relies on distinguishing between the substantive teaching of the Kallipolis (city in speech), which is explicitly antidemocratic, and the teaching that is manifested in the actual collaborative construction of the Kallipolis that occurs between Socrates and his interlocutors. Following Allen, Kastely argues that the key political work of the Republic is not offering a blueprint for political rule by philosopher kings (the Kallipolis), but its interrogation of, and engagement with, the process of constituting and reconstituting cultural self-understandings and fundamental values (x, 18, 19, 207, 213).
The intricate connections Kastely draws between Plato's philosophic persuasion, democracy, and justice can best be seen by attending to the differences he articulates between Platonic persuasion and manipulation. According to Kastely, our fundamental values and views about human nature are rhetorical artifacts because they depend on poetic, familial, political, and cultural narratives that figure these in certain ways (xiii, 29, 30, 32, 61, 212). Yet the unreflective embrace of these inherited cultural understandings poses a problem for one of democracy's fundamental values: freedom. By slavishly accepting these appearances, humans are not engaging in the democratic project of freely critiquing, choosing, and ordering their own values. This poses a problem for a regime based on freedom and citizen consent (xiii, 30, 45, 212). Instead of interrogating these culturally constructed appearances, manipulation (as espoused by professional rhetors like Thrasymachus, but also, and even more problematically, by the rhetoric of everyday life [46]) takes them as empirically given and natural and only offers individuals advice about how to attain whatever these rhetorical figures present as desirable (37, 121). This is especially problematic when in a democracy like ancient Athens the culturally constructed view of human nature, accepted by everyone and illustrated by Glaucon's ring of Gyges tale (359c–360e), is that humans are aggressive, self-interested, unjust, and desirous of unfettered forms of freedom (46, 48, 51, 177, 217). Moreover, this view of human nature is particularly likely to arise in democracies because one of their fundamental values is freedom (50, 56, 173, 175).
In contrast to this manipulative rhetoric, Plato's philosophical rhetoric moves its audience from “intellectual slavery to the possibility of reflective citizenship” (47). It works in what Kastely calls a counterempirical way by showing the audience (Glaucon and Adeimantus, but also the readers of the dialogue) the very rhetoricity and constructedness of what they take to be unproblematically natural and empirically given (71, 79). While the prescribed curriculum for the guardians (Books 2–7) might be seen as a form of manipulative rhetoric, the education that the audience attains by engaging in this very self-conscious censorship of traditional Athenian education opens them up to the rhetoricity of their own values, beliefs, and desires, freeing them to become more reflective and critical (79). Thus persuasion, in opposition to manipulation, works by bringing its audience inside the very activity of rhetorically constructing the world (22, 202, 210, 212, 223).
The many interruptions and resistances to Socrates's description of the Kallipolis, made by the interlocutors throughout the Republic, are for Kastely integral to Plato's philosophical persuasion. They constantly alert the reader that the authority of Socrates's views about justice, philosophy, the soul, and so forth have not been established and should be questioned (89, 115, 221). These interruptions, and the clarifications and complexities that follow, teach readers that it is their responsibility as citizens of a democracy to question the authoritative descriptions of human nature or fundamental values coming from any authority, including the new epic hero, Socrates.
As this point makes clear, Kastely believes that Plato's brand of philosophical persuasion needs to work with, rather than against, mimesis and poetry, and in fact, must become a new form of epic poetry offering a model of heroism to be internalized by its democratic audience: that is, persuasion rather than war (18–22, 200, 212). Only poetry, with its vivid images and analogies, has the power to change the way people desire certain values and make choices (44, 209). The Republic shows that the heroism proper to a democratic citizen consists not of dying courageously on the battlefield, but of inquiring into the cultural constructions that have produced their identity and then of transforming one's identity, in this case, in relation to a radically new understanding of justice (22, 181).
For Kastely, this new notion of justice consists most basically in the fact that mutuality and the need for others lies at the foundation of political life (72, 217). While this is first suggested (and accepted by the interlocutors) as the origin of the city in Book 2 (369b), it is not fully defended until after the descriptions of democracy and tyranny in Books 8 and 9. In a startlingly original and perceptive discussion of the tyrannical regime and person of Book 9, Kastely shows that the tyrant's pursuit of unfettered desire leads to a life that is inhuman, slavish, filled with fear, devoid of trust, and incapable of fulfilling any of the tyrant's desires (175–77, 214). This vivid portrait of tyranny breaks the problematic association of injustice, self-interestedness, and freedom (understood as the unrestrained fulfillment of desire) that were all so prevalent in Glaucon's ring of Gyges tale. It thus makes it possible for Plato to demonstrate the importance of justice, understood as mutuality and the proper ordering of the parts of the soul and the city, for achieving the democratic goal of freedom, which is no longer understood as a lack of restraint (179–81, 220).
However, the close relationship between Platonic persuasion and the democratic value of freedom does not lead Kastely to espouse the stronger view that Platonic philosophy needs democracy or even that the Republic “offers a limited defense of democracy” (12). Unlike many of the commentators above, Kastely only wants to argue that “democracy as a type of political organization gives rise to fundamental questions that can only be addressed philosophically” (12). Democracy needs philosophy but philosophy does not need democracy. His very short and quite dismissive discussion of the democratic regime of Book 8 states that there are elements of democracy that both Plato and Socrates would have found quite problematic: its appeal to women and children and to diversity as a political value (172). The first point is especially puzzling given that Kastely argues earlier in the book that Plato's teaching about women guardians counters the conventional and nonnatural denigration of them in democratic Athens (101, 103). It is thus unclear why he flatly states that a regime's appealing to women would be a negative thing for Socrates or Plato.
Diversity is said to be negative because it allows for disorder, internal division, and civic strife (172). Yet the rest of the book seems to argue for diversity as a necessary part of philosophical persuasion. It is precisely because interlocutors like Glaucon and Adeimantus and the readers of the dialogue can see the diversity and differences between the views about the gods and heroes characteristic of the Kallipolis and their own inherited views that they can begin to release themselves from slavish adherence to their own cultural inheritances. In contrast, Kastely's own teaching about the dangers of manipulation seemed to be pointing to the problematic uniformity rather than diversity in the blindly accepted and universal belief in the desirability of injustice and aggression.
Kastely's response would probably depend on his strict distinction between philosophy and persuasion: philosophic persuasion might need the diversity and freedom found in a democracy, but the dialectical philosophy that underpins this persuasion does not. In contrast to Roochnik and Rowe, Kastely stresses that the conversation of the Republic is not an example of philosophy or dialectic but of rhetoric and of how philosophy can offer a nonphilosophic audience images and analogies that will convince them of the need to open themselves up to the insights of the philosopher regarding justice and freedom (131–35, 141, 146, 156–57). For Kastely, philosophy involves the nonimagistic and unmediated vision of the truth and this is simply not accessible to those outside of the tiny group of people willing to undergo the rigors of a full philosophic education (140–41).
But it is unclear how this kind of extensive philosophical education could occur in any regime except a democracy, which allows for a large degree of freedom in pursuing what would be considered useless and private pleasures in any other regime. Also, if one takes into account the significant doctrinal differences between Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, because of their years of dedication to the pursuit of philosophy, it would seem that democracy's valorization of diversity would have been a fundamental value for them. These reservations aside, Kastely's excellent book will be of interest not only to scholars of Plato but to anyone interested in rhetorical theory, democratic theory, and their complex interrelationships.
