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Snacks, meals, or buffets? (Dis)Aggregating social influence across social environments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 September 2026

Lauren Ratliff Santoro*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, The University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX, USA
Matthew P. Hitt
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA
*
Corresponding author: Lauren Ratliff Santoro; Email: lauren.santoro@uta.edu
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Abstract

Much survey-based research on social influence in politics has measured disagreement within a single social environment, most often individuals’ core networks of closest ties. Yet individuals are simultaneously embedded in multiple, overlapping social environments that may push them in the same or opposing political directions. We use original survey data measuring political disagreement across four distinct social environments—core networks (closest ties), periphery networks (weaker ties), affiliation networks (voluntary organizations), and social contexts (geographic community)—to ask a foundational but underexplored question. Should these environments be studied separately or in aggregate? We first describe the landscape of disagreement across environments, documenting meaningful variation in both levels and correlates of disagreement exposure. We then ask whether disagreement across environments reflects a common underlying dimension or operates through distinct mechanisms, finding that a single latent factor accounts for approximately 85% of joint variability, consistent with but not conclusive evidence for aggregation. We assess what is gained and what is lost under each approach. Disaggregated models reveal that environments differ in their associations with partisan and ideological strength, while an aggregated “global disagreement” measure reveals that relying solely on core networks underestimates the relationship between the broader social environment and political attitudes. Our findings indicate that both approaches capture substantively distinct patterns, and that the appropriate level of aggregation depends on the inferential goal.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press
Figure 0

Table 1. Candidate disagreement across social environmentsTable 1 long description.

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Table 2. Global disagreement factor analysis resultsTable 2 long description.

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Figure 1. Figure 1 long description.Ridgeline plot of candidate disagreement across social environments.

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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for outcome variablesTable 3 long description.

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Figure 2. Cross-environment consistency of candidate disagreement.

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Figure 3. Figure 3 long description.Mean candidate disagreement by demographic group and social environment.

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Table 4. Disaggregated models of partisan and ideological strength on disagreement across social environmentsTable 4 long description.

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Table 5. Core-only and global disagreement factor models of partisan and ideological strengthTable 5 long description.

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Figure 4. Predicted probability of high and low partisan strength, by global disagreement.

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Figure 5. Predicted probability of high and low ideological strength, by global disagreement.

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Table 6. Conditional relationships between disagreement across social environments and partisan and ideological strengthTable 6 long description.

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Figure 6. Predicted probability of maximum partisan strength, by core and periphery disagreement.

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Figure 7. Predicted probability of maximum ideological strength, by core and periphery disagreement.

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