Historical research on both neoliberalism and Euroscepticism has gained in popularity over the last decade or so. This is hardly surprising, given that both ‘isms’ are salient concepts in the political discourse of our time. Anyone writing the history of contemporary Europe today sooner or later encounters these terms and the issues they aim to describe. ‘Neoliberalism’ is typically used as a placeholder for particularly radical forms of free market capitalism, while ‘Euroscepticism’ serves as an umbrella term for various forms of opposition to European integration. However, debates on the right definition are contentious in either case.Footnote 1 Both phenomena have their own complicated histories, but they entered the political mainstream at a similar time. Since the late 1980s, ideas associated with the two terms became increasingly influential, first in some, mostly right-wing segments of the political spectrum and later also in broader parts of European societies at large.Footnote 2 Not long ago, both phenomena were at the height of their influence, shaping Europe’s political and economic history in significant ways. In the 2010s, fiscal austerity measures from the neoliberal rulebook were the default response of many European countries to the global financial crisis. In 2016, Eurosceptics achieved their greatest victory to date by winning the Brexit vote, as a result of which the European Union (EU) lost one of its most powerful members.
Against this backdrop, historians began to take a greater interest in these issues. Important works have now been published, including special issues, edited volumes and monographs.Footnote 3 These works demonstrate that neoliberalism and Euroscepticism were, in many ways, intertwined. Not all neoliberals were Eurosceptic, and vice versa. At times, committed neoliberals even worked directly for the EU, while some Eurosceptics were decidedly anti-neoliberal and others had concerns about European integration that were not economic in nature. Nevertheless, there was significant overlap, too. As we will see, neoliberals and Eurosceptics often took a critical stance towards the EU’s alleged over-regulation and its ambition to establish a state-like structure at a supranational level. In some cases, the amalgamation went so far that it is difficult to discern which set of convictions was ultimately more characteristic. Margaret Thatcher is certainly the most prominent example in this regard. Historians did not miss these connections – how could they? – but the scholarship is largely separated into distinct fields. One (on neoliberalism) is dominated by economic and intellectual historians, the other (on Euroscepticism) by experts on the history of European integration. Special issues and edited volumes tend to be produced within these established networks.Footnote 4
Considering the chronological and empirical overlap between the two phenomena, it is striking that this separation, although never total, has been sustained for so long, especially since the two research fields also share similar epistemological challenges. Both deal with phenomena that are difficult to grasp analytically, to the extent that writing about them could resemble chasing ghosts. After all, hardly anyone ever self-identified as neoliberal or Eurosceptic, with the notable exception of the British ‘Leave’ campaign’s hard core around Nigel Farage and his United Kingdom Independence Party, who wore the badge of ‘Euroscepticism’ with pride.Footnote 5 Furthermore, both ‘isms’ quickly ran the risk of becoming diffuse catch-all terms for very different, at times even opposing views. Some have therefore suggested using them only in the plural – ‘neoliberalisms’ and ‘Euroscepticisms’.Footnote 6 Others went even further, arguing that the terms are of questionable value altogether since they obscure more than they explain.Footnote 7
This essay is less concerned with these definitional disputes, important as they are for such relatively young research fields. Instead, it focuses on the empirical connections between the varied historical phenomena that the descriptors ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘Euroscepticism’ came to encompass. The essay aims to encourage closer dialogue between fields that have more in common than their relative isolation suggests. It also seeks to contribute to the special issue on ‘Varieties of Neoliberalism’ by bringing Euroscepticism into the fold. The essay proceeds as follows: firstly, it explores the intersection between Euroscepticism and neoliberalism, bringing together recent contributions from both fields that speak to one another, but often in their own languages. Taken together, their findings tell a story of this intersection that, while reaffirming the centrality of Thatcherite Britain, ultimately extends much further, in terms of both chronology and geography. As neoliberalism and Euroscepticism continue to define our present, the two themes and their complex entanglements will remain important in historiographical debates. Secondly, the essay thus identifies some avenues for future research.
The Intersection of Neoliberalism and Euroscepticism
‘In the beginning was Margaret Thatcher.’ A book, yet to be written, on the intersection we are interested in here might begin with this sentence. While obviously too simplistic – Thatcher was by no means the first neoliberal Eurosceptic, a point to which we shall return – the claim would nevertheless carry some legitimacy since the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom symbolises the fusion of the two ‘isms’ like no one before or after her. For both histories, Thatcher plays a central role. Her controversial 1988 ‘Bruges speech’, in which she criticised the European Community (EC) for its ‘endless regulation’ and centralist tendencies, inspired one of the first Eurosceptic think-tanks in the United Kingdom, the ‘Bruges Group’. According to Quinn Slobodian and Dieter Plehwe, two of the most well-known experts on the history of neoliberalism, the ‘Bruges Group’ was of critical importance for the emergence of a neoliberal variant of Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom and beyond.Footnote 8 By portraying the EC as a socialist ‘United States of Europe’ in the making, the think-tank helped to shatter ‘the relatively pro-Europe position held by neoliberals in the 1980s’.Footnote 9 Although the ‘Bruges Group’ was a very British affair, Slobodian and Plehwe argue that it ultimately gained significance in the wider European context as it provided Eurosceptics across the continent with a central rallying cause for years to come: the struggle against the Euro. In line with neoliberal preferences for the market principle, the Bruges Group advocated ‘currency choice’ instead of monetary union.Footnote 10
Mark Gilbert, an expert on European integration history, also underlines the importance of Thatcher’s ‘Bruges speech’ in his chapter of the 2020 volume Euroscepticisms: The Historical Roots of a Political Challenge, edited by himself and Daniele Pasquinucci. According to Gilbert, Thatcher’s speech initiated a ‘thirty years’ crisis’ over the EU in the United Kingdom.Footnote 11 However, Gilbert goes one step further, tracing the roots of British Eurosceptic sentiment back to the 1960s and 1970s. Regarding the neoliberal case against European integration, Gilbert highlights the significance of Enoch Powell, a right-wing ideologue and Tory MP from 1950 to 1987 who has recently been referred to as the ‘godfather of Brexit’ on the popular British podcast The Rest Is History.Footnote 12 Although not a prominent member of the ‘neoliberal thought collective’ per se, Powell was one of the earliest and most high-profile Eurosceptics from the pro-market right in the United Kingdom.Footnote 13 As early as 1971, he published a collection of speeches setting out arguments against joining the EC from a liberal perspective anchored in concepts of free trade and low taxation. ‘Underlying all these economic beliefs was an Ur-Thatcherite conviction that there was nothing wrong with the British economy that tighter monetary policy wouldn’t cure’, Gilbert emphasises.Footnote 14 Most importantly, however, Powell saw what many in the United Kingdom on both sides of the political spectrum refused to see clearly: European integration was a political as much as an economic choice. Gilbert paraphrases Powell: ‘If political unity meant that Britain would become a province or county in a larger political whole, then no economic benefit was worth the price of membership.’Footnote 15 The similarities to Thatcher’s brand of Euroscepticism two decades later are striking. Her preference for a restrictive monetary policy at the national level served as an argument against participating in European monetary policy, and her concern that in a European federation the United Kingdom would become to Brussels what Florida was to Washington motivated her opposition to ‘political union’ at the supranational level.Footnote 16
Studies going beyond the 1980s and 1990s, such as Gilbert’s, are a clear trend in the historical literature on Euroscepticism. Kiran Klaus Patel recently argued that it would be illusory to think that there ever was a ‘golden age’ when European integration was uncontested. He thus challenges the influential thesis of the ‘permissive consensus’ by Lisbeth Hooghe and Gary Marks. In an article published in 2009, the political scientists stated that prior to the Treaty of Maastricht, European citizens generally viewed supranational integration as positive and necessary.Footnote 17 Patel however, stresses that political leaders often simply did not ask the public for their opinion on European matters, and if they did, for example, through the Commission’s Eurobarometer surveys, they designed the questionnaires in a way that left little room for fundamental criticism.Footnote 18 Opposition to European integration thus remained in the shadows, even though it clearly existed from the beginning, as many of the newer studies on Euroscepticism demonstrate.Footnote 19 Wolfram Kaiser makes a similar point. He views European integration as an inherently conflict-ridden process that has always been accompanied by contentious political debates. He argues that the territorial composition, institutional design and economic direction of the European project have been contested ever since the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s, not only since Maastricht.Footnote 20
Nevertheless, for the history of the neoliberal version of Euroscepticism, the late 1980s and early 1990s remain pivotal, particularly with regard to the United Kingdom. Most recent scholarship, however, has shifted its focus away from the political leadership and onto the second and third rows of policymakers. David Lawton, for instance, shows how conservative lawyers working in the City of London (unsuccessfully) attempted to reverse British ratification of the Maastricht Treaty through legalistic means. While their case against the EU was ostensibly about parliamentary sovereignty, many of them were also decidedly pro-market, sharing a profound distaste for projects such as monetary union and European social policy. It is no surprise, then, that they chose William Rees-Mogg, a member of the Mont-Pelèrin Society, to present their case in court.Footnote 21 Much of the scholarship on the history of Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom, including Lawton’s, has a clear vanishing point in Brexit. Another example is Lars Cornelissen’s work on the question of ‘how neoliberal intellectuals came to support Brexit’.Footnote 22 He identifies three central arguments against the EU made by neoliberals in the United Kingdom since the 1980s, regarding social and monetary policy as well as the notion of national sovereignty. In his account too, the ‘Bruges Group’ and other Thatcherite think-tanks play a central role. It is an important task for historians to explain how the conditions for Brexit came about. As Cornelissen rightfully underlines again, neoliberalism forms a crucial part of this explanation. On the flip side, the risk is to over-emphasise a path dependency from Thatcherism to Brexit, which was not as clear-cut as it seems today. After all, Thatcher herself, like many other neoliberals before and after her, never advocated for leaving the EU but rather for transforming it from within.Footnote 23
Meanwhile, historical research on Euroscepticism has recently undergone a process of Europeanisation, moving beyond the British case. This was a necessary response to the spread of the phenomenon under study: already by the early 1990s, the United Kingdom was no longer the only EU member state with a flourishing Eurosceptic movement. The second most notable case regarding the neoliberal incarnation of such movements is Germany. Numerous authors have shown that the influential Ordoliberal school of economics, often considered the German branch of the neoliberal family tree,Footnote 24 had always been critical of the EC’s most ambitious project, monetary union. Ordoliberal economists, who had strong connections to the Bundesbank and the Ministry of Finance, advocated free markets within a strict regulatory order. From the outset, they cautioned against the risks of abandoning the stable D-Mark. They feared that a common European currency would soon turn out to be a Trojan horse for economic dirigisme à la francaise.Footnote 25 After all, the French openly campaigned for the politicisation of monetary union by advocating for the introduction of a ‘gouvernement économique’ alongside the new currency.Footnote 26 Some of the Ordoliberal critics of such schemes, like Joachim Starbatty, became founding members of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland; AfD) in 2013, when it was still primarily an anti-Euro party.Footnote 27 Simultaneously, however, a much more radical mutation of neoliberal Euroscepticism emerged apart from the Ordoliberal orthodoxy. Historians of European integration have written relatively little so far on this new, aggressively libertarian and racist form of Euroscepticism in Germany. Here, authors specialising in the history of neoliberalism are leading the way. In his latest book, Hayek’s Bastards: The Neoliberal Roots of the Populist Right, Quinn Slobodian shows how this new cohort of German neoliberals, inspired by right-wing radicals from the United States, emerged over the last two decades: ‘The new fix found in race, culture, and nation is the most recent strain of a promarket philosophy based not on the idea that we are all the same but that we are in a fundamental, and perhaps permanent way, different’, writes Slobodian.Footnote 28 In Germany, these right-wing neoliberals, whom Slobodian refers to as 'new fusionists', campaigned hard against the Euro, which they perceived as part of a conspiracy to turn Europe into a socialist, multi-ethnic super-state. Instead, they argued for closed borders and the return to a ‘hard’ currency backed by gold in order to create a kind of ‘Volkskapitalismus’. Slobodian demonstrates how the 'new fusionists' gained significant influence within the AfD following the European financial and refugee crises of the 2010s by providing fresh arguments for the party's traditional anti-EU brand that aligned with its increasingly radical stance on immigration.Footnote 29
Paradoxically, this was also the period when neoliberal ideology arguably exerted the greatest influence within the EU. In his latest monograph, Liberty, Solidarity and Community: Capitalism and European Integration, 1945 to the Present, Laurent Warlouzet describes the years between 1992 and 2015 as the EU’s era of ‘high neoliberalism’. Warlouzet, a historian with expertise in both of the research fields discussed here, argues that the fragile balance between ‘solidarity’ and ‘liberty’ achieved under the leadership of Commission President Jacques Delors (1985–95) tilted strongly towards the liberal side from the mid-1990s onwards. The list of evidence is long. It includes the notorious ‘Bolkenstein directive’, which increased competition in the EU’s service sector; controversial rulings by the European Court of Justice that legitimised corporate tax evasion and undermined trade union power; and a competition policy directed against state aid. Adopting ‘neoliberal legislation in the face of growing international competition’, the EU departed on ‘a slope of legislative Darwinism’, Warlouzet states, culminating in José Emanuel Barroso’s decade-long Commission presidency (2004–14), which was marked by an economic policy of ‘minimal intervention’.Footnote 30 The ways in which these neoliberal reforms, especially the deregulation of the banking sector, coupled with ‘an unquestioning belief in the self-regulating nature of financial markets’, contributed to the economic crisis of the 2010s are beyond the scope of this essay.Footnote 31 However, what is important here is that the EU’s era of ‘high neoliberalism’ provoked counterbalancing reactions. On the one hand, as Warlouzet shows, it led to a revival of policies aimed at rebuilding ‘solidarity’ between member states, for instance, by strengthening social rights and improving tax cooperation within the EU.Footnote 32 But on the other hand, the era of ‘high neoliberalism’ also gave rise to yet another form of Euroscepticism, one that was directed against neoliberalism.
Nowhere was the anti-neoliberal form of opposition to the EU more pronounced than in Greece. At the height of the debt crisis in 2015, the Greek government, led by the Coalition of the Radical Left – Progressive Alliance (SYRIZA), threatened to leave the Eurozone in response to the EU’s demands for the implementation of austerity measures. The government even organised a referendum on the issue. During the campaign, it portrayed the EU as an imperial oppressor that disregarded the sovereignty and dignity of the Greek people.Footnote 33 In her contribution to the Euroscepticisms volume introduced above, Kira Gartzou-Katsouyanni shows that this kind of defiant Euroscepticism had a long tradition in Greece. Historically, many Greeks associated ‘Europe’, and later the EU, with oppression.Footnote 34 First, Germans and Italians occupied Greece during the Second World War, killing hundreds of thousands. Then, the British and French supported the dictatorial Regime of the Colonels in the context of the Cold War. Thus, when governments of other EU countries, Germany in particular, demanded the implementation of ever-new austerity packages in the wake of the financial crisis of the 2010s, resistance against this form of external pressure came to be seen as a matter of national pride.Footnote 35 In other words, resistance against neoliberalism was now part of a fight for sovereignty.
This anti-neoliberal variety of Euroscepticism was not only a significant force in ‘poor’ southern Europe. As Torsten Borring Olesen demonstrates, in Denmark too, fears that EU membership would lead to the erosion of the welfare state merged with concerns about national sovereignty to form a potent opposition to European integration. Based on these concerns, the Socialist Party and certain trade unions campaigned against the Maastricht Treaty – and were successful. In 1992, Denmark’s ‘No’ in its first referendum on the treaty, just a few months after the solemn signature ceremony in Maastricht, sent shockwaves through Europe. Although the Danes later approved the treaty in a second referendum after Copenhagen had secured several opt-outs, the original rejection proved that the march towards an ‘ever closer union’, as set out in the treaty’s preamble, was in fact not inevitable.Footnote 36
Avenues for Future Research
Neoliberalism and Euroscepticism are thus intertwined in complex ways. Together, they constitute a particular form of opposition to European integration; however, Euroscepticism could also be directed against neoliberalism. The literature on the history of Euroscepticism tends to underestimate the importance of these connections. For example, the term ‘neoliberalism’ features only three times in the entire Euroscepticisms volume and only twice in the most recent special issue on the topic, edited by Philipp Müller and Christina von Hodenberg.Footnote 37 This indicates that opposition to European integration takes many forms and that the (anti-)neoliberal versions are only two out of many. Highlighting this diversity is important because it contributes to a much-needed normalisation: like any other polity, the EU can and should be criticised from different angles. What is also clear, however, is that the most destructive and authoritarian political forces within the EU today – those on the far right – often have close ties to the neoliberal network, as the specialised literature on neoliberalism discussed here demonstrates. Historians of the EU should be aware of this powerful alliance and continue to research its historical origins to better understand the challenges it may pose in future.
Another striking characteristic of the literature on the history of Euroscepticism is a certain correlation between the nationalist tendencies of the phenomenon under study and the methodological approach of the research: most contributions focus on individual EU member states and their national histories of opposition to European integration.Footnote 38 In a way, this is merely a backswing of the methodological pendulum. Since the turn of the last century, ‘transnational’ has been the buzzword in cutting-edge European integration historiography, while approaches focusing on individual member states were criticised as outdated.Footnote 39 This trend followed a broader shift in the social sciences, but it was also an expression of its time in political terms. After all, since Maastricht, European integration seemingly transcended the nation-state in ever more policy areas, creating new transnational solidarities and dependencies along the way. In contrast, historians holding on to national perspectives increasingly looked like captains refusing to abandon their sinking ships. However, the resurgence of nationalism and Euroscepticism in recent years suggests that this view was partly based on a future that never quite materialised. In fact, European nation-states are still powerful actors with public spheres that are often surprisingly resistant to Europeanisation processes.Footnote 40 The nation-state thus remains an important category of historical analysis, especially when it comes to Euroscepticism.Footnote 41 However, researching the neoliberal critique of the European project also requires the toolkit of transnational history and its perspectives. As Quinn Slobodian has demonstrated, many early neoliberals were actually ‘globalists’ with an instrumental relationship to the nation-state who placed great hopes in European integration to further their cause.Footnote 42 Building on this observation, it seems important to ask what role their transnational networks played in shaping Euroscepticism as the integration project fell out of favour within the neoliberal movement. This line of enquiry would also help to contextualise the history of Euroscepticism within the broader scope of global developments, given that neoliberal networks today extend well beyond Europe and ‘the West’, particularly into Latin America. Here, libertarian figures such as Javier Milei and Jair Bolsonaro clinched the highest offices. Not very surprisingly, they also hold considerable sway among populists on the Eurosceptic right.Footnote 43 A lot of fascinating work on these global connections remains to be done.
Another important task for future research will be to recalibrate Europe’s, and more specifically the EU’s, place in the history of global capitalism. After the economic ‘crisis of the long 1970s’, the conflict-ridden first half of the 1980s (which has somewhat misleadingly been labelled as a time of ‘Eurosclerosis’) and the collapse of state socialism at the end of the decade, the EU emerged as a different kind of actor. It was now bigger, including former East Germany, which became part of West Germany in 1990. Multiple rich central and northern European states, notably Austria, Sweden and Finland, were on their way to membership too. Equally important, the EU was now stronger than before. As protracted as the negotiations had been, the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht was a momentous step towards the institutional consolidation of the European polity. And with monetary union, it had embarked on a truly astonishing project of economic integration.Footnote 44 It was this new-found dynamism that laid the foundation for the EU to become a more assertive global actor, not so much in the domain of foreign and security policy, where it still lacked coherence, but in the domain of economics.Footnote 45
How did the EU fill this new role? One important element seems to be that, in the 1990s and 2000s, the EU evolved into what Giandomenico Majone famously called a ‘regulatory state’: a new type of state whose power lay in economic re-regulation after years of deregulation, rather than direct intervention.Footnote 46 Anu Bradford has shown that this regulatory power was not only aimed at European markets. On the basis of its economic power, the EU was increasingly able to set norms and standards on a global scale. This ‘Brussels Effect’ was particularly evident in the field of competition law, which was an important item on the neoliberal agenda too because it touched on issues such as state aid and subsidies.Footnote 47 Further research is needed on the complex issue of whether and how the EU contributed to the neoliberalisation of the global economic order in the post–Cold War era. In this context, individual actors should come into sharper focus, too. Leon Brittan, for instance, who was Competition and then Trade Commissioner at the European Commission in the 1990s, advocated for an ‘unregulated transatlantic free trade area’, a little-known precursor to the controversial Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and other, more successful, trade agreements, as Laurent Warlouzet notes.Footnote 48 However, the effects of neoliberalism on the EU’s global influence cut the other way too. Arguably, neoliberalism also weakened the EU in important ways. On the one hand, neoliberal thought encouraged a depoliticisation of economic policy and discouraged the creation of a collective fiscal capacity, leaving the EU vulnerable to the vagaries of global markets. On the other hand, and coming back to the central theme of this essay, neoliberalism fuelled Eurosceptic movements in the United Kingdom and elsewhere that want to see the EU weakened. This is history yet to fully unfold. Evaluating the precise correlation of these contradictory forces emanating from the same core neoliberal ideology, however, will soon become an important task for historical research.
At the time of writing this essay, neoliberalism and Euroscepticism have lost some of their centrality in the political discourse, at least on the European continent. Neoliberals have suffered several setbacks over the last fifteen to twenty years. The financial crisis of the 2010s shattered the belief of many Europeans in the capacities of financial markets to self-regulate. This even led the European Central Bank, originally the guardian of neoliberal economics within the EU, to change course towards a more Keynesian approach.Footnote 49 Then the COVID-19 pandemic made European states adopt interventionist measures to prevent economic collapse. While some of these measures, such as common borrowing on the EU level (a historic first), were controversial, they were also generally met with broad public support.Footnote 50 Then Donald Trump plunged the world, including the EU, into a tariff war before attacking Iran, with severe consequences for global trade. Against this backdrop, it is hard to avoid the feeling that the era of ‘high neoliberalism’ might be over.Footnote 51 This does not mean, however, that neoliberal ideas and networks have somehow evaporated into thin air. Some neoliberal dogmas are deeply ingrained in the institutional design of the EU and continue to shape economic policy views in European capitals, especially in Berlin. This is the case, for instance, when it comes to an independent monetary policy prioritising stability above all else or the limits of government borrowing and spending. As long as Germany, the EU’s most powerful member state, continues to defend these beliefs, the neoliberal signature of the EU’s economic order will likely remain, not to speak of the more radical forms of neoliberal thought that are currently trending within the AfD.Footnote 52
The characteristics of Euroscepticism have also changed in recent years. In the face of the rather unglamorous divorce proceedings between the United Kingdom and the EU, many Eurosceptics on the continent changed course. Where populists used to argue for leaving the EU, they now often aim to reshape the European project from within.Footnote 53 Since Brexit, no other member state has held a referendum on whether to leave the EU, and at the time of writing, no political party with governmental responsibilities is pursuing an exit from the club. Furthermore, the EU appears to have lost little of its appeal to the outside. It is currently engaged in official accession negotiations with six countries, at least two of which – Montenegro and Albania – have increasingly realistic prospects of joining by the end of the 2020s.Footnote 54 While open hostility towards the EU has thus waned in recent years, opposition to the ideal of an ‘ever closer union’ remains potent. In some parties, Euroscepticism has taken deep roots – think of Hungary’s Fidsez, Poland’s PiS, France’s Rassemblement National or Germany’s AfD. None of these parties is in power at the moment, but if this changes, the EU will immediately come under immense pressure from within. In the meantime, Eurosceptic parties will continue to make their voices heard, not least through their strong presence in the European Parliament.Footnote 55
In other words, while neoliberalism and Euroscepticism may be undergoing a transformation, they are set to remain with us in some form and combination for the foreseeable future. This should be reason enough for historians to continue researching these phenomena, their intellectual origins and changing guises as well as their manifold connections.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Grace Ballor and Mattia Ravano for their comments on an earlier draft of this article, as well as the editors Stephanie Wright and Doina Anca Cretu for their valuable input.
