II. THE SCIENCE OF ETHOLOGY

In Chapter Five of Book VI of the System of Logic, Mill proposed to found a new science, called “ethology,” which aimed to understand the role played by social circumstances in individual choices. Based on psychology’s general laws, ethology was supposed to reconcile deductive and universal laws of human nature with seemingly contrary empirical evidence. Its aim was to explain why individuals behave differently in comparable circumstances whilst all being subject to the same universal laws. In his classic History of English Utilitarianism (Reference Albee1902), Ernest Albee maintained that Mill abandoned his project of developing a science of ethology soon after the publication of the System of Logic to dedicate himself to political economy. But, according to David Leary, Mill’s failure to complete his scheme can be partly explained by ethology’s own weaknesses. As a deductive science-to-be grounded on empirical psychology, ethology was, he believes, doomed from the start (Leary Reference Leary1982, p. 155). This theory has since been contested (Capaldi Reference Capaldi1973; Leary Reference Leary1982; Ball Reference Ball2000). I claim here that, whatever Mill’s reasons for abandoning his project of writing a full treatise on ethology, he never abandoned the idea of using social science, and political economy in particular, to improve individual characters.

Although ethology is explicitly dealt with only in System of Logic, character formation is a topic Mill often refers to in his other works. This is especially true in An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy (Reference Mill and Robson1865), Auguste Comte and Positivism (Reference Mill and Robson1865), and his notes on James Mill’s Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (Reference Mill and Robson1869). Janice Carlisle (Reference Carlisle2010) and Terence Ball (Reference Ball2000) have argued that Mill’s autobiography could be read as a case study of ethology, an illustration of how “his character was being formed (and to some degree deformed) by his father and subsequently re-formed by himself” (Ball Reference Ball2000, p. 33). The issue of the formation of character is also a prominent one in Considerations on Representative Government ([1861] Reference Mill and Robson1977) and Subjection of Women ([1869] Reference Mill and Robson1984). I shall, however, essentially deal here with his writings on political economy.

As a first approximation, ethology can be described as a branch of human psychology. Its origins are to be found in the associationist theory defended by David Hume, David Hartley, and Alexander Bain, as well as James Mill’s Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (Reference Mill1829).Footnote ¹ In his Autobiography, Mill describes his father’s “fundamental doctrine” as “the formation of all human character by circumstances, through the universal Principle of Association, and the consequent unlimited possibility of improving the moral and intellectual condition of mankind by education. Of all his doctrines none was more important than this, or needs more to be insisted on” (Mill [1874] Reference Mill and Robson1981, p. 111). Those views were, however, not generally shared, including by associationist theorists. Robert Owen, for instance, contested the role (self)education could potentially play in character formation (Tait Reference Tait1971). Auguste Comte, Mill’s main opponent, was, however, not a disciple of associationism, and he considered it to be scientifically flawed.Footnote ²

Although they often disagree on fundamental issues, associationist philosophers all agree that human beings follow general and universal psychology laws and that the distinctness of individual behaviors can be explained by the great variety of circumstances they are subject to. As a member of the associationist school (to which Mill’s father also belonged), Mill believed that individual actions are caused by a number of psychological associations, and that provided we have sufficient knowledge of the character of the person and of her environment, then her actions could be scientifically predicted, since “volitions do, in point of fact, follow determinate moral antecedents with the same uniformity, and (when we have sufficient knowledge of the circumstances) with the same certainty, as physical effects follow their physical causes” (Mill [1865] Reference Mill and Robson1979, p. 446).

In its purest form, associationism excludes the idea of free will. For Mill, however, individuals can—to some extent—alter their character (Mill [1865] Reference Mill and Robson1979, p. 466). In that respect, Mill dissociates himself from Owen and his followers, who believed that individual character could be molded only through external action (Harrison Reference Harrison2009; Owen Reference Owen1813). Determinism is not “fatalism,” says Mill, and it certainly does not diminish an individual’s personal responsibility in their actions. This distinction between irresistible and resistible causes of action is, as suggested by John Skorupski, fundamental to avoid determinism turning into fatalism (Skorupski Reference Skorupski1989, p. 252). It would be misleading, however, to conclude that individuals owe their capacity to resist motives of action to their moral autonomy. They owe it only to their character. People who have a strong character are better equipped to select amongst different motives of action the one they will actually yield to. But this is not autonomy, not—at least—in the Kantian meaning of the word.Footnote ³ To be fully autonomous, the agent’s will ought to be independently and rationally formed. For Mill, however, all motives of action are externally determined and nothing suggests that a rational—and consequently universal—one should be given priority. On the contrary, he clearly states in On Liberty that all experiences of living are equally desirable and, moreover, that this includes the desires of the most spontaneous and impulsive people—the most praiseworthy, in effect, as they are the mark of a strong and energetic character.

The aim of ethology is

If ethology can give us a scientific account of how our character, and as a consequence our behavior, is determined by our environment, then it becomes possible to design policies that could positively affect people’s decision-making processes, without directly interfering with their personal choices.

There are two different sides to ethology, depending on whether it applies to national or to individual character. Mill believed each developed nation had its particular characterFootnote ⁴ and that it would be “an absurdity” (Mill [1865] Reference Mill and Robson1979, p. 99) to ignore these differences when discussing legal and political matters. This is, as John Robson showed it, the very core of Mill’s attack against Jeremy Bentham’s universalism. Similar points can be made against the supposed universality of the principles of political economy. Personal characters are the combined product of individual and social circumstances, and it is through a combined action on these circumstances that personal character can evolve. How could it be otherwise, knowing that we all influence our (close) environment, just as we are swayed by it? The real issue, though, is to what extent it is possible to anticipate the consequences on people’s character of a change in their environment; or, in other words, whether Mill’s project of a science of ethology is achievable. Mill believes that, if it is impossible to anticipate with great exactitude the consequences of a social policy in that respect, it is nonetheless possible—or at least it should soon be—to ascertain its general impact. This should suffice to decide whether or not an action is desirable:

III. THE ULTIMATE AIM OF ETHOLOGY

The cultivation of nobleness of character, for Mill, “should be to individual human beings an end” (Mill [1843] Reference Mill and Robson1974, p. 952), and therefore constitute the ultimate aim of ethology. The idea of nobleness of character is a recurrent notion in Mill’s writings, one that he adopted when still very much under the influence of the Romantics and one that he never abandoned.Footnote ⁵ Mill believed, as did a number of public moralists, that some types of characters, which he called “noble characters,” were of higher moral standards than others, and that the achievement of a well-ordered society depended on people’s ability to excel in character.

What does being of “noble character” involve? Mill does not give a full account. “Noble” translates as love of pride, of liberty and personal independence, of power or excitement, “but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all humans beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong” (Mill [1838] Reference Mill and Robson1985, p. 212). The notion of nobleness of character is purposefully kept ill-defined by Mill, who does not want to convey the idea that it refers only to a unique pattern. Noble characters are those able to assert their singularity, whilst at the same time cultivating higher pleasures and higher values.

For Mill, there are two main institutional ways to foster nobleness of character. The first one is to further democracy. This may be surprising as Mill clearly singled out democracy as a major cause of standardization of characters. It is important, however, to distinguish the social and the political meaning of the word “democracy.” Democracy, as a social movement towards equality, for Mill, like for Alexis de Tocqueville before him, inevitably results in the downwards harmonization of people’s lifestyles. Democracy, as a political system of representative government, appears to be the only appropriate response to what de Tocqueville referred as the “fated” gradual progress of equality. But democracy can also represent a serious threat to nobleness of characters. Strong and energetic characters are an asset to the proper functioning of representative government, but, as Mill is well aware, they are not usually appreciated by people.Footnote ⁶ They are, therefore, less likely to be elected. The British election system exacerbates this “natural” tendency. “At present,” regrets Mill,

The real danger, as Mill sees it, is not that noble characters are underrepresented—this is to be expected—but that they are totally excluded from representation. Once a few are elected, Mill confidently assumes, they will necessarily be heard. Although counting only according to their number in the actual voting, the instructed minority “would count for much more, in virtue of their knowledge, and of the influence it would give them over the rest” (Mill [1843] Reference Mill and Robson1974, p. 460).

The secondFootnote ⁷ institutional lever to alter people’s character in England (as well as anywhere else) is to promote, to generalize, and to improve education. Although all men have the potential to experience such pleasures, some people’s pleasures are limited on account of their lack of education. According to associationism, sensations produce ideas, which, in turn, when associated to others’ ideas, produce complex mental states that enable us to derive pleasure from situations or events we would otherwise have been indifferent to. Education gives us the means to develop the necessary faculties that will be later instrumental to our happiness. But education is wasted if it stops individuals from asserting their character, as Mill believes. Strength and diversity of character are what education is about, and, more importantly even, are what civilization is about. “Ethology,” writes Mill, “is the science which corresponds to the art of education in the widest sense of the term, including the formation of national or collective character as well as individual” (Mill [1843] Reference Mill and Robson1974, p. 869).

It is therefore one of the government’s main duties and one of the very few, if not the only, case where it has full legitimacy to interfere with its citizens’ private lives: “Education … is one of those things which it is admissible in principle that a government should provide for the people. The case is one to which the reasons of the non-interference principle do not necessarily or universally extend” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 948). In aspects of practice, promoting education is achieved by setting up new schools across the country; however, the most important aspect is rather the underlying legal obligation made for parents to send their children to school at little or no cost (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 949). Schools are also not required to be state-funded, so that parents have the freedom, as they ought, to send their children to private and religious schools. Furthermore, the government should have no authority to bind teachers to a single curriculum (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 950). The only obligation to be made is to provide proper education to all children. This, Mill believes, is far from being the case in Victorian England, where “[t]he present wretched education, and wretched social arrangements” are responsible for the English’s lack of sophistication, their egoism, and their unrepentant sexism, and these should be the first institutions to be reformed (Mill [1861] Reference Mill and Robson1985, p. 215).

For Mill, nobleness of character refers to “the conformity of his own character to his standard of excellence, without hope of good and fear of evil from other source than his own inward consciousness” (Mill [1838] Reference Mill and Robson1985, p. 95). It relies on a deep conviction that “individuality should assert itself” (Mill [1859] Reference Mill and Robson1977, p. 261), that different modes of life are worth living and that “free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others” (Mill [1859] Reference Mill and Robson1977, p. 261). This belief is supported by different types of arguments. The first one is utilitarian in nature: by letting people find their pleasure wherever they choose to find it (on the condition that no one else is hurt), one ensures their greatest happiness.

Mill secondly sees the cultivation of strong characters as a defense against the standardization of characters entailed by the upcoming democracy. Strong and energetic characters are impervious to public opinion and custom. “The general average of mankind,” regrets Mill, “are not only moderate in intellect, but also moderate in inclinations: they have no tastes or wishes strong enough to incline them to do anything unusual, and they consequently do not understand those who have, and class all such with the wild and intemperate whom they are accustomed to look down upon” (Mill [1859] Reference Mill and Robson1977, p. 271). But for this standard of excellence to be achieved, adequate circumstances need to be created. This is where sciences such as ethology and political economy should assist the legislator.

IV. MILL’S CONCEPTION OF ECONOMICS

Mill’s Principles of Political Economy stands as one of the most influential economic textbooks of the second half of the nineteenth century. Initially published in 1848, it has been continually republished, was revised by Mill up until its seventh edition in 1871, and was extensively used at least until World War One. Mill’s contribution to economics has often been undermined and read only to be compared with Adam Smith’s and David Ricardo’s. It is true that historians of economic thought, who used to exclusively focus on a retrospective history of economic concepts, have not been very sympathetic to Mill’s works (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1954; Blaug Reference Blaug1985; Hollander Reference Hollander1985). The idea according to which Mill’s economic ideas lacked originality was, however, not shared by everyone. John Hicks considered him as “the most undervalued economist of the nineteenth century” (Hollander Reference Hollander1985, p. ix), and George Stigler even claimed that he was “one of the most original economists in the history of the science” (Hollander Reference Hollander1985, p. xii).

Unlike Ricardo, Mill does not see the decline of the rate of profits as an adverse process to arrest or to delay but rather as a necessary condition to reach the stationary state, which he sees as “a very considerable improvement on [their] present condition” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 754).Footnote ⁸ Since acquisition of wealth is made virtually impossible in such a state, people can concentrate on a better distribution: “It is only in the backward countries of the world that increased production is still an important object: in those most advanced, what is economically needed is a better distribution, of which one indispensable means is a stricter restraint on population” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 755). Like Thomas Malthus, he disapproved of the unsustainable growth of population caused by people’s imprudent behavior but does not contemplate colonial trade as a possible solution to what can only be regarded as a moral issue. Political economy, on the contrary, offers conclusive evidence that population growth and profit rates are closely linked. While, according to Mill, “the countries in which the greatest prudence is manifested in the regulating of population, are often those in which capital increases less rapidly,” one can also observe that “[w]here there is an indefinite prospect of employment for increased numbers, there is apt to appear less necessity for prudential restraint” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 753). The economic slowdown consecutive to the fall of the profit rate should therefore, for Mill, be conducive to an improvement of people’s moral constraint. According to his own words, Mill “cannot … regard the stationary state of capital and wealth with the unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards it by political economists of the old school” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, pp. 753–754).

The difficulty in assessing Mill’s contribution to political economy from a strictly economic point of view becomes obvious once we realize that, for Mill, the science of political economy cannot be considered separately from the other social sciences, and most specifically from ethology. Political economy should not be treated

Whilst economic commentators are prone to acknowledge the distinction introduced by Mill between science and art, they are not ready to admit that, in order to have any possible application, political economy must be connected to other social sciences.

According to Mill, science “deals in facts, [art] in precepts. Science is a collection of truths; art, a body of rules, or directions for conduct” (Mill [1836] Reference Mill and Robson1967, p. 312). As a science, political economy is logically strictly restricted to the uncovering of universal economic laws. To identify such laws, it is necessary to imagine an economic agent stripped from all that could potentially make him belong to a certain time or a certain culture. “Just in the same manner [that geometry presupposes an arbitrary definition of a line],” writes Mill in his Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy (Reference Mill and Robson1844; in Mill Reference Mill and Robson1967), “does Political Economy presuppose an arbitrary definition of a man, as a being who invariably does that by which he may obtain the greatest amount of necessaries, conveniences, and luxuries, with the smallest quantity of labour and physical self-denial with which they can be obtained in the existing state of knowledge” (Mill [1836] Reference Mill and Robson1967, p. 326). Of course, Mill never considered increasing wealth and economic growth as society’s ultimate end. And whatever this aim may be, it is not for political economists to uncover it. This is the task of art, like moral philosophy, not of science. Mill’s economic man has nevertheless been attacked by a number of thinkers such as Emile Durkheim (Gillig Reference Gillig2015). Durkheim was not averse to the idea of using abstractions for scientific purpose and he certainly belonged to those who believed in the scientific potential of social studies, but he believed that Mill’s process of abstraction went too far. If Mill’s political economy had been supposed to stand on its own, Durkheim’s criticism would probably have been acceptable. However, this was never supposed to be the case, and, once articulated with ethology, Durkheim’s point falls through.

The scientific legitimacy of political economy relies, as presented above, on a desocialized view of man. The practical validity of the general laws it has uncovered depends, however, on the social and historical circumstances actually encountered. Circumstances can strongly affect people’s character in one way or another and this has potentially decisive consequences on their economic choices. In the absence of a science capable of anticipating the impact caused on individual character by institutional changes, political economy is condemned to remain a purely theoretical science, devoid of any possible applications. To be fully relevant, the lessons from political economy need to be completed by those of ethological principles, the omission of which “is no defect in them as abstract or hypothetical sciences, but it vitiates them in their practical application as branches of a comprehensive social science” (Mill [1843] Reference Mill and Robson1974, p. 487). General economic laws ought to be reinterpreted according to social and cultural specificities to have some “applications to social philosophy,” as stated in the full title of the Principles.

As we know, Mill abandoned the idea of writing a treatise on ethology, and dedicated the few years immediately following the System of Logic to the redaction of his book on political economy instead. This may explain why he did not strictly follow the epistemological rules he ascertained in the Definition of Political Economy ([1836] Reference Mill and Robson1967) and in the System ([1843] Reference Mill and Robson1974). In the following sections, I present two economic issues—land properties and colonies—in which Mill voluntarily stepped aside from using the abstraction of the homo oeconomicus to include considerations drawn from ethology in order to promote moral improvement.

V. LAND PROPERTY AND COLONIES

Let us first consider the issue raised by large agricultural exploitation. Mill considers small landed properties to be far superior to large exploitations, yet he recognizes that, economically speaking, labor “is unquestionably more productive on the system of large industrial enterprises” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 768). In chapter nine of his Principles, “Of Production on a Large, and Production on a Small Scale,” Mill compares the productivity of small and large agricultural enterprises and endeavors—not without difficulties—to present the economic benefits of small agricultural exploitations. He eventually admits that “the comparative merits of the grande and the petite culture, especially when the small farmer is also the proprietor, cannot be looked upon as decided. It is a question on which good judges at present differ. The current of English opinion is in favour of large farms: on the Continent, the weight of authority seems to be on the other side” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 150). Property is the determinant factor to take into consideration: “To understand the subject, it must be studied where the cultivator is the proprietor, or at least a métayer with a permanent tenure; where the labour he exerts to increase the produce and value of the land avails wholly, or at least partly, to his own benefit and that of his descendants” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 148).

Although not as efficient as hired labor, economic independence gives a sense of responsibility and prudence to the farmers, whose survival now depends only on their ability to work, save, and plan ahead for their future. In addition to being constitutive of strong and active personalities, economic independence is also a prerequisite to moral improvement, including sexual restraint. This applies to rich countries, in which increased production ceases to be an important object (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 755), as well as poor countries, who should give priority to character formation over immediate economic growth: “In a backward state of industrial improvement, as in Ireland, I should urge its introduction, in preference to an exclusive system of hired labour; as a more powerful instrument for raising a population from semi-savage listlessness and recklessness, to persevering industry and prudent calculation” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 768). In a series of articles on Ireland, published in the Morning Chronicle, Mill also claims that the Irish peasants’ admittedly revolting behavior is the result of their exploitation, and that with proprietorship, “tendencies in the current character of the peasant are reversible” (Carlisle Reference Carlisle2010, p. 149).

In the case of Ireland, Mill actually conjectured that the Irish character had been “malformed” by the economic exploitation and religious subservience imposed by Britain (Bell Reference Bell2010, p. 49). To put it right, Mill proposed to buy up the wastelands of Ireland and distribute them to the Irish peasantry, either through outright grants-in-deed, or through permanent tenures under a quit-rent (Zastoupil Reference Zastoupil1983, p. 710). In India, where the government is “being itself the landlord” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 327), redistributing land to Indian peasants is not an option. He therefore proposes to reform the terms of tenure and grant perpetual leases to the farmers. But, whatever the means employed, changing a national character always remains a long and slow process. A more direct and efficient way is to aim at individual characters. This perfectly illustrates the principle enunciated above, and is reaffirmed in the Principles, according to which “the moral aspect of the question … is still more important than the economical” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 768). His argument is moral rather than economic, and it relies on the types of psychological mechanisms ethology should have uncovered. His aim is to foster strong and energetic characters. As noted by Joseph Persky, “the point was not to redistribute, but to reorganize in a fashion that increased efficiency and overcame rural lethargy” (Persky Reference Persky2016, p. 106).

Mill, like his father before him, believed that England, as one of the most morally advanced countries in the world, had a duty to civilize underprivileged countries. Unlike his father, however, and in discordance with the Ricardian tradition, Mill argues that England would gain from carrying on its ancient colonial trade system with India. Colonies are, for Mill, “the last of the counter-forces which check the downward tendency of profits, in a country whose capital increases faster than that of its neighbours, and whose profits are therefore nearer to the minimum” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, pp. 745–746). His main argument, developed in the Principles of Political Economy, is that only an emigration of capital (as well as population) could check the progressive decline of the rate of profit and keep up a level of “a supply of cheap food and cheap materials of clothing, proportional to the increase of our population; thus enabling an increasing capital to find employment in the country, without reduction of profit, in producing manufactured articles with which to pay for this supply of raw produce” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 746). If one does accept the wage-fund theory, as Mill does,Footnote ⁹ the reasoning is perfectly valid. However, it should not be read as a personal stance in favor of imperialism.

The reason why Mill still favors colonization is not economic but moral. Political economy provides some arguments in favor of imperialism but they are not and cannot be determinant. It is fundamental, to fully understand Mill’s approach to political economy, to keep in mind the way he sees the relation between science and art (Riley Reference Riley and Skorupski1998; Robson Reference Robson1968). Amongst the main sciences, Mill gives a special importance to moral sciences such as political economy, ethology, history, and psychology, which he discusses in Book VI of the System of Logic. By “art,” he essentially refers to morality, politics, and esthetics, which form the basis of the “art of life.” For Mill, art and science both contribute to improve man’s condition but each within its own constitution. The object of science is to uncover the general laws of the organic and inorganic world, while the aim of art is to set human ends. Science is then strictly instrumental to art: “The art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to the science. The science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be studied, and having investigated its causes and conditions, sends it back to art with a theorem of the combination of circumstances by which it could be produced” (Mill [1843] Reference Mill and Robson1974, pp. 944–945). Despite this important methodological principle, Mill also, on occasion, introduces moral and normative considerations in his Principles of Political Economy. This happens, in particular, when oppositions occur between potential economic benefits and character improvement. Take the case of productivity and land reform. As a science, the role of political economy is to analyze the mechanisms behind economic growth. However, such analyses do not suppose that economic growth is man’s ultimate end. In fact, morality tells us that it is not and that when a conflict occurs between increase of wealth and improvement of character, priority should be given to the latter. The difficulty arises when political economy is to give practical instruction on how to achieve ends set by art. This cannot be done without the support of ethology.

Colonialism constitutes a perfect illustration of Mill’s belief that “the moral aspect of the question … is still more important than the economical” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 768).Footnote ¹⁰ Contrary to what has sometimes been argued, Mill did not use political economy to justify colonialism. Like his father, he supported the English colonial system but essentially for moral—or what Eileen Sullivan called “cultural”—reasons. Colonies, when suitably governed, could benefit from the experience and wisdom of the old countries. They also, as Duncan Bell judiciously noted, constituted “laboratories of character development” or “case studies of his proposed science of ethology” (Bell Reference Bell2010, p. 46). This remains true whether colonies change indigenous characters for the better or the worse. And, as shown by Bell, Mill grew more and more disillusioned about England’s ability to foster strong and noble characters abroad.

In his Autobiography, Mill explains that, though he sometimes took the historical and cultural context of the economic agent, the Principles of Political Economy “yielded to none of its predecessors in aiming at the scientific appreciation of the action of these causes, under the conditions which they presuppose; but it set the example of not treating those conditions as final” (Mill [1874] Reference Mill and Robson1981, p. 257). Land properties and colonies are but two examples of these provisional conditions. It is possible that Mill broke his own epistemological rule because he knew his treatise on ethology would never be completed. He may also simply have considered the issue too politically sensitive not to be dealt with.Footnote ¹¹ As such, the conditions do not jeopardize the scientific status of political economy as he defined it. However, I argue that by systematically promoting individual competition, political economy goes beyond its scientific scope, and that it actually aims at improving people’s character.

VI. WHEN COMPETITION SHAPES CHARACTER

In what follows, and to close this discussion, I want to show that not only did ethology sometimes bias Mill’s economic reasoning but that it may also have influenced his defense of competition.

As Smith’s and Ricardo’s successor, Mill supports economic competition, then referred to as the “laissez-faire principle,” as the most effective system imagined so far. We have seen that Mill had reasons to also support colonialism. This is not, however, the only exceptions he makes to the liberal creed. In Book V, Chapter Eleven, of the Principles, “On the Grounds and Limits of the Laissez-faire or Non-interference Principle,” Mill presents an impressive list of exceptions to the rule of competition.

It is often believed, maybe due to the influential thesis of Friedrich Hayek, that Mill’s liberalism wore off under the spell of his wife, Harriet Taylor, who eventually led him away from economic liberalism (Légé Reference Légé2008). This is partially incorrect. First, historians have shown that Mill’s early positions were largely shaped by the Saint-Simonian philosophy (Gillig and Légé Reference Gillig and Légé2017). His faith in the utility of public intervention, however, steadily declines after the publication of de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America and the 1848 revolution. It is also wrong to conclude from his late socialist sympathies (which actually were limited to local experiments) the idea that he then came to question the legitimacy of competition. On the contrary, competition always had been a bone of contention between him and them (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 792).

Whilst writing the Principles of Political Economy, between 1845 and 1848, Mill is hesitant about the importance to give to the laissez-faire principle. He confides his doubts in a letter to John Austin (Schwartz Reference Schwartz1972, p. 114) before finally deciding to support the rule of free competition with a few exceptions on account that “if competition has its evils, it prevents greater evils” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 793). Mill is also concerned about the consequences of the development of democracy (according to de Tocqueville’s meaning) in English society. Individual freedom and competition are, alongside an appropriate political constitution, the major means to stop the rise of uniformity and apathy characteristic of such societies:

In the Principles of Political Economy, Mill lists four reasons for supporting the system of free competition. The first one is related to the imperative right that individuals have to be in control of their own personal life. According to Mill, “there is a circle around every individual human being which no government, be it that of one, of a few, or of the many, ought to be permitted to overstep: there is a part of the life of every person who has come to years of discretion, within which the individuality of that person ought to reign uncontrolled either by any other individual or by the public collectively” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 943). But, as Mill acknowledges, this objection seldom applies to governmental interferences, which are generally not directed against individual free agency. The second objection raised by Mill against the increase of governmental agency follows from the impact such an increase has on the actual power of the government, in terms of both authority and influence. The danger is especially when members of the government have social or individual vested interests to pursue. This is also particularly alarming in democratic societies in which public opinion absolutely rules and minorities can easily be oppressed. The third objection against governmental agency is linked to the principle of the division of labor, or, more exactly, its implicit denial. The more governments take over what was previously held by individuals or local powers, the less efficient they are in fulfilling their functions. This is especially true of centralized countries such as France. The fourth and last objection but also, according to Mill, the “strongest” one is the loss of individual agency that goes along with the growing individual apathy produced by sprawling governmental interferences:

This main reason for governments not to interfere in private lives is that they have disastrous effects on the formation of characters. The less competitive is a society, the less strong and energetic individual characters will be. Interestingly enough, competition is not supported by strictly economic arguments.

Despite those reasons, Mill concedes that a number of exceptions can be made to the principle of competition, which are also developed in Chapter Eleven, Book V, of the Principles of Political Economy. The consumer is, theoretically, the best judge of his needs and of his interest. However, this is not always the case:

In other words, those who may be the most in need of education are not necessarily the ones who are the most desirous of it. Education, for Mill, can legitimately be enforced and paid for by the government, as it is essential to the improvement of human character. There are a number of further cases for which Mill believes the principle of free competition should not apply, including child and female labor, perpetual commitments, and unions. Although each could be linked to character improvement, they are nonetheless justified otherwise. The last case, a defense of public charity, is ethology related.

The case of public charity, or the Poor Laws, was particularly sensitive in the first half of the nineteenth century in England (Clément Reference Clément1999). Ricardo, in particular, had voiced his opposition to such laws, which he considered partly responsible for the poverty of the lowest classes. In addition to deterring people from work, public charity interfered with the labor market and enabled employers to pay their workers a rate below the natural wage. Despite adopting very similar principles to Ricardo’s, John Stuart Mill is one of the very few classical economists to have given his support to the Poor Laws. His reasons are not, however, strictly economic but ethologic.Footnote ¹² The legitimacy of public assistance ought to be assessed by the consequences it has on individual character. Mill admits that too generous an assistance can foster idleness,Footnote ¹³ but he also believes that not being assisted can also have detrimental effects on character:

The difficulty is to find a system that supports people in real need and prevents them from giving up whilst not discouraging those who do not need support but seek it. This implies differentiating assistance according to the situation and character of the people calling for help. Private individuals only occasionally meet people in need and they tend to act according to their emotions rather than their reason. They give either too much or too little. When properly managed, public charity, on the contrary, can be efficient; and Mill believes history has proven English Poor Laws to be effective (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 968).

VII. MILL ON PATERNALISM

We have seen that education was, for Mill, one of the most efficient ways to mold characters. But, providing that it equally applies to all, it is also one of the slowest. “The initiation of all wise or noble things,” claims Mill, “comes and must come from individuals” (Mill [1859] Reference Mill and Robson1977, p. 269). Being altruistic, noble characters are logically incited to assist the less privileged to rise to higher moral and hedonistic standards. But more than being a mere incentive to altruistic people, inequality of characters, caused, as previously seen, by adverse social circumstances, is also a matter of social justice.

In the absence of external guidance, people born in unfavorable circumstances cannot hope to reach high levels of happiness and morality. It is therefore essential, for Mill, that those who were lucky enough to benefit from better circumstances therefore help those less fortunate to overcome their condition. And as it happens, they are the only ones to be in a position to assist them. Noble characters have benefited from privileged instruction and education. They now have a moral duty towards those who have not:

For Mill, there is nothing wrong in accepting “guidance” from more privileged people: “Many have let themselves be guided (which in their best times they always have done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and instructed One or Few.… The honour and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following that initiative; that he can respond internally to wise and noble things, and be led to them with his eyes open” (Mill [1859] Reference Mill and Robson1977, p. 269). Individuals are, for Mill, all progressive beings and as such they have a decisive part to play in their own moral development. Although it is always desirable for an individual to reform his own character, it is in practice hardly possible for him to do so in isolation. Reformation of character can only be indirect: “I can indeed influence my own volitions, but only as other people can influence my volitions, by the employment of appropriate means. Direct power over my volitions I am conscious of none” (Mill [1865] Reference Mill and Robson1979, pp. 298–299). In other words, reformation of one’s character cannot be—strictly speaking—a self-regarding action.

Mill reckons, however, that some individuals are better equipped than others to initiate these actions. “It is no novelty,” he writes in Subjection of Women, “that mankind do not distinctly foresee their own changes, and that their sentiments are adapted to past, not to coming ages. To see the futurity of the species has always been the privilege of the intellectual élite, or of those who have learnt from them; to have the feelings of that futurity has been the distinction, and usually the martyrdom, of a still rarer élite” (Mill [1869] Reference Mill and Robson1984, p. 294). They belong to what Samuel Taylor Coleridge originally called clerisy, a group of men of superior intellectual and moral standards. It is likely, therefore, that this particular feature of Mill’s philosophy is a testament to the Romantics’ deep influence exercised during his youth. But, as argued by Nicholas Capaldi, the nature of Coleridge’s notion of clerisy changed with Mill, most probably as a result of the influence of Auguste Comte (Capaldi Reference Capaldi2004, p. 170). For Maurice Cowling, the clerisy performs the functions once performed by the clergy, substitution for the ideal object of Christianity, which is altruistic elevation of feelings (Cowling Reference Cowling1963, p. 78). It is unclear, however, what Mill really expects from this group and how they could be identified. Could the members of the clerisy be those granted with multiple votes in representative government? To what extent are these individuals entitled to interfere with other people’s lives? With what legitimacy? Mill explicitly rejects any form of paternalism. Legal paternalism is explicitly discarded by his famous harm principle. Individuals, however, can, under some conditions, interfere with other people’s lives. “It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine,” explains Mill in On Liberty, to suppose that it is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business with each other’s conduct in life, and that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest is involved. Instead of any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterest exertion to promote the good of others. But disinterested benevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to their good, than whips and scourges, either of the literal or metaphorical sort. (Mill [1859] Reference Mill and Robson1977, p. 277)

The first of these conditions is to never use coercion or threat but rather to use persuasion, as described in the last, but rarely quoted, sentence of the harm principle:

This passage, considered in extenso, demonstrates the misconception that subsequently arose from an overinterpretation of the expression “against his will.”

For private actions on character formation to take place, as the second condition, they ought not to express or reinforce any existing subjection relationship between individuals. This notably applies to relations between rich and poor, between different social classes, between men and women, or between different races. This point is defended in Chapter Seven, Book IV, of the Principles of Political Economy. Mill is appalled by the idea that a category of individuals, essentially composed of rich men, sees itself as being in loco parentis to the poor and women, “guiding and restraining them like children” (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 759). It relies on a strongly idealized concept of the relationship between protector and protected, which conceals its real authoritative nature. “The so-called protectors are now the only persons against whom, in any ordinary circumstances, protection is needed,” contends Mill (Mill [1848] Reference Mill and Robson1965, p. 761).

This leads me, to finish, to question a possible similarity between Mill’s project of ethology and Cass Sunstein’s and Richard Thaler’s libertarian paternalism. Although the authors reject any intellectual legacy from the English philosopher, it is impossible not to notice a certain similarity with the way they respectively propose to use psychology and behavioral economics to improve people’s lives. There is a striking similarity between Mill’s ethology and Sunstein’s and Thaler’s use of empirical studies in behavioral economics. Considering Mill’s emblematic figure in the debates over paternalism, I believe the question of its potential connection with libertarian paternalism offers both a valuable criticism of this new trend in paternalism and a better idea of Mill’s originality.

Over the last twenty years a number of books and articles have been published in defense of what Sunstein and Thaler coined “libertarian paternalism” (Sunstein and Thaler Reference Sunstein and Thaler2003), that is to say, a form of paternalism that is fully compatible with the principles of individual freedom. Based on a vast literature of experimental psychology studies, libertarian paternalism, or “behavioral paternalism,” as it is also referred to (Salvat Reference Salvat2014; Lecouteux Reference Lecouteux2016), argues that since individual choices are unavoidably subject to other people’s choices, the latter actors are therefore obliged to take the welfare of the former into account. This can be achieved, for instance, through carefully designed default rules, framing, or endowment effects (Loewenstein and Haisley Reference Loewenstein, Haisley, Caplin and Schotter2008). Apart from its literary and scientific success, behavioral paternalism has been experimented with in traditionally liberal countries such as the USA and the United Kingdom, where nudges units are or have been implemented.

For Sunstein and Thaler, all paternalistic actions are legitimate as long as they promote the “right” choice and individuals can freely turn them down. In practice, they believe paternalistic actions are needed in all kinds of decisions in people’s lives, from pension schemes to grocery shopping, considering that “almost all people, almost all the time, make choices that are [not] in their best interest” (Sunstein and Thaler Reference Sunstein and Thaler2003, p. 1163). They claim that more than being merely justifiable, behavioral paternalism is in fact unavoidable. Since individuals are still “free to choose,” the authors argue that their version of paternalism is fully compatible with libertarianism. Like Mill, Sunstein and Thaler consider that there is an objective good, but they plainly disagree about its nature. For Mill, the objective good translates into being of noble character. It covers both a sensibility to higher pleasures and some degree of selflessness. For Sunstein and Thaler, on the contrary, the goodness of an action exclusively relates to the objective welfare of the agent.