It comes as no surprise to learn that Lori Marso was dissuaded from writing her PhD dissertation (and her first book) on Beauvoir's political thinking, as Beauvoir had not previously been recognized as part of the canon of political theory. Moreover, thirty years later, when she mentioned she wanted to write this book on politics with Beauvoir, she was confronted with comments (by some) that there was nothing new to gain from reading Beauvoir. We should be grateful that Marso was determined to demonstrate that this is not the case at all. As she says in her acknowledgments, “I have always wanted to take the time and the space to say just what it is that I find so compelling about Beauvoir's unique political vision, formed in her moment and in conversation with her contemporaries but still urgent for us today. … Reading Beauvoir has taught me that freedom is experienced only in encounter and that political commitments emerge from communities formed within agonistic and affective interactions” (vii–viii). I was delighted to note that Marso first began thinking about bringing attention to the political thought of Beauvoir by putting her into conversation with Hannah Arendt at a panel I organized and chaired at the 2010 American Political Science Association meeting on fifty years of The Human Condition that included co-panelists Seyla Benhabib, Dana Villa and Patchen Markel.
Marso begins the book by re-encountering The Second Sex and reading Beauvoir as a theorist of encounter, since “without struggle, sans encounter, freedom cannot emerge” (3). Marso foregrounds the language of encounter to enhance other key terms in Beauvoir's lexicon, those of situation and ambiguity, because doing so highlights what is at stake for understandings of collective freedom. Marso's contribution draws our attention to encounter (212), rather than situation and ambiguity, and brings to the fore that our ontological and political lives are always entangled with others. The language of situation and ambiguity begins from an individual or group subject perspective. Using the language of encounters extends this perspective as “we must acknowledge the social and political constraints of situation and the ethical imperative to acknowledge ambiguity, but we also see struggle and plurality” (4). Crucially, Marso's foregrounding of encounters demonstrates “that individual subjectivity and individual or group agency do not exist prior to but rather emerge from encounters. There are always two or more: responsiveness and judgment from other(s) limit and drive us as political subjects” (4). How we engage in this complex nexus literally constitutes our political freedom. “I emphasize throughout this book that freedom cannot be experienced elsewhere than in encounters; it is completely meaningless (in fact impossible) for freedom to be experienced alone” (4). This is precisely what Marso seeks to elucidate when she uses the term freedom in the encounter (43–45).
Marso brilliantly demonstrates the way in which encounter is at the very center of everything Beauvoir wrote and points out that this is easily overlooked when Beauvoir is read solitarily. “When we read her in dialogue with others, as thinking with and against others, it is harder to miss what so many have ignored when they focus on her feminism in isolation from her relationship to other thinkers and her other leftist political engagements” (4–5). Marso advances Beauvoir as a theorist of encounter by considering her commitments to feminist, anti-racist, anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist projects and movements. She reminds us that Beauvoir responded to and theorized from key historical and political circumstances during her life in France, experiencing the Occupation, the war in Algeria, and the 1968 worker and student movements. “When we read her work as engagée and in dialogue with others about social and political questions, the contributions she makes to political thinking, as well as its tight links to her feminism, suddenly come into view” (5, my emphasis). Marso is drawn to illuminating the manner in which Beauvoir's encounters demonstrate “how our lives are always interlinked with others, often in uncomfortable and dangerous ways, and that this is the stuff of politics, the place and moment where we grasp or deny freedom” (6).
In what constitutes Marso's strikingly original contribution to furthering our understanding of politics with Beauvoir, she demonstrates the way Beauvoir's work on encounter goes far beyond “the ethical turn” in political thought. “Parting ways with theorists who limit their focus on the behavior of individuals within encounter to observe or advocate an ethics of individual responsibility or choice, Beauvoir is attentive to the way encounters themselves are made possible by historical and political circumstances” (7). Marso takes Beauvoir's texts out of their context, as well as reading them in historical context, a practice of political theory exemplified by Honig and Martel (213). She divides the book into Beauvoir's encounters with enemies, allies, and friends as Beauvoir did because it “emphasizes the felt and lived intimacies of how politics happens (in addition to offsetting the still too central Schmittian distinction between friend and enemy)” (204).
The book begins with a reconsideration of The Second Sex as it is rarely deemed a canonical text or studied in the history of political theory. In this context she asks the question, Why and, more important, how should we read The Second Sex as political theory? Part 1, “Enemies,” is read in the context of Beauvoir's textual encounters with enemies in “Right Wing Thought Today” and The Second Sex. Marso reads Beauvoir in conversation with Arendt (though sadly they never met) on judging Brasillach and Eichmann, by examining their differences about how freedom might be preserved (44). Marso argues that Beauvoir's emphasis on how the political meanings of embodiment close some individuals out of the space of encounter remedies Arendt's too idealistic conception of freedom (43). There is also a chapter on the Marquis de Sade's bodies in Lars von Trier's AntiChrist, where “the roles—wife, mother, bride—are patriarchy's, but these women's habitations of them and their ways of being inhabited by them point elsewhere” (75). Part 2, “Allies,” “takes up the task of distinguishing among physical, structural, linguistic, and intimate forms of political violence, but by putting Beauvoir in conversation with Frantz Fanon, [the author is] most interested in exploring how violence(s) of language, geography, and mandated activity (labor, housework) shape bodies, physically and psychically” (93). This section also engages in solidarity with Richard Wright, who ignited a “firestorm” when he challenged the idea of reclaiming “blackness” as a politically liberating identity in a speech to the Paris Congress of 1956 (122).
While the first two parts of the book focus on enemies and allies, part 3 features the freedom-enhancing potential of feminist friendship. Thinking about them with regard to feminist friendship, Marso frames her discussion of several films by applying Alison Bechdel's “rule” for feminist film. The “Bechdel rule,” from Bechdel's 1985 Dykes to Watch Out For, claims that a film is only feminist if it has at least two (named) female characters who talk to each other about something other than men (150; see figure III.1). The films discussed in this section are Chantal Akerman's 1975 feminist classic Jeanne Dielman, David Fincher's 2014 Hollywood blockbuster Gone Girl, and Lars von Trier's 2013 two-volume European art-house film, Nymphomaniac. Reading with feminist film theorists and in conversation with key aspects of The Second Sex, Marso demonstrates why it is important “for women to find friends: to speak together, to have conversations about something other than men, and for these conversations to be available (for viewing, reading, encountering) in public culture” (152). The films appear to fail the Bechdel rule, but pass its interpretative task in the sense that women are living their lives on their own terms. Marso argues they are struggling with patriarchal demands and not the male gaze (170). Chapter 7 utilizes Beauvoir's politics as encounter with a focus on her reaching out to Violette Leduc, Arendt's to Rahel Varnhagen (whom she never met), and Margarethe von Trotta's to Arendt. Overall, Marso makes an important new contribution that extends studies on Beauvoir, specifically the way in which encounter, while not being a key term in her lexicon, forms the foundation for Beauvoir's method of political thinking.
