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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 June 2005
The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric. By Frank Schimmelfennig. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 338p. $80.00 cloth, $28.99 paper.
At the European Union meeting in December 2004, one of the topics for discussion was Turkey's accession. Although it appears that negotiations regarding this topic and the specific requirements regarding membership (e.g., Turkey's recognition of Cyprus) will continue for the next few years, this time it also appeared that EU member states were willing to engage in serious discussion about this issue. For Turkey, this has been a long time in coming; it initially applied for membership in 1987 and has been rebuffed each time since then. Although a member of NATO since 1951—the only Muslim member-state of the alliance—Turkey has been kept at a distance by the EU for a number of reasons. Justified largely on economic grounds, an underlying issue clearly has been whether the countries of first Western and now Eastern Europe really want to admit a country that is so “different.” In other words, what values and perspectives, as well as political and economic structure, are important for a country to really become a member of “the community”? The decision calculus regarding the admission of new states to both NATO and the EU are at the heart of this monograph by Frank Schimmelfennig, and the arguments he puts forth are especially germane now as the EU considers Turkey's membership and as NATO ponders its own future in light of the divisions caused by the war in Iraq.
At the European Union meeting in December 2004, one of the topics for discussion was Turkey's accession. Although it appears that negotiations regarding this topic and the specific requirements regarding membership (e.g., Turkey's recognition of Cyprus) will continue for the next few years, this time it also appeared that EU member states were willing to engage in serious discussion about this issue. For Turkey, this has been a long time in coming; it initially applied for membership in 1987 and has been rebuffed each time since then. Although a member of NATO since 1951—the only Muslim member-state of the alliance—Turkey has been kept at a distance by the EU for a number of reasons. Justified largely on economic grounds, an underlying issue clearly has been whether the countries of first Western and now Eastern Europe really want to admit a country that is so “different.” In other words, what values and perspectives, as well as political and economic structure, are important for a country to really become a member of “the community”? The decision calculus regarding the admission of new states to both NATO and the EU are at the heart of this monograph by Frank Schimmelfennig, and the arguments he puts forth are especially germane now as the EU considers Turkey's membership and as NATO ponders its own future in light of the divisions caused by the war in Iraq.
Schimmelfennig sets the stage for his arguments early in the book when he outlines clearly his arguments as to why the two major European organizations, NATO and the EU, each made the decision to enlarge. But it is important to note that this is not a book that dissects the policy decisions within each organization; rather, what the author does is try to explain the enlargement decision using a range of approaches. What sets this book apart from others that also address enlargement is that he draws from both sociological and political theory to analyze and answer a set of questions regarding enlargement of both the EU and NATO. This multifaceted approach gives added richness to our understanding of this clearly complex topic.
Two important questions are central to the focus of The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe: Why did the Eastern European countries want to join each of these two solidly Western European organizations, and why did each of the two organizations agree to enlarge and admit new members? The author does an excellent job of answering the first question from a number of perspectives. He puts the various countries' desires for membership into the context of history and the Cold War, as well as their identification with the democratic countries of “the West.” Using traditional political theory approaches as well as the sociological, Schimmelfennig makes the case that it was rational for the countries to want to join the two organizations.
The author is less successful at answering the second question, however, that is, why both organizations were willing to enlarge and accept new members, especially when doing so had the potential to cost each organization more than what it gained. He concludes that “a rule-based collective outcome is possible even if the individual actors pursue selfish and conflicting goals” (p. 279). Introducing the sociological perspective does give added dimension to what is generally seen as a uniquely political issue. While this provides some insight into understanding why each of the organizations acted as it did, I think that it does not begin to provide a complete picture of the answer to the very important question that he asks. Rather, to do so would require melding his approach with other research that looks at the question in different (i.e., more political) ways. Taken together, these approaches would provide a more complete picture of the decisions that each of the organizations made and why.
In other ways, the approach that he takes gives short shrift to the role of politics. In fact, I would argue that it is impossible to really understand the enlargement decisions made by both NATO and the EU without fully appreciating the role that politics played. Domestic politics helped drive each country's decision to apply for membership in NATO and/or the EU and, in many cases, affected the member-states' responses to the application. Similarly, the politics of each of the organizations affected its response to the enlargement issue. In this case, the whole (whether the EU or NATO), becomes more than simply the sum of its parts as organizational politics and dynamics come into play as well.
In his analysis, I think that the author stretches when he decides to expand his model to include all countries in the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) region and then to do a multivariate statistical analysis “designed to analyze the conditions under which an event is more or less likely to occur” (p. 112). Given the richness of his theoretical analysis, this statistical approach did not add much explanatory information to his model and in many ways detracted from the central argument.
The idea of comparing the two organizations, the EU and NATO, is a sound one. Comparison can provide the basis for generalization and insights that are easily missed when looking at only one case, the approach that most research takes. In this case, the author gives the reader a detailed case study of each of the organizations and draws conclusions that become the basis for more general conclusions tied to the importance of community rules and rhetorical action in order to help explain why each organization acted as it did. This allows him to come to some important generalizations, especially about why states wanted to join one or both of these organizations. Although the studies of the two organizations were to be parallel, he interviewed a range of people whose focus was on NATO enlargement; he did not do the same for the EU. I think that his arguments would have been strengthened had he done similar interviews with those who study the EU as well.
Because of the unique approach that the author takes, despite its relatively minor flaws, the book makes an important contribution to our understanding of a process that is far from over, as the case of Turkey makes clear. And it is incumbent upon all of us who study this topic, whether NATO or the EU, to realize that our perspective and understanding of the enlargement issue will be broadened if we study it from multiple points of view.