Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments is easy to misread. And if Jacob Howland is right, the book may even be said to invite misreading. Philosophical Fragments opens by distinguishing sharply between philosophy and religious faith, or more specifically between Socratic and Christian thought; it ends by boasting that it has “indisputably [gone] beyond the Socratic.” These facts have given generations of readers the impression—unfortunate, if understandable—that Kierkegaard's aim is to teach his audience how to ascend from philosophy to faith.
As if to clinch this impression, Kierkegaard pointedly attributes his Fragments to a pseudonym named “Johannes Climacus,” that is, “John of the Ladder.” The name derives from St. John Climacus, a sixth-century abbot who authored the manual of spiritual exercises known as The Ladder of Divine Ascent. It has commonly been claimed that Kierkegaard's Fragments is or seeks to be an updated Ladder written by a modern Climacus. The goal of Fragments, it is often thought, is to lead its readers beyond the immanent sphere of secular philosophizing (epitomized by Socrates' “Doctrine of Recollection”), and onward and upward, by a kind of intellectual staircase, to the higher realm of transcendent religious Truth.
Jacob Howland's engaging new monograph on Fragments ably dismantles this widespread view. According to Howland, the trenchant opening distinction that Kierkegaard—or, more precisely, Climacus—draws between immanent Socratic philosophizing and transcendent Christian faith is actually “only the first move in a book full of unexpected twists and turns” (3). When we read Fragments closely, Howland argues, we find that Climacus in fact “works hard to keep us suspended” between the Socratic and Christian points of view that he initially represents as “diametrically opposed” (28–29).
Howland refers to the latter project as Climacus's “dialectical” method, “his practice of introducing into the inquiry elements that force the reader to revise earlier assumptions and inferences” (102). (A less charitable reader might be inclined to call this the bait-and-switch scheme.) As Howland demonstrates, Climacus undermines his initial distinction between Socratic philosophizing and Christian faith in several prominent ways. Climacus depicts Socrates as a quasi-religious figure whose “philosophizing essentially involves a kind of faith” (68). He portrays Christian faith, conversely, as a “passion” resembling Socrates' “philosophical eros” (146–47). Finally, Climacus explicitly models his own enterprise as a theorist of philosophy and faith on the life and work of Socrates himself (31).
In Howland's account, although Climacus may talk a good game about going beyond Socrates, the point of such talk is not in fact to urge us to leave Socrates behind. Instead, Climacus prompts us to follow Socrates in attempting to burst the bounds of Socratic ignorance. As Howland provocatively puts it, what Climacus calls “going beyond Socrates” in fact turns out to be “a quintessentially Socratic gesture” (184–85).
Now, if Howland is right about Fragments, what then is the point of the book's subterfuge? Why should Climacus, or anyone, write a book that at first seems to cast Socrates in the role of foil to Christianity, but ultimately reveals Socrates to be (at least in certain respects) a model of Christian faith? Howland reasons that Climacus's true aim cannot be to alert us to the difference between faith and philosophy—a difference that Climacus, according to Howland, “never fully clarifies” (128 n.25, 204). Rather, Climacus's goal is to call our attention to “something in the nature of Socratic philosophizing that allows it to bridge the seemingly unbridgeable opposition between philosophy and faith” (55).
This “something” that allows Socratic philosophizing to draw near to Christian faith is soon specified as what Socrates calls his “eros”: Socrates' passionate desire for the truth that he does not yet know. Howland defines Socratic eros as an “intermediate passion that binds the human with the divine and the self with that which transcends it” (59). Unlike thumotic reason, which seeks to control and digest the truth that it possesses, Socrates' erotic reason is marked by “receptivity and openness” to “that which the understanding cannot fully grasp,” and even to “the gift of faith” itself (69, 80, 156).
Socratic eros is thus the true child of intellectual Want and Plenty. It is a form of reasoning that is acutely aware of its own limitations, and seeks fervently to surmount them; precisely in so doing, it develops “a powerful intimation” or “prophetic grasp” of the very truths that lie beyond its range (124). Socratic eros thereby supplies the missing link, for Climacus and Fragments, between the supposedly irreconcilable domains of philosophy and faith. If Climacus has a life-lesson to teach his readers, Howland declares, “the lesson would have to do with the self-transcending power of the analogous passions of eros and faith in relation to the truth” (185). The point of Fragments, in short, is not to direct us away from Socrates; it is to call us to embrace Socratic philosophizing as “a preparation for faith, if not quite a ladder by which one may ascend to it” (127).
Do Climacus and his Fragments, then, have anything at all to teach us about the difference between Socratic philosophizing and Christian faith? Given Howland's analysis so far, it would seem that the answer must be “No.” For if Climacus is, in fact, as Howland persuasively argues, a thoroughly Socratic thinker—a thinker who sheds light on the relation between philosophy and faith by pressing, together with Socrates, against the upper limits of Socratic philosophizing—then it is hardly reasonable for us to expect him also to provide a critique of Socratic thought from the very point of view that Socrates and he are (by assumption) unable to reach.
Unfortunately, Howland ends his book by attempting to do just that: to extract a trans-Socratic critique of Socrates from his own Socratic Climacus. In his final chapter and epilogue, Howland turns first to Climacus's sequel to Fragments (the Concluding Unscientific Postscript), and then to a number of cryptic journal entries about Socrates, in an earnest but futile attempt to clarify Climacus's account of “the relationship between philosophy and faith” (204). When no good answer emerges, Howland finally tries his own hand at explaining the “difference between Christian faith and Socratic philosophizing” (207). Howland here offers a few pages of speculation—intriguing, but ungrounded in Kierkegaard's texts—on the difference between Socrates' “erotic ascent,” on the one hand, and Christianity's “participatory ascent,” on the other, to the elusive realm of divinity and transcendent truth (207).
The trouble is that Howland is here attempting to plug a nonexistent hole in Climacus's enterprise. He thereby loses his grip on the irrepressibly Socratic Climacus that the rest of his book so daringly brings to light. In general, if one seeks an account of the difference between Socratic eros and faith in Kierkegaard's thought, there are better places to look than in the Climacus literature or the journals. (One such place is Works of Love, in which Kierkegaard, writing under his own name, distinguishes Christian agape from pagan eros, and declares that Socrates “did not know the neighbor” whom Christians are commanded to love.)
Howland's book stumbles at its close. But this should not detract from the value of his larger interpretive enterprise, which is an important, original, and incisive contribution to Kierkegaard scholarship. Howland's work has defeated, one hopes for all time, the lamentably common misreading of Fragments as an antiphilosophical work of Christian apologetics. He has set in its place a compelling vision of Climacus's Socrates—and of Climacus himself as a modern-day Socratic dialectician—that challenges us all to rethink our assumptions about the relation between philosophy and faith in Kierkegaard's thought.
