Muzaffar Alam's latest book should transform the scholarship on Mughal India. This statement needs to be made at the outset because the author's modesty in staking his claims, as well as the nature of his writing, sometimes obscure the departures Alam makes from the historiography. The book is organized as a series of loosely connected essays rather than as a single, authoritative monograph, and it is this that seems to have forced Alam to express his conclusions so tentatively. The attentive reader, however, is likely to derive more intellectual sustenance from this modestly presented work than from many an authoritative tome on the political language of premodern Islam.
Although this book deals with both the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire, the former seems to exist more as a foil against which to set off the latter's novelty. Yet the unfairness of treating the Delhi Sultanate as a standard-issue Muslim kingdom bearing the label “Made in Baghdad” is more than excused by what Alam writes about the Mughals. To begin with, he moves decisively beyond the received schools of Mughal historiography, which for our purposes we can call the religious, the economic, and the comparative. Since they do not count for much in Alam's book, we can dispense with the last two quickly. The economic or, rather, Marxist school of Mughal historiography has given us a great deal of important data on the empire but little that is interesting about its intellectual life. Its goal is dual: to save Mughal history from the religious school, which places it within a larger narrative of Hindu–Muslim relations, and to tie the Indian past into another kind of large narrative about modes of production. The comparative school of Mughal historiography is not as determinedly secular as the economic, but it, too, tries to link South Asia to a larger political and cultural geography, generally by way of “influences” from the neighboring empires of the Safavids and the Ottomans. However, all of these are very broadly painted, like the supposed influence of Iranian illuminationists on Emperor Akbar, and so do not allow for a serious reinterpretation of the Mughals.
As far as the religious school of Mughal historiography is concerned, Alam points out that its preoccupation with Hindu–Muslim relations is far too narrow, given the empire's extent, large parts of which possessed no significant Hindu population. He also shifts the attention of this school's liberal wing from the supposed “composite culture” created by the Sufis to the Mughal state and its political thought. Sufism, of course, has been the favored location of a Hindu–Muslim accommodation for decades, mostly because it is seen, quite anachronistically, as popular or apolitical and therefore easy to patronize. By attending to the political language of Islam in Mughal India, however, Alam does more than correct this bias towards Sufism, which was in any case more involved with militant forms of religion than other forms of Islam. He argues that the religious politics of the Mughals had no independent existence but was instead part of a post-Mongol shift in the eastern Islamic world from Arabic to Persian, and thus from the caliphate as a political model to an imperial form that I call post-Islamic because its legitimacy is based not only in Islam but also in explicitly non-Islamic forms like the Mongol code and dynastic genealogies going back to a pagan goddess.
Alam uses this approach to tell us a great deal that is very interesting about the creation of Persian as an imperial language in which texts of ethics assume pride of place in political thought and in which the concept of religious law is broadened and even transformed out of Arabic recognition. His chapter on the uses of Persian as an imperial language is particularly suggestive. It is a new idea of empire that comes to organize such changes. Such an idea, I have suggested, is a Mongol or post-Islamic one, an idea of world empire in which all peoples and all religions are not simply accommodated but actively claimed. This idea comes through in texts like the Mughal Prince Dara Shukuh's translation of the Upanishads, which is part of a project to claim the entire past of Central Asia and South Asia for the empire. Among other things, Dara tells us that their translation into Mughal Persian preserves the Upanishads for the empire's Hindu subjects and disseminates them among the Brahmins more effectively than does the Sanskrit original. The wisdom of the Hindus is appropriated for the empire as a kind of classical past, since its ancient character is invariably emphasized in Mughal texts. In this sense the Hindu or, indeed, Mongol past functions in much the same way that the pre-Islamic past does for Persian literature more generally, which is perhaps why Akbar's historian Abul Fazl claims to have modelled his great epic of the emperor's rule on the Shahnama.
