(a) Enforced disappearances and the lack of an effective investigation under Article 2 of the Convention

31. The applicant Government argued that since what they have consistently classified as the “occupation”, there had been forty-three documented cases of “enforced disappearance” in Crimea.

32. In none of these cases, despite the availability of compelling evidence, including CCTV footage of the abductions, had the perpetrators been brought to justice. The Russian Federation had failed to take all (or indeed any) reasonable steps to ensure that an effective independent investigation was concluded and/or that the perpetrators were brought to justice.

33. The alleged “enforced disappearances” in Crimea were evidenced by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) which had meticulously catalogued documented cases of enforced disappearances in Crimea (paragraphs 101-03 of the 2017 OHCHR Report). In 2018 the OHCHR reported on the continuing practice of enforced disappearances and the ongoing failure of the Russian authorities to carry out an adequate investigation (reference was made to paragraphs 32 and 35 of the 2018 OHCHR Report).

34. On 31 March 2021, the OHCHR's Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (“HRMMU”) published a detailed briefing paper on the issue, finding, inter alia, that since 2014 there had been forty-three documented cases of enforced disappearance in Crimea. Of these forty-three documented cases:

1. A. one victim, Reshat Ametov, who disappeared on 3 March 2014, had been tortured and summarily executed;

2. B. eleven of the victims, including Timur Shaimardanov (who had disappeared on 26 May 2014) and Seiran Zinedinov (who had disappeared on 30 May 2014), remained missing;

3. C. one victim, Valentyn Vyhivskyi, had disappeared for a month before being acknowledged by the Russian Federation and tried and sentenced to eleven years' imprisonment for espionage; as at 18 November 2020, he remained in detention; and

4. D. thirty victims, including Oleksandr Kostenko, Oleksandr Steshenko and Renat Paralamov, had been released subsequent to their enforced disappearance but had not been provided with redress.

35. Details of the cases of these named victims, described by the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) as “emblematic cases”, were incorporated by reference.

36. In terms of the timing of these disappearances, the HRMMU reported the following:

37. The number of enforced disappearances recorded by the HRMMU for the spring of 2014 broadly corresponded to the figure given by the Russian Federation Ombudsperson, Ella Pamfilova. In her annual report for 2014, she recorded having received reports of thirteen cases in which Crimean Tatars had disappeared and twenty-four instances in which Ukrainians had disappeared.

38. During the spring of 2014, when the vast majority of disappearances occurred, the OHCHR observed that there was a discernible pattern of members of the “Crimean Self Defence Forces” (the CSDF, as defined in the 2017 OHCHR Report, was a people's militia registered on 29 July 2014 “composed of former policemen and army officers, Afghan war veterans and biker groups, tasked to ‘maintain order and combat fascism’ on the peninsula”, A 102) and associated Russian paramilitary groups subjecting to enforced disappearance persons who were perceived as “pro-Ukrainian”. It identified twenty such cases.

39. In terms of the steps taken by the authorities of the Russian Federation, OHCHR cited the following passages from the 2021 HRMMU Report:

40. On this evidence alone, it was quite clear that the investigations, to the extent that they had actually taken place, were and continued to be grossly inadequate. The Russian Federation had failed in some cases to take any reasonable steps to ensure an effective, independent investigation and to bring the perpetrators to justice as required under the Convention.

41. This conclusion was further supported by the following, illustrative examples.

(a) Mr R. Ametov had disappeared on 3 March 2014 after staging a one‐man picket in front of a government building in Simferopol. Publicly available television footage showed him being led away by three men in military-style jackets. His body had been discovered twelve days later, showing visible signs of torture. The members of the CSDF who were caught on camera abducting Mr Ametov had been interviewed as witnesses before being released. The investigation had been closed in 2015. Although reopened in 2016, there had been no further progress in bringing the perpetrators to justice (reference was made to paragraph 81 of the 2017 OHCHR Report and OHCHR HRMMU 2021).

Mr Ametov's brother had lodged an individual application with the Court regarding the investigation of Mr Ametov's death and its circumstances (Ametov v. Russia and Ukraine, no. 46393/15). He alleged that the existing footage clearly confirmed the fact that Mr Ametov had been captured by representatives of the CSDF. He also outlined that the Russian authorities had identified individuals who were responsible for the kidnapping of his brother, but that they had not been arrested. Subsequently, the investigation had been discontinued owing to the failure to identify suspects.

Furthermore, despite the fact that the Ukrainian authorities had no access to the territory of Crimea, they had been able to establish that Mr Ametov had been captured by two representatives of the CSDF under the guidance of the former representative of the Russian Armed Forces and taken to the headquarters of the CSDF (reference was made to a Letter from the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine of 10 January 2023, A 144). In addition, three individuals had been officially identified as suspects.

(b) Mr Shaimardanov and Mr Zinedinov had disappeared on 26 and 30 May 2014 respectively. In response to the submission of reports by family members to the de facto authorities, a formal inquiry had been initiated in July 2014. The following year it had been suspended. No information about the whereabouts of either man or the circumstances of their disappearance had ever come to light. In 2018, the “Supreme Court of Crimea” (in this section, the names of courts and other authorities established under Russian law in Crimea are indicated in inverted commas) had rejected an appeal by the families' lawyer claiming inaction on the part of the investigative committee (OHCHR HRMMU 2021).

(c) As regards Mr S. Karachevsky, it was noted that his wife had lodged an individual application with the Court, which is still pending, (Karachevska v. Russia and Ukraine, no. 23777/17) in which she alleged that during the investigation the Russian military authorities had threatened witnesses and fabricated evidence to ensure that the murder was classified as “excessive measures undertaken during the apprehension of a person who had committed a crime”. As a result, his killer, Mr Ye. Zaitsev, had been sentenced to only two years' imprisonment. The conviction had been confirmed on appeal by the “North Caucasian District Military Court”, but the sentence of imprisonment had been quashed and the lower court's order to pay compensation to Mrs Karachevska had been overturned.

(d) In relation to Mr M. Ivanyuk, it was noted that his mother had specifically referred to his friend who had been with him and who had stated that representatives of the Russian law-enforcement authorities had beaten Mr Ivanyuk to death (reference was made to an article in the Daily Mail of 25 April 2014). In any event, Russia had failed to provide any evidence relating to the investigation of the circumstances of Mr Ivanyuk's death. They had failed to discharge the burden of proving the actual circumstances of the death or the Convention compliance of the investigation. In particular, they had provided no evidence of any investigation into the allegations of the key eyewitness to these events, or of any other efforts to address the published concerns raised by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (“the Commissioner for Human Rights”) regarding Mr Ivanyuk's death.

42. Among other missing persons were Mr I. Dzhepparov, Mr D. Islyamov, Mr I. Bondar, Mr V. Vashchyuk, Mr V. Chernysh, Mr M. Arislanov, and others named and unnamed (reference was again made to the letter from the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, see paragraph 41 above, A 144).

(b) Ill-treatment and unlawful detention under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention

43. The applicant Government submitted that the Russian military and security personnel, the CSDF and local collaborators had committed numerous, inter-related instances of kidnapping, unlawful detention, torture and inhuman or degrading treatment against Ukrainian military personnel, pro-Ukrainian and Tatar activists and journalists.

(c) Extending the application of Russian law to Crimea with the result that the courts in Crimea could not be considered to have been “established by law” within the meaning of Article 6

53. Pursuant to section 6 of the Federation Constitutional Law on admitting the “Republic of Crimea” into the Russian Federation and establishing within the Russian Federation the new constituent entities – the “Republic of Crimea” and the “City of Federal Importance of Sevastopol” (21 March 2014), from the date of its enactment until 1 January 2015 (“the transitional period”) courts of the Russian Federation were to be created in accordance with the judicial system and laws of the Russian Federation on the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and the City of Sevastopol.

54. However, at no stage had the Russian Federation sought to demonstrate that the application of its laws (by way of modification, suspension or replacement of the laws in force in the occupied territory, predating the “occupation”) was justified under international humanitarian law, for instance under the exceptions provided for in Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, namely maintaining order in the occupied territory and ensuring the security of the relevant authorities of the occupying forces or administration, or as strictly necessary to give effect to the Geneva Conventions.

55. As the Court had noted in its admissibility decision (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above), given the regulatory nature of those measures, they applied throughout the entire territory of Crimea, were binding for all courts and applied to all judicial proceedings and to all people concerned. The practical effect of this was described in the witness statement of the Ukrainian judge, Alyona Kushnova.

56. As a consequence of the unlawful substitution of Ukrainian laws by the laws of the Russian Federation and the unlawful operation of the “Ukrainian courts”, the applicant Government submitted that, in further violation of the right to a fair trial under the Convention and associated rules of international humanitarian law, people on the Crimean Peninsula:

1. (a) had been charged and convicted on the basis of the arbitrary and politically motivated application of Russian criminal law. This included provisions purportedly designed to fight terrorism, extremism and separatism, which had been applied in such a way as to restrict the right to liberty and security of person (the Federal List of Extremist Materials was introduced by Federal Law no. 114-FZ on combating extremist activities (25 July 2002). Those same laws had been applied to acts which had occurred before the de facto application of Russian Federation legislation in Crimea. For example, the Deputy Chair of the Mejlis, Akhtem Chyigoz, had been sentenced to eight years' imprisonment on the basis of Russian criminal law after he had been found guilty of organising mass protests on 26 February 2014. Two further individuals had received prison sentences in 2015 and 2016 for allegedly injuring Berkut police officers, contrary to prohibitions under the Russian criminal law during the Maidan protests in Kyiv on 14 February 2014 (reference was made to paragraph 77 of the 2017 OHCHR Report). OHCHR had documented a total of ten cases in which people had been convicted pursuant to Russian law in relation to acts allegedly committed prior to the “occupation”. Half of these cases had penalised social media posts allegedly containing symbols, slogans or statements of organisations banned in the Russian Federation or regarded as extremist, contrary to the Federal List of Extremist Materials under Russian Federal Law no. 114-FZ. The other half involved alleged participation in mass disorder in Crimea on 26 February 2014.

2. (b) had appeal proceedings under Ukrainian law arbitrarily terminated; and

3. (c) had their prison sentences arbitrarily reclassified in accordance with Russian Federation law, including to their detriment.

57. They further submitted that until the “annexation” of Crimea by Russia in March 2014, 520 judges had worked in Crimea and the City of Sevastopol. Approximately 50% of these judges had continued to work in the Russian “courts” in Crimea. In 2015, Russia had appointed a significant number of those judges to the Russian “court system” in Crimea, the existence of which was “authorised” under Russian federal law.

58. Thus, a number of previously appointed Ukrainian judges had switched sides and engaged in activities against the interests of Ukraine and Ukrainians, in breach of their oath of office and in favour of demands imposed by a foreign and hostile occupying power.

59. Criminal charges had been issued in relation to 276 former Ukrainian judges of Crimea and Sevastopol. As of 20 August 2020, there were 392 “judges” on the territory of the so-called “Republic of Crimea” and the City of Sevastopol, including 219 “judges” with Ukrainian citizenship and ninety‐five with Russian citizenship (the citizenship of seventy‐eight “judges” was not identified).

60. The applicant Government submitted that those “judges” could not be considered independent and impartial. Nor could any “court” or “tribunal” over which they presided be considered to be a competent judicial authority established by law. Their appointment was an inducement to former Ukrainian officials to cooperate (or collaborate) with the Russian Federation.

61. The Decree of President Putin on “Appointment of Judges of Federal Courts” from 19 December 2014 should not be accorded any legal recognition by the Court. “Judges” had been assigned by the occupying authorities without reference to the relevant requirements of education and experience.

(d) Alleged violations of Article 8 of the Convention

(e) Harassment and intimidation of religious leaders not conforming to the Russian Orthodox faith, arbitrary raids of places of worship and confiscation of religious property, in breach of Article 9 of the Convention

87. During the period under consideration as defined by the Grand Chamber in the admissibility decision, the Russian occupying administration either attempted to take control over religious groups, or to eradicate and force them out of Crimea.

88. The Russian co-option of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) and the Religious Administration of Muslims of Crimea and Sevastopol (RAMCS) provided clear evidence of successful attempts by the Russian authorities to establish control over Ukrainian religious communities in Crimea and to use them to eradicate views (and exclude individuals holding or espousing views) contrary to the Russian policies in, and “occupation” of, Crimea.

89. “Republic of Crimea” stated that the communities of the UOC‐MP were in a privileged position on the territory of Crimea. They were among the first which had managed to re-register in Crimea and were able freely to conduct their religious and other activities. The UOC-MP actively cooperated with the occupying administration, the Russian Armed Forces, and its Black Sea Fleet.

90. The applicant Government referred to the information noted in the 2017 OHCHR Report (§§ 137-45) and stated that although a small number of the incidents fell outside the period under consideration (for example, the 2016 Yarovava Package and the wholesale prohibition of Jehovah's Witnesses on the basis of anti-terrorism legislation in April 2017), details of these incidents had been retained and rehearsed for the purpose of impressing upon the Court the vital importance of requiring the Russian Government to take measures to put an end to this continuing pattern of violations and prevent their recurrence.

91. The same pattern (and a number of the same, specific incidents) of religious persecution (and official tolerance thereof) during the first year of the “occupation” was also documented by the US State Department in its Religious Freedom Report for 2014, as well as by detailed witness testimony (from, for example, Archbishop Kliment of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (“the UOC-KP”), the journalist Maria Tomak and the primate of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, Metropolitan Epiphaniy), some of which was further reiterated in some NGO reports (e.g. Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union and others, “Crimea Beyond Rules; religious “occupation”: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate”).

92. The applicant Government also referred to (and submitted in evidence) their observations of 5 November 2021 as a third-party intervener in the case of Upravlinnya Krymskoyi Yeparkhiyi Ukrayinskoyi Pravoslavnoyi Tserkvy v. Russia, no. 33931/19 to the effect that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) had not only been persecuted on the territory of Crimea, but that those actions had been directly instigated by Russian officials.

93. This persecution had been incited at the very highest levels of the Russian government. The President of the Russian Federation had called the OCU a “false project” which provoked intolerance and had nothing to do with freedom of religion. Also, he stated that the decision to grant autocephaly to the OCU was contrary to religious norms.

94. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation had said on numerous occasions that the separation of the OCU from the Russian Orthodox Church was “illegal” and that it had been carried out on the instructions of the Government of the United States of America.

95. As to the persecution of the OCU and its representatives, the Government referred to individual applications and documents submitted to the Court by the Crimean Diocese of the OCU in the case of Upravlinnya Krymskoyi Yeparkhiyi Ukrayinskoyi Pravoslavnoyi Tserkvy (cited above) and in 5 applications within the group Upravlinnya Krymskoyi Yeparkhiyi Ukrayinskoyi Pravoslavnoyi Tserkvy v. Russia (no. 69421/17) and to the witness statements of Metropolitan Kliment and priest Yaroslav Hontar.

96. The applicant Government emphasised that priests of the UOC‐MP were among the service members of the Russian Armed Forces and representatives of the so-called “Cossacks” who had blocked the church in Perevalne village. Furthermore, the UOC-MP had since continued its aggressive activities against the OCU.

97. Priests of the UOC-MP espousing pro-Ukrainian positions were routinely persecuted. The clergy of St Paisius Velichkovsky's stavropegial monastery of the UOC-MP in the village of Morozivka was under continuous pressure for that reason. On 13 October 2016, unidentified persons had set some of the buildings of the monastery on fire. The administration of the monastery received frequent threats from representatives of the occupying administration. The gates of the monastery had been vandalised with threatening inscriptions, including “Russian land for Russians”.

98. The Russian occupying administration had also applied several methods of intimidation and pressure to compel the Crimean Muslim community in general, and the Mufti of the RAMCS in particular to cooperate with the Russian “occupation”. Incidents included the setting on fire of mosques in Simferopol and the village of Sonyachna Dolyna in 2014; unreasonable and unlawful searches of mosques by law-enforcement authorities; and restrictions on the distribution of Muslim literature under the guise of combating extremism.

99. Following his personal decision to co-operate with the Russian repression, the Mufti of the RAMCS had been involved in the persecution of dissenting Muslims: he had provided statements against them for the purposes of court hearings and made speeches in support of Russian law enforcement.

100. The cooperation between the RAMCS and the occupying administration had resulted in increased persecution of non-conformist Muslim religious groups (that is, those not controlled by the RAMCS) such as Hizb ut-Tahrir.

101. The applicant Government made reference to individual applications submitted to the Court (Mistseva religiyna organizatsiya Musulmanska obschyna Alushta v. Russia, no. 17009/21, application forms of 21 April 2021 and 15 March 2022, and Ashyrov v. Russia, no. 11890/21, application forms of 25 February 2021 and 21 April 2022) stating that the applicants in those cases had specifically provided facts and materials describing the persecution of Muslim groups and individuals not controlled by the RAMCS.

(f) Suppression of non-Russian media, including the closure of Ukrainian and Tatar television stations, in breach of Article 10 of the Convention

102. The applicant Government noted that in its 2017 report OHCHR had reported the shutting down of non-Russian television stations, attacks on journalists, bans on newspapers and the denial of licences to media outlets deemed critical of the Russian “occupation” (paragraphs 155-161 of the OHCHR report).

103. The process of liquidation of Ukrainian television channels in Crimea had begun in early March 2014. All Ukrainian television channels had been blocked and their frequencies were illegally used by Russian television channels. The Russian occupying administration had seized the Ukrainian State television and radio company Krym and the enterprise Radioteleviziinyi peredavalnyi tsentr v AR Krym.

104. As a result of the Russian aggression, 161 transmitters and twenty radio lines had been lost in Crimea.

105. With respect to the practice of shutting down television channels, banning media outlets and suppressing of free expression by way of “official warnings”, the applicant Government further noted the following evidence and illustrative examples.

1. (a) Chernomorskaya television and radio company (TRC) was one of the largest television companies in Crimea. On 29 June 2014 Chernomorskaya TRC was blocked from broadcasting on Crimean cable networks. Its property was subsequently seized and the “occupation” authorities began using its transmitters to broadcast the Russian Rossiya-24 television channel.

2. (b) ATR was the main Crimean Tatar TV channel, broadcasting to Crimea, Turkey and other European countries. On 24 September 2014 its general director received a letter from the Russian Centre for Combating Extremism with a request to hand over certain documents to the authorities. The request was justified on the basis that ATR allegedly “stubbornly lays down the idea of possible repression on national and religious grounds, contributes to the formation of anti-Russian opinion, deliberately foments Crimean Tatars distrust of power, which indirectly carries the threat of extremist activity”. On 26 January 2015 ATR's offices were raided by representatives of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation and the Centre for Countering Extremism. ATR's server was seized, resulting in disruption to its broadcasting. In February 2015 Roskomnadzor (Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media), the Russian media regulator, unilaterally reallocated ATR's broadcast frequency to a different, pro-Russian channel and on 1 April 2015 ATR stopped broadcasting. It had since relocated to mainland Ukraine where it continued to broadcast.

3. (c) Reporters Without Borders reported that, as at 11 August 2014, most Crimean Internet Service Providers had been blocked and access to Ukrainian news websites was being blocked (reference was made to Reporters Without BordersFootnote ⁷ and Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union and others, “Crimea Beyond Rules: Information Occupation”).

4. (d) In his witness statement, Mr Refat Chubarov noted that from 1 March 2014 all Ukrainian TV stations with the exception of one (ATR) had been “banned” from Crimea and replaced with Russian TV channels.

106. With respect to the practice of suppressing non-Russian media by attacking and intimidating journalists, the applicant Government noted the following additional evidence.

107. According to the editor of the Centre for Investigative Journalism (Crimea), Tatiana Kurmanova, the peak of attacks on journalists in Crimea was in March 2014 when eighty-five cases were recorded. This was followed by a prolonged period of systematic intimidation during which searches and arbitrary detention were used as a tool to intimidate and silence independent journalism. This was often done on the pretext of the offence of inciting actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation under Article 280.1 of the Russian Criminal Code.

108. The case of Ganna Andriievska provided a good illustration of this practice. Ms Andriievska was a Crimean journalist. In May 2014 she fled Crimea for Kyiv, fearing persecution by the “authorities” in Crimea. A criminal investigation was opened on 2 February 2015 on the basis that a blogpost she had authored was alleged to amount to a crime under Article 280.1. As Ms. Andriievska was located in Kyiv, she was out of the reach of the FSB. Nevertheless, on 13 March 2015, FSB officers searched her parents' house in Crimea, seizing her father's computer. At the same time, the authorities ordered the post office to report any correspondence addressed to Ms. Andriievska. She was listed on the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring's List of Terrorists and Extremists.

109. The applicant Government further noted the following illustrative examples of harassment and intimidation of journalists belonging to media outlets perceived to be critical of the Russian “occupation”.

1. (a) In early March 2014 a group of twenty or so men in camouflage seized the office of the “Information Press Centre”, the office of the Centre for Investigative Journalism. Journalists were beaten, prevented from broadcasting and subsequently evicted from the premises. They temporarily moved to the building of the Chernomorskaya TV and radio company. However, in June 2014 that office was raided by Russian authorities as well. Equipment was seized, without a warrant, and the journalists were told to leave the building.The Editor-in-Chief of the Centre for Investigative Journalism, Valentyna Samar, was summoned for “preventive” talks with the FSB in Simferopol. Facing the threat of continued persecution, Valentyna Samar and her colleagues fled Crimea and began to operate from mainland Ukraine. However, the following year, the Russian media regulator blocked access to the Centre for Investigative Journalism.

2. (b) Yelizaveta Bogutskaya, a Crimean blogger who had expressed pro‐Ukrainian views on her Facebook page, was detained and interrogated for six hours on 8 September 2014. Her house was raided and a computer, a camera and a flash drive were seized. The following day, she fled Crimea.

3. (c) On 9 April 2015 the security services conducted a ten-hour search of the house of Tatyana Guchakova, a journalist and former deputy editor‐in‐chief of the BlackSeaNews.net website. Her computer and other property were seized and she was subjected to an interrogation. She was released and subsequently interrogated again, during which time she was played recordings of her telephone conversations. Ms Guchakova subsequently decided to leave Crimea.

4. (d) On 13 August 2015, the house of the parents of Natalia Kokorina, editor of the Centre for Investigative Journalism in Crimea was searched by Russian FSB officers. Documents and laptops were seized and Ms. Kokorina was interrogated for six hours. Fearing further persecution, she fled Crimea.

110. Those accounts were corroborated by the witness testimony of Ms. Maria Tomak, Ms. Alona Kushnova and Ms. Olena Maksymenko.

111. In their subsequent memorial of 1 March 2023, the applicant Government stated that during the entire period of the “occupation”, the occupying authorities have created conditions for the illegal persecution of independent media and journalists in Crimea.

112. Since March 2014, the information and communication space of Crimea had been built on the “Concept of Informatisation of the Republic of Crimea”, which had been developed in line with the main directions of the State policy of the Russian Federation in that field. It was prepared as part of the “Strategy for the development of the field of information technologies in the Russian Federation for 2014-2020 and for the perspective of 2025”. In this context, the suppression of independent media outlets and the suffocation of all forms of dissent and pluralism had been a key goal in Russia itself and – even more so – in the territory of occupied Crimea.

113. In March 2014, all editorial offices were given a deadline for re‐registration under Russian law. Media outlets that remained in Crimea following the “occupation” and failed to act in accordance with Russian legislation were forced to cease their activities. Moreover, media outlets that were not controlled by the occupying authorities were denied licences. Thereafter, media websites were deprived of the right to broadcast in the occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

114. Human Rights Watch reported in 2014 that the Russian authorities had issued official and informal warnings to Shevket Kaibullaev, the editor‐in-chief of the Mejlis newspaper, Avdet, which was established in 1990 and published in Crimean Tatar and Russian. Mr Kaibullaev told Human Rights Watch that in early June the Simferopol prosecutor's office had issued him with an official warning that some of the material published by the newspaper contained extremist content, for example the call to boycott the September elections in Crimea and the use of the terms “annexation,” “occupation,” and “temporary occupation” of Crimea. He further stated that the authorities had also called Mr Kaibullaev for two informal conversations during which FSB agents and officials from the prosecutor's office had warned him that Avdet would not be allowed to re‐register under Russian law if it continued to publish such controversial content. Subsequently, in September 2014, the FSB searched the office of Avdet.

115. In an official response to the statement by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) expressing concern about the fate of Avdet, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the search was connected with alleged extremist activities of the newspaper, which “refuses to work within the boundaries of the law”.

116. A similar situation of pressure was also reported regarding the ATR company and its journalists, who reported extensively about the situation in Crimea.

117. All major Russian television and radio channels were operating in occupied Crimea. Since 2014, Ukrainian television channels had been available for viewing only via the internet on Divan TV.

118. Since the “occupation” of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by the Russian Federation, Ukrainian periodical publications were also no longer available in the territory. The most important daily newspapers in Crimea were Russian publications.

119. In the spring of 2014, the editorial office of the Ukrainian-language newspaper Krymska Svitlytsia was seized. Ukrainian language periodicals such as Dumka, Krymske slovo, Slovo Sevastopolia and Dzvin Sevastopolia were discontinued. Ukrainian-language Crimean online publications such as Media-Krym, Holos Tavrii and Ukrainskyi Kavkaz had been subjected to hacker attacks. The migration of Ukrainian language publications to the mainland was almost complete by June 2014. In September 2014 the property of the Crimean Tatar newspaper Avdet was confiscated by occupation authorities.

120. After Russia's “occupation” of Crimea, Ukrainian institutions had stopped receiving statistical data regarding the published periodicals. Daily newspapers from Crimea had not been delivered inside Ukraine since March 2014.

121. Russia had pursued the policy of cutting off the access of the residents of Crimea to independent Ukrainian informational sources, a policy that continues today.

122. At the end of June 2019, the accessibility of different websites was tested in networks of ten internet service providers that operated in nine different locations in Crimea (including the biggest and the most populated towns). The results showed that all providers had blocked numerous websites, including those of fourteen different Ukrainian media outlets, social networks, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar PeopleFootnote ⁸, the Jehovah's Witnesses, and Hizb ut-Tahrir.

123. In addition, some of them had blocked a more extensive number of Ukrainian websites including those of media outlets, the NGO Crimean Solidarity, and others.

124. The NGOs ZMINA Human Rights Centre and Crimean Human Rights Protection Group had documented more than 350 acts involving harassment of journalists and bloggers in Crimea between 2014 and 2019. This administrative practice had intensified since that time.

125. The largest number of violations in this regard occurred in March 2014 – during the active phase of the “occupation”. During this period, journalists from all over the world worked in Crimea. From 26 February to 22 March 2014, more than 100 cases involving the violation of the rights of journalists and bloggers were recorded.

126. Journalists and film crews were subjected to various methods of pressure: beatings, kidnappings, torture, unjustified politically motivated detentions, damage to property, prohibition of filming and non-admission to the peninsula, as well as threats and intimidation. Such actions were carried out by the paramilitary formations of the so-called “Cossacks” or “People's self-defence” under the control of the Russian Federation, as well as by the Russian military, which at that time controlled all the strategic facilities of Crimea.

127. Illegal, politically motivated criminal prosecutions of journalists by the occupying authorities were aimed at forcing those media and journalists who were not under the control of and were not loyal to the occupying regime to leave the territory of the Crimean Peninsula.

128. According to the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, after the “occupation” of Crimea by Russia unofficial supervisors from the FSB had been appointed for each editorial office, who effectively took on the role of both editor and censor. The editorial policy of all media was changed with the aim of supporting and justifying the “occupation”. On that account, the broadcasting company Krym, Chornomorska and the Crimean bureau of the information agency “Ukrinform” stopped their activities, and the Ukrainian-Turkish agency QHA and the editorial office of Radio Svoboda moved their offices to Kyiv.

129. According to the Ukrainian PEN Centre, the Russian authorities had imprisoned 162 Ukrainian journalists, activists and writers.

130. Many citizen journalists were imprisoned on false accusations, among them: Amet Suleimanov, Marlen (Suleiman) Asanov, Osman Arifmemetov, Remzi Bekirov, Ruslan Suleimanov, Rustem Sheikhaliiev, Server Mustafaiev, Seiran Saliiev, Timur Ibrahimov, Asan Akhtemov, Vladyslav Yesypenko, Oleksiy Bessarabov, Iryna Danilovych and Vilen Temerianov.

131. The applicant Government further alleged that many Ukrainian journalists were banned from visiting Crimea for 10 to 35 years without, however, identifying the authorities responsible for these decisions.

132. The seriousness of the situation concerning the violation of the rights of journalists in Crimea was also reflected in the numerous criminal proceedings initiated by Ukrainian investigative authorities into these allegations. For example, the Ukrainian investigative authorities established as a fact the illegal detention on 13 March 2015 of the editor of the Centre for Journalistic Investigations Ms Nataliya Kokorina and notified the FSB officers Ms Marina Viktorivna Savchuk and Mr Dmytro Viktorovych Tkachenko that they were suspected of the commission of a crime under Part 2 of Article 162 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

133. In addition, the Ukrainian authorities were carrying out an investigation into the case of the obstruction of the legal professional activity of Mr Yuhosh, a founder of the internet-portal Podii Krymu, and Mr Kaibullaiev, the chief editor of the newspaper Avdet, allegedly committed by representatives of the Russian law-enforcement agencies during May-June 2014.

134. The prohibition, by the decision of the Russian “occupation” administration of 22 April 2014, of the broadcasting of speeches of Crimean Tatar leaders on the TV channel Krym had also been investigated by the Ukrainian authorities.

135. In total, the Ukrainian authorities had been carrying out investigations in twenty-six sets of criminal proceedings regarding forty‐eight incidents of alleged violations of journalists' rights in Crimea (thirteen persons were notified that they were suspected to have committed related offences). It should also be noted that the available means of investigation were limited as the Government had no access to the territory of Crimea. The Government referred to the report of the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine on specific persecutions of journalists by the Russian authorities in Crimea.

136. According to the press service of the Roskomnadzor, as of 1 April 2015, 232 media outlets were registered in Crimea, of which 163 were print media and news agencies. At the same time, according to the UN, as of the beginning of 2014, about 3,000 mass media outlets were registered in Crimea.

137. Because of the armed aggression, licensees of the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine were deprived of the right to broadcast in Crimea as follows.

1. - Analogue television broadcasting – thirty-one television and radio companies were deprived of the right to use 292 frequency assignments for broadcasting in sixty-nine settlements;

2. - Digital terrestrial television broadcasting – twenty-eight television and radio companies were deprived of the right to use seventy-two frequency assignments for broadcasting in eighteen settlements;

3. - Radio broadcasting – thirty-nine television and radio companies were deprived of the right to use 139 frequency assignments for radio broadcasting in thirty-one settlements. In fact, these radio frequency assignments were illegally used to broadcast Russian programmes. This was contrary to the Statute of the International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”), the ITU Radio Regulations and the statement of the ITU Secretary General at the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference of 2014, and violated the requirements of Resolution 68/262 (2014) of the UN General Assembly.

138. Overall, approximately two million citizens of Ukraine residing in Crimea had lost access to the broadcast (analogue, digital) signal of Ukrainian television channels and the broadcast signal of radio stations. According to the information of the independent rating agency BIGDATA UA LLC, more than 230,000 subscribers had lost access to Ukrainian cable television in Crimea.

139. Television and radio companies broadcasting on the territory of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol were fully subordinate to the occupying authorities, which used measures of control as a means to suppress free speech, and to spread war propaganda against Ukraine, the EU, the United States of America, and NATO. News had been replaced by misinformation.

140. Public statements were limited, and journalists worked in accordance with the instructions received from the occupying authorities of Crimea, while others were persecuted together with their families and were subjected to direct threats to their lives.

141. According to the 2017 estimates of the international organisation Freedom House, since 2014 the level of freedom of speech in Crimea had fallen to one of the worst in the world. The organisation's report stated that on a 100-point scale, where 100 was the worst indicator, Crimea received ninety-four points and was included in the list of the “worst of the worst” territories in the world. At the same time, Russia itself received eighty-three points.

(g) Prohibition of public gatherings and demonstrations, as well as intimidation and arbitrary detention of organisers of demonstrations in violation of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11 of the Convention

142. The applicant Government referred to the findings of the OHCHR in relation to the freedom of peaceful assembly, noting in particular the regulatory measures used to suppress freedom of assembly (reference was made to 2017 OHCHR Report, §§ 147-51 thereof).

143. The general description, focussing on the regulatory measures adopted by the authorities to suppress peaceful assembly, was supplemented by accounts of individuals who were arbitrarily detained for seeking to take part in public demonstrations. For example, the applicant Government recalled the following cases.

1. (a) In his witness statement, Mr Vladyslav Polishchuk recalled how members of the CSDF had violently disrupted a peaceful demonstration on 9 March 2014 to commemorate the 200th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko (a famous Ukrainian poet and public figure). Mr Polishchuk escaped, only to be later arbitrarily detained and interrogated about his participation in the demonstration by the de facto authorities before being charged with a public‐order offence (see witness statement, A 407-09).

2. (b) Mr. L. Kuzmin, Mr. O. Kravchenko and Mr. V. Shukurdzhyev, who were detained following the use of Ukrainian symbols at a meeting to commemorate the birth of Taras Shevchenko on 9 March 2015 (paragraph 123 (f) of the admissibility decision);

3. (c) Mr L. Terletskiy, Mr M. Kuzmin and Mr L. Kurmin were detained on 24 August 2015 after they had laid flowers at a monument for Taras Shevchenko (paragraph 123 (i) of the admissibility decision).

144. The applicant Government added that in late February-early March 2014, rallies had been held almost daily in support of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the participants of these rallies were constantly attacked by the so-called CSDF.

145. With respect to the systematic suppression of demonstrations by organisations perceived to be hostile to the “occupation”, the applicant Government further referred to the report of the Centre for Civil Liberties (Ukraine), “Freedom of Assembly in Crimea Occupied by the Russian Federation”, which reported on a number of incidents, two of which they included for illustrative purposes, along with quotes from correspondence received from local authorities.

(a) On 16 May 2014, the self-proclaimed Crimean Prime Minister Sergei Aksionov issued a decree prohibiting public assemblies in Crimea until 6 June 2014. This period included the seventieth anniversary of the deportation of Crimean Tatars. Mr Aksionov justified the decision in the following terms:

(b) On 11 June 2014, the Tatar Mejlis requested permission from the Simferopol City Council to hold a cultural event dedicated to the Crimean Tatar flag on 26 June, to be held in the city's central park. However, on 17 June, the Mejlis received a written response, refusing to permit the assembly. The refusal of the local authorities states the following:

146. The occupying authorities used administrative resources to organise repression. The most instrumental entity in the harassment of civil society representatives was the CSDF, with the participation of the local police and the Russian Armed Forces. Several civil activists who openly protested against Russia's actions in Crimea had been kidnapped. All of them were unlawfully detained, and many of them were tortured.

147. The systematic nature of the repression was confirmed by the comprehensive organisation and coordination of various public bodies: the registration authorities, “the police”, “the prosecutor's office”, the “courts”, the CSDF and the Russian military. This was confirmed by numerous criminal cases having been brought against Crimean Tatars and pro‐Ukrainian activists. The most well-known case of prosecution was the so-called “Case of 26 February” in relation to the participation in a peaceful meeting of the Mejlis in support of Ukraine's sovereignty near the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Simferopol (ARC Supreme Council).

148. The Ukrainian authorities conducted investigations in relation to possible charges of murder due to carelessness, intentional bodily injuries, illegal obstruction of pro-Ukrainian rallies with the use of physical violence, and the beating of citizens on 26 February 2014 near the building of the ARC Supreme Council, as well as the illegal persecution of participants in a pro‐Ukrainian rally.

149. The applicant Government also referred to case-law of the Russian courts in administrative cases concerning the prohibition of rallies or peaceful protests in the occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol.

(h) Expropriation without compensation of property from civilians and private enterprises in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

150. The applicant Government submitted that the available evidence clearly demonstrated that, during the period under consideration, there was a pattern of expropriation of private property without compensation, in the absence of military or any other lawful justification. Where the policy was not effected through legislative and administrative means, it was officially tolerated by the authorities.

151. The 2017 OHCHR Report provided a clear overview of the pattern of property seizure during the period under consideration both through legal and administrative means and the official tolerance of unlawful actions (see §§ 171-74 thereof). This was further confirmed by documentary evidence (Resolutions of the Sevastopol City Government “On some aspects of the nationalization of property” No. 118-1111, 123-1111, 662-1111 of 28 February 2015 and 8 July 2016 respectively), OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), and the Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea of 2015, which detailed the deficiencies in the “nationalisation” process rendering it unlawful, and reported on the apparently discriminatory nature of those seizures (§§ 67 and 68 thereof) and called on Russia and the de facto authorities to:

152. The Commissioner's Report of 2014 provided evidence, in particular, that the practice of seizure of private property was not just officially tolerated but was even endorsed (reference was made to paragraph 35 of that report, A 85).

153. The practice of property seizures was a feature of the “occupation” from the outset. On 17 March 2014, for instance, the “Parliament” of Crimea purported to adopt a resolution to appropriate the assets of the Feodosia enterprise which, prior to the crisis, was one of Ukraine's primary transhipment terminals. No compensation was provided. Similar seizures of significant, as well as smaller, private enterprises without compensation continued throughout the year (reference was made to the Report “International Crimes in Crimea: An Assessment of Two and a Half Years of Russian Occupation” (September 2016)).

154. On 2 April 2014 the Russian Federation passed the Federal Law on the specifics of the functioning of the financial system of the “Republic of Crimea” and the City of Sevastopol during the transitional period, which enabled the Russian Central Bank to terminate licences of Ukrainian banks operating in Crimea, and to seize all property in the possession of a bank. The matter was eventually the subject of an arbitration award (reference was made to the Award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of 26 November 2018 in.the case of Oschadbank v. Russian Federation, PCA CASE No. 2016-14).

155. By December 2014 it was estimated that some 4,000 public and private properties had been seized by the occupying authorities. As regards the type of property seized, an investigation into the matter by Associated Press concluded that the seizures “vary in scale and type of assets involved” but had in common that they were “reliably profitable and would require little additional investment.” One of the specific instances they report in an article entitled “Crimea's New Russian Overlords are Seizing Thousands of Businesses” of 2 December 2014 involved the non-payment of USD 5.2 million to Trans-Bud, a construction and transport company, following its delivery of fifty-four vehicles to the Simferopol firm Krymsky Passazh. When Trans-Bud took the matter to the police, it was determined that no crime had been committed because the property was being “nationalised”.

156. On 27 May 2015 Russia's Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law on nationalisation of property in Crimea (ruling of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation no.127-APG15-2 of 27 May 2015).

157. The NGO IPHR (International Partnership for Human Rights) also documented twenty-five representative cases of appropriation of private property including agro-industrial enterprises, a major bank, property belonging to associations, media and telecommunication companies, energy companies, construction and transport companies, and tourism-sector enterprises. IPHR also found that “[a]side from big commercial enterprises, appropriations ha[d] taken place against small businesses, mainly belonging to Crimean Tatars and persons in actual or perceived opposition to the occupation.”

158. In their supplementary memorial of 30 January 2023, the applicant Government noted that on 20 March 2020 the President of the Russian Federation had issued Decree no. 201 of 20 March 2020 by which nineteen territories in Crimea and eight in Sevastopol were granted the status of “border areas” of the Russian Federation.

159. In relation to this decree, the applicant Government referred to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General's Report of 2020, according to which:

160. The applicant Government also noted the practice of demolition of houses of Crimean Tatars on the territory of Crimea by the Russian occupying administration.

161. Further reference was made to the statement of Metropolitan Kliment according to which individuals who refused to receive Russian citizenship sustained interference with their property rights by the Russian occupying administration. He described the situation of one of his parishioners who had not been able to register her title to her flat because of her absence of Russian citizenship. The same problems had confronted the priest I. Katkalo Jr. and as a result of those issues, he had been forced to apply for Russian citizenship.

162. The applicant Government also referred to a group of 230 individual communicated cases regarding breaches of the applicants' property rights by the respondent Government in Sevastopol (Andriyevskiy and Others v. Russia, no. 53891/16). The applicants in those cases had submitted that on the territory of Sevastopol alone, more than 10,000 lawsuits had been brought by the occupying administration in the local “courts” in order to confiscate private plots of land and all of the decisions had been in the administration's favour. Judicial decisions provided by the applicants within that group of cases demonstrated that while deciding to seize property from them or persons to whom the applicants had sold the land plots, the “courts” had not provided evidence of “imperative military necessity”; they had only referred to provisions of Russian legislation to justify their decisions.

163. It was also noted that the Ukrainian authorities were also investigating decisions of local “courts” on the occupied territory of Crimea confiscating private property.

(i) Suppression of the Ukrainian language in schools and persecution of Ukrainian-speaking children at school in violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1

164. The applicant Government submitted that the respondent State was responsible for the suppression of the Ukrainian language in schools, notwithstanding the ostensible protection afforded to the Ukrainian (and Crimean Tatar) language under the 2014 Constitution.

165. Whilst the “Constitution” of 2014 of the de facto authorities following the February 2014 events provided that “everyone shall have the right to use his/her native language and to freely choose the language of communication, teaching, education and creation” (Article 19 § 2), such rights were not enforced in practice, nor were they protected by other legal instruments.

166. On 30 December 2014 the de facto authorities issued Decree no. 651 to approve a “State Programme for Development of Education and Science in the Republic of Crimea for 2015-2017”. The programme did not envisage access to education in a native language and did not reference any statistical data regarding the current “language of instruction or other characteristics of the existing educational institutions of Crimea” (reference was made to Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research, Integration and Development Centre for Information and Research, “‘Annexed’ Education in Temporarily Occupied Crimea Monitoring Report,” 2015).

167. Before 2014 seven schools of general education teaching in Ukrainian and fifteen schools teaching in the Crimean Tatar language functioned on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Three educational institutions with Ukrainian as the language of instruction had ceased their activities.

168. In November 2014 the OHCHR reported on the sharp decline in Ukrainian language education since the start of the “occupation” (see OHCHR 2014). The decline in Ukrainian (and Crimean Tatar) language education continued, as recounted in the OHCHR's subsequent reporting (reference was made to paragraphs 196 and 199 of the 2017 OHCHR Report).

169. Between 2014 and 2015 the number of children studying in Ukrainian decreased from 12,600 in.the previous school year to 2,000. The number of pupils studying Ukrainian decreased from 162,700 to 39,100.

170. As argued by the applicant Government, local authorities were putting pressure on educational institutions which continued to teach in Ukrainian.

171. As a result of the actions of the Russian authorities, people were afraid to discuss the issue of teaching in the Ukrainian language in schools.

172. Parents reported that they had been put under pressure or they even had no opportunity to express their will regarding the language of education.

173. For example, Mr Yaroslav Hontar, a priest in Evpatoria who left Crimea in 2014, in his witness statements, stated that his son had problems in school with his peers as he only knew and was able to speak the Ukrainian language, which negatively affected him.

174. Furthermore, children bullied their peers who spoke Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar or whose nationality was Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian. Teachers did not address the situation.

175. The absence of meaningful legal protection had allowed an environment to flourish which was hostile to the Ukrainian language. According to a report of the Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research:

176. Archbishop Kliment similarly mentioned reports of the inculcation of Ukrainophobia in schools at this time (see witness Statement of Archbishop Kliment, paragraphs 20 and 94):

In particular, he recalled the experience of another priest in Evpatoria:

(j) Restriction of freedom of movement between Crimea and mainland Ukraine, resulting from the de facto transformation (by the Russian Federation) of the administrative delimitation line into a border (between the Russian Federation and Ukraine) in violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4

177. The applicant Government observed that on 11 March 2014 the ARC Supreme Council had purported to adopt decision no. 1731‐6/14, according to which the State bodies of Ukraine, including the armed forces, law enforcement, prosecutors and the State border service located in the territory of Crimea, were to be subordinate to the Head of the Council of Ministers of Crimea.

178. On 18 March 2014 the Russian Federation, the “Republic of Crimea” and the City of Sevastopol signed the “Treaty of Unification”, which was “accepted” by the Russian Duma on 20 March that year.

179. By 24 April 2014 the Russian Federation authorities had established a border at the northern entrance to Crimea, thereby creating a de facto State border between mainland Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula that applied to all inhabitants of Crimea wishing to leave, and all inhabitants of mainland Ukraine wishing to enter.

180. The applicant Government referred to relevant passages of Mitropolitan Kliment's statement, as well as the 2017 OHCHR Report (paragraphs 123-27 thereof). They also referred to the statement of the journalist Mr B. Kutyepov that the so-called “Cossacks” had stopped him on the administrative border between mainland Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula, refused to let him into Crimea and claimed that Crimea was a territory of the Russian Federation.

181. In her witness testimonies Ms O. Maksymenko stated that she and three other journalists had been stopped and detained at the checkpoint controlled by the so-called “Crimean self-defence forces”. They claimed to have been tortured and kept in inhuman conditions. A few days later, they had been removed from Crimea.

182. Ms A. Kushnova recalled further instances of violence against foreign journalists who had attempted to cross and record the checkpoint on the administrative border.

183. In addition to the creation of a de facto border, the imposition of Russian immigration and other laws created additional restrictions on the freedom of movement which violated the rights of those living in Crimea. The Ukrainian NGO UHHRU (Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union) identified the groups of Ukrainian citizens whose freedom of movement was particularly affected by the application of Russian immigration legislation following the “occupation” as including those: (a) whose place of residence was officially registered on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or the City of Sevastopol, and who subsequently refused to accept the citizenship of the occupying power imposed by the Russian Federation; (b) who had lived in the above-mentioned territory before the “occupation” without official registration (which did not constitute a violation of Ukrainian law); and (c) who had arrived in the specified territory after the beginning of the “occupation” in pursuit of personal, family or other reasons.

Moreover, the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation provided for twenty-three administrative offences, for which expulsion could be imposed.

184. For instance, Kadyrov Sinaver Arifovich, a human rights activist who was born in Uzbekistan but had lived in Crimea from 1990, was expelled from Crimea in January 2015 after a judge had found him guilty of the administrative offence of exceeding the established period of stay on the territory of Crimea. As a consequence, he was banned from the territory of the Russian Federation and Crimea for a period of five years, unable to see his wife, son, seriously ill father and other close relatives.

185. The Russian Federation had adopted a policy of shifting the demographic composition of Crimea. The functioning of the so-called “State border” on the administrative border between mainland Ukraine and Crimea and the practice of expulsion of Crimean residents who refused or failed to receive Russian citizenship were among the main components of this policy.

186. The policy also included direct transfers of groups of individuals from Crimea. A major example was the so-called “Train of hope” programme initiated by Russia in 2014. It was used to transfer orphans and children deprived of parental care from Crimea to the territory of Russia for their adoption by Russian citizens and their subsequent assimilation there.

187. The General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine stated that it was “currently” investigating more than 300 cases of expulsion of Ukrainian citizens who had previously resided in Crimea from the territory of the peninsula for breaches of “the Russian legislation on migration”. Among them, more than 100 cases related to expulsion orders issued during the period between 27 February 2014 and 26 August 2015.

188. In addition, the applicant Government emphasised that the so‐called “State border” functioned not only to prevent persons from entering Crimea but also to prevent them from leaving. To demonstrate an example of such circumstances they referred to Lavrenchuk v. Russia (no. 24218/18), in which the applicant had complained under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention that she had been prohibited from leaving Crimea because of non-payment of compensation awarded in a judicial decision.

(k) Targeting Crimean Tatars in breach of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4

189. The applicant Government submitted that the Russian Federation was responsible for discriminatory legal and administrative measures aimed at Crimean Tatars, which were effected through, inter alia, the following: frequent summoning of Tatars by the police and the Public Prosecutor of Crimea; the initiation of criminal proceedings against Tatars; the prohibition of broadcasting of Tatar television channels; the prohibition of public meetings; and restrictions on freedom of movement through the imposition of a de facto State border which particularly affected Crimean Tatars.

190. The information available from numerous intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), NGOs, and other sources consistently pointed to the conclusion that the Crimean Tatars had been subjected to an administrative practice of discrimination in violation of Article 14 of the Convention.

191. The ICJ (International Court of Justice) had already ordered provisional measures and dismissed preliminary objections in relation to Ukraine's complaints of a policy of discrimination and campaign of cultural erasure against the Crimean Tatar population brought under International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (A 90 and 91).

192. As found in the admissibility decision of the Court, such a pattern of discriminatory acts was borne out by the reporting of multiple NGOs and IGOs, such as the 2017 OHCHR Report (see paragraphs 179-81 of the report) and the Commissioner's Report (regarding religious discrimination against the Crimean Tatar community, see paragraph 21 of the report). Furthermore, as noted in the analytical report on politically motivated persecutions and discrimination on the ground of pro-Ukrainian opinion, “Crimea: Ukrainian identity banned”, in 2015 the “Ministry of Education” ordered an audit of “Extremist Literature” and seizure of material with Islamic or Tatar content.

193. PACE Resolution 2133 (paragraph 8 thereof) drew attention to forced nationality and political repression:

194. In its case studies on the seizure of private property, the NGO IPHR found that “[a]side from big commercial enterprises, appropriations had taken place against small businesses, mainly belonging to Crimean Tatars and persons in actual or perceived opposition to the occupation”. IPHR also noted that “the occupying authorities had also targeted the property of cultural and religious organisations. As a result, a Tatar cultural centre … had been seized with no compensation or right of appeal”. It further documented the whole or partial destruction of four mosques and of memorials to Tatar deportation, and reported that Tatar shops had been attacked and defaced with paint and racist slogans.

195. Crimean Tatars had also suffered disproportionately from the Russian Federation's unlawful policy on freedom of movement. For instance:

1. (a) Mr Mustafa Dzhemilev (Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People and a member of the Ukrainian Parliament) was banned from entering the territory of the Russian Federation for five years.

2. (b) Following a session of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People in the town of Henichesk, the Mejlis leader, Mr Refat Chubarov was excluded from Crimea for five years.

3. (c) On 9 August 2014, at the check point on the administrative boundary line, FSB officials excluded the councillor of the Head of Mejlis Ismet Yüksel when he and his family were on their way home after a trip. He was told that he had been excluded for five years.

196. The discrimination experienced by Crimean Tatars was all the more egregious and the need for the Court to take measures to put an end to such practice was urgent because it had not abated since the “occupation”. In this connection reference was made to “War in religious dimension: Attacks on religion in Crimea and Donbas region”, Truth Hounds and IRFF, 2019.

(a) Arguments about the absence of administrative practice in respect of the alleged violations of Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention

198. The respondent Government submitted “that in the case under consideration there was no administrative practice of enforced disappearances, lack of effective investigation, ill-treatment or illegal detention on the territory of the Republic of Crimea”.

199. The authorities of the Russian Federation were deeply convinced that an abstract description of actions as advanced by the applicant Government could not be regarded as an “administrative practice”.

200. In particular, the Ukrainian authorities appeared to refer to episodes of alleged abductions or detention by unknown persons. Careful consideration of those “incidents” showed that they could not be used in any way to prove the existence of “repetitive actions” and, consequently, the existence of an “administrative practice”.

201. Firstly, there were generally no grounds for holding the authorities of the Russian Federation responsible for those events, and the Ukrainian authorities had not provided any relevant evidence. Secondly, some allegations were so vague that the alleged victims could not be identified. Some of the alleged victims denied the words of the Ukrainian authorities during evidence given to the Russian authorities.

202. For example, V. Sadovnik denied that he had been abducted, and E. Pivovar claimed that he had not been forced to go anywhere; he had made decisions on his own initiative. In some cases, the alleged victims of abduction had subsequently been found alive and well (in particular, O. Filipov and A. Kalyan), and there were no signs of criminal acts. Other alleged victims of unlawful detention had simply been stopped for a short conversation (A. Moryakov, V. Radzivinovich). Most of the alleged victims (V. Chemysh, O. Ryazantseva, I. Kiryushenko, V. Necheporenko, D. Delyatytskyi, I. Voronchenko, Y. Mamchur, M. Demyanenko, B. Kostetsky and relatives of the allegedly disappeared person L. Korzh) had never reported the alleged violation of their rights to the domestic authorities. Other alleged victims, such as M. Seytasanova, had refused to provide explanations during the checks carried out by the authorities; others, for example, D. Jeffrion, M. Kvich, S. Dub, S. Mokrushin, O. Pashayev and Ch. Kizgin, had been detained or brought for questioning in connection with their participation or suspicion of participation in criminal activities.

203. The second mandatory criterion for the existence of an “administrative practice” was “official tolerance”, which had also not been proven by the Ukrainian authorities.

204. In this connection it should be noted that in almost all cases cited by the Ukrainian authorities, there had been no real attempt on the part of the alleged victims to exhaust domestic remedies. Instead, in some cases the alleged victims had refused to cooperate with the Russian investigating authorities. In the majority of other cases, the initial recourse to domestic remedies (if any) was brief and formal and was not accompanied by supporting evidence. These facts alone proved that the arguments of the Ukrainian authorities about “official tolerance” were mere speculations.

205. There were insufficient grounds to assert that the authorities of the Russian Federation had refused to take measures to investigate the complaints and punish the perpetrators. At the same time, the authorities of the Russian Federation provided examples of effective measures taken by public authorities in fulfilling their obligations under the Convention.

206. The Ukrainian authorities had claimed that there had been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in respect of R. Ametov, S. Karachevsky and M. Ivanyuk.

207. Regarding the case of R. Ametov, the respondent Government submitted perpetrators were unknown and there were no reasons to attribute any responsibility to the authorities of the Russian Federation for the crimes committed against R. Ametov. Furthermore, the competent Russian authorities had conducted a thorough examination of the circumstances of the disappearance and death of R. Ametov. In the context of the criminal case, considerable efforts had been made to identify the perpetrators: about 500 witnesses had been questioned, and sixty inspections and four searches had been carried out. This criminal case had been investigated thoroughly. At the same time, R. Ametov's next of kin had not challenged the actions of the competent authorities of the Russian Federation as provided for under the relevant domestic law (Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation (“CCrPRF”)).

208. As regards the death of S. Karachevsky, following the investigation by the Russian investigating authorities, on 13 March 2015 a Russian serviceman had been convicted under Article 108 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (“CrCRF”) (murder committed in excess of the measures necessary to arrest a person who had committed a crime). The penalty had been upheld by the Court of Appeal. Domestic remedies had been used and had been effective.

209. The Ukrainian authorities had also referred to the case of M. Ivanyuk, unreasonably alleging that he had been killed. However, he had died as a result of a traffic accident. M. Ivanyuk's mother had not claimed that the representatives of the Russian Federation had any connection to that incident. Accordingly, there was no reason for this case to be regarded as evidence of an administrative practice.

210. As regards R.B. Zeytullayev, R. Vaitov and Yu.(N.)V. Primov, who had allegedly been kidnapped and unlawfully deprived of their liberty, it was noted that criminal cases no. 42015010000000019, no. 42015010000000021 and no. 42015010000000022 had been initiated by the Department of the National Police of the Kherson Region in the town of Genichesk in relation to a crime punishable under Article 146 § 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (unlawful deprivation of liberty or kidnapping). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and its foreign missions did not have access to the information entered into the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations of Ukraine. This right was vested in prosecutors and heads of departments of the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, the State Bureau of Investigation, investigators of the prosecutor's office, the police, the security forces, and so on.

211. On the other hand, R.B. Zeytullayev, R. Vaitov and Y.(N.)V. Primov, who were regarded by the competent authorities of the Russian Federation as citizens of the Russian Federation, were subject to criminal prosecution in Russia and had been convicted by the North Caucasian District Military court on 7 September 2016 for participation in the activities of the Party of Islamic Liberation (Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami). The latter was considered a terrorist organisation on the basis of a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 14 February 2003 no. GKPI 03‐116 and prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation. Since participation in the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami was prosecuted in accordance with Russian criminal law (Article 205.5 of the CrCRF, providing for the offence of organisation of the activities of a terrorist organisation or participation in it), the competent authorities of the Russian Federation had jurisdiction to prosecute R.B. Zeytullayev, R. Vaitov and Yu.(N.)V. Primov, regardless of whether those persons had legally obtained citizenship of the Russian Federation from the point of view of international law.

212. In particular, pursuant to Article 11 § 1 of the CrCRF, any person who committed a crime on the territory of the Russian Federation was subject to criminal liability. Pursuant to Article 12 § 1 of the Criminal Code, citizens of the Russian Federation who had committed a crime outside the Russian Federation against the interests protected by the Code were subject to criminal liability in the absence of a court decision against them in a foreign State in respect of the crime in question.

213. In any event, even from the point of view of Ukraine, which did not recognise Crimea as a part of the Russian Federation, and R.B. Zeytullayev, R. Vaitov and Yu.(N).V. Primov as Russian citizens, the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation to bring those individuals to criminal justice stemmed from Article 12 § 3 of the CrCRF, which provided that foreign citizens who did not reside permanently in the Russian Federation and who had committed a crime outside the Russian Federation were subject to criminal liability if the crime in question was directed against the interests of the Russian Federation, and the relevant persons had not been convicted in a foreign State and were subject to criminal liability in the territory of the Russian Federation.

(b) Arguments about the extension of the legislation of the Russian Federation to the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” and on the establishment of courts in Crimea “by law” within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention

214. The Court's case-law had specified the contents of the right to a tribunal established by law, in particular the requirements that a court, as a public authority, should be established in accordance with the law, and that the composition of a court in a particular case should be determined on the basis of clear and specific procedures provided for by law. The first element implied that the national legislation should clearly indicate which authorities were competent to consider a specific dispute.

215. In that connection, the authorities of the Russian Federation noted that the courts and judicial authorities on the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” had been established on the basis of a law that met the criterion of legal certainty.

216. Pursuant to Article 118 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, justice in the Russian Federation was administered only by courts. The judicial system of the Russian Federation, which included the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, federal courts of general jurisdiction, arbitration courts, and justices of the peace of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, was established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal constitutional law. The establishment of emergency courts was not allowed.

217. Prior to the admission of the “Republic of Crimea” to the Russian Federation, courts established in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine operated in the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol”.

218. Section 6 of the Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ provided for a transitional period between the date (21 March 2014) of the admission of the “Republic of Crimea” into the Russian Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation and 1 January 2015.

219. Pursuant to section 9 of the Federal Constitutional Law, courts of the Russian Federation (federal courts) had been created in the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol” during the transitional period in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation. Prior to the establishment of courts of the Russian Federation on the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol”, justice on behalf of the Russian Federation in these territories was to be delivered by the courts operating on the day of the admission of the “Republic of Crimea” into the Russian Federation and the formation of new constituent entities of the Russian Federation. The supreme judicial authorities in respect of decisions and sentences of those courts were the courts of appeal operating in the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol” on the day of the admission of the “Republic of Crimea” and the formation of new constituent entities in the Russian Federation, and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.

220. In addition, the same section of the Federal Constitutional Law regulated the procedure for considering claims in civil and administrative cases, in economic disputes, in criminal cases that had been admitted for examination by the courts of first instance operating in the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol” on the day of admission to the Russian Federation of the “Republic of Crimea” and the formation of new constituent entities of the Russian Federation, as well as the appeal procedure during the transitional period before the courts operating on that day in those territories.

221. Pursuant to section 9 of Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ and section 17 of Federal Constitutional Law no. 1-FKZ of 31 December 1996 on the judicial system of the Russian Federation, on 23 June 2014 Federal Law no. 154-FZ on establishment of courts of the Russian Federation in the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol” and on amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation had entered into force, which established the “Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea” and the “Arbitration Court of the Republic of Crimea”, twenty-four district and city courts of the “Republic of Crimea”, the “Arbitration Court of Sevastopol”, “Sevastopol City Court”, four district courts of Sevastopol, the “Crimean Garrison Military Court” and the “Sevastopol Garrison Military Court”. It also determined the territorial jurisdiction of those courts and the procedural rules.

222. Federal Constitutional Law no. 10-FKZ of 23 June 2014 on the establishment of the “Twenty-first Arbitration Court of Appeal” and on amendments to the Federal Constitutional Law on arbitration courts in the Russian Federation established the “Twenty-first Arbitration Court of Appeal” with a permanent seat in the City of Sevastopol, which had jurisdiction to review the judicial decisions taken by the arbitration courts of the “Republic of Crimea” and the City of Sevastopol.

223. Pursuant to the above-mentioned federal constitutional laws and the federal law, on 23 December 2014 the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation adopted Ruling no. 21 on the date of commencement of the operation of federal courts in the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol”, according to which the “Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea”, the “Arbitration Court of the Republic of Crimea”, the district and city courts of the “Republic of Crimea”, the “Crimean Garrison Military Court”, the “Sevastopol City Court”, the “Arbitration Court of the City of Sevastopol”, the district courts of the City of Sevastopol, the “Sevastopol Garrison Military Court”, as well as the “Twenty-first Arbitration Court of Appeal”, were established on 26 December 2014.

224. For the purposes of organisational support (personnel, financial, logistical, informational and other measures aimed at creating conditions for the full and independent administration of justice) for the activities of the courts operating in the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol”, the Judicial Department at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation took urgent measures, such as the issuance of orders of the Judicial Department no. 71 and no. 72 of 28 March 2014, in accordance with which the Department of the Judicial Department in the “Republic of Crimea” and the Department of the Judicial Department in Sevastopol, respectively, were established.

225. In addition, section 23 of the Federal Constitutional Law provided that legislative and other regulatory legal instruments of the Russian Federation were valid on the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol” from the date of admission to the Russian Federation of the “Republic of Crimea” and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation, unless otherwise provided by federal constitutional law. Regulatory legal acts of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, the “Republic of Crimea” and the City of Sevastopol with a special status were to be valid in the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol”, respectively, until the end of the transitional period or until the introduction of the relevant regulatory legal instrument(s) of the Russian Federation, the “Republic Crimea”, or the “Federal City of Sevastopol”. Regulatory legal instruments of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, the “Republic of Crimea” and the City of Sevastopol with a special status that were contrary to the Constitution of the Russian Federation did not apply.

226. Thus, during the transitional period, justice on behalf of the Russian Federation in the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and the City of Sevastopol was delivered by the previously operating courts established in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine, including the economic courts of the “Republic of Crimea” and the City of Sevastopol and the Sevastopol Economic Court of Appeal.

227. During the same period, a number of legislative instruments were passed aimed at forming the judicial system of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol” in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, including the system of arbitration courts.

228. Thus, the Russian Federation had taken the necessary legislative and other measures in a timely manner to ensure the continuity of justice in the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol” during the transitional period and to ensure the exercise of the constitutional right of persons living in the territories of the new constituent entities of the Russian Federation to judicial protection and access to justice.

229. The aforementioned circumstances indicated that the courts operating in the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol” had been and still were the courts established by law within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.

230. In addition, Federal Law no. 155-FZ on the bodies of the judicial community of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol”, as well as Federal Law no. 156-FZ on the procedure for selecting candidates for the initial composition of federal courts established in the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol” of 23 June 2014 determined the selection procedure for the post of judge and established that citizens holding such a post in courts operating in the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and “Federal City of Sevastopol” on the day of the admission of the “Republic of Crimea” into the Russian Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation had priority for appointment in the courts of the Russian Federation established in these territories if they held citizenship of the Russian Federation and complied with the other requirements for the post of a judge.

231. The issues of equipping the courts with personnel during the transition period had been resolved in accordance with the requirements of section 9 of Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ. Persons replacing judges in these courts continued to administer justice until the establishment and start of activities in the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” of the courts of the Russian Federation, subject to them holding the citizenship of the Russian Federation. The appointment of judges in those courts was carried out by the Higher Qualification Board of Judges of the Russian Federation.

232. Meanwhile, candidates for the post of judge were subjected to the general requirements provided for in section 4 of the Law of the Russian Federation no. 3132-1 of 26 June 1992 on the status of judges in the Russian Federation, by which a citizen of the Russian Federation could be a judge if he or she:

1. (1) had a higher legal education in “jurisprudence” or a higher education in the field of training “jurisprudence” with the qualification (degree) “Master” and with a bachelor's degree in the field of training “jurisprudence”;

2. (2) had no criminal record;

3. (3) did not have citizenship (nationality) of a foreign State or a residence permit or other document confirming the right of permanent residence of a citizen of the Russian Federation in the territory of a foreign State;

4. (4) was not recognised by the court as legally incompetent or having limited legal capacity;

5. (5) was not registered in a narcotic or neuropsychiatric dispensary for treatment for alcoholism, drug addiction, substance abuse, chronic and protracted mental disorders; and

6. (6) had no other diseases that prevented him or her from exercising the powers of a judge.

233. It should be noted that the legislation of the Russian Federation did not provide for such criteria for the appointment of judges, which could be characterised as a requirement to be “loyal to the Russian Federation”.

234. Owing to those legal requirements, immediate measures had been taken to grant citizenship of the Russian Federation to judges who did not have it as of 21 March 2014, in the manner prescribed by Federal Law no. 62‐FZ of 31 May 2002 on citizenship of the Russian Federation.

235. According to available information, in the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol” during the transitional period, justice was delivered exclusively by judges who were citizens of the Russian Federation.

236. By decrees of the President of the Russian Federation, judges of federal courts located in the territories of the “Republic of Crimea” and “Federal City of Sevastopol” had been appointed since November 2014 (decrees of the President of the Russian Federation no. 719 of 13 November 2014, no. 786 of 19 December 2014, no. 4 of 2 January 2015, no. 135 of 16 March 2015 and no. 343 of 4 July 2015).

237. In connection with the above, the appointment of judges and the formation of the judicial system of the “Republic of Crimea” and “Federal City of Sevastopol” had been carried out in accordance with Russian legislation.

(c) On the absence of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention due to the lawfulness and reasonableness of the imposition of the Russian citizenship in the territory of the “Republic of Crimea”, and the availability of an effective opportunity to withdraw from the citizenship of the Russian Federation

238. In accordance with section 17 of Federal Law no. 62-FZ of 31 May 2002 on citizenship of the Russian Federation (Federal Law no. 62-FZ), when the State border of the Russian Federation was changed in accordance with an international treaty of the Russian Federation, persons living in the territory of which the nationality had changed had the right to choose citizenship in the manner and within the time-limits established by that international treaty.

239. As stated by Article 5 of the Accession Treaty of 18 March 2014, from the date of admission of the “Republic of Crimea” into the Russian Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation, citizens of Ukraine and stateless persons permanently residing on the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” or on the territory of the “Federal City of Sevastopol” on that day were recognised as citizens of the Russian Federation, except for persons who, within one month after the date in question, declared their wish to keep another citizenship that they held and/or that of one of their minor children, or to remain stateless. A similar provision was contained in section 4 of Federal Constitutional Law no. 6‐FKZ.

240. People who had possessed the citizenship of Ukraine, were permanently residing in the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” or in the territory of the “Federal City of Sevastopol” on the date of admission of the “Republic of Crimea” into the Russian Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation and until the date of the admission of the “Republic of Crimea” into the Russian Federation and had acquired the citizenship of the Russian Federation or had applied for the citizenship of the Russian Federation were to be recognised as citizens of the Russian Federation.

241. Russian legislation provided for the possibility of voluntary withdrawal from citizenship of the Russian Federation, subject to the notification procedure.

242. In accordance with section 19(1) of Federal Law no. 62-FZ, residents of the Russian Federation could seek withdrawal from citizenship of the Russian Federation on the basis of a voluntary expression of their will, except for the cases provided for in section 20 of the Federal Law, under which withdrawal from the citizenship of the Russian Federation was not allowed if the citizen of the Russian Federation:

1. - had an unfulfilled obligation to the Russian Federation established by law;

2. - had been designated by the competent authorities of the Russian Federation as a defendant in a criminal case or there was a valid and enforceable court sentence against him or her; or

3. - had no other citizenship and no guarantees of its acquisition.

243. At the same time, citizens of Ukraine who were recognised as citizens of the Russian Federation and who did not hold a passport of a citizen of the Russian Federation could apply for withdrawal from Russian citizenship upon presentation of a Ukrainian passport.

(d) On the absence of violations of freedom of thought, conscience and religion on account of searches of religious communities, confiscation of religious property and persecution of religious leaders who do not profess the Russian Orthodox faith

244. Sections 11 and 12 of Federal Law no. 125-FZ of 26 September 1997 on freedom of conscience and religious associations established the grounds for registration of religious organisations. They were subject to State registration in accordance with Federal Law no. 129-FZ of 8 August 2001 on State registration of legal entities and individual entrepreneurs, which set forth the procedure for registration of religious organisations established by the Federal Law. The decision on registration of a religious organisation was to be made by the federal State registration body or its local body.

245. An application for registration of a religious organisation established by a centralised religious organisation or on the basis of a confirmation issued by a centralised religious organisation was to be considered within one month from the date of submission of all documents listed in section 11 of the Federal Law. The competent body could extend the period for consideration of documents up to six months.

246. A religious organisation could be denied registration in the following cases:

1. - if the goals and activities of the religious organisation were contrary to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the legislation of the Russian Federation;

2. - if the organisation was not recognised as a religious one;

3. - if the articles of association and other documents submitted did not comply with the requirements of the legislation of the Russian Federation or the information contained therein was not reliable;

4. - if an organisation with the same name had been previously registered in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities; or

5. - if the founder(s) was/were not duly authorised.

247. In the event of refusal to register a religious organisation, the decision was to be communicated to the applicant(s) in writing, indicating the grounds for refusal. Refusal to register a religious organisation could be appealed against to a court.

248. Furthermore, in the event of a refusal to register a religious organisation, the organisation could submit a fresh request for registration. Twenty-four religious organisations, following an initial refusal, had been registered by the judicial authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

249. From 18 March 2014 to the present day, the Department of the Crimean Diocese of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had not submitted any applications for re-registration to the territorial departments of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. The refusals to register the local religious organisation “Ukrainian Orthodox Parish of Saints Equal to the Apostles Prince Vladimir and Princess Olga in Simferopol” had not been contested in court by that organisation, despite the clear indication of this possibility in the relevant notices.

250. Pursuant to section 13 of Federal Law no. 125-FZ of 26 September 1997, a branch of a foreign religious organisation could not engage in acts of worship and other religious activities. Missionary activity could not be carried out on its behalf and the status of a religious association established by the Federal Law could not apply to it.

251. Section 24.2 of Federal Law no. 125-FZ of 26 September 1997 provided that foreign citizens who had entered the territory of the Russian Federation upon invitation of a religious organisation were entitled to carry out missionary activities only on behalf of that religious organisation for the territory of a constituent entity or territories of constituent entities of the Russian Federation in accordance with the territorial scope of its activities on the basis of a decision of the general meeting of the religious group on the granting of the relevant powers with an indication of the details of the written confirmation of receipt and registration of the notice on the establishment and commencement of the activities of the religious group in question issued by the territorial body of the federal State registration body.

252. The allegations by the applicant State of a violation of the Article 9 rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church were ill-founded for the following reasons.

253. The Ministry of Property of the “Republic of Crimea” had lodged a claim with the Arbitration Court of the “Republic of Crimea” against the Department of the Crimean Diocese of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church claiming rent arrears and compensation for the early termination of the lease agreement. The authorities of the Russian Federation noted that the termination of the lease agreement was a logical consequence of the refusal by the religious organisation in question to comply with the legislation of the Russian Federation. It had nothing to do with the organisation's religious activities.

254. The decision of the Arbitration Court of the “Republic of Crimea” of 5 July 2019 granting the above claims had not been enforced as yet. The administrative building in the “Republic of Crimea”, at 17 Sevastopolskaya Street, Simferopol, had not been returned to the Ministry of Property of the “Republic of Crimea”. Representatives and parishioners of the religious organisation had free access to the aforementioned property. The Ministry of Property of the “Republic of Crimea” had systematically sent requests to the Inter-District Department of Bailiffs for Special Enforcement Proceedings of the Department of the Federal Bailiff Service of Russia for the “Republic of Crimea” seeking postponement of the enforcement of the relevant decision.

255. Furthermore, the local religious organisation “Ukrainian Orthodox Parish Church of Saints Equal to the Apostles Prince Vladimir and Princess Olga in Simferopol” carried out its religious activities on the territory of the Russian Federation, despite the fact that the organisation's documents had not yet been brought into line with the requirements of the legislation of the Russian Federation.

256. According to information provided by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, as of 31 December 2021, 806 religious organisations of over twenty denominations were registered in the territory of the “Republic of Crimea”, including one centralised religious organisation and 805 local religious organisations (799 as of 2020, 786 as of 2019 and 763 as of 2018). As of 31 December 2021, 113 local religious organisations of seventeen denominations (108 as of 2020, 105 as of 2019 and 105 as of 2018) had been registered in the City of Sevastopol. In 2021 the Department of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation for the “Republic of Crimea” had registered twenty-one new religious organisations (forty-one as of 2020, twenty-nine as of 2019 and thirty-three as of 2018). The Department of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation for Sevastopol had registered five new religious organisations (five as of 2020, two as of 2019 and six as of 2018). In addition, the central office of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation had decided requests for the registration of sixteen religious organisations located in the “Republic of Crimea”, and three such organisations in the city of Sevastopol.

257. In March 2016 the Catholic communities of Crimea had been registered in the manner prescribed by the Russian legislation. All of them had been granted the status of local religious organisations within the Crimean Exarchate of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite, specially established and directly subordinate to the State Secretariat (Holy See).

258. It should also be noted that pursuant to the instructions of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation to consider the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.V. Lavrov concerning the alleged violations of human rights in the City of Sevastopol in the second half of 2015, the prosecutor's office of the City of Sevastopol had investigated the possible violation of the rights of national minorities in the city. During the investigation, it was established that there were 137 religious organisations of twenty-nine denominations in the city, including three monasteries of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, one monastery of the UOC-KP, one women's skete, ninety-five religious communities and twenty-nine Sunday schools, where 1,200 children studied. There were no cases of forced closure of churches, temples of the UOC‐KP or other religious denominations, or of harassment of Orthodox Ukrainians through the creation of obstacles for sidesmen and believers to enter church buildings. There had been no searches of churches, mosques and temples, and no pressure had been exerted on religious communities. This was confirmed by interviews with clerics of the UOC-KP and the rector of the parish of Holy Martyr Clement Pope of Rome. In particular, there had been no conflicts, harassment or pressure, and no searches had been carried out.

259. In addition, twelve former State-owned facilities in the City of Sevastopol had been returned to religious organisations free of charge.

260. In Sevastopol there was no religious building called the “Temple of Holy Martyr Clement Pope of Rome”. There was a monastery in honour of the Holy Martyr Clement of the Simferopol and Crimean Diocese of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The city also had a Roman Catholic parish of Holy Martyr Clement Pope of Rome, whose services were held in the former Druzhba cinema on Ushakova Square at 1 Schmidt Street, which had been transferred by the authorities of Sevastopol to the community for free use in 2018.

261. The law-enforcement agencies of the City of Sevastopol had received no complaints from the abbots of the monastery in honour of the Holy Martyr Clement Pope of Rome or the Roman Catholic parish of the Holy Martyr Clement Pope of Rome on account of violations of their rights, unlawful actions or harassment.

262. Pursuant to sections 5 and 9 of Federal Law no. 327‐FZ of 30 November 2010 on the transfer of State or municipal property of religious purpose to religious organisations, Articles 83, 84 of the Constitution of the “Republic of Crimea”, and the Law of the “Republic of Crimea” of 8 August 2014 no. 46-ZRK 2 on management and disposal of State property of the “Republic of Crimea”, on 11 November 2014 the Council of Ministers of the “Republic of Crimea” issued Order no. 437 on the transfer of the property of religious purpose publicly owned by the “Republic of Crimea” to religious organisations. The order regulated the procedure for the formation and publication of the Plan for the transfer to religious organisations of property of religious purpose publicly owned by the “Republic of Crimea”. The relevant powers were vested in the Ministry of Property and Land Relations of the “Republic of Crimea”.

263. In order to prevent the “seizure” of property, improper allocation and so on, a Commission on the settlement of disputes arising from the consideration of applications of religious organisations on the transfer of ownership or free use of religious property owned by the “Republic of Crimea” had been established.

264. In this connection, the authorities of the Russian Federation noted that all buildings used by religious organisations of the Crimean Diocese of the UOC-KP in the “Republic of Crimea” for the purpose of worship had been leased. The religious building of the Cathedral of the Intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary, located in the village of Perevalnoye in the Simferopol District, had been transferred to the UOC-KP community and was used by it in violation of the current legislation of Ukraine.

265. In the village of Perevalnoye in the Simferopol District, on the territory of military unit L-0279, in the premises of the cathedral, built by and at the expense of the Orthodox community of the Moscow Patriarchate, the community of the Intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary of the UOC‐KP was operating. That community did not have the status of a legal entity. In 1996 the commander of military unit L-0279 demanded that the priest of the Kyiv Patriarchate conduct the service in the cathedral, since soldiers conscripted from Western Ukraine were serving in the unit. Those requests of the commander of the military unit were a violation of the Law of Ukraine on freedom of conscience and religious organisations.

266. On 1 June 2014, at 8.30 a.m., the duty unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for the Simferopol District received a message from Ivan Ivanovich Katkalo (date of birth and address provided) that Cossacks had arrived in the village of Perevalnoye; that they were near the church; that they were engaging in hooligan actions; and that they would not allow a priest of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to enter the premises of the church.

267. This communication was registered as no. 2563 on 1 June 2014. During the visit to the scene in the village of Perevalnoye it was established that the conflict had arisen as a result of the transfer of the church from the jurisdiction of the Kyiv Patriarchate to the jurisdiction of the church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the division of property located in the church. After collecting the material, those concerned were advised to apply to a court to resolve the matter. Subsequently, people dispersed. That event was recorded on video by journalists of the ITV channel of the “Republic of Crimea”.

268. In addition, on 1 June 2014 at 11.30 a.m., the duty unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for the Simferopol District received a message from Zhanna Leonidovna Alekseeva (date of birth and occupation provided), who claimed to have been beaten by unknown persons in the course of the above-mentioned conflict. The message was registered as no. 2571 on 1 June 2014.

269. These materials were considered jointly, but there was no criminal investigation (case file no. 2109 of 7 August 2014) by the prosecution.

270. The ambiguous impact of the activities of the UOC-KP on the socio‐political situation in Crimea should be noted. In fact, adherents of this church was mainly composed of citizens of Ukraine who had moved to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea from mainland Ukraine, most of them being military personnel and members of their families, while the indigenous Christian population of Crimea were parishioners of the Moscow Patriarchate Church. To date, the UOC-KP had carried out almost no socially significant activities, and the activity of its parishioners had sharply decreased to a minimal level. According to available information, the Spiritual Directorate of the UOC-KP in Crimea had not yet applied for registration in accordance with the current legislation, and this would entail the delegitimisation of the activities of the church on the territory of the Russian Federation and might subsequently be unreasonably used to accuse Russia of discrimination against the Ukrainian population of Crimea in the exercise of religious freedoms.

271. In addition, the authorities of the Russian Federation noted that the Department of the Crimean Diocese was a structural unit of the unrecognised UOC-KP, which had ceased to exist on 15 December 2018 after it had dissolved itself and joined the established Orthodox Church of Ukraine. On 14 December 2018 the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine deleted the registration of the Kyiv Patriarchate as a legal entity, and in January 2019 it cancelled the order for registration of the Charter of the Department of the Crimean Diocese of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Its parishes were to be transferred to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Thus, the legal status of this religious organisation was unclear, since it had been liquidated in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine and had not been registered in accordance with Russian legislation.

(e) On the absence of any restrictions on the activities of non-Russian media in the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” (Article 10 of the Convention)

272. Section 6 of Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ established a transitional period until 1 January 2015, during which the issues relating to the integration of the new constituent entities of the Russian Federation into the economic, financial, credit and legal systems of the Russian Federation were to be regulated.

273. Following the admission of the “Republic of Crimea” into the Russian Federation, Roskomnadzor had taken various measures since spring 2014 to clarify provisions of the current legislation of the Russian Federation in the field of mass communications.

274. Federal Law no. 402-FZ of 1 December 2014 on the peculiarities of legal regulation of relations in the field of mass media in connection with the admission of the “Republic of Crimea” to the Russian Federation and the formation of new constituent entities within the Russian Federation – the “Republic of Crimea” and “Federal City of Sevastopol”, extended the transitional period for issuing relevant documents in the field of mass communications until 1 April 2015.

275. Chapter 25.3, “State Duties”, of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation regarding the collection of State duties in the field of registration of mass media in the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol” had not applied until 1 January 2015. Accordingly, the provision of public services in the field of mass communications had been carried out at no cost in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on the mass media.

276. At the same time, the legislation had not restricted the provision of public services in the field of mass communications in the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” and the City of Sevastopol after the transitional period. The provision of public services in the field of mass communications was carried out in accordance with the current legislation, with the application of the provisions of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation.

277. Under section 12.2 of Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ, until 1 June 2015 legal entities had the opportunity to carry out television and radio broadcasting in the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” and the City of Sevastopol without a licence issued in accordance with the established procedure by Roskomnadzor.

278. To obtain a broadcasting license, it was first necessary to register a media outlet and obtain a universal licence, and then to renew the broadcasting licence in connection with the allocation of radio frequencies and the provision of information about specific radio frequencies.

279. The procedure for obtaining and renewing broadcasting licenses was determined by the Law of the Russian Federation no. 2124-1 on mass media of 27 December 1991, Federal Law of 4 May 2011 no. 99-FZ on licensing of certain types of activities, and Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation no. 25 of 26 January 2012 on the allocation of specific radio frequencies for broadcasting using a limited radio frequency resource (terrestrial broadcasting, satellite broadcasting), holding a tender, charging a one-time payment for the right to carry out terrestrial broadcasting, satellite broadcasting using specific radio frequencies and invalidation of certain acts of the Government of the Russian Federation.

280. The allocation of specific radio frequencies for terrestrial analogue television broadcasting, terrestrial analogue broadcasting in administrative centres (capitals) of constituent entities of the Russian Federation and/or cities with a population of 100,000 or more people was carried out by Roskomnadzor on the basis of the results of a bidding procedure held in the form of a tender, in accordance with the Regulations on the tender for the right to carry out terrestrial broadcasting and satellite broadcasting using specific radio frequencies, approved by Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation no. 25 of 26 January 2012.

281. Terrestrial broadcasting was carried out on the basis of an appropriate licence and permission to use radio frequencies, issued by the bodies of Roskomnadzor. To carry out terrestrial broadcasting on the territory of the Russian Federation and the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, which included the “Republic of Crimea”, it was necessary, firstly, to have a broadcasting licence issued by the bodies of Roskomnadzor. Secondly, the broadcasting of television channels was carried out by transmitting a radio frequency signal from the source (television centre, mast transmitting antenna, and so on) to the receiving device (television receiver); in other words, for broadcasting in Crimea, television channels needed to obtain permission to use radio frequencies, which were also issued by the bodies of Roskomnadzor. Thus, for terrestrial broadcasting of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar television channels on the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” it was necessary to register and obtain a licence, as well as to obtain permission to use radio frequencies in accordance with the legislation of the “Republic of Crimea” and the legislation of the Russian Federation, in particular Federal Law no. 99-FZ of 4 May 2011 on licensing of certain types of activities and Federal Law no. 2124-1 on mass media of 27 December 1991.

282. Meanwhile, the population of the Crimean peninsula also had free access to broadcasting of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar television channels via satellite and cable television, IP television and the internet information and telecommunications network.

283. According to the information provided by the State Council of the “Republic of Crimea”, the Chernomorskaya Television and Radio Company had not amended its constituent documents in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation; it had not applied to register in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities and had failed to acquire the status of a branch. Accordingly, on the basis of Federal Law no. 506-FZ of 31 December 2014 on amendments to section 19 of the Federal Law on the enactment of Part One of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, from 1 March 2015 it had not been entitled to operate on the territory of the Russian Federation, including the territory of the “Republic of Crimea”, and had been subject to liquidation. Chemomorskaya Television and Radio Company had ceased the broadcasting of television programmes on 5 August 2014 following a decision of the Economic Court of the “Republic of Crimea” (at present the Arbitration Court of the “Republic of Crimea”) (case no. A83-112/2014) on a claim by the Radio and Television Transmitting Centre of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea for a debt.

284. The newspaper Avdet (certificate KM no. 232 of 3 January 1996) had been established and had been published by the BO “Fund Crimea” since 15 July 1990. The editorial office of the newspaper was located at: 2/27 Schmidta/Naberezhnaya Street, Simferopol, in premises owned by BO “Fund Crimea”, without any contract of lease or governing the use of property.

285. Pursuant to section 8(2) of the Law on Mass Media, an editorial office of a mass media outlet needed to register in order to operate. To register a media outlet, the founder needed to lodge with the registration authority an application that met the requirements of section 10(1) of the Law on Mass Media. The application should be accompanied by the documents listed in Decree no. 1107 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 16 October 2015 on approval of the list of documents indicating compliance by the founders (participants) of the media, media outlets, organisations (legal entities) performing broadcasting, with the requirements of section 19.1 of the Law on Mass Media, and Order no. 1752-r of the Government of the Russian Federation of 6 October 2011 on approval of the list of documents attached by an applicant to an application for registration (making amendments to the record of registration) of a mass media outlet.

286. By virtue of section 13(2) of the Law on Mass Media, if the application and the documents attached thereto did not meet the requirements of that Law and secondary legislation, they were to be returned to the applicant without consideration, with an indication of the grounds for their return. After any deficiencies were rectified, the application was accepted for consideration. Thus, it was sufficient for the claimant to eliminate the flaws in the application and the attached documents and to reapply to the registration authority. It should be noted that this procedure was quite standard and it was applied throughout the territory of the Russian Federation, without exception, and did not apply exclusively to Crimean or Crimean Tatar media outlets.

287. According to Roskomnadzor, applications for registration of the Avdet newspaper had been received on 2 December 2014 and 14 January 2015 by the Department of Roskomnadzor for the “Republic of Crimea” and Sevastopol. In accordance with the applicable provisions on public service, applications for registration of the mass media outlet were returned without consideration. In the period from 2 December 2014 to 1 July 2019, no other applications for registration (re-registration) of the Avdet newspaper had been submitted to Roskomnadzor. The Avdet newspaper was not subject to any enforcement nor had there been any court ruling for its suspension or prohibition of its activities, use of property or any of its premises. The prosecutor's office of the Republic had not received any complaints about actions of the officials of the law-enforcement agencies Inter-district Department of Bailiffs for the Execution of Special Enforcement Proceedings of the Department of the Federal Bailiff Service for the “Republic of Crimea”.

288. As regards the Crimean Tatar television channels ATR T and Lale and the radio station Meydan, according to the available information, the Department of Roskomnadzor for the “Republic of Crimea” and the City of Sevastopol had repeatedly considered applications for their registration in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, after which the documents had been returned to them because of multiple errors. In the official replies from the territorial division of Roskomnadzor, the claimants were clearly informed of the grounds of the decisions and were provided with specific recommendations for rectification.

289. The mass media outlets previously operating in the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” operated on the basis of licences issued by the official bodies of Ukraine. Subsequently, the legislation of the Russian Federation required the acquisition of a Russian licence, in connection with which, in November 2014, the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation had decided to extend the transitional period for Crimean media outlets until 1 April 2015.

290. Accordingly, there was every reason to believe that the ATR T television channel, the Meydan 102.7 RM radio station and the Lale television channel had had sufficient time before 1 April 2015 to bring their constituent documents into line with the requirements of the current legislation.

291. Furthermore, those media outlets were independent commercial projects of a private individual and were not owned by the municipal or republican authorities. The activities of the television channels and radio stations were financed from their own financial sources without the support of the State or municipal budget. Accordingly, the owner of those media outlets had independently decided to stop broadcasting. On 31 March 2015 E.R. Islyamova, Director General of LLC Atlant-SV Television Company, had sent a letter of her own volition to the Directorate of the RTPC RK with a request to tum off the transmitters of the ATR T and Lale television channels and the Meydan 102.7 RM radio station from midnight on 1 April 2015. Consequently, the broadcasting of these media outlets was discontinued.

292. In addition, according to Roskomnadzor, those outlets were not the only Crimean Tatar television channels and radio stations in the “Republic of Crimea”. When they were closed, according to data from Roskomnadzor, there had been more than twenty registered mass media outlets in the “Republic of Crimea” in the Crimean Tatar language, including five television channels, eight radio channels and more than ten periodicals. Also, other television channels were broadcasting on the territory of Crimea, having submitted the relevant documents provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation for television and radio broadcasting. It should be noted that during the same period 207 media outlets, which had obtained licences in accordance with the Ukrainian legislation, managed to register. Among them were the following Crimean Tatar media outlets: the newspapers Yany Dunya, Kyrym and Golos Kryma new, and the magazines Iyldyz and Armanchyk.

293. As regards the creation of a television channel for Crimean Tatars, the authorities of the Russian Federation submitted the following.

294. After termination of the activities of the ATR T and Lale television channels and the Meydan 102.7 RM radio station on the initiative of the owner, the authorities of the “Republic of Crimea” had supported the initiative of the Crimean Tatar community to establish a public Crimean Tatar television and radio company in Crimea, for which the necessary instructions had been given to the relevant ministries and departments.

295. In accordance with Order no. 291-r of the Council of Ministers of the “Republic of Crimea” of 2 April 2015, the State Autonomous Institution of the “Republic of Crimea” “Media Centre named after Ismail Gasprinsky” was established.

296. According to Decree no. 114-U of the Head of the “Republic of Crimea” S. Aksionov of 22 April 2015 on the Crimean Tatar Public TV and Radio Company, the task of this television and radio company was to provide deep and comprehensive coverage of the socio-political, economic and cultural life of the “Republic of Crimea”, events in the “Republic of Crimea” and beyond, mainly in the Crimean Tatar language, as well as the languages of national minorities of the “Republic of Crimea”.

297. By Order no. 507-r of the Council of Ministers of the “Republic of Crimea” of 9 June 2015, the Autonomous Non-Profit Organisation “Public Crimean Tatar TV and Radio Company” was established.

298. Moreover, the Crimean Tatar editorial office had been established and was actively working at ANO “TV Radio Company Krym”, as part of the department of national programmes, which created programmes about the history, culture and identity of the Crimean Tatars in their native Crimean Tatar language. The percentage of such programmes in the relative total broadcast volume of the Pervy Krymskiy Television and Radio Company was steadily growing.

299. The diversity of people living in the region required a balanced national policy, including in terms of meeting their spiritual and information needs. The State bodies of the Russian Federation and the “Republic of Crimea” paid great attention to the factor of inter-ethnic stability in the “Republic of Crimea”.

300. In accordance with Decree no. 268 of the President of the Russian Federation of 21 April 2014 on measures for the rehabilitation of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and State support for their revival and development, measures aimed at the national, cultural and spiritual revival of the peoples of Crimea, including the creation of information centres, expert councils on inter-ethnic issues and programmes for the national and cultural development of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol were developed, which received significant financial support from the State.

301. According to the Department of Roskomnadzor for the “Republic of Crimea” and the City of Sevastopol, more than twenty mass media outlets in the Crimean Tatar language in the Republic had been registered during the transitional period, including five television channels, eight radio channels and more than ten periodicals.

302. In accordance with Law no. 2124-1 of the Russian Federation of 27 December 1991 on Mass Media, all mass media outlets had equal opportunities for registration and for obtaining an operating licence. Decisions of Roskomnadzor were amenable to judicial review.

303. In addition, the internet resources Information Agency QHA (Crimean News Agency) and Centre for Investigative Journalism, as well as the Crimean Tatar newspaper Avdet were available on the internet. There had been no decision banning their broadcasting.

304. Since 1 September 2015 the Crimean Tatar television channel Millet, and since 6 February 2017, the Crimean Tatar radio station Vetan sedasy (“Voice of the Motherland”) had started broadcasting with the support of the authorities of the “Republic of Crimea”.

305. In a number of cities of the “Republic of Crimea” there had actually been no so-called “local radio stations” before Crimea's admission into the Russian Federation. In most cases, Kyiv radio stations, as holders of broadcasting licences, were retransmitted.

306. The respondent Government also referred to the rules on public bidding for obtaining licences for broadcasting and to eighteen pools for tender consideration launched by Roskomnadzor.

(f) Arguments about the absence of an administrative practice of prohibition of public events and gatherings, as well as unreasonable detention of the organizers of public events (Article 11 of the Convention)

307. In the interests of public order and national security, section 7 (Notification of a public event) of the Federal Law on gatherings, meetings, demonstrations, marches and picketing (Law no. 54-FZ) required notification for holding public events. This required an agreement on the place and time of the event with an executive body of the Russian Federation or a local authority.

308. In judgment no. 4-P of 14 February 2013, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation held, inter alia:

309. The organisers of the public events had failed to coordinate with the local authorities, which demonstrated their reluctance to resolve the disagreement regarding the place and/or time of the public events.

310. Section 5(5) of Law no. 54-FZ provided that a public event could not be held in the absence of a timely notification or if the place and (or) time of the event had not been agreed with the executive authority of the constituent entity of the Russian Federation or the local authority. The aim of such coordination was to ensure the uninterrupted functioning of vital facilities of communal or transport infrastructure, as well as to maintain public order and the safety of citizens, or for other similar reasons.

311. Section 16(3) of Federal Law no. 54-FZ provided that a public event would not be allowed in the event of non-compliance with section 5(4)(1) and section 7 of Law no. 54-FZ.

312. Furthermore, during a public event, its participants had to comply with all legal requirements (section 6(3) of Law no. 54-FZ). Under Russian law, holding a public event in contravention of those requirements constituted an administrative offence provided for by Article 20.2 of the Administrative Offence Code of the Russian Federation.

313. The rights and obligations of local government bodies in the “Republic of Crimea” were regulated by Federal Law no. 54-FZ of the Russian Federation of 19 June 2004. Regulatory legal instruments relating to public gatherings, meetings, demonstrations, marches and picketing were to be issued by the President of the Russian Federation or the government of the Russian Federation, and signed and issued by the State authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

314. Section 8(1.1), (2.2), (3) and (3.1) of Federal Law no. 54‐FZ provided that the executive bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation were to determine uniform areas which were specially designated or adapted for collective discussion of socially significant issues and manifestations of the public opinion, as well as for mass attendance by citizens for the public demonstration of public opinion on topical issues of a socio-political nature (hereinafter referred to as “specially designated areas”). The procedure for the use of these specially designated areas, their maximum occupancy and the maximum number of persons participating in public events of which notification was not required were to be established by the law of the constituent entity of the Russian Federation, and the specified maximum number could not be below one hundred people.

315. The law of each constituent entity of the Russian Federation additionally had to determine the places where gatherings, meetings, marches or demonstrations were prohibited, including situations where the holding of public events in such places could entail a malfunction of critical infrastructure, transport or social infrastructure or communications, interfere with the movement of pedestrians and/or means of transport or access of citizens to residential premises or means of transport or social infrastructure facilities.

316. The procedure for holding a public event in premises that constituted historical and cultural monuments was to be determined by an executive authority of the relevant constituent entity of the Russian Federation, taking into account the specific features of such monuments and the requirements of this Federal Law.

317. The procedure for holding a public event at transport infrastructure facilities used for public transport was to be determined by the law of the constituent entity of the Russian Federation, taking into account the requirements of this Federal Law, as well as the requirements for ensuring transport and road traffic safety provided for by federal laws and other regulatory legal instruments.

318. Pursuant to the above provisions of Federal Law no. 54-FZ, on 8 August 2014 the State Council of the “Republic of Crimea” passed Law no. 56-ZRK of the “Republic of Crimea” on ensuring the conditions for the realisation of the right of citizens of the Russian Federation to hold gatherings, meetings, marches and picketing in the “Republic of Crimea”, signed by the Head of the “Republic of Crimea” on 21 August 2014.

319. This law was enacted on the basis of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Federal Law no. 54-FZ and the Constitution of the “Republic of Crimea”, and was aimed at ensuring the conditions for the exercise of the right of citizens of the Russian Federation within the jurisdiction of the “Republic of Crimea” to hold gatherings, meetings, demonstrations, marches and picketing.

320. It should be noted that the above law of the “Republic of Crimea” did not confer on local government bodies the right to restrict or prohibit peaceful gatherings. It established the procedure for submitting a notice to hold a public event; the special features of ensuring the rights of citizens, and transport and road traffic safety when organising and holding public events at transport infrastructure facilities; the procedure for using means of transport during public events; the requirements for the picketing procedure; the determination of specially designated areas and the procedure for their use; and the conditions for material, technical and organisational support for the public event.

321. Section 3(3) of this Law established that if a notice for a public event specified that it would be held on a carriageway of the transport infrastructure facility which was directly adjacent to another territory (pavement, park, any other territory), the local government body was entitled to propose that the organisers of the event hold it in the adjacent territory for the purposes of ensuring the movement of vehicles. If the public event was held in the territory directly adjacent to a transport infrastructure facility with a carriageway, the local government body was to ensure that the public event was held in the specified territory only.

322. At the same time, in accordance with section 12(3) of Federal Law no. 54-FZ, the executive authority of the constituent entity of the Russian Federation or the local government body could refuse permission for the holding of a public event only if the notice of the event was submitted by a person who, in accordance with this Federal Law, could not be the organiser of the public event, or if the notice indicated a place for the public event where the event was prohibited in accordance with this Federal Law or the law of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation.

323. In addition, local government bodies were entitled to determine the maximum occupancy of territories where the public event would take place, with the exception of the specially designated areas, individually for each public event, taking into account the size of the plot of land, its occupancy with greenery, buildings, structures and other conditions, using as a basis the possibility of the unimpeded presence of two people per square metre, including officials of internal affairs bodies ensuring public order, and representatives of the mass media.

324. The permissible maximum occupancy for a transport infrastructure facility which had several roadways was to be calculated in such a way that at least half of the roadways could be used for traffic, and, if necessary, for the movement of people not participating in the public event.

325. In discharging the above powers, the local government bodies should ensure regular and uninterrupted operation of vital points of the municipal or transport infrastructure, public order and security (both of participants in the public event and of others), or other public interests. Such powers could not be regarded as powers to restrict or prohibit peaceful gatherings. The only ground for refusal of the executive authority of the constituent entity of the Russian Federation or the local government body to approve a public event was established by Federal Law no. 54-FZ (see paragraph 322 above).

(g) On compliance with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention

326. On 17 March 2014 the National Council of the “Republic of Crimea” adopted Decree no. 1745-6/14 on the Independence of Crimea, by which all institutions, enterprises and other organisations, as well as property of Ukraine, were to be regarded, as of the day of adoption of the Decree, as property of the “Republic of Crimea” (Articles 5 and 6 of the Decree). The property of labour unions and other public organisations of Ukraine located on the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” on the date of the Decree were to be the property of subdivisions of the relevant organisations located in the “Republic of Crimea”, and if there were none - the state property of the “Republic of Crimea”.

327. Pursuant to section 12.1 of Federal Constitutional Law no. 6‐FKZ, prior to 1 January 2017, in the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol”, issues relating to the regulation of property, town-planning, land and forest relations, as well as relations in the sphere of cadastral registration of real estate and State registration of rights and transactions in respect of real estate could be established by the regulatory legal instruments of the “Republic of Crimea” and of the “Federal City of Sevastopol” in coordination with the federal executive body authorised to implement legal regulations in the relevant sphere.

328. Accordingly, the Russian Federation, using the right granted to it by Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, as well as the Constitution of the Russian Federation, had regulated property-related relations and property‐related issues in the “Republic of Crimea” by means of regulatory legal instruments of the “Republic of Crimea” in coordination with the federal executive body authorised to implement legal regulations in this sphere.

329. As regards the “transfer of immovable property into State ownership of the Republic of Crimea”, the respondent Government referred to an Agreement on Mutual Recognition of Rights and Regulation of Relations in Terms of Property signed on 15 January 1993 between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, which had provided (Article 1 of the Agreement) for mutual recognition of the transfer of title to all assets of enterprises on the party and in accordance with its national legislation where those assets had been located. This also concerned social facilities (such as healthcare resorts, preventive medicine and recreational centres, resort houses, recreational facilities, boarding guest houses, hotels and camping areas, tourist camps and children's recreational institutions (Article 4 of the Agreement)). Under Article 13 of the Agreement, the parties guaranteed that their property, legal entities and individuals would be legally protected. Such property could not be subject to compulsory expropriation, except in exceptional cases provided for by law and subject to the payment of compensation corresponding to the real value of the property. Under Article 11 of the Agreement, the legal status of assets of enterprises located in one party, but recognised as the property of the other party, was to be determined in accordance with the legislation of the former party and validated (by means of a protocol) by the competent bodies of both parties. Any property-related disputes were to be considered by a Russian-Ukrainian Commission. Accordingly, the relevant protocol on the ownership of assets located on the territory of Ukraine was to be drawn up and approved by the parties. No change of ownership could take place without both parties having approved such a protocol. When assets had become private, the protocols had not been executed. Accordingly, since 1991 State‐owned assets had been transferred into private ownership without any discussion by the Russian-Ukrainian Commission and approval by the parties concerned.

330. On 30 April 2014 the National Council adopted Resolution no. 2085-6/14 on the issues of property administration of the “Republic of Crimea”, according to which prior to the division of property between the Russian Federation, the “Republic of Crimea” and the municipalities, all State property and property without title located on the territory of the “Republic of Crimea”, as well as the property specified in an annex to that Resolution, was regarded as the property of the “Republic of Crimea”.

331. Section 2-1 of Law no. 38-ZRK of the “Republic of Crimea” of 31 July 2014 on the Peculiarities of Regulation of Property Relations in the Territory of the “Republic of Crimea” provided that the title of previous owners to land and other immovable property would be terminated and property transferred to the “Republic of Crimea” from the date of the inclusion of such property in the list of property regarded as property of the “Republic of Crimea”, specified in Resolution no. 2085-6/14.

332. Pursuant to section 8(2) of Federal Law no. 161-FZ of 14 November 2002 on State and municipal unitary enterprises, Articles 83 and 84 of the Constitution of the “Republic of Crimea”, section 28 and 41 of Law no. 5‐ZRK of the “Republic of Crimea” of 29 May 2014 on the system of executive bodies of State power of the “Republic of Crimea”, section 2 of Law no. 46-ZRK, Resolution no. 2085-6/14 and orders of the Council of Ministers of the “Republic of Crimea”, State enterprises of the “Republic of Crimea” were established, to which the property described in the previous paragraph was assigned.

333. Pursuant to section 19(9) of Federal Law no. 52-FZ of 21 December 1994 on the enactment of Part One of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, legal entities located in Crimea or in the “Federal City of Sevastopol” which did not bring their constituent acts into line with the legislation of the Russian Federation, did not seek registration in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities or did not acquire the status of a branch (representative office) of a foreign legal entity were not entitled to operate (except under certain circumstances) on the territory of the Russian Federation after the admission of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol into the Russian Federation and were to be liquidated.

334. By Resolution no. 1836-6/14 of 26 March 2014 on nationalisation of property of enterprises, institutions, and organisations of the agro-industrial complex located in the territory of the “Republic of Crimea”, adopted by the National Council of the “Republic of Crimea”, the property of the State enterprise “Educational and Research Poultry Breeding Plant named after Frunze of the National University of Biological Resources and Environmental Management of Ukraine” was nationalised. By Order no. 559‐r of 24 June 2014 of the Council of Ministers of the “Republic of Crimea” on determining the subordination of enterprises, institutions, organisations of the agro-industrial complex and other property owned by the “Republic of Crimea”, that enterprise was assigned to the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of the “Republic of Crimea”. By Order no. 1479‐r of 23 December 2014, the Council of Ministers of the “Republic of Crimea” established the State Unitary Enterprise of the “Republic of Crimea” “Educational and Experimental Poultry Breeding Plant named after Frunze”, which was assigned to manage immovable property owned by the State Enterprise “Educational and Research Poultry Breeding Plant named after Frunze of the National University of Biological Resources and Environmental Management of Ukraine”. On 9 February 2015 that enterprise was registered in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities and assigned to the Ministry of Agriculture of the “Republic of Crimea”. Accordingly, the applicant State's allegations about the unlawful seizure of the poultry breeding plant named after Frunze had not been confirmed. The allegations about unlawful seizure of the “Radiant” children's health camp in the village of Zaozemoye had not been submitted to the public prosecutor of the Republic.

335. Therefore, the State property of Ukraine had indeed been transferred to the “Republic of Crimea” and the City of Sevastopol. As for the property of labour union organisations, as of today, their property belonged to the subdivisions of the relevant labour union organisations which were located and were registered in the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” at the time of the declaration of independence of Crimea, and re-registered in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation as independent labour union organisations.

336. According to the information provided by the authorities of Sevastopol, on 17 March 2014 Sevastopol City Council adopted Resolution no. 7156 on the status of the Heroic City of Sevastopol, which did not provide for the transfer of property of labour union organisations and other public institutions into the State property of Sevastopol.

337. Under Resolution no. 260 of 6 May 2014 of the National Bank of Ukraine on the revocation and cancellation of banking licences and general licences for foreign-exchange transactions of certain banks and the closure by the banks of separate subdivisions located in the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, Ukrainian banks terminated the operation of their structural units located in Crimea and the “Federal City of Sevastopol”. After its adoption, a considerable number of Ukrainian banks ceased to fulfil their obligations to creditors and depositors and the National Bank of Ukraine failed to take any countermeasures.

338. Pursuant to section 7(2) of Federal Law no. 37-FZ of 2 April 2014 on the peculiarities of the functioning of the financial system of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol” for the transitional period, and having regard to the banks' inability to honour their obligations towards creditors (depositors), the Bank of Russia terminated the operation of the corresponding structural units of forty-five Ukrainian banks.

339. Reference was made to decision no. RN-33/11 of 26 May 2014, by which the Bank of Russia had terminated the relevant structural units of the Public Joint Stock Company “State Savings Bank of Ukraine” (JSC Oschadbank). Following the default of the separate structural units of JSC Oschadbank and CB PJSC “PRIV ATBANK”, the prosecutor's office of the “Republic of Crimea” lodged a claim against those banks. By rulings of the Kievskiy District Court of Simferopol of 29 May 2014 and the Central District Court of Simferopol of 4 June 2014, interim measures were taken in the form of a transfer of the property complex owned by JSC Oschadbank and PJSC CB “PRIVATBANK” into the trust management of the autonomous non-profit organisation “Depositors Protection Fund” established by the State Corporation “Deposit Insurance Agency” in order to meet the requirements of Federal Law no. 39-FZ of 2 April 2014 on protecting the interests of persons who have deposits in the banks and separate structural units of the banks registered and/or operating in the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol”. In the event that the Bank of Russia terminated the structural units of a bank, the Fund was entitled to acquire the rights (claims) to the deposits and effect compensation payments to individuals. Compensation was to be paid by the Fund in the amount of 100% of the amount of the acquired rights (claims) to the credit institution, but not more than 700,000 Russian roubles (RUB) for all deposits (accounts) of a depositor opened before 2 April 2014 with a credit institution. Compensation not exceeding RUB 100,000 was to be made to the depositors of the following credit institutions: those having entered into bank account agreements or bank deposit agreements with a credit institution during the period from the date of entry into force of Federal Law no. 39‐FZ until the date of the decision of the Bank of Russia to terminate the separate structural units of such credit institution; those who had failed to submit the documents specified in section 7(5)(3) of Federal Law no. 39-FZ; and citizens of the Russian Federation who did not reside on the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” or of the “Federal City of Sevastopol”.

340. Moreover, Federal Law no. 39-FZ provided for a mechanism for making additional compensation payments to depositors who had the rights to credit institutions in an amount exceeding the compensation payment made (RUB 700,000).

341. Pursuant to section 4(11) of Federal Law no. 39-FZ (as amended by Federal Law no. 148-FZ) and in compliance with the statutory procedural rules provided for by the legislation of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol”, funds received as a result of the alienation of the State-owned property of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation were transferred to the Fund and used for the purpose of making compensation payments to the depositors. In order to satisfy the acquired rights over the deposits to the credit institutions previously operating in the “Crimean Federal District” (“CFD”), the Fund was entitled to apply methods not prohibited by law to protect its rights and interests as a creditor, including the right to seek provisional measures and/or enforcement measures against the property of Ukrainian banks whose structural units operated in Crimea and the “Federal City of Sevastopol”. The Fund had lodged claims with the arbitration courts of the CFD seeking to recover the rights (claims) assigned to the Fund. The latter had also sought a ban on the alienation by the banks of their property in the CFD.

342. According to the Fund, as of 11 June 2015, it had obtained power of attorney from 6,300 depositors to represent their interests in collecting outstanding debt from forty credit institutions; it had submitted before the courts of general jurisdiction 1,485 claims against credit institutions seeking to recover funds in favour of the depositors.

343. In accordance with section 3 of Federal Law no. 37-FZ, the Bank of Russia issued Order of the Bank of Russia no. OD-525 of 3 April 2014 on the submission of a request by the Bank of Russia to submit a register of obligations to creditors and depositors in accordance with the Federal Law on peculiarities of the functioning of the financial system of the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal City of Sevastopol” during the transitional period. However, banking activities had continued in Crimea and the “Federal City of Sevastopol” until 1 January 2015 notwithstanding the fact that the banks had not obtained the operating licence from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. The failure of Ukrainian banks to comply with Order no. OD‐525 was not a basis for the decision of the Bank of Russia to terminate the separate structural units of Ukrainian banks.

(h) On the absence of suppression of the Ukrainian language and persecution of students speaking the Ukrainian language in the schools of Crimea in violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention

344. Pursuant to section 14 of Federal Law no. 273-FZ of 26 December 2012 on Education in the Russian Federation, citizens of the Russian Federation had the right to receive primary, elementary and compulsory education in their native languages, as well as the right to study their native languages within the limits of the possibilities provided by the education system. Those rights were ensured by establishing the necessary number of relevant educational institutions, classes and groups, as well as by creating conditions for their operation.

345. In the 2014/15 academic year, fifty-four educational institutions of the “Republic of Crimea” had provided classes in the Ukrainian language, and sixty-two educational institutions had provided classes in the Crimean Tatar language.

346. At the same time, teaching and learning of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages could be carried out in these educational institutions on the basis of the parents' (or legal representatives') request.

347. No seizure of educational and methodological literature had been carried out in the educational institutions of the “Republic of Crimea” in 2014-2015. The educational institutions of the “Republic” used the textbooks from the register of the publications recommended by the Ministry of Enlightenment of the Russian Federation for use in the educational process.

348. There were 586 general educational institutions in the “Republic of Crimea” in the 2014/15 academic year, where 184,869 children studied. 1,990 students (1.1 %) studied in the Ukrainian language, 4,895 (2.7%) students studied in the Crimean Tatar language, and 177,984 (96.2%) students studied in the Russian language.

349. In the 2013/14 academic year, 12,694 (7.2%) students had studied in the Ukrainian language, 5,551 (3.1%) students studied in the Crimean Tatar language, and 158,174 (89.7%) students studied in the Russian language.

350. In the 2014/15 academic year, the Ukrainian language (39,150 students) and the Crimean Tatar language (21,420 students) had been studied within the framework of the implemented general educational programmes of the educational institution as a compulsory part of the curriculum, as an optional part of the curriculum, and within extracurricular activities.

351. There were currently fifteen general educational institutions providing teaching in the Crimean Tatar language in the “Republic of Crimea”. Of the seven Ukrainian teaching schools operating in the “Republic of Crimea” teaching in Ukrainian in the 2013/14 academic year, six continued to operate. At those schools, in addition to the classes studying in the Ukrainian language, classes studying in Russian were open.

352. In sum, classes studying in the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages were available at schools where the main language of instruction was Russian. Ukrainian language and literature and Crimean Tatar language and literature were studied using textbooks published in Ukraine as a teaching aid.

353. In 2015, at the request of the Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the “Republic of Crimea”, JSC Prosveshchenie Publishing House had received an order for the production of more than sixty textbooks in Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian for national schools.

354. Both employees of the publishing house and Crimean specialists had taken part in the preparation for publication and delivery of the textbooks for grades 1-9 on the main subjects for the 2015/16 academic year. In particular, the textbooks had been translated and edited by Crimean authorities, and the publishing house had been involved in the layout, printing and delivery of the books. In addition, the Tatar Book Publishing House (Kazan) had been involved in the development of the textbooks. The Prosveshchenie publishing house had already had a successful experience in publishing translated textbooks with the Tatar Book Publishing House.

355. In the 2014/15 academic year, there were eight classes (128 students) studying in Ukrainian and fourteen classes (227 students) studying in Russian in the municipal State educational institution “Yalta Educational Complex no. 15” in the urban district of Yalta of the “Republic of Crimea”. The Ukrainian language as a subject was studied by all students at the school.

356. Taking into account the community of students, in September 2014 three departments of the Ukrainian Philology Faculty (Ukrainian Linguistics, Culture of the Ukrainian Language and Theory and History of Ukrainian Literature) of the Tavria National University named after V.I. Vernadskyi had been united in the Ukrainian Philology Department as part of the Slavic Philology and Journalism Faculty.

357. Since January 2015 the Ukrainian Philology Department of the Slavic Philology and Journalism Faculty had been working as part of the Tavria Academy of the Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education “Crimea Federal University named after V.I. Vernadskyi”, and its teachers had trained the students in the major of “Ukrainian Language and Literature” and graduate students in the majors 10.02.03 “Slavic Languages (Ukrainian language)” and 10.01.03 “Literature of Foreign Countries and Peoples (Ukrainian literature)”.

358. Therefore, in the “Republic of Crimea”, at the Crimean Federal University, the conditions had been created for educational, methodological, scientific and research and cultural work majoring in the Ukrainian language and literature.

359. The textbooks of JSC Prosveshchenie Publishing House, delivered to the “Republic of Crimea” and the City of Sevastopol in 2014‐2015, provided a sufficiently comprehensive presentation of the issues of geography, history and culture of Ukraine and Crimea.

360. Ukrainian language and literature was taught by 673 teachers in the general educational institutions of the “Republic of Crimea” during the 2014/15 academic year. Supplementary vocational education under the professional retraining programme “Philology. Russian Language and Literature” was being undertaken by 564 teachers of Ukrainian language and literature.

361. In order to form the educational plan of an institution for the 2014/15 academic year, in May and June 2014 the head teachers of all (seventy-three in total) general educational institutions in the City of Sevastopol conducted a written survey of the parents relating to the wish and need to learn Ukrainian in the next academic year (2014/15). According to the results of the parents' survey, the Ukrainian language was studied in forty-seven general educational institutions of the city. In particular, the Ukrainian language was studied as a subject in nine educational institutions, as an additional course and as a subject in separate classes in nine educational institutions, as a club in three educational institutions and as an extracurricular course in twenty‐six educational institutions. In general, 15.2% of all students (grades 1‐11) studied Ukrainian in the city: 2.5% being students in grades 1-4, 9.8% being students in grades 5-9, and 2.9% being students in grades 10-11.

362. In the 2014/15 academic year, the Crimean Tatar language was studied in four general educational institutions of the city. In particular, the Crimean Tatar language was studied as a subject and an additional course in one educational institution (State budget educational institution secondary school no. 46), and was studied as an extracurricular course in three educational institutions (State budget educational institutions secondary schools nos. 47, 52, 55). This subject was studied by 281 children.

363. The students were provided with textbooks from among those included in the federal list of textbooks recommended for use in the implementation of the State-accredited educational programmes of primary and elementary education, as well as in compulsory general education.

364. According to the information provided by the authorities of Sevastopol, in the 2013/14 academic year, 280 teachers taught Ukrainian language and literature in the general educational institutions of the City of Sevastopol.

365. Of the 280 Ukrainian language and literature teachers who had been working the previous year, in the 2014/15 academic year sixty-one left their job, 113 worked in schools in the city in other teaching positions, nineteen were on maternity leave, one died (from secondary school no. 43) and eighty‐six taught Ukrainian. Of the language and literature teachers teaching Ukrainian, eight were listed as teachers of the Ukrainian language only, sixty‐five combined the position of teacher of the Ukrainian language with another specialist position (teacher of Russian language and literature – twenty-six, deputy head – seven, after-school teacher - seven, primary school teacher – five, English teacher – four, social teacher – four, facilitator – three, teacher of Sevastopol studies – two, teacher of the basics of religious cultures and secular ethics – two, club leader – two, fine arts teacher – one, teacher of world art culture – one, school librarian – one), and thirteen teachers combined the position of teacher of the Ukrainian language with two other positions.

366. Teachers of the Ukrainian language had been working in secondary professional and higher educational institutions in the 2013/14 academic year. Since 1 September 2014 thirteen teachers had left their job, and twenty‐two teachers were still employed. Of these, fifteen were working in other existing majors and seven people had completed advanced training courses.

(i) On compliance with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention as a result of establishing the state border line between the “Republic of Crimea” and Ukraine

367. Pursuant to section 27 of Law no. 4730-1 of the Russian Federation of 1 April 1993 on the State border line of the Russian Federation, State management in the field of protection and security of the State border line, as well as the organisation of the border guard service, was carried out by the federal executive body authorised in the field of security (the border authorities that protected and secured the State border were part of the Federal Security Service).

368. In accordance with section 3 of Federal Constitutional Law no. 6‐FKZ, the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” and the territory of the “Federal City of Sevastopol” was determined by the borders of the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” and the territory of the “Federal City of Sevastopol” which had existed on the date of the admission of the “Republic of Crimea” into the Russian Federation and the formation of new constituent entities.

369. The land border of the “Republic of Crimea” adjacent to the territory of Ukraine was the State border line of the Russian Federation.

370. Pursuant to section 1 of Law no. 4730-1 of the Russian Federation of 1 April 1993, the State border line of the Russian Federation was the line, and the vertical surface passing along that line, defining the limits of the State territory (land, water, subsoil and airspace) of the Russian Federation, that is, the geographical limit of the State sovereignty of the Russian Federation.

371. The protection of the State Border ensured the vital interests of the individual, society and the State on the State border within the border territory (the border zone, the Russian part of the waters of border rivers, lakes and other bodies of water, internal sea waters and the territorial seas of the Russian Federation, the checkpoints across the State border, as well as the territories of administrative districts and cities, healthcare resorts, specially protected natural areas, facilities and other territories adjacent to the State border, the border zone, the banks of the border rivers, lakes and other bodies water, sea coasts or checkpoints) and was carried out by all federal executive authorities in accordance with their powers as established by the legislation of the Russian Federation.

372. The protection of the State border was an integral part of the security of the State border and was carried out by the border authorities of the Federal Security Service within the border territory, by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the airspace and underwater environment and other forces (bodies) to ensure the security of the Russian Federation in the cases and in the manner determined by the legislation of the Russian Federation. Protection of the State border was carried out in order to prevent unlawful changes in the route of the State border, and to ensure compliance by individuals and legal entities with the regime of the State border, the border regime and the regime at the checkpoints across the State border.

373. The delimitation of the maritime areas of the Black and Azov Seas was carried out on the basis of the international treaties of the Russian Federation, and the rules and principles of international law.

(j) On the absence of an administrative practice of persecution on the Crimean Tatars in violation of Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4

374. The authorities of the Russian Federation stated that there were no signs of discrimination against the Crimean Tatars, Crimean activists, citizens of Ukraine, Ukrainian activists or journalists of the Ukrainian mass media in the investigation of criminal cases or in administrative proceedings.

375. According to available documents, in 2014 4,920 persons had been held criminally liable, of whom 3,694 (75%) were Russians, 527 (10.7%) were Ukrainians, 177 (3.6%) were Crimean Tatars and 250 (5.1 %) were Tatars.

376. In particular, 157 Russians (65.4%), 39 Ukrainians (16.3%), 8 Crimean Tatars (3.3%), and 17 Tatars (7.1%) had been held liable for particularly serious crimes. 818 Russians (75.1 %), 125 Ukrainians (11.9%), 37 Crimean Tatars (3.4%), and 55 Tatars (5.1%) had been held liable for serious crimes, 1,323 Russians (76.3%), 121 Ukrainians (10.4%), 52 Crimean Tatars (3%) and 91 Tatars (5.2%) had been held liable for moderately serious offences. 1,395 Russians (75%), 182 Ukrainians (9.8%), 80 Crimean Tatars (4.3%) and 87 Tatars (4.7%) had been held liable for minor offences.

377. Moreover, it had been established that in 2015 10,129 persons had been held criminally liable, of whom 7,954 (78.5%) were Russians, 764 (7.5%) were Ukrainians, 458 (4.5%) were Crimean Tatars and 478 (4.7%) were Tatars. 301 Russians (68.1%), 46 Ukrainians (10.4%), 43 Crimean Tatars (9.7%), and 16 Tatars (3.6%) were held liable for particularly serious crimes. 1,341 Russians (78%), 118 Ukrainians (6.9%), 71 Crimean Tatars (4.1 %) and 89 Tatars (5.1%) had been held liable for serious crimes; 2,849 Russians (81.1%), 241 Ukrainians (6.9%), 134 Crimean Tatars (3.8%) and 143 Tatars (4.1%) had been held liable for moderately serious offences. 3,467 Russians (77.7%), 359 Ukrainians (8.1%), 210 Crimean Tatars (4.7%) and 225 Tatars (5%) had been held liable for minor offences.

378. On 23 January 2015 the prosecutor's office of the Republic, pursuant to Article 37 § 2 (2) of the CCrPRF, had sent the case file to the Main Investigating Department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for the “Republic of Crimea” to resolve the issue of the criminal prosecution of E.E. Bariev, S.A. Kadyrov and A.M. Suleymanov, the coordinators of the organisation “Committee for the Protection of the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People” under Article 239 § 2 (establishment of a non-commercial organisation that infringes the personality and the rights of citizens) and Article 282 § 2 (incitement to hatred or enmity, as well as abasement of human dignity) of the CrCRF.

379. In the course of the investigation, it was established that on 17 January 2015, the 2nd All-Crimean Conference on the Protection of the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People had been held on the premises of the Marakand hotel complex, located at: 17 Vorovskogo Street, City of Simferopol, “Republic of Crimea”. E.E. Bariev, S.A. Kadyrov and A.M. Suleymanov were the organisers of and direct participants in the conference.

380. During the conference, E.E. Bariev, S.A. Kadyrov and A.M. Suleymanov, calling for actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, had appealed to the then President of Ukraine P.A. Poroshenko, the Secretary-General of the UN Ban Ki-moon and the President of Turkey R.T. Erdoğan with statements about the harassment of the Crimean Tatar population by the Russian Federation and the aggressive policy being pursued by the State authorities against non‐Slavic nationalities, as well as seeking their assistance in preventing young Crimean Tatars from being called up for service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

381. During the investigation, Mustafa Maushev, Kurtseit Abdulaev, Gulnara Seitumerova, Rishat Armametov and Kamil Kadurov and others had been questioned.

382. On 24 February 2015 the investigator of the Main Investigating Department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation in the “Republic of Crimea” made a decision to refuse to initiate a criminal case on the basis of Article 24 § 1 (2) of the CCrPRF.

383. The above-mentioned procedural decision had not been set aside.

384. As a result, criminal proceedings had not been initiated against E.E. Bariev, S.A. Kadyrov and A.M. Suleymanov for participating in the 2nd All‐Crimean Conference on the Protection of the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People.

(a) Persecution of Crimean Tatars

(b) Persecution of Euromaidan activists

409. Several active participants in the Euromaidan protests were arrested and eventually sentenced to terms of imprisonment.

(c) “Case of an activist” - Volodymyr Balukh

(d) “Internet cases”

(e) Cases of “Ukrainian saboteurs”

497. According to the applicant Government, several Ukrainian individuals, whom Russian propaganda described as “ruthless and despicable Ukrainian saboteurs”, were arrested in Crimea and charged with planning to undermine the economic security and defence capabilities of the Russian Federation, facing twelve to twenty years in prison. It is believed that the “saboteurs' case” was in fact designed to persuade Russians, Crimeans and Western countries that Ukraine had used its military to harm Russia and endanger civilians in Crimea. Similarly, Russian propaganda used the occasion to glorify the role of President Putin, who arrived at the scene to discuss “measures to protect the peninsula and its residents” from “Ukrainian terrorists”. Mr Yevhen Panov, Mr Andriy Zakhtey, Mr Redvan Suleymanov and Mr Volodymyr Prysych were arrested in August 2016. Mr Dmytro Dolgopolov and Ms Ganna Sukhonosova were arrested in September 2016. Mr Dmytro Shtyblikov, Mr Oleksiy Bessarabov, Mr Volodymyr Dudka, Mr Hlib Shabliy, Mr Oleksiy Stohniy and Mr Leonid Parkhomenko were arrested in November 2016.

498. The Russian media have published videos – fragments of operational recordings of the FSB – in which some of the “Ukrainian saboteurs” “confessed” to their crimes. According to the applicant Government, they had not had access to a lawyer and the recorded confessions had been made under torture.

(f) Persecution of Muslims

555. According to the applicant Government, the Muslims living in Crimea found themselves in a difficult situation after March 2014. The new Crimean authorities started conducting extensive searches and seizures of banned literature from Crimean Tatars, and a number of Crimean residents were fined under Article 20 § 29 of the CAORF (production and mass distribution of extremist material), while others were criminally prosecuted for alleged extremist activities.

556. Among the main targets of the authorities in Crimea were those being seen as being affiliated with Hizb ut-Tahrir, an organisation described by the applicant Government as follows:

557. Any ties with the Hizb ut-Tahrir organisation can trigger criminal convictions and heavy sentences, despite the lack of any single example of its involvement in the actual organisation of a terrorist act. The applicant Government referred to several incidents in this connection.

2. Facts of the case as submitted by the respondent Government

774. The facts as presented by the respondent Government are set out in this section and are drawn from their memorial submitted on 28 February 2022. The respondent Government's version of the facts contains references to different episodes of events which are set out separately. Following those submissions, the respondent Government have ceased to correspond or cooperate with the Court in any way.

(b) “The case of 26 February”

(c) Searches in the house of Mr M. Asaba, a Mejlis member, and the premises of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People and its newspaper Avdet as part of the investigation of the “3 May case”

799. On 3 May 2014, in the vicinity of the Armyansk border crossing point for individuals and vehicles (“Turetsky Val”), located at the 115th kilometre on the Kherson-Dzhankoy-Feodosiya-Kerch highway, at a distance of about 4 km to the north of the administrative boundary of Armyansk, (Krasnoperekopsky District of the “Republic of Crimea” of the Russian Federation), during a protest action relating to the prohibition on Mr Dzhemilev's entering the territory of the Russian Federation, an unidentified person used violence against an officer of the “Berkut” special police battalion.

800. On 4 May 2014 the “Investigative Department of Armyansk” initiated criminal case no. 2014687003 under Article 318 § 1 of the CrCRF (use of violence against a public official) in relation to the above-mentioned facts. On 1 July 2014 the Crimean investigative authorities initiated criminal cases no. 2014417030 and no. 2014417031 under Article 318 § 1 (use of violence against a public official) and Article 319 (public insult of a public official) of the CrCRF, for acts committed against officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs performing their official duties – namely, protecting the territory of the Russian Federation – on 3 May 2014 at the Armyansk checkpoint. The three criminal cases were joined into a single set of proceedings under no. 2014687003.

801. During the investigation, other instances of the use of violence against six officials of the “Berkut” special police battalion were identified, including five individuals being run over by a car driven by Mr R.A. Abdurakhmanov, Mr M.R. Abkerimov, Mr T.P. Smedlyaev, Mr E.Kh. Ebulisov and Mr E.M. Osmanov.

802. With a view to checking whether the actions of the five individuals had been coordinated and organised, home searches were envisaged at the places of residence of Mr E.E. Bariev and Mr M. Asaba. This investigative measure was triggered by a notification from the “Centre for Countering Extremism of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Crimea” on the possible involvement of Mr E.E. Bariev and Mr M. Asaba in the organisation of protest actions of 3 May 2014, as well as information that firearms and ammunition, items withdrawn from civilian circulation and items or literature of extremist nature might be stored in their homes.

803. On 3 September 2014 the “Kyiv District Court of Simferopol” authorised the home searches, which were eventually carried out on 16 September 2014.

804. During the investigation it was also established that representatives of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People had been involved in the organisation of the protest actions on 3 May 2014. Moreover, information was received from the “Crimean FSB Department” that weapons and ammunition, items withdrawn from civilian circulation, and items or literature of an extremist nature might be stored in the premises of the central office of the Mejlis. On the basis of those data and in order to assess whether the actions of the five individuals concerned had been coordinated and organised, the investigating authorities ordered a search at the premises of the Mejlis.

805. The search of the premises was carried on 16 September 2014. During the search, electronic media devices, photographic materials and documentation belonging to the Mejlis were seized.

806. On 6 February 2015 and 3 March 2015 the seized property was returned following its examination, except for the minutes of the meeting of the Mejlis held on 2 May 2014, which were important for the investigation. The holding of a peaceful gathering on 3 May 2014 in.support of Mr Dzhemilev, the spiritual leader of the Crimean Tatar people, was mentioned in those minutes, which showed that the Crimean Tatars were aware of the action in support of Mr Dzhemilev at the “Turetsky Val” checkpoint in Armyansk.

807. Neither the lawfulness nor the measures taken to enforce the search order were challenged.

(d) Criminal case against Aleksandr (Oleksandr) Kostenko

808. On 6 February 2015, the investigative authorities initiated criminal case no. 2015417005 against Mr A.F. Kostenko, on charges of intentional harm to health causing a short-term health disorder and based on ideological hatred and enmity (under Article 115 § 2 (b) of the CrCRF) and unlawful acquisition, transfer, sale, storage, transport or carrying of firearms, their main components and ammunition (under Article 222 § 1 of the CrCRF).

809. On 15 May 2015 the “Kyiv District Court of Simferopol” sentenced Mr Kostenko to four years and two months' imprisonment in a common-regime penal facility.

810. By a judgment of 26 August 2015, the “Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea” reduced the sentence to three years and eleven months' imprisonment.

811. On 24 February 2016 the Presidium of the “Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea”, hearing a cassation appeal, held that the criminal and criminal procedure laws had been breached and terminated the criminal proceedings in the part concerning the charges of unlawful acquisition and carrying of a component of a firearm, for lack of corpus delicti. It found Mr Kostenko guilty of storage of the main component of firearms, an offence under Article 222 § 1 of the CrCRF, and sentenced him to three year and six months' imprisonment. It upheld the conviction under Article 115 § 2 (b) of the CrCRF.

812. During the preliminary investigation, Mr Kostenko's lawyer lodged a complaint with the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, which was received on 28 April 2015. He argued that Mr Kostenko had been subjected to torture and physical violence by State officials (the governor of the Simferopol SIZO and an officer of the Crimean FSB) conducting the preliminary investigation while he had been placed in pre‐trial detention and incarcerated in the Simferopol SIZO.

813. The complaint was considered on 22 May 2015. On 25 May 2015 the investigative authorities refused to institute criminal proceedings against the SIZO governor for lack of the corpus delicti provided for in Article 286 § 3 (a) of the CrCRF (actions undertaken by a public official which clearly exceeded his or her authority and entailed a substantial violation of an individual's rights and lawful interests, committed with violence or the threat of violence). The prosecutor's office confirmed the lawfulness of the decision.

814. The materials collected concerning the Crimean FSB officer were transmitted for investigation to the Black Fleet military investigative authorities on 6 May 2015.

815. On 19 June 2015 Mr Kostenko's lawyer lodged a complaint with the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation against Ms Natalia Poklonskaya, the Prosecutor General of the “Republic of Crimea”, for incitement to hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity by a person acting in an official position (an offence under Article 282 § 2 (b) of the CrCRF).

816. On 29 July 2015 the investigator found that there were no elements indicating the commission of a crime by the Prosecutor General of the “Republic of Crimea”, and therefore there were no grounds for conducting a pre-investigation inquiry and initiating a criminal case. By a judgment of 24 September 2015, the “Kyiv District Court of Simferopol” upheld the investigator's decision.

(e) Criminal case against Ukrainian activists in Crimea (“Cherkasy case”)

817. On 15 June 2015 the Russian investigative authorities initiated criminal case no. 2015417083 on grounds of attempted murder with aggravating circumstances (an offence under Article 30 § 3 in.conjunction with Article 105 § 2 (a), (b), (f), (g) and (1) of the CrCRF).

818. During the preliminary investigation it was established that on 19 February 2014 at about 8 p.m., a group of unidentified persons had stopped a passenger bus transporting several tax police officers, on the Kyiv-Odesa highway in the vicinity of the village of Podobnoye in the Mankovsky district (Cherkasy Region, Ukraine). The unidentified persons were sharing the ideology of the Ukrainian radical nationalist organisations “Svoboda”, “Tryzub”, and “Right Sector”, were aiming to bring about the violent overthrow of the constitutional system of Ukraine and the executive authorities, and were displaying a feeling of political and ideological hatred and enmity towards the law-enforcement officers of Ukraine perceived as being the representatives of the legal authority. After finding out that the thirty-nine law-enforcement officials present in the bus had been sent to Kyiv, Ukraine, to carry out official activities for the protection of public order, the attackers had broken the windows of the bus and begun throwing Molotov cocktails inside the bus with the aim of killing the officials, actions which had caused them bodily injuries of various degrees of severity. When the officials managed to get out of the bus, the assailants had inflicted upon them numerous bodily injuries of various degrees of severity and shouted insults at them. After the assailants learnt that the victims were residents of Crimea and law-enforcement officers, their criminal activity had intensified, subjecting the victims to overt discrimination through violent torture, bullying, threats and humiliation with the infliction of bodily harm. The factual circumstances were confirmed by the statements of two witnesses.

819. On account of the fact that the victims of the offence were Russian citizens, and considering that a criminal case had not been opened in the territory of Ukraine, the initiation of the criminal proceedings by the Russian authorities was based on the provisions of Article 12 § 3 of the CrCRF, pursuant to which persons who have committed a crime outside the Russian Federation are subject to criminal liability where the offence committed by them is directed against citizens of the Russian Federation.

820. On 30 June 2016 a separate criminal case (no. 2016417071) was initiated on the grounds of intentional destruction of or damage to property (a crime under Article 167 § 2 of the CrCRF) regarding the bus which had been destroyed by fire during the events of 19 February 2014, causing significant damage to its owner. The case was joined to case no. 2015417083.

821. On 19 February 2018 the preliminary investigation was suspended under Article 208 § 1 (1) of the CCrPRF, that is, owing to the fact that the identity of a person to be charged with the crime had not been established.

(a) Substantive and temporal scope of the case determined at the admissibility stage

826. In its admissibility decision (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, § 238) the Court confined its examination to the applicant Government's specific allegations, as formulated in their memorial before the Grand Chamber, of an administrative practice adopted by the respondent State in or in respect of Crimea in violation of the Convention between 27 February 2014 and 26 August 2015 (“the period under consideration”). By asking the Court not to give a decision on any individual case in support of the alleged “pattern of violations”, the applicant Government had limited the scope of their complaint before the Court to the alleged administrative practice of human rights violations as such (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, §§ 260-63). The Court concluded that the allegations of an administrative practice were sufficiently clear and precise to merit a judicial examination. The only exception was the complaint about the “transfer of convicts to the territory of the Russian Federation”; in respect of which the Court decided to examine both the admissibility and the merits of that complaint and application no. 38334/18 at the same time as the merits stage in the present proceedings (ibid., § 446). Having regard to the substantive scope of the complaints, as delimited above, the Court held that any other allegations which the applicant Government had raised earlier, but had not maintained, either explicitly or by way of reference, in their memorial on admissibility, were to be regarded as not pursued by the applicant Government (ibid., §§ 246-48).

(b) Scope of the case at the merits stage

827. The Court reiterates that, according to its established case-law, the “case” now before the Grand Chamber is the application as it has been declared admissible. Furthermore, for the purposes of Article 32 of the Convention, the scope of a case “referred to” the Court in the exercise of the right of any High Contracting Party to refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party is determined by the applicant's complaint or “claim”. An applicant is not prevented from clarifying or elaborating upon his or her initial submissions during the Convention proceedings. The Court has to take account not only of the original application, but also of the additional documents intended to supplement the latter by eliminating any initial omissions or obscurities (see, mutatis mutandis, Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 122-25, 20 March 2018).

828. Consequently, in so far as application no. 20958/14 is concerned, the Grand Chamber will confine its examination at the merits stage to “the case” as relinquished to it under Article 30 of the Convention and as delimited in the admissibility decision and described above (see, mutatis mutandis, Carême v. France (dec.), no. 7189/21, § 87, 9 April 2024).

829. In their written pleadings on the merits the applicant Government put forward a number of supplementary considerations under various Articles of the Convention, including:

1. - Article 3 (that “detainees were … also subject to conditions of detention which fell substantially below the standard required under Article 3” or that “the conditions in which detainees were kept by agents of the Russian State were contrary to Article 3”),

2. - Article 8 (forced revocation of an existing citizenship),

3. - Article 9 (regarding the re-registration of religious communities and failure of the Russian Federation to comply with its positive obligation to protect the freedom of religion);

4. - Article 10 (regarding “intimidation and harassments of journalists perceived as critical of the Russian occupation” and that “the Government of Russia entirely failed to discharge its positive obligation to create an enabling environment for the freedom of expression and to protect journalists from physical violence and threats thereof”);

5. - Article 11 (that “there has been an unjustifiable interference with … freedom of association”);

6. - Article 2 of Protocol No. 2 (“that the Russian Federation has wholly failed in its positive duty to protect the right to education”); and

7. - Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (deportation (expulsion) of inhabitants of Crimea for non-compliance with the “Russian legislation on migration” and failure to receive Russian citizenship, as well as “direct transfers of groups of individuals from Crimea”, such as “the so-called ‘Train of hope’ programme” initiated by Russia in 2014 concerning “transfer of orphans and children deprived of parental care from Crimea to the territory of Russia for their adoption by Russian citizens and subsequently their assimilation there”).

They also made reference to reports of NGOs and IGOs and witness evidence and allegations raised in some individual applications lodged with the Court.

830. The Court considers that the above additional submissions, which the applicant Government raised either in some of their pre-admissibility submissions, although they did not maintain them in their memorial before the Grand Chamber (see paragraphs 246-48 of the admissibility decision), or for the first time in their memorial on the merits of application no. 20958/14, are neither identical to the complaints that have been declared admissible nor could they be considered to concern particular aspects of those complaints. Inasmuch as they can be regarded as complaints within the meaning of the Court's established case-law (see Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, § 88, 1 June 2023, and Radomilja and Others, § 110, cited above), they relate to distinct requirements arising from the provisions relied on. Those submissions must accordingly be regarded as new complaints which do not fall within the scope of the case to be examined at the merits stage of the proceedings. It follows that the Grand Chamber cannot take cognisance of these additional submissions in its examination of the merits of the present case. It will therefore limit its examination to those aspects of the complaints which were declared admissible (see, mutatis mutandis, Denis and Irvine v. Belgium [GC], nos. 62819/17 and 63921/17, §§ 110 and 111, 1 June 2021).

831. On the other hand, the Grand Chamber considers that the submissions regarding the “intimidation and harassments of journalists perceived as critical of the Russian occupation” are to be regarded an aspect of the complaint under Article 10 of the Convention that was declared admissible in the decision of 16 December 2020. This aspect will therefore be examined under the relevant heading below (see §§ 1078-1104 below).

(a) Subject-matter of the application

832. The applicant Government complained that the respondent State was responsible for administrative practices amounting to violations of a continuous nature of numerous rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. In their application form submitted on 10 August 2018, the applicant Government outlined their case as follows:

833. In their memorial of 30 January 2023, the applicant Government emphasised that the respondent Government had continued to perpetrate the administrative practices of unlawful arrests and systematic violations of the rights of Ukrainian civil and political activists. They referred in support of their allegation to a list drawn up by the Ukrainian Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories listing 203 individuals detained “on the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and on the territory of the Russian Federation” recognised as being “political prisoners” (A 454).

(b) Pursuance of the claims

834. The Court observes that, after it gave its admissibility decision on 16 December 2020 in.application no. 20958/14, the parties were invited to answer questions pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation regarding the events referred to in the application form, the admissibility of the complaints and whether there had been a violation of the various provisions of the Convention relied on by the Ukrainian Government (see paragraph 14 above).

835. In so far as application no. 38334/18 was concerned, the Court notes that, in their memorial of 28 February 2022, the Ukrainian Government stated the following:

836. In addition, both in the above-mentioned memorial and in the memorial submitted on 30 January 2023 in.the second round of observations, the applicant Government explicitly referred to some precise underlying facts and evidential materials set out in application no. 38334/18 in.setting out their arguments relating to the complaints overlapping (in part) with those raised in the original application no. 20958/14. The Court will take these facts and materials into account for both applications inasmuch as they support the existence of the administrative practices alleged by the applicant Government.

837. In view of the above, the Court takes note of the applicant Government's wish to pursue their claims as set out in the application form submitted on 10 August 2018 within the framework of application no. 38334/18 and developed in their subsequent memorials.

(c) Object of the application

838. As to the object of the application, the Court underlines that the applicant Government maintained that their application before the Court concerned “the administrative practice of State-sanctioned policy of persecution of Ukrainians”, referred to by the applicant Government as “political prisoners”, and “Russia's tolerance of and indeed instigation of their human rights violations”. The specific allegations made by the applicant Government against the Russian Federation thus focus on the existence of administrative practices of violations of the Convention. These allegations refer to events unfolding after March 2014.

839. The Court notes that, in support of their claims, the applicant Government provided information and/or submitted evidential material in respect of about eighty Ukrainian nationals. However, they explained that the information and material referred to in the application form was provided as evidence of “an administrative practice of persecution of Ukrainians in the occupied territory of Ukraine (Crimea and Donbas) and in Russia which enjoys official tolerance in Russia”, and expressly stated that they were not asking the Court to give a decision in each individual instance. The applicant Government added that the case had been brought before the Court “in order to prevent a continuation or recurrence of administrative practices and/or of such violations”.

840. As explained above (see paragraph 824), under Article 33 of the Convention, the Court has identified two basic categories of inter-State application : whereas one of the categories covers cases where the applicant State complains of violations by another Contracting Party of the basic human rights of one or more clearly identified or identifiable persons, the other category concerns cases raising general issues brought with a view to protecting the public order of Europe. In light of the position adopted by the applicant Government, the claims in application no. 38334/18 clearly fall into the second category of inter-State cases, regarding allegations of administrative practices in breach of the Convention. The concept of “administrative practice” assumes a particular relevance in such a case, as will be explained in more detail below, given both its close interrelationship with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (procedural admissibility), as applied to inter-State cases under Article 33 of the Convention, and its implications for the substantive admissibility of the “alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention” under the latter Article (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, §§ 260 and 263).

841. The Court also notes that individual applications pending before it have been lodged by several individuals referred to by the applicant Government in support of their application. Notice of most of these applications has been given to the Russian Government. In this connection, the Court emphasises that the applicant Government did not ask for a determination of the individual cases but only for them to be treated as evidence of an administrative practice (see paragraph 839 above). In these circumstances, the conclusions reached by the Court in the present judgment are not to be taken as prejudging the admissibility or merits of the individual applications in question.

(d) Extent of the complaints raised

842. The Court notes at the outset some incongruences in the presentation of the applicant Government's claims in the application form. Whereas in the “Introduction” section of the form the applicant Government alleged administrative practices “violating Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13 and 18 of the Convention”, under the heading “Violation of the Convention” they in fact referred to “Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 18 of the Convention”, thus mentioning for the first time Articles 9 and 14. Lastly, when they then set out their detailed allegations and arguments under the provisions of the Convention, the applicant Government only referred to complaints under Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 10, 11 and Article 18 in.conjunction with Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11 of the Convention. Next, the Court observes that, in their memorial of 28 February 2022, the applicant Government expressed no detailed and comprehensive position on the admissibility and the merits of the complaints in application no. 38334/18, but simply stated that they incorporated the application form and the evidence set out in the memorial (see paragraph 835 above). Nor have they presented any such position on that issue in their memorial of 30 January 2023.

843. Against this background, the Court reiterates that the complaints must contain all the parameters necessary for it to define the issue it will be called upon to examine, all the more so when the scope of application of an Article of the Convention is very broad, the Court's examination being necessarily delimited by the specific complaints submitted to it (see, for an example concerning Article 6 of the Convention, Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, § 104, 6 November 2018). Likewise, the Court can base its decision only on the facts complained about. Therefore, it is not sufficient that a violation of the Convention is said to be “evident” from the facts of the case or the applicant's submissions. Rather, the applicant must complain that a certain act or omission entailed a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto, in a manner which should not leave the Court to second-guess whether a certain complaint was raised or not. This means that the Court has no power to substitute itself for the applicant and formulate new complaints simply on the basis of the arguments and facts advanced (Grosam, cited above, §§ 90-91).

844. As a result, concerning application no. 38334/18, the Court observes the lack of any legal argumentation in the application form with respect to the complaints later raised under Articles 9, 13 and 14 of the Convention. It also bears in mind that the temporal scope of the violations alleged within the framework of the present application was defined in broad terms by the applicant Government who referred to their “continued nature” (see paragraph 832 above).

845. In view of the above, the Court will not examine the applicant Government's factual contentions which may theoretically come within the ambit of Articles 9, 13 and 14 of the Convention, as separate complaints in the framework of application no. 38334/18. In the Court's view, to proceed otherwise would be unduly extending its jurisdiction.

(a) The parties' submissions

(b) The Court's assessment

(a) Existing case-law

924. In Loizidou v. Turkey (cited above) the Court dealt with an argument by the respondent Government that the applicant's ownership of some land had been lost as a result of the operation of “Article 159 of the Constitution of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’” (“TRNC”), which purported to vest in the “TRNC” authorities, irreversibly and without payment of any compensation, the applicant's rights to her land in northern Cyprus. The relevant passages of that judgment read as follows.

925. In Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 11138/10, §§ 136-41, 23 February 2016), which concerned the events in the “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” (“MRT”), the Court summarised the general principles concerning the “lawfulness of acts adopted by unrecognised entities”. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:

926. Relying on the above principles, in Mozer (cited above, §§ 142-44) the Court reiterated that the primary concern must always be for Convention rights to be effectively protected throughout the territory of all Contracting Parties, even if a part of that territory was under the effective control of another Contracting Party. Accordingly, the decisions taken by the courts of an unrecognised entity could not automatically be regarded as unlawful purely because of the entity's unlawful nature and the fact that it was not internationally recognised. It further held that “when assessing whether the courts of an unrecognised entity satisfy the test established in Ilașcu and Others, namely whether they form ‘part of a judicial system operating on a “constitutional legal basis” … compatible with the Convention’, the Court will attach weight to the question whether they can be regarded as independent and impartial and are operating on the basis of the rule of law”. The Court further stated in Mozer:

927. The relevant findings in Ilaşcu and Others (cited above), referred to in Mozer, were as follows:

928. In the recent case of Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia (nos. 29999/04 and 41424/04, §§ 425-26, 440, 7 March 2023) the Court was unable to assess the conformity of the Abkhaz courts with the “constitutional and legal basis” requirement on account of the parties' failure to provide it with sufficient information on that matter and the absence of such information in the public domain. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that there had been no system in Abkhazia reflecting a judicial tradition compatible with the Convention. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows.

929. The examples of the Court's case-law set out above can be divided into two categories. On the one hand, in Loizidou v. Turkey (merits) the Court held that the acts (the Constitution) of the internationally unrecognised entity (the “TRNC”) had no legal validity. On the other hand, the remaining cases concerned the issue of lawfulness of the acts of such entities and whether they “reflect(ed) a judicial tradition compatible with the Convention”.

930. Whereas the Court held that “TRNC domestic law” was based on the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition and was therefore accepted as “law” for the purposes of the Convention, in cases concerning Transdniestria (the “MRT”), the Court found “no basis for assuming that [in the ‘MRT’] there is a system reflecting a judicial tradition compatible with the Convention similar to the one in the remainder of the Republic of Moldova”. The Court has reached similar conclusions regarding the “law” of Abkhazia and the “lawfulness” of Abkhaz courts.

(b) Considerations in favour of distinguishing the present case

931. The Court considers that the present case is to be distinguished from the above-mentioned cases for the following reasons: firstly, in none of those cases was the Court called upon to interpret the Convention in the light of the rules of IHL, as it is in the present case (see discussion above). Secondly, the above-mentioned cases did not directly deal with the issue of whether the law applied by the local or federal authorities (courts) giving rise to the complaints in question could be regarded as “law” within the meaning of the Convention. Thirdly, the “law” applied in the second category of cases was substantively different from the “law” applied in the present case.

932. Furthermore, whereas the above-mentioned cases concerned the “law” of internationally unrecognised entities, the present case concerns the application of Russian law and acts of the “Russian courts” operating in Crimea following the establishment of “effective control” over that territory. Moreover, while the “MRT” and Abkhaz-related cases concerned the “law” of unrecognised entities that did not reflect “a judicial tradition … similar to the one in the remainder of the Republic of Moldova” or “to the rest of Georgia” respectively, in Cyprus v. Turkey (merits) the Court held that “the civil courts operating in the 'TRNC' were in substance based on the Anglo‐Saxon tradition and were not essentially different from the courts operating before the events of 1974 and from those which existed in the southern part of Cyprus”. This particular aspect makes the latter case similar, yet different from the present case. The Cyprus v. Turkey case concerned the continued application of pre-existing Cypriot law valid in the territory of the “TRNC” before Turkey had obtained actual control of that territory, whereas the present case concerns the application in Crimea of the law of the Russian Federation (or the “law” of the local authorities, as its derivative) replacing the previously applicable and valid Ukrainian law.

933. Accordingly, this is the first case in which the Court has been called upon to determine whether the law of the Russian Federation, which served as a legal basis for the measures complained of, taken while the Russian Federation exercised extra-territorial jurisdiction over Crimea on account of effective control, can be regarded as “law” within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Convention.

934. The Court has confirmed above that IHL is to be taken into account in the present case. In this connection it considers it important to take note of the following relevant provisions of IHL.

935. The relevant provisions of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (The Hague, 18 October 1907; “the Hague Regulations”) are contained in Section II (“Hostilities”) and Section III (“Military authority over the territory of the hostile State”) and read as follows (the text below is a translation of the authentic French text of the 1907 Regulations). It is to be noted that according to IHL database of the ICRC available online, the Russian Federation ratified the Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex on 27 November 1909 and Ukraine acceded to it on 29 May 2015.

Article 23

Article 42

Article 43

936. The relevant provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 read as follows:

Article 47

Article 54

Article 64

Article 66

Article 154

937. The relevant extracts from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary, IV Geneva Convention p. 276 (ICRC, O.M. Uhler and H. Coursier eds., 1958, p. 276– read as follows:

Article 47 - Inviolability of rights

Article 54 - Judges and public officials

938. Accordingly, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations (A 53) imposes on the Occupying Power the obligation to respect the laws in force in the occupied territory “unless absolutely prevented” (“sauf empêchement absolu”). That means that the Occupying Power has to maintain the laws in force in the occupied territory (predating the occupation) and not modify or suspend or replace them with its own legislation. The pre-existing legal system can be modified only if “necessary” (wording used in Article 3 of the Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, 27 August 1874, on which Article 43 of the Hague Regulations was based).

939. Article 64 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention (A 43) expresses in a more precise and detailed form the terms of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and authoritatively explains the concept of “necessity”. It specifies that “penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force” and in this regard that “the tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all offences covered by the said laws”. However, it allows for the suspension or repeal of existing laws and the enactment of new legislation in the following exceptional situations: (i) the need of the Occupying Power to remove any direct threat to its security (and that of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them), (ii) the duty of the Occupying Power to discharge its duties under the Geneva Convention, and (iii) the necessity to ensure the “orderly government” of the occupied territory. The “orderly government” exception seems to be a more open-ended concept which becomes more prominent under conditions of prolonged occupation.

940. Relevant in this respect are the following extracts from the ICRC commentary on Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (see ICRC, Commentary, IV Geneva Convention, cited above, pp. 335-36).

941. Of further importance is Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which specifies that any institutional changes introduced by the Occupying Power must not deprive the protected persons in the occupied territory of any benefits conferred by that Convention.

942. It is in the light of these provisions of IHL that the Court should interpret the notion of lawfulness (“law”) under the Convention in the present case. The principal premise deriving from the rules of IHL is that, unless it can be justified by reference to one of the narrow exceptions recognised by IHL, the “repetition of acts” element of the administrative practice (defined as “an accumulation of identical or analogous breaches which are sufficiently numerous and interconnected not to amount to merely isolated incidents or exceptions but to a pattern or system”; see paragraph 261 of the admissibility decision) referred to under various of the Articles relied on can only be considered “lawful” or “in accordance with the law” in so far as it has its origin in Ukrainian law and not if it is based on Russian law, the law of the “occupier”.

943. The Court notes that the respondent Government neither adduced any evidence nor submitted any arguments regarding the applicability of IHL in general or its relevance to or impact on the application and validity of Russian law within Crimea. In fact, they made no reference at all to IHL nor did they directly invoke any of the exceptions set forth therein.

944. Even assuming that their reliance on “public order”, “national security” and the “safety of citizens” in the context of the complaints under Article 11 of the Convention (see paragraphs 307 and 310 above) is to be interpreted by reference to the requirements under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, the respondent Government provided no evidence or explanation capable of demonstrating that the Russian authorities had been “absolutely prevented” from achieving those aims on the basis of “the laws in force in the country”.

Similarly, the respondent Government submitted no argument (or evidence) that the replacement of Ukrainian legislation with that of the Russian Federation was necessary on the ground that the former represented “a threat to [the] security [of Crimea] or an obstacle to the application of the [Fourth Geneva] Convention”, as provided for in Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Whereas they confirmed that the measures complained of had a legal basis in Russian law, they did not explain why it had been necessary to replace the pre-existing Ukrainian law, as applied in Crimea, with the provisions of Russian law. Finally, no argument was made which could justify reliance on the power conferred on the Russian authorities by Article 64 § 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention to subject the population of Crimea to provisions of Russian law which were essential to enable them to fulfil their obligations under that Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Russian Federation, of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them.

A further element to be taken into consideration relates to the fact that what occurred in Crimea, certainly after 18 March 2014, was a general and wholesale replacement of Ukrainian law irrespective of the individual circumstances and potential needs of the existing population in Crimea, or the property, security forces or administration of the Russian Federation, or of the need to maintain the orderly government of the territory. Equally important are the fact that the respondent State applied Russian law immediately after signing the “Accession Treaty”, and also Crimea's admission, as a matter of Russian law, as a constituent part of the Russian Federation.

945. Accordingly, there is nothing to indicate that such a wholesale application of Russian law was consonant with the changing (social or other) needs of the local population. As stated in the ICRC's Commentary IV, Geneva Convention (cited above, p. 336), “the occupation authorities cannot abrogate or suspend the penal laws for any other reason – and not, in particular, merely to make it accord with their own legal conceptions”.

946. In such circumstances, the Court considers that, when the respondent State extended the application of its law to Crimea, it did so in contravention of the Convention, as interpreted in the light of IHL. Accordingly, Russian law cannot be regarded as “law” within the meaning of the Convention and any administrative practice based on that law cannot be regarded as “lawful” or “in accordance with the law”. The consequential effects of this conclusion will be outlined in more detail below and to the extent necessary in relation to each alleged violation, including the Article 6 complaint that the “court system” operating in Crimea during the period under consideration could not be regarded as “established by law”.

(a) The applicant Government

951. The applicant Government submitted that the respondent State had presided over an administrative practice in violation of both the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 2 of the Convention, construed in harmony with the applicable rules of IHL, namely the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.

952. The victims of the alleged disappearances were overwhelmingly ethnic Ukrainian or Tatar and/or were opponents or perceived opponents of the Russian “occupation”. They were sufficiently numerous and interconnected to amount to a pattern or system carried out predominantly by members of the “Crimean Self-Defence Forces”. At the oral hearing of 13 December 2023, in reply to questions put by judges, the applicant Government maintained that there were forty-three cases of enforced disappearances (thirty-nine men and four women) of whom eleven persons were still missing. According to them, any unacknowledged detention was a life‐threatening circumstance that entailed a risk of death sufficient to engage the applicability of Article 2 of the Convention. In their view, all the circumstances of the case, and not just strictly the number of individual instances, were to be taken into account in the assessment of whether there were sufficiently numerous examples to disclose a pattern. In this connection they referred to the time, place and motives behind the alleged pattern. They urged the Court to acknowledge that the respondent State had put in place a pattern aimed at occupying part of the sovereign territory of another State with a view to suppressing the civil rights of its opponents.

With respect to the “official tolerance” element of an administrative practice, the applicant Government referred to paragraph 402 of the admissibility decision, in which the Court had referred to the public statement by President Putin that “the Russian servicemen did back the Crimean self‐defence forces”; the fact that in April 2014 the members of the CSDF had been awarded medals “For the return of Crimea” by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, and that in June and July 2014 the Crimean Parliament had “endorsed a proposal to ‘legalise’ those forces through an act …”. These factors had led the OHCHR to conclude that the members of the CSDF “have been recognized as agents of the State” (paragraph 89 of the 2017 OHCHR Report). Subsequently, such disappearances had been perpetrated by agents of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and other Russian law-enforcement agencies, including the Police and the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation.

953. In any event, irrespective of whether the perpetrators were members of the CSDF, the FSB or any other organ of the Russian State, they had acted as an agent of the Russian Federation. At the oral hearing of 13 December 2023, the applicant Government added that the respondent State was responsible before the Court for the acts of its agents as well as those of their local subordinates. However, to date, no such perpetrator had been held accountable for any enforced disappearance in Crimea. That demonstrated a systemic and continuing failure by the Russian Federation to adequately address the allegations of enforced disappearances, in breach of its procedural obligation to investigate under Article 2. The result had been a state of impunity and bore the mark of a tacit or a secret State policy.

(b) The respondent Government

954. The respondent Government maintained in their submissions of February 2022 that the applicant Government's “abstract description of actions” could not be regarded as an “administrative practice”. Certain “episodes of alleged abductions or detention by unknown persons” referred to by the applicant Government could not prove the existence of the “repetition of acts” element of the administrative practice. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the authorities of the Russian Federation had been responsible for the alleged events. In addition, some allegations were vague and the alleged victims could not be identified. In some cases, the alleged victims of abduction had subsequently been found alive and well (reference was made to O. Filipov and A. Kalyan). As regards the alleged “official tolerance”, the respondent Government noted that in almost all reported cases there had been no real attempt on the part of the alleged victims to exhaust domestic remedies. Instead, in some cases they had refused to cooperate with the Russian investigating authorities. In the majority of other cases, the initial recourse to domestic remedies (if any) had been brief and formal and had not been accompanied by supporting evidence. These facts alone proved that the arguments of the Ukrainian authorities about “official tolerance” were mere speculation.

955. Similarly, there were insufficient elements to show that the authorities of the Russian Federation had refused to investigate the allegations and punish the perpetrators. The applicant Government had not referred to any examples where domestic remedies had been used unsuccessfully. In that connection the respondent Government referred to several instances of “effective measures taken by public authorities [in fulfilling] their obligations [under the Convention]” that concerned incidents in which individuals had been killed or had otherwise died (reference was made to R. Ametov, S. Karachevsky, and M. Ivanyuk).

(a) Relevant provisions of international law

956. The relevant provisions of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977 read as follows.

Article 32 - General principle

Article 33 - Missing persons

957. Under Rule 98 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law study by the ICRC, enforced disappearance is prohibited.

958. Having regard to the complaints raised in the present case, there is no conflict between Article 2 of the Convention and the rules of international humanitarian law (see Georgia v. Russia (II), cited above, § 199).

(b) General principles in the Court's case-law

959. The Court has addressed the issue of “enforced disappearance” under Article 2 in.a number of judgments. In Varnava and Others v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 16064/90 and 8 others, § 148, ECHR 2009), in the context of the procedural obligation under Article 2 to carry out an effective investigation, the Court gave a definition of the notion of “disappearance”:

960. This “presumption of death” has been held to be the crucial element that distinguishes the “disappearance” phenomenon from a mere irregular detention in violation of Article 5. In Timurtaş v. Turkey (no. 23531/94, §§ 82 and 83, ECHR 2000-VI) the Court held:

961. Furthermore, in Medova v. Russia (no. 25385/04, § 90, 15 January 2009), the Court held:

962. Similarly, in the context of cases decided in relation to the conflict in Chechnya, the Court has concluded that when a person is detained by unidentified servicemen without any subsequent acknowledgement of detention, this can be regarded as life-threatening (see Baysayeva v. Russia, no. 74237/01, § 119, 5 April 2007, and Beksultanova v. Russia, no. 31564/07, § 83, 27 September 2011).

963. The Court further refers to the general principles regarding the procedural obligation to carry out an effective investigation under Article 2 as recently summarised in Georgia v. Russia (II) (cited above, § 326).

(c) Application of the above principles to the facts of the present case

964. In paragraph 404 of the admissibility decision, the Court concluded, on the basis of the available evidence at the time, that, on the whole, there was sufficient prima facie evidence of the alleged administrative practice of enforced disappearances during the period under consideration. In their memorial on the merits, the applicant Government mainly referred to the information contained in the 2017 and 2018 OHCHR reports and its 2021 Briefing Paper. A further source of relevant information for the allegations under this head is the letter from the Ukrainian Prosecutor's Office of 10 January 2023 sent to the Government Agent of the applicant State for the purposes of the present case. No witness evidence was provided which contained any relevant information for consideration of the allegations under this head.

965. The 2017 OHCHR Report, relying on Article 2 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, indicated (in paragraph 99; A 102):

It further noted the following:

966. The 2018 OHCHR Report stated the following:

967. The OHCHR HRMMU Briefing Paper of 2021 noted that since 2014 OHCHR had documented forty-three cases of disappearances in Crimea, of whom eleven persons (all men) remained missing and one man remained in detention. The vast majority of the disappearances documented by OHCHR took place in 2014 (twenty-eight), with an additional two disappearances in 2015, four in 2016, seven in 2017, and two in 2018. The first documented disappearance took place on 3 March 2014 and the most recent on 23 May 2018. Thirty victims were released but have not been provided with redress. Out of the eleven disappeared persons who remain missing, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation lists only seven as missing persons, with no mention of the remaining four. The Court has not been provided with any information to explain what prompted the Investigative Committee to assemble this list of missing person in Crimea. Alleged perpetrators comprised militia groups, such as the Crimean self‐defence and Cossack groups; agents of the Russian Federal Security Service; and other law‐enforcement authorities, including the Crimean police. No individual has been prosecuted in relation to any of the enforced disappearances.

968. On the basis of the above material, it can be concluded that during the period under consideration (between 27 February 2014 and 26 August 2015, thus falling within the temporal scope of the case), there were approximately thirty instances of disappearances. Furthermore, the Court is aware that, in the subsequent period, but not after 2018, there were further such instances. The total number of documented cases of disappearances between 2014 and 2018 was forty-three.

969. As reported by relevant international and national authorities (the reports of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe of September 2014 and April 2023, the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Representative of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Verkhovna Rada), the whereabouts and fate of some eight individuals abducted in the period under consideration referred to above still remain unknown (I.A. Dzhepparov, Dz.S. Isliamov, I.A. Bondarets, V.V. Vashchuk, V.V. Chernysh, T.D. Shaimardanov, S.S. Zinedinov and M.R. Arslan). Given the lapse of time since their abduction, these individuals can be presumed dead in the absence of any reliable news regarding their fate.

970. However, the Court does not consider that the overall examination of the complaint about the existence of an administrative practice of enforced disappearances in the present case is to be confined only to these individuals who remain unaccounted for. In the Court's view, the following factors are of particular importance even though the presumption of death applies only to those individuals: the overall context of a large number of instances of irregular deprivation of liberty and the relatively short period during which the abductions took place; based on the available evidence, the abductions were perpetrated either by the CSDF, the Cossacks, Russian Federation armed forces or by agents of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) – acts by any of these perpetrators entailed the responsibility of the respondent State irrespective of whether it exercised detailed control over their policies and actions (see Georgia v. Russia [GC] (II), cited above, § 200); the fact that the victims were predominantly pro-Ukrainian activists, journalists and Crimean Tatars who were perceived, as their common feature, as opponents to the events that had unfolded in Crimea at the time; the fact that the abductions followed a particular pattern and were used as a means to intimidate and persecute such individuals in the enforcement of a global strategy of the respondent State to suppress the existing opposition in Crimea to the Russian “occupation”. Some of these factors were referred to by the applicant Government in their oral pleadings (see paragraph 952 above). Due to their deliberate absence from the oral hearing, the respondent Government did not reply to those arguments (see paragraph 27 above). In the light of the above elements, the Court considers that during the period under consideration there were “sufficiently numerous” instances of abduction to amount to a pattern or system (“repetition of acts”). The phenomenon is to be considered in itself life-threatening so as to engage the applicability of Article 2 of the Convention as regards that administrative practice. This is the case regardless of the fact that most of those abducted were released soon after they had gone missing.

971. The evidential material further shows consistently that the prosecuting authorities of the respondent State did not carry out an effective investigation, if any investigation at all, into the incidents underlying the credible allegations made by relevant international organisations (and the Russian Ombudsperson) of an administrative practice of enforced disappearances. Furthermore, the respondent Government did not provide the Court with any information in this respect or with copies of any relevant case files which are in their exclusive possession.

972. The above-mentioned reluctance of the authorities of the respondent State to investigate the allegations under this head and to cooperate with the Court in the present proceedings further militate in favour of the existence of the “official tolerance” component of the administrative practice. Furthermore, the Court notes that the impugned “pattern or system” of enforced disappearances continued for several years after the period under consideration.

973. In such circumstances, the existence of an administrative practice under this head, relating to both the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 2, is established beyond reasonable doubt. Furthermore, there is sufficient evidential material to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the responsibility of the responsible State under the Convention is engaged.

974. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 2 on account of an administrative practice of enforced disappearances and the lack of an effective investigation into the alleged existence of such an administrative practice.

(a) The applicant Government

976. The applicant Government submitted that there was sufficient evidence of an administrative practice of inhuman and degrading treatment, torture and arbitrary deprivation of liberty contrary to Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, as interpreted in the context of the relevant IHL. Reference was made to several provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Additional Protocol I, and rules of customary IHL. The applicant Government recognised the conflict between Article 5 § 1 of the Convention and the relevant provisions of IHL in so far as Ukrainian military personnel detained “during the active phase of the occupation in the spring of March 2014” were concerned, in that the lawful grounds for detention under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, as read in light of the relevant provisions of IHL, did not preclude the detention of a member of the armed forces of a territory subject to belligerent “occupation” by another State (reference was made to Hassan, cited above, §§ 103-06).

977. According to the applicant Government, the evidence suggesting that victims were targeted on the basis of their perceived political affiliation, support for Ukrainian territorial integrity and/or ethnicity was indicative of a pattern or system of violations. As to “official tolerance”, they reiterated their arguments above (see paragraph 952 above) and also drew attention to the involvement of senior members of the Russian military in the negotiated release of persons from unlawful detention, where they had been subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.

(b) The respondent Government

978. In their memorial the respondent Government denied that there existed an administrative practice of ill-treatment and unlawful detention in Crimea. They stated that the applicant Government's allegations were vague and abstract and concerned “episodes of alleged abductions or detention by unknown persons”, which did not prove the existence of the element of “repetition of acts”. Furthermore, some alleged victims could not be identified, while others had denied the allegations during subsequent interrogation by the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation. Nothing in the material submitted by the applicant Government indicated a violation of Article 5 of the Convention and there was nothing to indicate that the authorities of the Russian Federation could have been responsible for the alleged events. The mere fact of detention did not mean that the restriction of liberty had been carried out in violation of the provisions of the Convention.

979. As regards the “official tolerance” element, they reiterated their arguments about the failure of the alleged victims to exhaust properly the available domestic remedies.

980. Furthermore, they argued that the actions of the Russian Federation in relation to R.B. Zeytullayev, R. Vaitov and Yu.(N).V. Primov could not be regarded as unlawful deprivation of liberty or as abduction. Their prosecution and conviction, as members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir organisation which was banned in Russia, had been aimed at protecting public order. That organisation was recognised as a terrorist organisation, since it aimed to eliminate non-Islamic governments and establish Islamic rule on a worldwide scale by re-establishing the “World Islamic Caliphate”. Besides the Russian Federation, it was prohibited in Germany, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, as well as in all Arab countries, except for the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon and Yemen, and in most Muslim States.

(a) Relevant international humanitarian law

981. The relevant IHL for the allegations under this head is contained in Articles 27, 32, 33 § 1, 34, 42 § 1, 43 and 78 §§ 1 and 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Article 75 of Additional Protocol I relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, and in rules of customary international law reflected in Rules 87 and 99 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law study by the ICRC (A 57 and 58).

982. Having regard to the complaints raised in the present case, there is no conflict between Article 3 of the Convention and the above-mentioned IHL, which provide in a general way that detainees are to be treated humanely.

983. There may, however, be a conflict between Article 5 of the Convention and the relevant IHL, as the Court stated in Hassan (cited above):

984. However, in the present case the situation is different from that in Hassan, given the fact that the respondent Government in the present case did not invoke the applicability of IHL. As stated in the extract from Hassan (cited above, § 107) reproduced in paragraph 913 above, “the provisions of Article 5 will be interpreted and applied in the light of the relevant IHL only where this is specifically pleaded by the respondent State”.

(b) General principles regarding Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention

985. The relevant passages from El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ([GC], no. 39630/09, ECHR 2012), in relation to Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, recently reiterated in Georgia v. Russia (II), cited above, §§ 240 and 241, read as follows:

(c) Application of the above principles to the facts of the present case

986. The Court notes that the 2017 OHCHR Report noted “multiple and grave [human rights] violations” “such as arbitrary arrests and detentions … ill-treatment and torture” which sometimes involved “elements of sexual violence. The victims were kept incommunicado, tied, blindfolded, beaten up, subjected to forced nudity, electrocuted through electric wires placed on their genitals, and threatened with rape with a soldering iron and wooden stick.” Such acts were committed by “members of the Crimean self-defence and various Cossack groups” “for a three-week period following the overthrow of Ukrainian authorities in Crimea” and by “representatives of the Crimean Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) and police” “following Crimea's temporary occupation, on 18 March 2014”. The report further noted that “most of [the documented multiple allegations of violations of the right to liberty] occurred in 2014”, and remained unaccounted for by the respondent State. In addition, the OHCHR noted that “in March 2014 … at least 21 persons” had been held incommunicado and that “documented multiple allegations of violations of the right to liberty … attributed to agents of the Russian Federation authorities … would usually last from several hours to several days, exceeding the legal limits for temporary detention and ignoring procedural requirements, such as the establishment of a protocol of arrest. Many of the victims were journalists … members of the Crimean Tatar community … The victims included pro‐Ukrainian and Maidan activists, journalists, Crimean Tatars and former and active Ukrainian servicemen” (see paragraphs 11 and 85-101 of the 2017 OHCHR Report). The multiplicity of instances of abductions is a further element in this respect.

987. Similar findings have been made by other IGOs, such as the relevant UN Committees (see paragraphs A 62), the Commissioner's report 2014 (see paragraphs 30 and 34 of the report), the 2014 report of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) (see paragraphs 120 and 132 of the report, which refer to a “disturbing pattern of [human rights] violations”; A 73 and 107), as well as by NGOs (IPHR's report of 2016, §§ 114-19), the 2017 report by the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union and other; A 117 and 124).

988. The Court sees no reason for arriving at any different conclusion at the merits stage from those reached in its admissibility decision regarding the probative value of the information contained in the 2017 OHCHR Report and the Human Rights Watch Report (see paragraphs 381 and 385‐90 of the admissibility decision). It cannot discern any elements casting doubt on the objective factual reporting contained in the IGO's reports, which carry significant weight. Moreover, widespread reports of allegations of violations of the Convention are in themselves an element which should be taken into account in the overall assessment of evidence. However, the Court reiterates that it will reach its own conclusions, applying the relevant Convention standard of proof, by reference to the objective facts reported by these organisations rather than adopting the conclusions they reached (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, cited above, § 462).

989. The Court notes that the testimonies of witnesses and victims (journalists, pro-Ukrainian activists, Ukrainian military personnel) concerning alleged abduction, detention and ill-treatment, which on the face of it appear to be truthful and credible, are consistent with the information contained in the above reports. The concordance of the details of the allegations under this head given by the witnesses and the IGOs is significant. Many alleged victims provided first-hand information about their abduction by the “Crimean self-defence forces” (or “Berkut” forces and agents of Russian FSB) and the ill-treatment to which they had been subjected. Some of them confirmed having been guarded by Russian soldiers and “green men” with Russian flags on their uniforms. Their release was effected by “armed military men”, Russian soldiers and FSB agents. A similar account was provided by witnesses whose statements concerned alleged abduction and ill‐treatment of other persons (A 331, 355, 356, 367, 374, 377, 384, 387‐91, 393-97, 400-03, 408-10, 413, 416, 417, 423-27, 429 and 430, 433, 437 and 438, 440-42, 444). Of further evidential value is the documentary material provided by the Ukrainian prosecuting authorities (letter from the Prosecutor of Ukraine of 10 January 2023) regarding ongoing investigations (or trials) of alleged perpetrators (including some identified individuals who were members of the CSDF or of an illegally created law-enforcement agency) on account of numerous instances of abduction, unlawful detention and ill‐treatment of named individuals. This material further attests to the fact that “a large number of people” (around eighty), of whom many were Crimean Tatars, had been detained (A 154-70 and 182).

990. For their part, the respondent Government did not engage with the merits of the complaints under Article 3 besides reiterating their general observation from the admissibility stage (see paragraph 369 of the admissibility decision) that the applicant Government's allegations of an administrative practice under this head were vague and unclear. As regards the Article 5 allegations, they admitted to some abductions and instances when persons had been “stopped for a short conversation” (see paragraph 202 above), which indicates that the respondent State authorities were aware of those events, irrespective of who had been involved. Furthermore, they submitted no record of any of those instances although such material is in their exclusive possession, including records of detention of the three named individuals convicted of terrorism, for being members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an organisation prohibited under the Russian but not under the Ukrainian law. As regards the evidence relied upon by the applicant Government, the respondent Government neither raised any new arguments nor did they otherwise contest its credibility.

991. This prevents the Court from assessing the lawfulness of specific instances of deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. Neither did the respondent Government rely on the exceptions provided for under the relevant provisions of the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention (see paragraphs 938 and 939 above) allowing for the limited application of the “criminal law of the occupying power” under IHL. In the absence of any relevant records, the Court cannot speculate whether and to what extent the reliance on that part of Russian legislation in the given circumstances was justified under the relevant provisions of IHL. It considers it appropriate to draw the necessary inferences from the respondent Government's failure to engage with the arguments or the evidence.

992. In such circumstances, the Court is satisfied that it has sufficient evidence in its possession to enable it to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that there existed an accumulation of identical or analogous breaches of Articles 5 and/or 3 during the period under consideration which are sufficiently numerous and interconnected to amount to a pattern or system of ill-treatment and unlawful detention.

993. Furthermore, it appears from the available evidence that such acts were perpetrated directly by or with the cognisance of, either members of the Crimean self-defence forces, Cossack groups, the Crimean Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), the police or Russian servicemen.

994. As regards the “official tolerance” element of the alleged administrative practice, as defined in paragraph 948 above, the Court refers to the following findings in the admissibility decision, albeit in the context of Article 2, which are also relevant to the allegations under this head (see paragraphs 402, 403, 417 and 418 of the admissibility decision):

995. The Court finds no grounds to deviate from the above approach at the present stage of the proceedings, which, of course, requires a higher standard of proof than the prima facie threshold applicable at the admissibility stage (see paragraph 12 above). Following this approach, the Court considers that the available evidence is sufficient to enable it to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the “official tolerance” element of the administrative practice under this head is satisfied. This conclusion also follows from the failure of the respondent Government to provide convincing arguments, as well as their failure, as noted above, to adequately engage with the complaints under this head. The Court considers it appropriate to draw the necessary inferences from that failure (see paragraph 846 above).

996. Given the Court's findings as to the respondent State's jurisdiction in Crimea under Article 1 of the Convention, that State was also responsible for the actions of any of the perpetrators other than the Russian military personnel, without it being necessary to provide proof of “detailed control” in respect of each of their actions (see Georgia v. Russia (II), cited above, § 248).

997. Having regard to all those factors, the Court concludes that there was an administrative practice contrary to Article 3 of the Convention as regards the treatment to which Ukrainian soldiers, ethnic Ukrainians and Tatars, as well as journalists, were subjected and which caused them undeniable mental and physical suffering.

998. Furthermore, the Court concludes that there was an administrative practice contrary to Article 5 of the Convention on account of detention of those categories of persons during the period under consideration. In addition, and having regard to the above considerations regarding the “lawfulness” of the measures (see paragraphs 944 and 946 above), the practice complained of under this head was applied pursuant to the Russian law and cannot therefore in any event be regarded as “lawful” within the meaning of the Convention.

999. There has therefore been a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention.

(a) The applicant Government

1001. The applicant Government referred to section III of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Articles 64, 67 and 70) as relevant to the administration of justice in an occupied territory and maintained that it was against that background that the Court had to determine the question of the applicable “domestic law” for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Under IHL, any courts presiding over criminal cases on the territory of Crimea had to be established in accordance with the law of Ukraine and had to continue to apply the laws of Ukraine. The respondent Government had not demonstrated that the application of Russian law was justified under IHL.

1002. Consequently, they submitted that “since 24 March 2014 the courts in Crimea have not been ‘established by law’”. In their supplementary submissions, they argued that “at all material times, the local ‘court system’ set up by the Russian Federation in occupied Crimea lacked essential guarantees of independence and impartiality in the appointment of ‘judges’ and in the ‘administration of justice’, and were established in breach of applicable domestic and international law, such that these ‘courts’ cannot be considered as established in accordance with the law”. By operating such an illegitimate system, the Russian Federation had presided over a continuing pattern of violations of its obligation to secure the rights of the people of Crimea to a fair trial by an independent tribunal established by law under Article 6 § 1, interpreted in harmony with the relevant provisions of IHL. The regulatory nature of that practice was indicative of the requisite official tolerance.

(b) The respondent Government

1003. In their memorial the respondent Government submitted that the judicial system in Crimea had been set up and operated in accordance with the “Accession Treaty” and Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ, the Constitution and the relevant legislation of the Russian Federation. They contended that prior to the admission of Crimea to the Russian Federation, courts established in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine had operated in Crimea and the “Federal City of Sevastopol”.

1004. The following reference was made to section 23 of the Federal Constitutional Law:

1005. During the transitional period, a number of legislative instruments had been adopted “in a timely manner” to enable “the formation of the judicial system of the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation” and “to ensure the continuity of justice in the[se] territories”. In particular, reference was made to several Federal Constitutional Laws of 23 June 2014 of the Russian Federation that had served as a legal basis for establishing different federal courts in Crimea, their territorial jurisdiction and their rules of procedure. The respondent Government also referred to other federal laws of the Russian Federation that specified the procedure and requirements for appointment of judges (as to the latter, the general requirements provided for under the 1992 Act on the status of judges in the Russian Federation applied). The incumbent judges on the day of Crimea's admission into the Russian Federation enjoyed priority for being appointed in the courts of the Russian Federation established in those territories, if they had Russian nationality and complied with the other requirements for the post of judge. The Government maintained that during the transitional period and before the courts of the Russian Federation had been established, justice had been administered exclusively by judges or “persons replacing judges in these courts” who had Russian nationality. For that purpose, “immediate measures were taken to grant citizenship of the Russian Federation to judges who did not have it as of 21 March 2014”. The appointment of judges in those courts was carried out by the Higher Qualification Board of Judges of the Russian Federation.

1006. As of November 2014, judges of the federal courts had been appointed by the President of the Russian Federation, as provided for by Russian legislation. The respondent Government argued that the appointment of judges and the formation of the judicial system of the “Republic of Crimea” and “Federal City of Sevastopol” had been carried out in strict accordance with the Russian legislation. The Plenary of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation had set 26 December 2014 as the starting date of the operation of the newly established federal courts of the Russian Federation in Crimea.

1007. In view of the foregoing, the extension of the legislation of the Russian Federation to the territory of “the Republic of Crimea” and the establishment of courts in Crimea “on the basis of [that] law” was in full compliance with Article 6 of the Convention.

(a) elevant IHL

1008. The relevant provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 (in addition to Article 64, cited in paragraph 936 above), read as follows (A 45 and 46):

1009. Having regard to the complaints raised in the present case, there is no conflict between Article 6 of the Convention and either the above rules of IHL or Article 23(h) of the Hague Regulations (cited at paragraph 935 above).

(b) As to the merits of the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention

1010. The Court reiterates that, according to its settled case-law concerning Article 6 of the Convention, the phrase “established by law” covers not only the legal basis for the very existence of a “tribunal” but also the compliance by the court or tribunal with the particular rules that govern it and the composition of the bench in each case (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson ([GC], no. 26374/18, §§ 223 and 229, 1 December 2020). Accordingly, if a tribunal does not have jurisdiction to try a defendant in accordance with the provisions applicable under domestic law, it is not “established by law” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. Furthermore, a violation of the domestic legal provisions on the establishment and competence of judicial organs by a tribunal gives rise to a violation of Article 6 § 1 (see Jorgic v. Germany, no. 74613/01, §§ 64 and 65, ECHR 2007-III).

1011. In the present case, the Court is confronted with the question whether the courts operating in Crimea during the period under consideration can be regarded as tribunals “established by law” and in this respect, as argued above, the decisive issue is whether the domestic law by reference to which this question is to be answered was that of Ukraine or of the Russian Federation.

1012. As argued by the respondent Government, and not contested by the applicant Government, prior to the “admission of Crimea to the Russian Federation”, pre-existing courts established in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine continued to function in Crimea (see paragraph 1003 above). Neither party clarified whether during that time (27 February to 21 March 2014), the courts continued to apply both the substantive and procedural law of Ukraine. On the other hand, it is common ground between the parties that after “Crimea's admission” as a constituent part of the Russian Federation as a matter of Russian law, the judicial system in Crimea began to align with and integrate into that of the Russian Federation. From that date onwards, as asserted by the respondent Government and indicated in Article 9 § 1 of the “Accession Treaty”, the courts in Crimea applied Russian law (and local law that was not contrary to the Constitution and laws of the Russian Federation) (see paragraph 423 of the admissibility decision and paragraph 1004 above). The applicant Government also asserted that “since 24 March 2014 the courts in Crimea have not been ‘established by law’” (see paragraph 1008 above). The witness statement of A. Kushnova, judge of the District Administrative Court in Simferopol, which the respondent Government did not contest, is a further element attesting to that fact (A 419-21).

1013. Accordingly, in relation to the court system operating in Crimea prior to the enforcement of the “Accession Treaty”, signed on 18 March 2014 and ratified by the Russian State Duma on 21 March 2014, the Court cannot establish beyond reasonable doubt that this was not based on Ukrainian law, and accordingly, that it was not “established by law”.

1014. Regarding the “legality” of the judicial system functioning in Crimea after the “Accession Treaty”, the Court notes that the integration of the judicial system of Crimea into that of the Russian Federation was gradual and passed through an initial transitional period (between Crimea's admission, as a matter of Russian law, into the Russian Federation, and 1 January 2015) during which pre-existing courts established under the law of Ukraine continued to operate in Crimea and delivered justice “on behalf of the Russian Federation”. During that time, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation was the court of final jurisdiction to decide cases heard by the courts operating in Crimea. A further aspect of the judiciary in Crimea during that transitional period was that only incumbent judges or “persons replacing judges in these courts” who had Russian nationality (see paragraph 1005 above) could sit in the cases assigned to them.

1015. During the transitional period, the Russian Federation adopted a number of legislative instruments which enabled “the formation of the judicial system of the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation”. Those legal instruments regulated the courts' territorial jurisdiction and rules of procedure and specified the procedure and requirements for the appointment of judges. The appointment of judges was carried out by the Higher Qualification Board of Judges of the Russian Federation. In November (as submitted by the respondent Government) or 19 December 2014 (as submitted by the applicant Government), the President of the Russian Federation issued Decrees appointing judges of the federal courts in Crimea. The Plenary of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation set 26 December 2014 as the starting date of the operation of the newly established federal courts of the Russian Federation in Crimea.

1016. In these circumstances, it can be concluded that from the time of Crimea's admission, as a matter of Russian law, into the Russian Federation, the judicial system functioning in Crimea operated on the basis of Russian law, both substantively and procedurally. The fact that certain incumbent judges with Russian nationality remained in post during the transitional period is of no relevance given that they applied Russian law and delivered justice “on behalf of the Russian Federation”. Furthermore, during that period the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation acted as a court of final jurisdiction in cases adjudicated by those courts. The subsequent establishment of the “federal courts” in Crimea and the appointment of judges in those courts was carried out in accordance with Russian law.

1017. As explained above, the relevant rules of IHL clearly provide that the law pre-dating the occupation should continue to apply in the territory on which another State exercises “effective control”, unless there are grounds for any of the exceptions listed in those rules. In the present case, that means that the courts in Crimea were required to continue to apply “the whole of the law (civil law and penal law)” (as explained in the Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention; see paragraph 940 above) of Ukraine and not to replace it with Russian legislation unless “necessary”. Nevertheless, it is clear on the evidence that “judges have applied Russian Federation criminal law provisions to a wide variety of peaceful assemblies, speech and activities, and in some cases retroactively to events that preceded the temporary occupation of Crimea or occurred outside of the peninsula in mainland Ukraine” (see paragraph 10 and other relevant passages of the 2017 OHCHR Report). Both parties pointed to the full-scale application of Russian law.

1018. The Court emphasises that the general arguments regarding the issue of “lawfulness” under the Convention stated in paragraphs 943-45 above apply likewise to the issues under this head. In particular, the respondent Government neither made a reference to IHL nor did they directly invoke any of the exceptions set out therein. Whereas they identified the laws and other legal instruments on the basis of which the judicial system of Crimea had been incorporated into that of the Russian Federation after Crimea's admission, as a matter of Russian law, as a constituent part of the Russian Federation, into that of the Russian Federation, they did not explain why it had been necessary to replace the overall pre-existing Ukrainian legal and judicial system with that of the Russian Federation.

1019. In such circumstances, the Court considers that the judicial system functioning in Crimea after the “Accession Treaty” cannot be regarded as “established by law” within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. The OHCHR also noted that the substitution of Ukrainian laws with Russian Federation laws was “in violation of the IHL” (see paragraphs 7 and 220 of the 2017 OHCHR report, quoted in A 102). Having regard to the wide scope of the requirement of a “tribunal established by law” – namely the legal basis for the very existence of a “tribunal”, the compliance by the court or tribunal with the particular rules that govern it and the composition of the bench in each case (see paragraph 1010 above) – the failure to comply with that requirement (given the general reliance on Russian law) is of such gravity that the existence of “tribunals” of this kind taints the entire administration of justice by such “tribunals”.

1020. For these reasons, there is no need for the Court to examine separately the independence and impartiality of individual judges operating in Crimea at the relevant time as an aspect of the right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial “tribunal” established by law (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson, cited above, § 295). Similarly, it is not necessary for the Court to examine separately the consequences of the above deficiency for the proper administration of justice and the fair-trial guarantees apparently referred to by the applicant Government (see paragraph 1002 above) and noted in some reports (for example, see 2016 and 2017 OHCHR Reports, the 2015 joint report of the ODIHR and the HCNM, Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission (HRAM) on Crimea; A 100, 102 and 108).

1021. The Court notes that the above situation came about as a result of the “Accession Treaty” and Crimea's admission, as a matter of Russian law, as a constituent entity of the Russian Federation. It stemmed from regulatory measures of a general nature which applied throughout the entire territory of Crimea. They were binding for all courts and applied to all judicial proceedings and to all persons concerned. These factors are sufficient evidence of the administrative practice alleged under this head.

1022. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention on account of an administrative practice with the result that, at least after the enforcement of the “Accession Treaty” (see paragraph 1013 above), the courts in Crimea could not be considered to have been “established by law” within the meaning of that Article.

(a) The parties' submissions

(b) The Court's assessment

1031. The Court reiterates that a “right to nationality” similar to that in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols (see Slivenko and Others v. Latvia (dec.), [GC] no. 48321/99, § 77, ECHR 2002-II). Nevertheless, it has previously stated that it cannot be ruled out that an arbitrary denial of citizenship might in certain circumstances raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of the impact of such a denial on the private life of the individual (see Karassev v. Finland (dec.), no. 31414/96, ECHR 1999-II, and Genovese v. Malta, no. 53124/09, § 30, 11 October 2011). Furthermore, it has accepted that the same principles must apply to the revocation of citizenship already obtained, since this might in certain circumstances lead to a similar – if not greater – interference with the individual's right to respect for private and family life (see Ramadan v. Malta, no. 76136/12, § 85, 21 June 2016; K2 v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 42387/13, 7 February 2017; and Alpeyeva and Dzhalagoniya v. Russia, nos. 7549/09 and 33330/11, § 108, 12 June 2018). While no right to renounce citizenship is guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols, the Court cannot rule out the possibility that an arbitrary refusal of a request to renounce citizenship might in certain circumstances also raise an issue under Article 8 if such a refusal has an impact on the individual's private life (see Riener v. Bulgaria, no. 46343/99, §§ 153-54, 23 May 2006).

1032. As noted above, the Court will confine its examination to the complaint as delimited in the admissibility decision, namely the operation in practice of the possibility of opting out of the Russian citizenship that was automatically imposed on all residents of Crimea following the events in February-March 2014. It will not examine, as requested by the applicant Government (see paragraph 1026 above), whether such automatic imposition amounted, in itself, to a violation of the Convention, interpreted in the light of IHL. However, it notes that in its 2017 Report the OHCHR indicated that such an imposition “can be equated to compelling them to swear allegiance to a power they may consider as hostile, which is forbidden under the Fourth Geneva Convention” (A 102). Another contextual factor to be taken into account, as argued by the applicant Government (see paragraph 1027 above), acknowledged by international organisations, and not contested by the respondent Government, is the “climate of severe intimidation” and the statement that “all inhabitants of Crimea have been placed under immense pressure to obtain Russian passports and renounce their Ukrainian nationality” (see PACE Resolution 2133 (2016) on legal remedies for human rights violations on the Ukrainian territories outside the control of the Ukrainian authorities, quoted in A 65). Denial of family visits to prisoners who refused Russian citizenship or their placement in smaller cells or in solitary confinement have been noted as examples of such pressure (see 2017 OHCHR Report, A 102). The main consequence was that those who opted out became foreigners in their own land. Whereas they retained certain rights enjoyed by Russian Federation citizens (right to pension, free health insurance, social allowances, and the right to practice professions for which Russian Federation citizenship was not a mandatory requirement), “they cannot own agricultural land, vote and be elected, register a religious community, apply to hold a public meeting, hold positions in the public administration and reregister their private vehicle on the peninsula” (A 73, 102, 123 and 110).

1033. Having regard to all the circumstances, including the stark and impossible choice for those concerned between continuously having to live with the imposition of Russian citizenship and its consequences, on the one hand, and opting out on the other hand, the Court considers that Article 8 of the Convention is engaged. Furthermore, it agrees with the applicant Government that the alleged lack of an effective system of opting out of Russian citizenship that was automatically imposed by law constituted an interference with the right to respect for private life. It remains to be examined whether that interference was “in accordance with the law”, whether it pursued a legitimate aim and whether it was proportionate.

1034. The Court notes that it is common ground between the parties that the system providing for the opting out of Russian citizenship was derived from the “Accession Treaty” and the Federal Constitutional Law no. 6‐FKZ of the Russian Federation, under which Crimea was admitted, as a matter of Russian law, as a constituent entity of the Russian Federation (see paragraphs 238 and 240 above). These instruments provided that all permanent residents of Crimea were to be automatically recognised as Russian citizens unless they opted out within one month “from the date of admission of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation” and declared that they would retain their existing citizenship or remain stateless. As further explained by the respondent Government, the procedure for renouncing Russian citizenship was regulated by Federal Law no. 62-FZ of 31 May 2002 on citizenship of the Russian Federation, which provided for the possibility of voluntary withdrawal by means of a written notification (see paragraph 1030 above). Certain related issues were further regulated by local Crimean laws post-dating the events in February-March 2014 (A 25).

1035. Furthermore, as alleged by the applicant Government and noted in the 2017 OHCHR Report, which in turn relied on information obtained from the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS) (A 102), over 3,400 permanent residents of Crimea had applied to opt out of Russian citizenship. The respondent Government did not contest that figure.

1036. The Court reiterates the close interplay between the automatic imposition of the Russian citizenship and the related system of opting out, both introduced pursuant to the Russian law. The former (automatic imposition of Russian citizenship), without which the system of opting out would not have existed, is outside the scope of the case, as delimited in the admissibility decision (see paragraphs 828 and 830 above), and cannot be examined by the Court (see paragraph 1032 above). Accordingly, the Court will not pronounce itself on the issue of lawfulness of the consequential system of opting out of Russian citizenship. However, it considers that, in any event, it imposed a disproportionate burden on those concerned for the following reasons.

1037. The applicant Government alleged that the opt-out system was ineffective given the procedural obstacles imposed by the Russian authorities. The Court notes that the relevant reports by IGOs and NGOs (the 2014 Commissioner's Report, the 2017 OHCHR Report, the 2014 Human Rights Watch, and reports of the Open Society Justice Initiative, and the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union) referred to multiple obstacles/constraints in the practical exercise of the opt-out process, including “the extraordinarily short grace period” during which the option applied, the limited information available about the procedure and the limited number of locations where individuals could declare their intention to opt out. In particular, the procedure was effectively only available for eighteen days (owing to the failure of the FMS to provide instructions on the refusal procedure until 1 April 2014); initially only two, and ultimately nine FMS offices were made available to receive and process such applications. Offices were difficult to access for residents living in the countryside. The offices also had insufficient capacity to process such applications. Furthermore, there were no clear instructions whether persons outside Crimea at the relevant time could apply to opt out in the embassies and consulates of the Russian Federation. This was to be contrasted with the system of receiving Russian passports, which could be requested by mail or in person at many designated offices around Crimea or any Russian consulate or embassy. The reports referred to above were consistent in reporting that the procedural requirements for refusing Russian citizenship “evolved” over a short period of time, including the requirement to make the application in person and the requirement that both parents make the application and/or be present to apply on behalf of their children. The documentary material provided by the Ukrainian authorities and the witness evidence corroborated the above reports in these respects (A 266‐71; 362 and 420). The respondent Government did not contest the above observations and limited themselves to stating that Federal Law no. 62‐FZ of 31 May 2002 provided for a clear and reasonable procedure for opting out of Russian citizenship (see paragraph 1030 above).

1038. The Court notes that the above deficiencies did not directly derive from that Law, but were the result of the implementation in practice of the system providing for the opt out (see paragraph 1034 above). They were of such a scale and intensity as to prevent the permanent residents of Crimea concerned to effectively enjoy the possibility to opt out of Russian citizenship.

1039. Therefore, there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of an administrative practice of a lack of an effective system to opt out of Russian citizenship.

(a) The parties' submissions

(b) The Court's assessment

1044. In the admissibility decision, the Court concluded that the information contained in the Commissioner's report of 2014, the 2017 OHCHR Report and the Human Rights Watch Report of 2014 constituted prima facie evidence in support of the alleged “repetition of acts” under this head during the period under consideration. Furthermore, it referred to the public recognition and endorsement by the highest authorities of the Russian Federation of the members of the CSDF as proof of the “official tolerance” element of an administrative practice under this head (see paragraph 449 of the admissibility decision).

1045. At the present stage of the proceedings, the applicant Government supplemented the above evidential material with concordant NGOs reports and witness statements corroborating the alleged existence of large scale raids and searches of private houses during the period under consideration, in particular in relation to Crimean Tatars. This evidence also provides some indication of the identity of the alleged perpetrators who were members of the CSDF, police officers and FSB officials (as reported by the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union and others, the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission, and the Crimean Human Rights Group). Similar incidents which were said to have occurred during the period under consideration were identified (and subsequently investigated) by Ukrainian national authorities (General Prosecutor's Office and Ukrainian Ombudsperson; A 174-76 and 274). It was further submitted that the arbitrary searches had been conducted on the basis of the anti-extremist legislation of the Russian Federation. The above reports of IGOs and NGOs also noted that the searches, which at times had taken place without search warrants or attesting witnesses, had been conducted for “weapons, drugs or literature with extremist content” with regard to suspected activities in relation to Hizb ut‐Tahir, an organisation classified as a terrorist organisation in the Russian Federation, but not in Ukraine. These reports also contain credible allegations of seizure of literature and various other items.

1046. The respondent Government neither rebutted the alleged facts nor did they submit any evidence in reply or counter arguments.

1047. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that there is sufficient evidence proving to the appropriate beyond reasonable doubt standard of proof that during the period under consideration there were sufficiently numerous and inter-connected searches of private dwelling houses, which were “officially tolerated” by the respondent State, constituting interference with Article 8 rights (see Funke v. France, 25 February 1993, § 48, Series A no. 256-A; Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, no. 34529/10, § 217, ECHR 2013 (extracts); Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v. Luxembourg, no. 26419/10, §§ 38 and 39, 18 April 2013; Vinks and Ribicka v. Latvia, no. 28926/10, § 92, 30 January 2020; and Sabani v. Belgium, no. 53069/15, § 41, 8 March 2022).

1048. The Court has to determine whether such interference was justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8 – in other words whether it was “in accordance with the law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and was “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of the aim or aims in question.

1049. The applicant Government submitted that the impugned actions by officials of the respondent State had their basis in Russian anti-extremist legislation, including Article 280.1 of the CrCRF. The respondent Government remained silent on this point.

1050. Assuming that the impugned measures were based on the above legislative instruments of the Russian Federation, the Court refers to its reasoning above to the effect that Russian law could not be regarded as “law” within the meaning of the Convention. Furthermore, the Court's findings outlined in paragraphs 944 and 991 above, to the extent relevant, apply equally under this head. Therefore, it considers that the administrative practice under this head, for which the respondent State is responsible, cannot be regarded as “lawful” (see paragraphs 942 and 946 above).

1051. In any event, the Court takes note of the applicant Government's arguments and the concerns voiced by some of the IGOs and NGOs mentioned above that the legal provisions relied on by the respondent Government were too broad and vague and therefore failed to meet the qualitative requirement of foreseeability (see paragraph 1040 above). In this connection the Court has regard to Opinion no. 660/2011 of the Venice Commission, which expressed the view that, inter alia, the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity of the Russian Federation “lacks clarity”, “should be made more specific as to the procedures available” and “has the capacity [to] impos[e] disproportionate restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (in particular Articles 6, 9, 10 and 11) and infringe the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality”. Those deficiencies have been relied on by the Court in finding that the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity was not foreseeable as to its effects and did not provide adequate protection against arbitrary recourse to the warning, caution and order procedures (see, albeit in the context of Article 10 of the Convention, Karastelev and Others v. Russia, no. 16435/10, §§ 78-97, 6 October 2020). Thus, even if the Russian legislation referred to could be relied on as “law” within the meaning of the relevant provision of the Convention, the Court could not regard it as sufficiently foreseeable as to its effects in so far as it concerns the allegations of arbitrary searches of private houses.

1052. Against this background, the Court finds it proven beyond reasonable doubt that during the period under consideration there existed an administrative practice of arbitrary raids and searches of private dwelling houses, which was not in “accordance with the law”. There has therefore been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

(a) The applicant Government

1055. The applicant Government submitted that the Russian Federation had presided over an administrative practice alleged under this head. According to them, there was “no inconsistency” between Convention principles and the applicable provisions of IHL (Rule 104 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law study by the ICRC, Article 58 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Article 15 of Additional Protocol I, A 42, 50 and 59). In fact, “they operate in harmony”.

1056. The alleged practice involved acts that were sufficiently numerous and interconnected to satisfy the “repetition of acts” element of an administrative practice targeting non-Russian Orthodox religious groups. With regard to “official tolerance”, the applicant Government noted the regulatory nature of certain measures infringing religious freedom, the context of impunity in which attacks on religious minorities had occurred, and the submissions on “official tolerance” set out at paragraph 952 above. The actions leading to those violations had been carried out by agents of the Russian State and its proxies in an environment of complete impunity.

1057. The applicant Government submitted that the respondent Government had not demonstrated that such infringements were justified as being in accordance with the law, had pursued a legitimate purpose and had been necessary or proportionate. In any event, for the reasons set out above (see paragraphs 910 and 922 above), no limitations imposed by Russian law could be regarded as “prescribed by law”.

1058. The various measures taken had resulted in a drastic decrease in the number of religious communities functioning on the territory of Crimea: from 2,083 religious organisations at the beginning of 2014, the respondent Government had admitted that by 2018 there had been fewer than 800 religious organisations operating in Crimea.

(b) The respondent Government

1059. The respondent Government submitted that there were no regulatory instruments or court decisions supporting the applicant Government's allegations of alleged persecution on religious grounds. An internal investigation had revealed that there had been no forced closures or searches of churches, mosques, temples of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchy or of other religious denominations, nor had Orthodox Ukrainians been harassed. The authorities had not executed an arbitral award of 2019 ordering the Department of the Crimean Diocese of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to pay rent arrears (to the respondent State). Furthermore, clerics of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had continued to have uninterrupted access to its premises in Simferopol. Similar considerations applied to the church of the Holy Martyr Clement Pope of Rome and the Roman Catholic parish of the Holy Martyr Clement Pope of Rome. The latter parish had carried out its services on its premises, which had been transferred to it for free by the authorities of Sevastopol in 2018. Twelve former State-owned facilities in the city of Sevastopol had been returned to religious organisations free of charge. The local religious organisation “Ukrainian Orthodox Parish Church of Saints Equal to the Apostles Prince Vladimir and Princess Olga in Simferopol” had continued to carry out its religious activities “on the territory of the Russian Federation”, notwithstanding the fact that its constituent instruments had not yet been brought into compliance with the relevant legislation. The respondent Government further referred to statistical data from the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation concerning the number of registered religious organisations between 2018 and 2021 in.the “Republic of Crimea” and the city of Sevastopol. Those figures indicated a gradual increase in the number of such organisations, which demonstrated the unimpeded exercise by individuals and legal entities of the right to freedom of religion and association.

1060. The respondent Government further referred to Federal Law no. 125-FZ of 26 September 1997 and Federal Law no. 129-FZ of 8 August 2001, which regulated the conditions and procedure for the registration of a religious organisation. An organisation could either seek judicial review of a refusal of registration or resubmit documents in order to seek registration anew (reference was made to the registration of twenty-four religious organisations after they had rectified deficiencies previously established by the competent authorities).

1061. Since 18 March 2014 the Crimean Diocese of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had not sought re-registration before the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation (a failure which the respondent Government asserted “may subsequently be unreasonably used” against the respondent State as an indication of a violation of religious freedoms of the Ukrainian population of Crimea). In any event, the respondent Government noted that the diocese in question had been a structural unit of the unrecognised Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchy and that it had ceased to exist as a legal entity on 15 December 2018, when it had been joined to the established Orthodox Church of Ukraine. In any event, it had carried out almost no socially significant activities and the activity of parishioners had sharply decreased to a minimum. Similarly, the “Ukrainian Orthodox Parish of Saints Equal to the Apostles Prince Vladimir and Princess Olga in Simferopol” had not contested the decision refusing its registration before the competent courts, despite the clear indications in the relevant notices of the possibility of doing so.

1062. Lastly, the respondent Government made a reference to several federal laws and regulatory instruments of the local Crimean authorities regarding the transfer of State-owned property of a religious nature to religious organisations.

(a) Relationship between the provisions of the Convention and the rules of international humanitarian law

1063. The Court considers that the provisions of IHL relied on by the applicant Government (see paragraph 1055 above, A 42, 50 and 59), insofar as relevant, are not in conflict with the Convention.

(b) General principles in the Court's case-law concerning Article 9 of the Convention

1064. As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the Convention. This freedom is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it. That freedom entails, inter alia, freedom to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise a religion (see, among other authorities, Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, § 31, Series A no. 260-A; Buscarini and Others v. San Marino [GC], no. 24645/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-I; S.A.S. v. France [GC], no. 43835/11, § 124, ECHR 2014 (extracts); and İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], no. 62649/10, § 103, 26 April 2016).

1065. Under the terms of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention, any interference with the right to freedom of religion must be “necessary in a democratic society”. An instance of interference will be considered “necessary in a democratic society” for a legitimate aim if it answers a “pressing social need” and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient” (see, among many other authorities, Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], no. 23459/03, § 123, ECHR 2011; Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], no. 56030/07, § 124, ECHR 2014 (extracts); and İzzettin Doğan and Others [GC], cited above, § 105).

1066. The Court has frequently emphasised the State's role as the neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs, and has stated that this role is conducive to public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society (see S.A.S. v. France [GC], cited above, § 127). What is at stake here is the preservation of pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy, one of the principle characteristics of which is the possibility it offers of resolving a country's problems through dialogue, without recourse to violence, even when they are irksome (see The United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 57, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‐I).

(c) Application of the above principles to the facts of the present case

1067. The Court notes, as was the case at the admissibility stage (see paragraph 455 of the admissibility decision), that the applicant Government's allegations under this head are consistent with the conclusions in the reports of multiple IGOs. The latter referred to a “series of incidents targeting representatives of minority confessions and religious facilities belonging to them”. Furthermore, they reported a “number of searches” and “informative talks” with “scores of persons” “by armed and masked members of the security forces” perceived by “various representatives of the Crimean Tatar community” as “intrusive” and intimidating, as well as threats and persecution of priests. “The gravest and most frequent incidents … were reported in 2014”. The alleged victims of those incidents were “representatives of minority confessions”, namely priests of Christian confessions not affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church, imams and other adherents to Islam. The reported acts included, inter alia, the seizure, closure or storming of churches of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (particular reference was made to the incident of 1 June 2014 in.a church in the village of Perevalne); the banning of priests from entering the churches; the non-renewal of residence permits for foreign religious leaders (twenty-three Turkish imams and a Roman Catholic priest); raids and searches of eight out of the ten Muslim religious schools (madrassas); the setting on fire of a mosque and a house belonging to a church; damage to a Muslim cemetery and a car belonging to a priest; and the confiscation of religious literature deemed “extremist”. The alleged effect of those incidents was that a considerable number of ministers and imams had left Crimea and that the UOC-KP had lost control over a significant number of churches belonging to it. Furthermore, there was a significant decline in the number of religious organisations operating in Crimea, namely from 2,083 in.Crimea and 137 in.Sevastopol (“before the occupation”) to 722 religious communities registered in Crimea and 96 in.Sevastopol (“as of 4 September 2017”) (see the 2017 OHCHR Report, the Commissioner's Report, quoted in A 73 and 102). Reports of intimidation and harassment of religious communities, including attacks on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the Greek Catholic Church and the Muslim community, were also noted in the UN HRC Concluding Observations of 2015 on the seventh periodic report of the Russian Federation (A 62). The above-mentioned incidents were also reported by other relevant bodies (US Department of State; A 109), NGOs (Human Rights Watch, the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union and Others, Truth Hounds et al.; A 110, 121 and 123), as well as the Ukrainian national authorities (the General Prosecutor's Office, the Mission of the President of Ukraine in Crimea, the Ukrainian Ombudsperson; A 179‐81; 206-12; 221-22; 274‐80) and witnesses (Metropolitan Kliment, the priest Yaroslav Hontar, Maria Tomak (a journalist) and Anatolii Kovalskii (an activist); A 331, 333, 339-41, 358, 374 and 399). Some of these materials referred to incidents that allegedly took place after 26 August 2015, that is, beyond the temporal scope of the present case.

1068. The respondent Government denied the allegations under this head, referring to the “internal investigation” carried out by the Sevastopol prosecutor's office in respect of possible violations of the rights of national minorities “in the second half of 2015” (see paragraph 258 above). Furthermore, whereas they accepted that an incident had occurred on 1 June 2014 in.the church of the UOC-KP in the village of Perevalne, they confirmed that there had been no criminal investigation into the allegations that “Cossacks … engaged in hooligan actions; that they did not allow a priest of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to enter the premises of the church”; and that a woman had been beaten (see paragraphs 266-71 above). They further referred to statistics from the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation purportedly showing an increase in the number of registered religious organisations between 2018 and 2021 in.Crimea. In addition, they made general observations about the registration requirement under Russian law and other related instruments and explained what had led to the closure of the UOC-KP in Crimea.

1069. The Court notes at the outset that the respondent Government did not make any submissions in response to the alleged incidents referred to in the above-mentioned reports, except for the incident of 1 June 2014 in.Perevalne. They did not submit any evidence to cast doubt on the credibility of the evidential material relied on by the applicant Government in support of the allegations relating to those incidents. They also did not produce any documentary material regarding the internal investigation carried out by the Sevastopol prosecutor's office. The Court is therefore prevented from assessing the facts and the evidence produced in that investigation, as well as the validity of the conclusions of the prosecuting authorities. Furthermore, it has not been explained whether that investigation concerned the alleged incidents that had taken place in 2014, the year when “the gravest and most frequent incidents” reportedly occurred in the peninsula (see 2017 OHCHR Report, A 102). Similar considerations apply to the oral evidence allegedly produced by the clerics of the UOC-KP and the rector of the parish of Holy Martyr Clement Pope of Rome militating against the finding of any wrongdoing (see § 258 above).

Furthermore, the absence of any investigation in respect of the incident in the village of Perevalne, to which the authorities of the respondent Government had been alerted, demonstrates the “entrenched culture of impunity” reported by many IGOs (see the 2023 Commissioner's Report, A 74; the 2017 OHCHR Report, A 102; the 2018 OHCHR Report, A 103; and the 2021 HRMMU Report, A 104). Lastly, the Court notes that the statistics referred to by the respondent Government (see paragraph 256 above) confirm the considerable decline in the number of religious organisations operating in Crimea (see also the 2017 OHCHR Report, A 102, and the report of the Mission of the President of Ukraine in Crimea, A 220) and the fact that freedom of religion in Crimea was “drastically (severely) curtailed” after the Russian Federation took effective control of Crimea (see the European Parliament resolution of 16 March 2017, A 76, and Human Rights Watch, A 110). The respondent Government's arguments pertaining to the “ambiguous impact of the activities of the UOC-KP on the socio‐political situation in Crimea” and the structural changes to the Department of the Crimean Diocese of 2018, namely that it ceased to exist in December 2018, when it joined the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (see paragraphs 270 and 271 above), if not irrelevant, have no bearing on the merits of the complaints under this head.

1070. In these circumstances, on the available evidence, the reliability of which it accepts, the Court finds that during the period under consideration there were sufficiently numerous and interconnected incidents amounting to an “administrative practice” of interference with Article 9 rights under the Convention, such as the denial of access of priests to places of worship (see, mutatis mutandis, Cyprus v. Turkey (merits), cited above, §§ 243-246); questioning by police, searches of homes and seizures of books, recordings and other items (see Boychev and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 77185/01, § 46, 27 January 2011, and Dimitrova v. Bulgaria, no. 15452/07, § 28, 10 February 2015); the non-extension or cancellation of residence permits for foreign ministers (see Perry v. Latvia, no. 30273/03, § 53, 8 November 2007; Nolan and K. v. Russia, no. 2512/04, § 62, 12 February 2009; and Lotter v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 39015/97, 6 February 2003); and the confiscation of religious publications (see Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, nos. 32401/10 and 19 others, §§ 197-98, 7 June 2022; and Moroz v. Ukraine, no. 5187/07, § 104, 2 March 2017).

1071. The Court therefore has to determine whether the above-mentioned interference was justified under paragraph 2 of Article 9 – in other words, whether it was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and was “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of the aim or aims in question (see paragraph 1065 above).

1072. The Court observes that the respondent Government referred to several federal laws of the Russian Federation and regulatory instruments of the local Crimean authorities pertaining to the registration of religious organisations and the transfer of State-owned property of a religious nature to religious organisations. However, these references were general in nature and it was not argued that – and if so, to what extent – any of the specific above-mentioned incidents took place on the basis of the statutory provisions relied on by the respondent Government.

1073. The Court is therefore satisfied that there existed an accumulation of identical or analogous breaches which were sufficiently numerous and interconnected to amount to a pattern or system (repetition of acts) that cannot be regarded as “lawful” within the meaning of the Convention.

1074. As regards the “official tolerance” element of the administrative practice, the Court observes that the available material points to several alleged perpetrators of the acts complained of, namely “armed and masked members of the security forces”, FSB officers, Cossacks and members of the CSDF or “local pro-Russian militia”. In this connection the Court refers to its considerations in paragraphs 994 and 996 above regarding the respondent State's responsibility for the acts committed by local militia and Russian servicemen, which likewise apply to the allegations under this head, and which are undisputed by the respondent Government. In any event, the evidence before the Court also shows that the competent local authorities had been specifically alerted to the acts complained of at the time (see the 2014 Commissioner's report, A 73). As noted in the admissibility decision, this is an additional element militating in favour of finding cognisance on the part of the higher authorities (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, § 457). Further support for finding that there was official tolerance by the respondent State to the required standard of proof can also be drawn from the IGOs' reports and the concrete example noted in paragraph 1069 above, demonstrating the failure of the relevant authorities to address the allegations made under this head.

1075. To the extent that that the impugned interference was based on any of the above legislative acts of the Russian Federation, the Court refers to the reasons given above that the Russian law cannot be regarded as “law” within the meaning of the Convention and that any individual acts constituting the practice complained of are to be examined by reference to the requirements of Ukrainian, not Russian law (see paragraphs 942 and 946 above). Assuming that the anti-extremist legislation of the Russian Federation served as a legal basis for the interference with Article 9 rights in Crimea, the Court refers to its earlier findings regarding the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity, based, inter alia, on the observations by the Venice Commission in its Opinion no. 660/2011 (A 75), according to which “impermissibly broad definition of ‘extremism activities’, coupled with a lack of judicial safeguards, is sufficient for a finding of a violation on the basis that the interference … was not “prescribed by law” (see Taganrog LRO and Others, cited above, § 159). Furthermore, it refers to its findings outlined in paragraphs 944 and 991 above regarding the general issue of lawfulness and IHL, which apply equally to the consideration of the complaint under this head.

1076. The Court further notes that the respondent Government did not seek to identify any legitimate aim nor did they submit any argument concerning the proportionality of the impugned interference.

1077. Against this background, the Court finds it established beyond reasonable doubt that during the period under consideration the respondent State was responsible for an unlawful administrative practice of harassment and intimidation of religious leaders not conforming to the Russian Orthodox faith (in particular Ukrainian Orthodox priests and imams), arbitrary raids of places of worship and confiscation of religious property. There has therefore been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention.

(a) The applicant Government

1079. The applicant Government submitted that since March 2014 and the annexation of Crimea by the respondent State, legal issues regarding freedom of speech, information policy and the provision of information and communication on the territory of “temporarily occupied regions” had been unlawfully regulated by legal instruments of the Russian Federation. For the reasons set out in paragraphs 910 and 922 above, the interference complained of could not have been “prescribed by law”. Furthermore, the vaguely worded and overly broad anti-extremism legislation of the respondent State had been used to pressure Crimean Tatar media outlets into ceasing criticism of the “occupation” of Crimea by the Russian Federation. The “laws” commonly used by the authorities to justify such infringements, for example Article 280.1 of the Russian Criminal Code, did not meet the quality requirements under the Court's case-law and failed to offer the necessary, or indeed any, safeguards against arbitrariness. Whereas the respondent Government had invoked the legal requirements for re‐registration of media outlets under the Russian legislation, they had not engaged with the issue of the compatibility of those measures with the Convention.

1080. Furthermore, the aim of the campaign of suppression and intimidation had been to silence independent journalism in Crimea, which could not be a legitimate aim in a democratic society. The respondent Government had provided no real justification for the closure of the Avdet newspaper, the ATR company, the radio station Lale and others and had failed to provide supporting documents or even to specify the reasons for rejecting licence applications.

1081. The acts of suppression had been carried out by officials of government agencies of the Russian Federation or, as regards certain physical attacks on journalists, members of its proxy militias. They had been carried out in a climate of impunity such that the large majority of independent media outlets and journalists had been forced to flee to mainland Ukraine. For that reason, as well as those set out in paragraph 952 above, the applicant Government submitted that there was clear and compelling evidence of “official tolerance”.

1082. They further submitted that although IHL did not provide the same level of protection of freedom of expression, there was no conflict between Article 10 and the applicable principles of IHL. Indeed, Article 70 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibited the arrest, prosecution or conviction of a person by the occupying power for opinions expressed prior to the “occupation”, and Article 79 of Additional Protocol I extended protection to journalists in areas of armed conflict.

(b) The respondent Government

1083. The respondent Government referred to the applicable rules on television and radio broadcasting (registration and licence procedures) and the facts as presented by them (see paragraphs 274-306 above), maintaining that the allegations under this head were unsubstantiated. They stated that the Crimean authorities had taken an active role in supporting the development of public broadcasting, allowing all citizens, irrespective of their national background, to actively participate in the decision-making process and receive information in their native language without any restrictions. Allegations of the closure of television channels were equally unsubstantiated and were aimed at destabilising the socio-political situation. Accordingly, there had been no violation of freedom of thought and speech on account of the alleged ban of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar TV channels and mass media operating in the “Republic of Crimea”.

(a) Relationship between the provisions of the Convention and the rules of international humanitarian law

1084. The Court considers that the provisions of IHL relied on by the applicant Government (see paragraph 1082 above), to the extent relevant, are not in conflict with the Convention.

(b) General principles under Article 10 of the Convention

1085. The Court considers it appropriate at the outset to recapitulate below the general principles established in its case-law concerning pluralism in the audiovisual media (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, §§ 129-33, ECHR 2012 and, more recently, NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 28470/12, §§ 182, 185, 186, 5 April 2022).

1086. Any interference with freedom of expression will be in breach of the Convention unless it was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in the second paragraph of Article 10 and was “necessary in a democratic society”.

1087. The general principles as to whether an interference under this Article was “prescribed by law” were summarised in NIT S.R.L. (cited above, §§ 157-61) and Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano (cited above, §§ 139‐43).

1088. The general principles concerning the question of whether an interference is “necessary in a democratic society” are well established in the Court's case-law and have been summarised as follows (see, among many authorities, Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48876/08, § 100, ECHR 2013 (extracts); Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569/09, § 131, ECHR 2015; and Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC], nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13, § 132, 17 May 2016):

(c) Application of the above principles to the present case

1089. In its admissibility decision the Court found that the incidents and conclusions noted by several IGOs and NGOs (the 2017 OHCHR Report, the UN HRC Concluding Observations of 2015 and the 2014 Human Rights Watch Report) provided sufficient prima facie evidence of the alleged administrative practice under this head. Those materials, to which the applicant Government also referred at the present stage of the proceedings, demonstrate that, inter alia, in March 2014 all Ukrainian television channels were shut down and that the only Ukrainian-language newspaper (Krymska) was banned from distribution. In addition, some Tatar-language media outlets (the Avdet newspaper, the ATR and Lale television channels, the Meydan and Lider radio stations, the QHA news agency and the 15minut internet site) were denied either re-registration or licences to operate in accordance with Russian Federation legislation and had to cease operations on the peninsula. Official “warnings” (from FSB officers and the Crimea prosecutor's office) often preceded the closing down of a media outlet on the basis that its views, articles or programmes were deemed “extremist” (for example, for use of the terms “annexation”, and “temporary occupation”). For that purpose, the authorities used Russia's vaguely worded and overly broad anti-extremism legislation to pressure Crimean Tatar media outlets into ceasing criticism of Russia's “occupation” of Crimea (see paragraph 1079 above). As reported by Roskomnadzor, the official media regulatory body of the Russian Federation, on 1 April 2015 – over a year after Crimea had been admitted, under Russian law, as a constituent entity of the Russian Federation – only 232 media outlets were authorised to operate, as compared to the 3,000 media outlets previously registered under Ukrainian regulations. The IGOs and NGOs also reported harassment and intimidation of journalists.

1090. The Court observes that the above information is concordant with the additional evidential material submitted to the Court, according to which 161 transmitters and twenty radio lines were lost in Crimea (A 309); in February 2015, almost all private Crimean radio companies had their frequencies seized (A 300); Chernomorskaya TRC, one of the largest television companies in Crimea, was blocked from broadcasting on Crimean cable networks; ATR's offices were raided by representatives of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation and the Centre for Countering Extremism; systematic intimidation (illustrated through some concrete examples of journalists and bloggers), during which searches and arbitrary detention were used as a tool to intimidate and silence independent journalism. The latter was often done on the pretext of an investigation into the offence of inciting actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation under Article 280.1 of the Russian Criminal Code.

1091. The applicant Government also relied on documentary material prepared by their national authorities attesting, inter alia, to the seizure of the office of the Ukrainian-language newspaper Krymska Svitlytsia, as well as the State television and radio company Krym and the enterprise Radioteleviziinyi peredavalnyi tsentr v AR Krym; the confiscation of property belonging to the Crimean Tatar newspaper Avdet; the discontinuance of Ukrainian-language periodicals such as Dumka, Krymske slovo, Slovo Sevastopolya, and Dzvin Sevastopolya; and hacker attacks on Ukrainian-language Crimean online publications such as Media-Krym, Holos Tavrii and Ukrainskyi Kavkaz (A 308 and 309). In the first days of the “occupation”, all editorial offices in Crimea had received an unofficial curator from the FSB, who took on the role of both an editor and a censor (A 315).

1092. The evidence submitted by the applicant Government further shows that during 2014-2019, more than 350 journalists and bloggers were harassed in Crimea. Between 26 February and 22 March 2014 alone, “there were over 100 cases of violations of the rights of journalists and bloggers in Crimea, as reported by 48 different media outlets and 39 journalists” (A 237). In addition, over 500 violations of journalists' rights and the principle of freedom of speech in Crimea had been recorded by Ukrainian human rights activists. The majority of those violations had occurred in 2014 and 2015 (A 318). The Ukrainian authorities noted that since 2014, Ukrainian television channels had been available for viewing only on the internet through the “Divan.TV” service (A 230). The Ukrainian Ombudsperson also confirmed that Ukrainian-language websites in Crimea had been blocked (A 281). The occurrence of some of the above incidents had been established by the Ukrainian General Prosecutor's Office, which had started an investigation regarding a series of incidents of alleged violations of journalists' rights in Crimea (A 183). The applicant Government submitted that since March 2014, the information and communication space of Crimea had been built on the “Concept of Informatisation of the Republic of Crimea”, which had been developed in concurrence with the Russian State information policy. The resulting effect was that “Russia illegally integrated Crimea into the Russian unified space of information” (A 226-28).

1093. The respondent Government confirmed that, following the admission of Crimea, under Russian law, as a constituent entity of the Russian Federation (18 March 2014), the provision of public services in the field of mass communications had been carried out in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation. That legislation required all television and radio broadcasting companies in Crimea to (re)obtain a licence from Roskomnadzor in accordance with the procedure provided for by the federal laws of the Russian Federation. Similar rules applied to the use of radio frequencies.

1094. In that connection they acknowledged that several media outlets, including some Crimea Tatar outlets (the Chernomorskaya television channel, the Crimean Tatar television channels ATR T and Lale, the radio station Meydan, and the Avdet newspaper), had not received licences and had ceased to operate in Crimea after the transitional period (set at 1 April 2015) had expired. This was because they had either failed to comply with the registration requirements or had stopped operating at their own request (see paragraphs 288-91 above).

1095. Furthermore, the respondent Government submitted that slightly more than 200 media outlets, including media operating in the Crimean Tatar language, had continued to operate in Crimea after 1 April 2015, the cut‐off date that marked the end of the transitional period specified in the “Accession Treaty” (as further prolonged by means of a federal law of the Russian Federation of November 2014) for the integration of the new constituent entities into the economic, financial, credit and legal system of the Russian Federation (see paragraphs 294 and 301 above). Whereas this figure corresponds to the number of media outlets operating in Crimea indicated in the 2017 OHCHR Report, the respondent Government neither contested nor explained the significant decline (from 3,000 to slightly over 200) of the number of such outlets from those previously authorised to operate in Crimea under Ukrainian law.

1096. The Court further observes that the respondent Government did not engage with the credible allegations of systematic intimidation and harassment of journalists, a particular aspect of the alleged practice of suppressing non-Russian media. They did not make any submissions or produce any evidence to rebut the already available evidence pointing consistently to the existence of a practice, employed by officials of the respondent State, of sending “warnings” to journalists and of their prosecution and detention for actions allegedly aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, punishable under Article 280.1 of the CrCRF.

1097. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that there is sufficient evidence to prove to the requisite standard that, during the period under consideration, there were numerous and interconnected instances sufficient, under the Court's case-law, to constitute an administrative practice of interference with the freedom of expression, such as:

1. (i) refusal to grant broadcasting licences (see, among other authorities, Informationsverein Lentia and Others, 24 November 1993, § 27, Series A no. 276; Radio ABC v. Austria, 20 October 1997, § 27, Reports 1997-VI; Leveque v. France (dec.), no. 35591/97, 23 November 1999; United Christian Broadcasters Ltd v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 44802/98, 7 November 2000; Demuth v. Switzerland, no. 38743/97, § 30, ECHR 2002‐IX; and Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov, no. 14134/02, § 42, 11 October 2007); it is of little consequence whether the licence was refused following an individual application or participation in a call for tenders (see Meltex Ltd and Movsesyan v. Armenia, no. 32283/04, § 74, 17 June 2008);

2. (ii) revocation of a broadcasting licence (see NIT S.R.L., cited above, § 150);

3. (iii) failure to allocate broadcasting frequencies (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano, cited above, § 137);

4. (iv) issuance of a warning to a private broadcasting company for disseminating content in breach of an applicable statute, on account, inter alia, of its effect of putting pressure on the broadcaster so that it abstained from broadcasting content which might be perceived as contrary to the interests of the State (see Özgür Radyo-Ses Radyo Televizyon Yayın Yapım Ve Tanıtım A.Ş. v. Turkey (no. 1), nos. 64178/00 and 4 others, § 73, 30 March 2006, and Karastelev and Others, cited above, § 74, concerning warnings, cautions and orders under “anti-extremism” legislation); and

5. (v) criminal investigations (see Altuğ Taner Akçam v. Turkey, no. 27520/07, § 75, 25 October 2011, concerning the mere potential of being subjected to investigation); pre-trial detention (see Ragıp Zarakolu v. Turkey, no. 15064/12, § 79, 15 September 2020, and Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, no. 23199/17, § 230, 10 November 2020); and conviction (see Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, § 40, ECHR 2007-IV, and Kasabova v. Bulgaria, no. 22385/03, § 50, 19 April 2011).

1098. The Court observes that it is common ground between the parties that the above-mentioned interference had a legal basis in the federal laws and other regulations of the respondent State, further operationalised through acts of the local Crimean authorities, as derivatives of Russian law (see paragraph 931 above). In the Court's view, the regulatory nature of the alleged practice, its scale and its general application confirm the existence of both the “repetition of acts” and “official tolerance” elements of the administrative practice under this head.

1099. Having regard to the reasons given above for the Court's finding that Russian law could not be regarded as “law” within the meaning of the Convention and that any individual acts constituting the practice complained of are to be examined by reference to the requirements of Ukrainian, not Russian law, the Court considers that the administrative practice under this head, for which the respondent State is responsible, cannot be regarded as “lawful” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention (see paragraphs 942 and 946 above).

1100. In any event, the Court also considers it important to note the following.

1101. The applicant Government argued that the legal provisions relied on by the respondent Government in any event did not meet the qualitative requirement of foreseeability on account of the “vaguely worded and overly broad anti-extremism legislation of the respondent State” and the reliance on Article 280.1 of the Russian Criminal Code (authorising punishment of “public calls for actions aimed at violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation”; see paragraph 1079 above). As noted above (see paragraph 1089 above), some IGOs and NGOs voiced similar concerns about the “anti-extremist warnings” issued “to pressure Crimean Tatar media outlets into ceasing criticism of Russia's occupation of Crimea”. Similarly, in the context of freedom of expression, the reliance on the “anti‐extremism” legislation and Article 280.1 of the CrCRF was criticised in the Commissioner's report of 2023 (A 74), the HRAM report of 2015 (A 107), the Parliamentary Assembly (A 69), the 2018 report of the Open Society Justice Initiative (A 115) and reports of local NGOs, such as the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (A 124), the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission (A 133), the Crimean Human Rights Group (A 135) and the IPHR 2016 Report (A 116). Of particular relevance is opinion no. 660/2011 of 20 June 2012, in which the Venice Commission noted a number of deficiencies that were relied on by the Court in finding that the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity was not foreseeable as to its effects and did not provide adequate protection against arbitrary recourse to the warning, caution and order procedures (see Karastelev and Others, cited above, §§ 78‐97).

1102. The respondent Government did not make any submissions and did not provide any evidence to address, still less rebut the above criticisms concerning the alleged lack of foreseeability of their anti-extremism legislation that had been used to suppress the freedom of expression in Crimea during the period under consideration. The Court refers to its findings outlined in paragraphs 944 and 991 above regarding the general issue of lawfulness and IHL, which apply likewise, to the extent relevant, as regards both their anti-extremism legislation and Article 280.1 of the CrCRF.

1103. Furthermore, it notes that the respondent Government did not provide any documentary evidence in respect of any of the relevant procedures, such as the procedures concerning the licensing of media outlets and the allocation of frequencies, with reference to which the respondent Government claimed that the media outlets concerned had failed to comply with the relevant requirements. Similarly, the respondent Government failed to substantiate their claim that some media outlets had themselves asked to be closed (see paragraph 1094 above). The Court notes that such documentary evidence is likely to be in the exclusive possession of the respondent State and that, on account of the respondent Government's failure, despite repeated requests by the Court, to provide any evidence, it can draw inferences from that failure that may be unfavourable to the respondent Government (see paragraph 846 above). Furthermore, owing to this failure, the respondent Government have failed to establish that the interference complained of was necessary within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. In particular and in so far as sending “warnings” to journalists, their prosecution and detention for actions allegedly aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation are concerned (see paragraph 1096 above), the respondent Government failed to prove that the publication of views aimed to preserve the Ukrainian territorial integrity included any incitement to violence or advocated recourse to violent actions so as to justify restrictions on the right of the public to be informed of them by bringing the weight of the criminal law to bear on the media (see, mutatis mutandis, Sürek v. Turkey (no. 4) [GC], no. 24762/94, § 60, 8 July 1999, and Dilipak v. Turkey, no. 29680/05, § 62, 15 September 2015). The creation of a public Crimean Tatar television channel, a radio company and a Crimean Tatar editorial office (see paragraphs 294-98 above) cannot offset the general decline in the number of independent television stations serving the Crimean Tatar population of Crimea noted above. Similarly, assuming that certain media outlets remained available online, that cannot be regarded as a sufficient substitute for the availability of print media and standard television channels (see paragraphs 282 and 303 above).

1104. Against this background, the Court finds that during the period under consideration there existed an administrative practice of “suppression” of non-Russian media, including the closure of Ukrainian and Tatar television stations, which was not only unlawful, but also, in any event, not necessary in a democratic society. There has therefore been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.

(a) The applicant Government

1106. The applicant Government maintained that there was no conflict between Article 11 and the applicable IHL. Furthermore, the term “law” under this Article was to be understood as referring to Ukrainian and not Russian law (see paragraphs 910 and 922 above). In any event, the “laws” commonly used by the authorities to justify the infringements did not meet the quality requirement under the Convention and failed to offer the necessary (or, in effect, any) safeguards against arbitrariness.

1107. Having regard, in particular, to the regulatory nature of certain measures used to suppress the freedom of assembly, the applicant Government submitted that the requisite elements of repetition and official tolerance were made out and that there was evidence of an administrative practice in violation of Article 11 of the Convention.

(b) The respondent Government

1108. The respondent Government referred to the relevant statutory provisions of the Russian Federation (Federal Law no. 54-FZ on gatherings, meetings, demonstrations, marches and picketing) and regulatory instruments of the local Crimean authorities regarding notification and holding of public assemblies. They maintained that the Russian authorities had fully ensured the right to freedom of peaceful assembly of people in the “Republic of Crimea” in compliance with Article 11 of the Convention.

(a) The applicant Government

1130. The applicant Government submitted that there was no conflict between the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and the applicable IHL (reference was made to Rule 51 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law study by the ICRC and the Hague Regulations (Article 52)).

1131. The applicant Government reiterated their arguments that the expropriation complained of was to be assessed against Ukrainian, and not Russian law. Accordingly, it could not be regarded as having been carried out under conditions “provided for by law”. In any event, even if expropriations had, on many occasions, been carried out under Russian law, the provisions applied did not meet the quality requirements within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in.that they had not offered the requisite procedural safeguards and had been unrelated to any legitimate aim. There was no indication that such a policy of nationalisation had been undertaken as a matter of “military necessity.” In the applicant Government's submission, the evidence demonstrated that during the period under consideration, the Russian Federation had orchestrated, through legal and administrative measures, a systematic seizure of private property, depriving the peninsula of any economic power. Furthermore, it had tolerated the seizure of private property by the CSDF and other actors. The alleged administrative practice under this head had also served as a means to persecute Crimean Tatars and those opposed to the Russian “occupation”.

(b) The respondent Government

1132. According to the respondent Government, when adopting the regulatory instruments regarding the transfer of title to immovable property to the “Republic of Crimea”, the National Council of the “Republic of Crimea” had acted within the powers conferred on it by law, in the public interest and in accordance with the Convention and Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ of 21 March 2014. Such measures had been adopted in accordance with the “Accession Treaty”, which was to be regarded, under Article 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, as an integral part of the legal system of the Russian Federation. Federal Constitutional Law no. 6‐FKZ had conferred on the “Republic of Crimea” and the “Federal city of Sevastopol” the right to regulate (by means of regulatory legal instruments), prior to 1 January 2017 and in coordination with the federal executive body, property-related issues, such as town planning, land and forest relations, cadastral registration of immovable property and registration of property rights and transactions. The above and other regulatory measures demonstrated that the respondent State had regulated all property-related issues.

1133. The respondent Government acknowledged that State-owned assets of Ukraine had been transferred to the “Republic of Crimea” and the city of Sevastopol. On the other hand, the property of labour union organisations had been transferred to the subdivisions of the relevant labour union organisations, which had been located and registered in the “Republic of Crimea” at the time of the declaration of the independence of Crimea, and re‐registered in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, as independent labour union organisations. The allegations of the applicant Government about the nationalisation of labour unions and banking organisations, State-owned enterprises falling under the category of “non‐governmental organisations” and other entities in favour of the city of Sevastopol were unsubstantiated.

(a) Relevant international humanitarian law

1134. The relevant IHL under this head, as argued by the applicant Government and not contested by the respondent Government, are Rule 51 of the Customary IHL study by the ICRC and Article 52 of the Hague Regulations. Rule 51 provides, in so far as relevant, that “private property must be respected and may not be confiscated except where destruction or seizure of such property is required by imperative military necessity”.

According to Article 52 of the Hague Regulations, “requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation … Such requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the authority of the commander in the locality occupied. Contributions in kind shall as far as possible be paid for in cash; if not, a receipt shall be given and the payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible.”

1135. Having regard to the complaints raised in the present case, as well as the failure of the respondent Government to refer to any of the exceptions provided for under IHL, there is no conflict between Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and the above-mentioned provisions of IHL, which provide, in a general way, for the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions of which one can be deprived only in the event of “imperative military necessity” or “for the needs of the army of occupation”. They further provide for compensation in case of such requisition (see, mutatis mutandis, Georgia v. Russia (II), cited above, § 199).

(b) Relevant principles in the Court's case-law concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

1136. The Court reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, which is set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second rule, contained in the second sentence of the first paragraph, covers the deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions. The third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose. However, the rules are not “distinct” in the sense of being unconnected. The second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule (see, among many other authorities, Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167/06, § 217, ECHR 2015).

(c) Application of the above-mentioned principles to the present case

1137. In the present case, the Court emphasises the consistency of information in the various reports by international organisations and NGOs about “‘nationalisation’ of private enterprises” and “large-scale expropriation (nationalisation) of public and private property … without compensation or regard for IHL protecting property from seizures or destruction”. The reports note that the Crimean de facto authorities drew up a “List of property considered as the property of the Republic of Crimea, which included hotels, private apartments, non-residential premises, markets, gas stations, land plots and movable property…”. They also mention that “additional to the list … designated in March 2014 for nationalisation, countless … private properties have also reportedly been seized …” during the period under consideration. “As of 12 September 2017, the Annex with the list of nationalised property … contains 4,618 'nationalised' public and private real estate assets” (see paragraph 35 of the Commissioner's Report; paragraphs 16 and 170‐75 of the 2017 OHCHR Report; paragraphs 67-70 of the ODIHR and HCNM Report of 2015; paragraph 37 of the Report of the Secretary-General of 2020; the Report of the Ukrainian Human Rights Union (2017) and the IPHR (2016) (A 123, 124, 73, 94, 102, 108 and 116-18).

1138. The above-mentioned reports are further corroborated by a number of arbitration awards made under the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the Encouragement and Mutual Protection of Investments of 27 November 1998 (see, in particular, Everest Estate LLC and others v. the Russian Federation (PCA Case No. 2015-36, 2 May 2018) and Public Joint Stock Company “State Savings Bank of Ukraine”(JSC Oschadbank) v. the Russian Federation (PCA Case No. 2016-14, 26 November 2018); A 92).

1139. In March 2014 and May 2015 the Ukrainian prosecuting authorities initiated criminal proceedings against the members of “illegally established bodies” in Crimea suspected of having administered the “large‐scale destruction and misappropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out illegally and aimlessly” (see Letter from the General Prosecutor's Office, A 167). In addition, the direct applicability of some of the federal laws of the Russian Federation entailed the loss of title to farmland and land located in the “border areas” of all non-Russian natural and legal persons in Crimea (A 11 and 12).

1140. The respondent Government acknowledged that there had been a “transfer of immovable property into State ownership of the Republic of Crimea” (see paragraphs 326, 329 and 1132 above). They confirmed the existence of the “List of property” mentioned in the reports cited above, adding that the list included private property transferred to the “Republic of Crimea”. As they explained, the title of previous owners to land and other immovable property had been terminated from the date of the inclusion of such property in the List. Furthermore, that property had been assigned to State enterprises of the “Republic of Crimea” established for that purpose (see paragraphs 321 and 322 above).

1141. The Court therefore finds that during the period under consideration there existed a systemic campaign of large-scale expropriation/nationalisation of property of civilians and private enterprises in Crimea, which entailed a conclusive transfer of ownership. Such interference amounted to a deprivation of possessions within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

1142. The Court reiterates that the first condition for any interference to be deemed compatible with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is that it should be lawful: the second sentence of the first paragraph authorises a deprivation of possessions only “subject to the conditions provided for by law”. The rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], no. 36480/07, § 94, 11 December 2018; G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others v. Italy [GC], nos. 1828/06 and 2 others, § 292, 28 June 2018; and Iatridis v. Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, § 58, ECHR 1999-II).

1143. In the case under examination, the available material contains consistent information to the effect that the large-scale interference with the ownership rights of civilians and private enterprises was based on a package of resolutions/laws of the local de facto authorities in Crimea and on the federal laws of the Russian Federation and was administered by members of the CSDF and the “Russian authorities in Crimea” (see the above-mentioned reports by international organisations). The respondent Government confirmed that the impugned measures had been based on regulatory instruments of the National Council of the “Republic of Crimea”, adopted in accordance with the “Accession Treaty”, which was to be regarded, under Article 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, as an integral part of the legal system of the Russian Federation. Those instruments derived from Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ and were adopted in coordination with the federal executive bodies and in accordance with certain federal laws of the Russian Federation. The respondent Government acknowledged the disputed measures as their own (see paragraph 1132 above and paragraphs 326-336 above).

1144. Accordingly, it is common ground between the parties that the interference complained of had a legal basis in the law of the Russian Federation, directly or through regulatory instruments of the de facto local Crimean authorities, as derivatives of Russian law (see paragraph 931 above). The regulatory nature of the alleged practice and its general application confirm the existence of both the “repetition of acts” and “official tolerance” elements of the administrative practice under this head. The respondent Government endorsed such measures, which had been applied in coordination with federal bodies, and moreover did not contest their large-scale implementation.

1145. Having regard to the conclusion reached above that Russian law cannot be regarded as “law” within the meaning of the Convention and that any individual acts constituting the practice complained of are to be examined by reference to the requirements of Ukrainian law, and not Russian law, the Court considers that the administrative practice under this head, for which the respondent State is responsible, cannot be regarded as “lawful” (see paragraphs 942 and 946 above).

1146. However, having regard to the specific circumstances of the case, the Court considers it important to continue its examination of whether the (Russian) “law”, even if it could be relied on, met the qualitative requirement of foreseeability and whether the interference in question was proportionate to any public interest pursued.

1147. In this connection the Court reiterates that a norm cannot be regarded as “law” within the meaning of the Convention unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his or her conduct; an individual must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Such consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable. The level of precision required of domestic legislation – which cannot in any case provide for every eventuality – depends to a considerable degree on the content of the law in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed. In particular, a rule is “foreseeable” when it affords a measure of protection against arbitrary interferences by the public authorities (see, for example, Sun v. Russia, no. 31004/02, § 27, 5 February 2009, and Osmanyan and Amiraghyan v. Armenia, no. 71306/11, § 53, 11 October 2018). The Court has held that any interference by a public authority with rights protected under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 must also pursue a legitimate aim in the general interest, while recognising that States nevertheless retain a wide margin of appreciation in respect of measures of political, economic or social strategy. In addition, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 requires that any interference should be reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realised. The requisite fair balance will not be struck where the person concerned bears an individual and excessive burden (see, among other authorities, G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others, cited above, § 293, and Lekić, cited above, §§ 105 and 110).

1148. The Court observes that the above-mentioned international organisations have noted numerous deficiencies in the model of nationalisation implemented during the period under consideration. In particular, their reports contain information that the relevant regulatory instruments underwent “frequent amendments, which … undermined legal certainty and guarantees against arbitrariness” (see the 2017 OHCHR Report, A 102). In this connection reference was made to Resolution no. 505-1/15 of the Parliament of Crimea of 27 February 2015, which “had been amended 56 times” (see 2017 OHCHR Report, A 102). Furthermore, it was noted that Resolution no. 2085-6/14 (also referred to by the respondent Government; see paragraph 320 and 331 above), which included (as an annex) the above-mentioned “List of property considered as the property of the Republic of Crimea”, “contained no criteria for the nationalization and, in most cases, no information on the owners of nationalized property”. Similarly, the reports voiced strong concerns that the relevant law “does not specify a procedure for property purchase, and provides neither a requirement of actual notification of the owner of the property being nationalized, nor an appeal procedure” (A 108). The arbitration tribunal in Public Joint Stock Company “State Savings Bank of Ukraine” (JSC Oschadbank) v. the Russian Federation (PCA Case No. 2016-14, 26 November 2018) also noted that the legal framework governing the termination of activities of Ukrainian banks “did not even attempt to provide any meaningful assessment process nor any practical means for the Ukrainian banks to defend themselves” (A 92). The reports all consistently pointed out that private property had been nationalised without any compensation being provided.

1149. At this juncture, the Court wishes to emphasise that the existence of judicial procedures that offer the necessary procedural guarantees and enable the domestic courts and tribunals to adjudicate effectively and fairly any cases concerning property matters is a factor to be taken into account in the proportionality test under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Anheuser‐Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, § 83, ECHR 2007‐I, and Bistrović v. Croatia, no. 25774/05, § 33, 31 May 2007). Similarly, the taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value will normally constitute a disproportionate interference that cannot be justified under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 9 December 1994, §§ 70 and 71, Series A no. 301‐A; Papachelas v. Greece [GC], no. 31423/96, § 48, ECHR 1999‐II; and Bistrović, cited above, § 34).

1150. Such deficiencies, which were also referred to by the applicant Government (see paragraphs 150 and 153 above), were not addressed let alone rebutted by the respondent Government. Indeed, they failed to present any evidence that could cast doubt on the veracity of the above allegations pertaining to the lack of foreseeability of the legislative measures referred to and the disproportionate nature of the deprivation of possessions complained of. Furthermore, they did not present any submissions or evidence suggesting that the impugned administrative practice under this head was justified by “imperative military necessity” or “for the needs of the army of occupation”, as required by the above-mentioned provisions of IHL (see paragraphs 1134 and 1135 above).

1151. Against this background, the Court finds that the administrative practice of expropriation without compensation of the property of civilians and private enterprises during the period under consideration was in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

(a) The applicant Government

1154. The applicant Government maintained that there was an administrative practice under this head which was incompatible with the Convention. They submitted that there was no conflict between Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and the applicable rules of IHL (Article 50 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).

1155. They submitted that the available evidence demonstrated that during the period under consideration the Russian Federation had presided over an environment that had been increasingly hostile to the Ukrainian language and had pursued an educational policy that had not protected the right to education in the Ukrainian language, in violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In that connection they referred to Decree No. 651 regarding a “State Programme for Development of Education and Science in Republic of Crimea for 2015-2017”, which had not envisaged access to education in a native language. The factual non-existence of schools providing teaching in Ukrainian or the Crimean Tatar languages and requiring pupils to study exclusively in Russian had deprived individuals who did not speak Russian of opportunities to obtain an education as such. The actions leading to these violations had been carried out by agents of the Russian State and its proxies within the education system who had been hostile to the Ukrainian language and had disregarded educational rights without pursuing any legitimate aim.

(b) The respondent Government

1156. The respondent Government reiterated the arguments they had made at the admissibility stage that education in both the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages had been offered alongside education in Russian. In that connection they submitted figures regarding the number of educational institutions and students in Crimea having classes in the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages (paragraphs 344, 348-53 above). The “small changes” that had occurred in the proportions of the school population studying in different languages reflected changes in demand against the background of the time.

(a) Relevant international humanitarian law

1157. Article 50 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War provides that, inter alia, the occupying power must facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the education of children in the occupied territory.

1158. Having regard to the complaints raised in the present case, as well as the failure of the respondent Government to refer to any of the exceptions provided for under IHL, the Court considers that there is no conflict between Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and the relevant provisions of IHL (see Georgia v. Russia (II), cited above, § 311).

(b) General principles under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1

1159. In Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, §§ 136-40, ECHR 2012 (extracts)), the Court summarised the general principles as follows:

(c) Application of the above-mentioned principles

1160. The Court notes that the ICJ in its recent judgment in Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), 31 January 2024, considered inter alia “the way in which it has implemented its educational system in Crimea after 2014 with regard to school education in the Ukrainian language” and concluded that, in this respect, the Russian Federation had been in violation of its obligation not to engage in an act or practice of racial discrimination under Article 2(1)(a) and 5(e)(v) of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (para. 370). In coming to this conclusion the ICJ noted, inter alia, that:

1. - “the Parties agree, that there was a steep decline in the number of students receiving their school education in the Ukrainian language between 2014 and 2016” (paragraph 358 thereof),

2. - “There was thus an 80 per cent decline in the number of students receiving an education in the Ukrainian language during the first year after 2014 and a further decline of 50 per cent by the following year. It is undisputed that no such decline has taken place with respect to school education in other languages, including the Crimean Tatar language.” (paragraph 359 thereof);

3. - “The Russian Federation exercises full control over the public school system in Crimea, in particular over the language of instruction and the conditions for its use by parents and children. However, it has not provided a convincing explanation for the sudden and radical changes in the use of Ukrainian as a language of instruction, which produces a disparate adverse effect on the rights of ethnic Ukrainians.” (paragraph 360 thereof); and

4. - “The legislative and other practices of the Russian Federation with regard to school education in the Ukrainian language in Crimea applied to all children of Ukrainian ethnic origin whose parents wished them to be instructed in the Ukrainian language and thus did not merely concern individual cases. As such, it appears that this practice was intended to lead to a structural change in the educational system.” (paragraph 369 thereof)

1161. These conclusions are also corroborated by numerous IGO reports which recorded the considerable decline in the number of educational institutions providing education in the Ukrainian language, and in the number of students obtaining such education. In this connection, the 2014 OHCHR report stated that between April and October 2014 “the number of high schools teaching Ukrainian has dropped from 96 to 12.” In its 2017 report, also referred to by the ICJ in its judgment (cited above, paragraph 358), the OHCHR noted the decrease in the number of Ukrainian schools (from seven to one) and the number of classes (from 875 to twenty-eight) “between 2013 and 2017”. The same report noted that the number of students educated in Ukrainian had “dropped dramatically” during the period under consideration, from 12,694 students in the 2013/14 academic year to 2,154 in.the 2014/15 academic year. Furthermore, by the end of 2014, “Ukrainian as a language of instruction had been removed from university‐level education in Crimea”. A similar decline in the use of the Ukrainian language in schools in Crimea was reported by the Commissioner for Human Rights (see Commissioner's 2014 Report, A 73) and some NGOs (such as the Crimean Human Rights Group and the IPHR, 2016, A 116 and 136). Those figures were confirmed by the Ukrainian national authorities, which also initiated an investigation related to discontinuation of education in “the Ukrainian‐language boarding school no. 7” (see the letter from the Representative of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Verkhovna Rada and the letter from the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, A 168).

1162. Furthermore, the applicant Government's allegations of threats and harassment relating to the use of the Ukrainian language in the context of education were also noted in the 2017 OHCHR Report, as well as in some witness statements (see witness testimonies of Metropolitan Kliment of Simferopol and Crimea and Yaroslav Hontar) and the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine (A 102, 347 and 361). A local NGO (Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research, A 139) noted the following:

1163. For their part, the respondent Government submitted certain statistics which also confirmed the decline in the number of students educated in Ukrainian during the school year 2014/15 noted above. As the Court has already found at the admissibility stage, such a decline cannot be regarded as “small”, an argument expressly relied on by the respondent Government at the present stage of the proceedings. As to the remaining figures regarding the number of educational institutions and classes with instruction in Ukrainian, the respondent Government provided the Court with no information about the source of and methodology applied in the collection of those figures. Nor did they refer to any evidence or material which would allow the Court to assess their veracity and reliability. Similarly, they failed to submit in evidence the written survey (and the results thereof) allegedly carried out by the head teachers of all educational institutions in the city of Sevastopol regarding parents' wishes for their children to study in the Ukrainian language (see paragraph 361 above).

1164. Furthermore, the respondent Government did not provide any counter-arguments regarding the substance of the allegations made under this heading, which, in the Court's view, are supported by multiple concordant pieces of evidence consistently pointing to a significant decline in the number of educational facilities and classes teaching in Ukrainian, as compared with the number previously available in Crimea (prior to the March 2014 events). The failure of the de facto authorities in Crimea to make continuing provision for such teaching must be considered in effect to be a denial of the substance of the right at issue (see, mutatis mutandis, Cyprus v. Turkey (merits), cited above, § 278). This denial is a direct consequence of “the introduction of the Russian Federation's education standards in Crimea” as the respondent State's policy (see paragraph 196 of the 2017 OHCHR Report). The result is that “education in the Ukrainian language had almost disappeared from Crimea” (see paragraph 17 of the 2017 OHCHR Report). In this connection, the Court considers it appropriate to reproduce the following passage from Catan and Others (cited above), the essence of which applies to the present case:

1165. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds to the requisite standard that during the period under consideration there existed an administrative under this head practice (both the “repetition of acts” and the “official tolerance” elements, the latter stemming from, inter alia, the regulatory nature of the measures complained of), which amounted to a denial of the substance of the right to education and a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.

(a) The applicant Government

1167. The applicant Government maintained that as a result of Crimea's annexation and the unlawful creation of an international border line along the administrative line between Crimea and mainland Ukraine, the respondent State was responsible for an administrative practice of unlawfully restricting the freedom of movement of the inhabitants of Crimea, in violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. This was because the creation of any kind of border within the territory of Ukraine and between its regions (in the present case, between the Kherson Region and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea), and the imposition of any restrictions on freedom of movement, could be regulated only by Ukrainian legislation.

1168. Given its regulatory nature, the alleged administrative practice under this head affected all inhabitants of Crimea. However, in practice, it was particularly obstructive in relation to certain parts of the population, especially those considered disloyal to Russia or opposing the “occupation” of Crimea. The categories of persons who were particularly repressed included journalists and Crimean Tatars, in particular representatives of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People.

(b) The respondent Government

1169. The respondent Government referred to section 3 of Federal Constitutional Law no. 6-FKZ, by which the territory of the “Republic of Crimea” and the city of Sevastopol had been delimited by existing borders on the date of their admission to the Russian Federation and their formation as new constituent entities. The delimitation line between the “Republic of Crimea” and Ukraine was a State border of the respondent State within the meaning of Federal Law no. 4730-1 of 1 April 1993 on the State border line of the Russian Federation. Pursuant to that Law, the protection and security of that border was ensured by the State border authorities, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and other competent bodies.

(a) The applicant Government

1178. The applicant Government submitted that there was clear and convincing evidence that the Crimean Tatars had been subjected to discriminatory treatment for which the Russian Federation bore responsibility. In that connection they relied on, inter alia, PACE Resolution 2133 (2016) (A 65), and information contained in reports by IGOs and some local NGOs. Reference was also made to several individual instances in which Crimean Tatars had been barred from entering the territory of Crimea for several years (see paragraph 21 of the Commissioner's Report). Across all aspects of their lives, Crimean Tatars had invariably suffered more as a consequence of the numerous administrative practices that the Russian Federation had applied in violation of the Convention.

(b) The respondent Government

1179. The respondent Government contested the allegations under this head. The statements made in the media, on social networks and at court hearings about criminal prosecution based on the ethnic origin and religion of the accused were not substantiated. Furthermore, those allegations could be a means to avoid criminal prosecution and the duty to testify under Article 51 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. They also referred to statistics regarding prosecution of Russians, Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and others in 2014 and 2015 for serious and minor offences (for figures classified according to the gravity of offences, see paragraphs 375-77 above).

1180. The respondent Government further referred to the decision of the Russian prosecuting authorities not to initiate a criminal investigation in respect of E.E. Bariev, S.A. Kadyrov and A.M. Suleymanov, the coordinators of the non-registered organisation “Committee for the Protection of the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People”, who were suspected of having committed several crimes under the CrCRF in relation to the 2nd All‐Crimean Conference on the Protection of the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People held on 17 January 2015 in.the city of Simferopol.

(a) The respondent Government

1191. In their memorial of 28 February 2022, under the heading “Effective domestic remedies to be exhausted for alleged violations in Crimea after 18 March 2014”, the respondent Government maintained that application no. 38334/18 was inadmissible for failure to exhaust the effective remedies available and advanced the following arguments:

1192. The respondent Government did not submit any specific arguments regarding the six-month rule.

(b) The applicant Government

1193. Under the heading “Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and six month rule” of their application form, the applicant Government alleged that all cases described therein clearly demonstrated the existence of a Russian policy of persecution of those who were considered to be an “enemy”, which had resulted in “human rights violations of [a] continued nature”. In their view, such a policy amounted to an administrative practice for the purposes of the Convention case-law. They concluded the following:

(a) Exhaustion of domestic remedies

1196. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies as embodied in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention applies to State applications (Article 33) in the same way as it does to “individual” applications (Article 34), when the applicant State does no more than denounce a violation or violations allegedly suffered by “individuals” whose place, as it were, is taken by the State. On the other hand and in principle, the rule does not apply where the applicant State complains of a practice as such, with the aim of preventing its continuation or recurrence, but does not ask the Court to give a decision on each of the cases put forward as proof or illustrations of that administrative practice. The concept of administrative practice is thus of particular importance for the operation of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 159; Denmark v. Turkey (dec.), no. 34382/97, 8 June 1999, and Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, § 363). The rationale behind this exception is that where there is both repetition of acts and official tolerance, any remedies would clearly be ineffective at putting an end to the impugned administrative practice (see Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], cited above, §§ 124‐25, and Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, cited above, §775).

1197. The Court highlights that the applicant Government expressly limited the scope of application no. 38334/18 to the alleged existence of administrative practices of violations of the Convention (see paragraph 838 above). Accordingly, the present application falls within the category of inter‐State cases relating to a practice for which, by virtue of the Court's settled case-law, the exhaustion rule does not apply. Therefore, the respondent Government's objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies should be dismissed. In these circumstances, the Court sees no need to determine what would have been the applicable law in Crimea for the purposes of an examination of the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies.

1198. Finally, the Court considers it useful to reiterate its findings set out in the admissibility decision, in relation to the consequences of the absence of sufficiently substantiated prima facie evidence of an administrative practice (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, § 366, references omitted):

(b) The six-month rule

1199. The Court stresses that in principle the six-month time-limit also applies to inter-State cases and to allegations of administrative practices and the Court must therefore determine whether it has been complied with (see as a recent authority, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.), cited above § 785).

1200. As the applicant Government complained of “human rights violations of [a] continued nature”, the Court considers it useful to restate its case-law regarding the application of the time-limit rule to instances of continuous violations, as summarised recently in the admissibility decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (cited above, §§ 779-81):

1201. The Court emphasises at the outset the nature of the complaints raised by the applicant Government in application no. 38334/18 which concern, inter alia, arrest procedures, detentions or proceedings that resulted in criminal convictions some of which were terminated at different points in time between 2014 and 2017, thus more than six months before the date when the application was lodged. Having regard however to the scope of the complaints, the Court is satisfied that they may concern allegations of continuing situations (see paragraph 832 above) akin to the first category of ongoing violations set out above in respect of which the six-month time‐limit will only begin to run once the alleged violations have ceased (see paragraph 1200 above). The Court will therefore consider in its examination of the evidence together with the merits whether the various administrative practices alleged (if shown to have occurred) came to an end more than six months before the complaint was originally made to the Court in substance. Complaints about administrative practices which ended six months before the date on which the complaint was lodged must be declared inadmissible (see Cyprus v. Turkey (merits), cited above, § 104).

1202. Consequently, in view of the available material and the standard of proof applicable thereto, the Court considers that the question of the compliance with the six-month rule is closely linked to the merits of the complaints, and therefore joins it to the merits.

(a) The parties' submissions

1213. The applicant Government's complaints under this head read as follows:

1214. The respondent Government submitted no observations on these specific allegations.

(b) The Court's assessment

(a) Events which allegedly occurred in Russia

1242. As regards the events which allegedly occurred in the Russian Federation under this head, the Court notes the scarcity of the material submitted in support of the applicant Government's allegations and notably the insufficient number of decisions given by the competent judicial authorities within criminal proceedings: a few judgments by which some of the sixteen individuals listed by the applicant Government in this group were convicted of criminal offences, only two of which judgments are final, and even fewer decisions remanding such individuals in custody. Moreover, despite concerns recently expressed by IGOs with regard to the situation of the “Ukrainian political prisoners” and their calls for either their release or the re-examination of their cases, no pattern of systemic persecution has been advanced in connection with this specific category (see PACE Resolutions 2231(2018) and 2446(2022) of 28 June 2018 and 21 June 2022 respectively, and the European Parliament resolution of 16 March 2017 – A 67, 69 and 76).

1243. The Court is particularly mindful of the difficulties faced by the applicant Government in gathering evidence to support their allegations. It also bears in mind the lack of constructive engagement from the respondent Government with the proceedings for the examination of the case and its failure to provide any of the relevant casefiles pertaining to the individuals referred to by the applicant Government and that despite the fact that these casefiles were undoubtedly within their (exclusive) possession (see paragraph 853 above). Nevertheless, the Court considers that the evidence before it in this connection cannot be said to establish that there is sufficiently substantiated prima facie evidence of an administrative practice (in either its “repetition of acts” or “official tolerance” components) in breach of Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention in relation to the unlawful detention and imprisonment of Ukrainian prisoners which took place in the Russian Federation (that is, with respect to proceedings concerning Mr Stanislav Klykh, Mr Mykola Karpyuk, Mr Mykola Dadeu, Mr Oleksandr Shumkov, Mr Roman Ternovskyy, Mr Serhiy Lytvynov, Mr Roman Sushenko, Mr Yurii Soloshenko, Mr Viktor Shur, Mr Oleksii Syzonovych, and Mr Pavlo Hryb and the convictions imposed by the Russian military courts on the Crimean Muslims charged with involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir). The Court recognises the contribution which the respondent Government's lack of cooperation may have made in this regard and refers to its findings concerning their failure to comply with the obligations under Article 38 of the Convention set out in paragraphs 908‐909 above. Accordingly, this part of the complaint must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

1244. The Court finds it useful to emphasise that the evidence adduced is insufficient only in relation to the need to demonstrate the existence of an administrative practice; its conclusions concern this legal issue only and the Court does not rule out that the alleged incidents did in fact occur and that the individuals concerned might therefore provide sufficient proof of a violation of the Convention in any individual application lodged with the Court. In addition, its findings under this heading do not prevent the Court from taking into account the evidence submitted in support of the allegations made in this regard, in so far as relevant to other complaints raised in the present application (see the Court's considerations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention).

(b) Events which possibly occurred in the “DPR” and “LPR” or Belarus

1245. Next, the Court refers to its conclusion (see paragraphs 876-878 and 885 above) that the claims put forward under Article 5 of the Convention pertaining to isolated instances of abduction by “the ‘DPR’ and ‘LPR’ collaboration authorities” or which occurred on the territory of a third country were not substantiated by sufficient prima facie evidence. Accordingly, this part of the complaint must also be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

(c) Events which allegedly occurred in Crimea

1246. The Court considers that this part of the complaint does not fall short of the prima facie evidential threshold, and that it complies with the six‐month time-limit for reasons which will be explained below. It must therefore be declared admissible.

(a) The parties' submissions

(b) The Court's assessment

(a) The parties' submissions

(b) The Court's assessment

(a) Events which allegedly occurred in Russia

1307. As regards the events which took place in Russia and which are considered by the applicant Government to form part of an overall administrative practice against “Ukrainian political prisoners”, the Court notes that the applicant Government's allegations refer to the same criminal proceedings as those considered under Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention. In this connection, the Court refers to its conclusions reached above (see paragraph 1243 above) regarding the scarcity of the material submitted in support of the applicant Government's allegations and in particular the lack of decisions of the judicial authorities taken within the framework of the criminal proceedings in question. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the evidence before it cannot be said to amount to sufficiently substantiated prima facie evidence of an administrative practice (either in its “repetition of acts” component or in its “official tolerance” components) in breach of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention with regard to the unlawful detention and imprisonment of Ukrainian prisoners in the Russian Federation. Accordingly, this part of the complaint must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

(b) Events which allegedly occurred in Crimea

1308. The Court observes at the outset that the applicant Government argued, inter alia, that the criminal proceedings initiated under Russian law against Crimean Muslims on account of their involvement with the Hizb ut‐Tahrir organisation was part of an administrative practice in breach of the guarantees enshrined in Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. At the hearing held on 13 December 2023, the applicant Government emphasised that affiliation with Hizb ut-Tahrir was an incidental part of this case. They submitted that the Russian repression conducted by means of application of the Russian criminal law was not directed at the Hizb ut-Tahrir organisation as such; persons affiliated with this organisation had merely been caught up in the suppression of all forms of expression of Muslim beliefs on the part of the entire Crimean Tatar population, which included the legitimate decision‐making authorities and those responsible for all religious administration of the Crimean Tatar community.

1309. The Court observes that it has already assessed complaints under these Articles with regard to the membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir and found that, by reason of Article 17 of the Convention, that organisation cannot benefit from their protection because of its anti-Semitic and pro‐violence statements, in particular statements calling for the violent destruction of Israel and for the banishment and killing of its inhabitants and repeated statements justifying suicide attacks in which civilians have been killed. Having regard to written statements published in magazine articles, flyers and transcripts of public statements by the organisation's representatives or on Articles published by the organisation itself in Germany, the Court has held that Hizb ut-Tahrir's aims were clearly contrary to the values of the Convention, notably the commitment to the peaceful settlement of international conflicts and to the sanctity of human life (see Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany (dec.), no. 31098/08, §§ 73-75 and 78, 12 June 2012). In Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia (nos. 26261/05 and 26377/06, 14 March 2013), the applicants complained that their convictions for membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir had violated their rights under Articles 7, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention. While the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 7 in.respect of one of the applicants, who could not reasonably have foreseen that his membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir would make him criminally liable under Article 282.2 of the CrCRF in the absence of an official publication of the Supreme Court's decision of 14 February 2003 banning that organisation, it nevertheless held that the complaints under Articles 9, 10 and 11 were incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. In doing so, the Court found, on the basis of the organisation's documents and literature, including a draft Constitution, the applicants' statements and the expert reports produced in the domestic proceedings, that the dissemination of the political ideas of Hizb ut-Tahrir by the applicants clearly constituted an activity falling within the scope of Article 17 of the Convention.

1310. The Court notes that its previous findings pertaining to Hizb ut‐Tahrir concerned proceedings conducted in Germany and Russia, two countries in which the organisation had been banned by decisions of their national authorities. While acknowledging that the limitations to the freedom of association accepted under the Convention are formulated broadly without constraining States to take measures only for the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals within their jurisdiction (see Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation e.V. v. Germany, no. 11214/19, § 76, 10 October 2023), the Court needs to take into account the specific situation in which the applicant Government themselves emphasised that the provisions of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention apply to the members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir organisation concerned by the present case and that those provisions had been breached. They referred to the nature of Hizb ut‐Tahrir (see paragraph 556 above) and insisted that the Hizb ut-Tahrir organisation is not banned in the territory of Ukraine (see paragraph 1314 below).

1311. The Court finds it reasonable to examine the issue identified in the paragraph above together with the issue of the necessity of the measures complained of under the second paragraphs of the Articles invoked, and this in the light of Article 17 of the Convention.

(c) Conclusion

1312. The Court considers that the present complaint, inasmuch as it concerns events which occurred in Crimea, does not fall short of the prima facie evidential threshold, and that it complies with the six-month time‐limit for reasons which will be explained below. It must therefore be declared admissible.

(a) The parties' submissions

(b) The Court's assessment

1317. The Court notes that, relying on the provisions of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, the applicant Government complained of an administrative practice in breach of the freedom of expression, the freedom of peaceful assembly and the freedom of association. The Court reiterates that, notwithstanding the particular sphere of application of Article 11, in the sphere of political debate the guarantees of Articles 10 and 11 are often complementary; so Article 11, where appropriate, must be considered in the light of the Court's case-law on the freedom of expression. Indeed, it has held that the link between Article 10 and Article 11 is particularly relevant where the authorities have interfered with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly in reaction to the views held or statements made by participants in a demonstration or members of an association (see, for example, Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden, cited above, § 85; Primov and Others v. Russia, no. 17391/06, § 92, 12 June 2014; and Navalnyy, cited above, § 102). Furthermore, given that the implementation of the principle of pluralism is impossible without an association being able to express freely its ideas and opinions, the Court has also recognised that the protection of opinions and the freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention is one of the objectives of the freedom of association (see, for instance, Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, cited above, § 88, and Gorzelik and Others, cited above, § 91).

1318. The Court notes at the outset that the applicant Government submitted a wealth of evidence concerning the overall situation in Crimea with regard to the freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly: resolutions of international organisations, including the Council of Europe; reports by international organisations, such as the OHCHR, the Commissioner for Human Rights, and the OSCE HCNM; reports of NGOs; documents issued by government bodies; media articles; news items; and, importantly, material from the case file in the criminal proceedings conducted against the individuals concerned. According to the above-mentioned evidence, since 2014, the Russian authorities had been enforcing the Russian legal framework governing public assemblies and freedom of expression and association in the territory of Crimea, showing little tolerance for any form of criticism, dissent, or opposition in relation to Russia's policies. The evidence contains information about the arrest and prosecution of political opponents who were charged with offences of extremism or terrorism, of Ukrainians who had participated in the Euromaidan protests, of Crimean activists, of Crimean Tatars linked to the Mejlis, of practising Muslims accused of belonging to banned Islamic groups, and of journalists or individuals posting messages critical of the authorities of the Russian Federation or expressing dissent on social media.

1319. Recent international reporting attests in addition that this practice has continued unabated (see paragraph 24 of the 2020 report of the UN Secretary-General; paragraph 14 of the 2022 report of the UN Secretary‐General; and paragraphs 16 and 29 of the 2023 Commissioner's Report, A 74 and 94-95).

1320. Next, the Court notes that the alleged administrative practice covers instances of both pre-trial detention and criminal convictions. As regards the first aspect, the Court reiterates that State actions which have been found to amount to an interference with the right to freedom of expression may encompass a wide variety of measures in the form of a “formality, condition, restriction or penalty”. Criminal-law measures capable of having a chilling effect on freedom of expression may confer on the affected individuals the status of a “victim” of an alleged violation even where criminal proceedings against them did not end in a conviction (see, among other authorities, Sabuncu and Others, cited above, §§ 223-26 – concerning the pre-trial detention of the applicants in criminal proceedings brought on charges of assisting terrorist organisations) or were discontinued for procedural or substantive reasons (see Bowman v. the United Kingdom, 19 February 1998, § 29, Reports 1998‐I; Altuğ Taner Akçam, cited above, §§ 69-83; Döner and Others v. Turkey, no. 29994/02, §§ 85-89, 7 March 2017; and Fatih Taş v. Turkey (no. 3), no. 45281/08, § 28, 24 April 2018). The same is valid for instances of interferences with the right to freedom of association of Crimean Muslims who have had their homes searched and have been arrested, remanded in custody and charged with involvement in Hizb ut‐Tahrir.

1321. On the basis of the evidence before it, the Court considers that there is sufficient evidence proving to the appropriate standard that there have been numerous and interconnected instances of arrest and prosecution, as well as convictions, constituting interference with the rights protected by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. The Court has to determine whether the interference was justified under paragraph 2 of those Articles – in other words whether it was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and was “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of the aim or aims in question.

1322. Similarly to their submissions under Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention, the applicant Government's submissions under Articles 10 and 11 concern measures taken by the authorities established by the Russian Federation in Crimea (prosecution and judicial authorities) pursuant to Russian law. The main question to be examined therefore pertains to the lawfulness of those measures.

1323. In this respect, the Court refers to its previous conclusions to the effect that the respondent State extended the application of its law to Crimea in contravention of the Convention, as interpreted in the light of IHL, and that, accordingly, Russian law cannot be regarded as “law” within the meaning of the Convention. The Court considers thus that the administrative practice under this head, for which the respondent State did not deny responsibility (since it has been carried out by the prosecution and judicial authorities established in Crimea), cannot be regarded as “lawful” (see paragraph 946 above).

1324. Assuming that the anti-extremism legislation of the Russian Federation served as a legal basis for the interference with the rights under Articles 10 and 11 in.Crimea, as contended by the applicant Government, the Court refers to its earlier findings regarding the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity which was not foreseeable as to its effects and did not provide adequate protection, findings based, inter alia, on the observations by the Venice Commission in its Opinion no. 660/2011 (see paragraph 1101 above).

1325. Moreover, the Court considers that the regulatory nature of the alleged practice and its scale and intensity, supported by the above‐mentioned evidence, confirm the existence of both the “repetition of acts” and the “official tolerance” elements of the administrative practice under this head.

1326. In such circumstances and having regard to the fact that the respondent Government failed to put forward any elements which could have warranted the interference with the rights protected under Articles 10 and 11, the Court considers it unnecessary to continue the examination of the complaint in respect of the “legitimate aim” and “necessary in a democratic society” requirements.

1327. Given the above, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention on account of an administrative practice of unlawful deprivation of liberty, prosecution and conviction of “Ukrainian political prisoners” for exercising their freedom of expression, and of peaceful assembly and association. In the light of the above consideration, the Court is also satisfied that the administrative practice continued after the allegations in this respect were raised with the Court on 10 August 2018 and that no issue arises under the six-month rule.

(a) Regarding Article 18 in.conjunction with Article 6 of the Convention

1337. As regards Article 6 of the Convention, the Court notes that its provisions allow for both explicit and implicit restrictions. An express limitation applies to the public pronouncement of judgments. Furthermore, the Court has recognised in its case-law several implied limitations, such as for example:

1. (i) in Golder v. the United Kingdom (21 February 1975, § 38, Series A no. 18), it acknowledged that the right of access to a court was not absolute and could be subject to implied limitations;

2. (ii) in a series of cases, it confirmed that there could be restrictions to the right to legal assistance which had to be considered in the light of the overall fairness of the trial (see Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391/02, § 55, ECHR 2008; Dvorski v. Croatia [GC], no. 25703/11, § 79, ECHR 2015; Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541/08 and 3 others, §§ 256-57, 13 September 2016; and Simeonovi v. Bulgaria, no. 21980/04, § 116, 12 May 2017); and

3. (iii) in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, §§ 118-19, ECHR 2011), the Court confirmed that the non-attendance of a witness, even if it involved limitations of the right to a defence, could be counterbalanced with appropriate safeguards.

The Court has developed extensive case-law assessing the proportionality of restrictions concerning the above-mentioned Article 6 rights.

1338. Having regard to the above, the Court finds that the rights protected under Article 6 are guarantees with reference to which fundamental abuses by a State may be likely to manifest themselves. Therefore, trials before a court must never be used for “ulterior purposes” and thereby undermined. The Court therefore concludes that Article 18 is capable of applying in conjunction with Article 6 of the Convention.

(b) Regarding Article 18 in.conjunction with Article 7 of the Convention

1339. As regards Article 7 of the Convention, the Court has consistently held that “the guarantee enshrined [in this Article], which is an essential element of the rule of law, occupies a prominent place in the Convention system of protection, as is underlined by the fact that no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 of the Convention in time of war or other public emergency (see Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, § 92, 17 September 2009). This means, for example, that the fundamental safeguards enshrined in Article 7 may not be applied less stringently when it comes to the prosecution and punishment of terrorist offences, even when allegedly committed in circumstances threatening the life of the nation. The Convention requires the observance of the Article 7 guarantees, including in the most difficult of circumstances (see Yüksel Yalçınkaya, cited above, § 270).

1340. Given the non-derogable nature of the Article 7 guarantee, the Court considers that Article 18 of the Convention cannot apply in conjunction with it. Therefore, the complaint under Article 18 in.conjunction with Article 7 of the Convention must be rejected as incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.

(c) Conclusion as to admissibility

1341. In view of the above considerations, the Court concludes that Article 18 is capable of applying in conjunction with Article 6 of the Convention, but not in conjunction with Article 7 of the Convention. In addition, the Court considers that the complaint under Article 18 in.conjunction with Articles 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11 of the Convention does not fall short of the prima facie evidential threshold, and that it complies with the six‐month time-limit for reasons which will be explained below. It must therefore be declared admissible.

(a) The parties' submissions

(b) The Court's assessment