This latest work from Henry Nau, a professor of international affairs at George Washington University with an esteemed track record in this area, contributes to a well-established genre of writing on US policy that might be termed “ideological taxonomy.” This is a pursuit of long standing, from the early efforts of Hans Morgenthau to divide American statesmanship into its realist and utopian branches, to more personalized twenty-first-century slicing and dicing such as Walter Russell Mead's Special Providence (2001), and many in between. As a work of this type, Nau's book is a success, though this brings with it both the pleasures and the pitfalls of the approach.
In the first section of the book, the author does the conceptual lifting, enumerating four traditions: nationalism, realism, liberal internationalism and conservative internationalism. These differ, he argues, in their attitude towards the use of force, their commitment to international institutions, and the strength of their exceptionalist tendencies. It is Nau's contention that the first three traditions have been amply discussed in the study of American statesmanship, the fourth “neglected” (38). This he seeks to set right, first by articulating conservative internationalism's virtues in general terms, then by illustrating its qualities through case studies of the four Presidents named in the title.
Exercises of this sort, while they start entertainingly enough, can start to drag rather quickly: long passages must be spent assigning this, that or the other tendency within the world of policy preferences – e.g. commercial isolation, eagerness for military intervention, interest in the domestic affairs of others – to a larger ideological school or tradition. These traditions are then populated with particular Presidents from American history. As a matter of strict history, this quickly becomes untidy, since the record of specific Presidents can only very imperfectly be made to fit any single tradition.
It certainly does make sense to contextualize the dilemmas of American policy historically by reference to recurring points of contention: the extent of the military apparatus, the wisdom of overseas alliances, willingness to commit to nation-building overseas, the permissibility of intervention in others' affairs. Whether the positions taken by participants in these various, cross-cutting controversies cohere with enough regularity and consistency to give concrete form to the notion of “traditions,” a concept which implies the existence of stable parcels of worldview encompassing a range of issues, is debatable. For those who start out with less than a full tank of enthusiasm for the project, the lengthy exercise of parsing whether person A or policy B meets the criteria for designation as a member of tradition X, Y or Z can quickly come to appear moot.
As a matter of intellectual advocacy, however, the purpose is clearer: Nau's taxonomy is not framed as a dry outline of four equal alternatives: in “conservative internationalism” he clearly has his own dog in the fight. That this is the case sows some seeds of doubt in the reader's mind when it comes to the initial outlining of traditions: the knowledge that the author is building to his own “Goldilocks” proposition as the final component in the schema leads to some degree of suspicion when he describes the commitments of principle attributed to each other tradition. Just how unqualified is the faith of those who would self-describe as liberal internationalists in international institutions and law to obviate the need for national uses of force? And how determined are actually existing realists to exclude the spread of liberal government entirely from the nation's objectives? Positions on questions of this sort tend to be matters of degree rather than binaries. One suspects that those who self-apply these labels might feel that Nau, by seeking to apply a more balanced approach to conservative internationalism, may have denied them this opportunity.
For Nau, “conservative internationalism” appears to represents a staking out of intellectual ground in intra-conservative policy debates: more committed to the advance of liberal government worldwide than realism, less reckless in the pursuit of the objectives than neoconservatives (and of course less naive about the necessity of force than liberal internationalists are considered to be). As policy entrepreneurship this is all to the good, though it is reminiscent of “smart power” in the sense that the term itself may be so broad as to simply obscure the basis for continued disagreement rather than resolving it. By leaving all options on the table while appending an expectation that wise judgment of some sort be exercised in balancing between them – do try and spread democracy, but be restrained about it; don't be afraid to use force, but only when appropriate – conservative internationalism is in danger of being reducible to a call for balance and common sense, thus making it necessary to impute an absolutism and impracticality to contending alternatives which their own advocates would be disinclined to recognize as accurate.
Ideological labels certainly can be useful, chiefly as a means of signalling on what side one prefers to err when forced to make decisions on big issues of the sorts mentioned above, in a context of uncertainty. Nau puts down a marker for a brand of conservatism that advocates a robust attitude to the usefulness of military force and democratic universalism while holding back from the excesses of neoconservative nationalism. Given the extent to which the latter's intellectual brand has been tarnished over the last decade, this is good territory to occupy, and a healthy addition to the foreign policy of debate on the American right lest it become polarized between the extremes of neo- and paleocons. That Nau's scholarship allows him to back up such advocacy with informative and well-executed illustrative case studies of presidencies under which he believes good policy was pursued makes his contribution stronger, even if it may prove a bridge too far for some scholars to accept that Jefferson, Polk, Truman and Reagan actually do belong to a single shared tradition.
This is an erudite and highly readable contribution to the literature of its type, which puts intellectual weight and historical analysis behind an appeal for a sort of moderated neoconservatism. It will therefore likely appeal to those with ties to the policy world as well as those with a purely intellectual interest.
