In her book, Christina L. Davis provides an insightful and careful analysis of the domestic underpinnings of international trade law litigation. Why Adjudicate? fills a real gap in the literature by examining the factors that both shape and determine when states pursue legal challenges before the World Trade Organization's dispute-settlement mechanism. The author moves beyond the traditional scholarly focus of emphasizing the role of power politics in international law and provides a critical assessment of the reasons why state actors use international courts. Focusing on the United States and Japan as her primary case studies, she has completed an exceptional and valuable study that will be read by both scholars and professionals for years to come.

Davis makes a number of richly layered arguments with strong evidence to support each of them. Most significantly, she demonstrates that in countries such as the United States and Japan, policymakers use the international legal forum as a tool to defuse domestic political problems. She convincingly argues that “[g]overnments may set aside legal principles and economic criteria in order to gain support from influential interest groups and achieve diplomatic goals” (p. 286). While she recognizes that informal negotiations between state actors could potentially resolve legal disputes, Davis underscores that addressing questions of law is not the only reason for pursuing WTO claims. Rather, the very act of initiating challenges before the WTO serves as a mechanism by which national leaders can demonstrate that they are representing domestic interests and serving the public interest. She underscores that the “decision to invoke international law in a dispute does not proceed automatically on merits of the case alone” (p. 2). Rather, a number of domestic factors are considered, too.

The author also demonstrates a clear linkage between democracy and the use of litigation in international trade. Davis explains that elected officials rely on international legal action not only to emphasize their commitment to the protection of domestic interests but also to enhance electoral support among constituents. She emphasizes that citizens of democratic nations conceptualize courts as legitimate dispute-settlement bodies in a democratic society. Therefore, when political elites turn to the international legal arena to address domestic problems, there is widespread acceptance and support among the electorate.

Davis further argues that democratic governments with divided executives and legislatures are particularly prone to the use of international courts. Accordingly, “[a]djudication offers the executive under pressure from the legislature a strategy to visibly demonstrate commitment to domestic industries without risk of a trade war” (p. 62). She uses her data convincingly to show that in the United States, Congress encourages the executive to initiate claims in order to demonstrate that they are representing domestic interests. In doing so, members of the executive want to be perceived as concerned and effective leaders.

Davis's research is excellent. Her arguments are both clear and compelling. She advances each position thoroughly and thoughtfully. The only minor concern about her use of evidence pertains to Chapter 6 where she evaluates the effectiveness of adjudication. Her assessment of the progress of WTO litigation is based on reports of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), which she recognizes might be biased. Indeed, they do appear to be biased given the information she presents, and this weakens her otherwise important argument.

For example, Davis notes that the USTR material she used to support her findings included a report that, as a result of the WTO's Periodicals Case, American publishers gradually gained improvements in accessing the Canadian market (p. 249). Accordingly, she categorized this case as an example of WTO litigation having progress as an effective use of adjudication. While it is true that the American government was able to moderately advance the interests of American magazine publishers, it is not clear that this was because of the WTO challenge. In the aftermath of this WTO dispute, American officials threatened their counterparts in Ottawa with billions in sanctions outside the auspices of the WTO. The United States was concerned that, in implementing the WTO decision, Canadian authorities were going to technically comply with the WTO Agreement while still limiting American access to the Canadian market. The US threat resulted in an agreement between the two governments that allowed US magazines to have more access. But arguably, this case might be used as a better example of WTO ineffectiveness: So-called middle powers like Canada continue to defer when threatened by the economic might of the hegemonic power. Canadian officials complied because of economic threats, not because of WTO adjudication. It is arguable, therefore, that other sources than the USTR material might have been better for Davis to use as the basis for her arguments regarding the effectiveness of adjudication.

This concern aside, Davis's work is both important and provocative. Like any important study, it leaves the reader thinking about several related questions to her main arguments. First, one wonders how federal or confederal structures of government affect decisions to adjudicate in the international arena. What role do subnational levels of government play? The author clearly underscores how the separation of the executive and the legislature encourages international litigation in democracies such as the United States. But what role does federalism play? Do states with highly decentralized federal structures use international courts differently than do other nations? In Canada, for example, the quest of national political parties to curry provincial favor, as well as the never-ending secessionist threat in Quebec, add additional variables to the mix. As Davis herself asks, one wonders if Canada would have taken the Asbestos Case to the WTO if a province other than Quebec had been involved (p. 54). It is, therefore, at least arguable that the nature of federalism within democratic states is also an important variable in understanding a state's decision to adjudicate cases before the WTO.

Secondly, does the nature of the legal issue play a role in a nation's decision to adjudicate? WTO disputes involving trade-remedy matters are fundamentally different from those pertaining to trade in goods, services, and intellectual property. WTO challenges involving antidumping and subsidies target the domestic rules applied to goods that are unfairly imported into a nation. Trade-remedy challenges often affect several companies rather than just one major corporation, such as Boeing or Kodak. Given Davis's argument, one wonders, therefore, whether the executive is more likely (or less likely) to pursue trade-remedy cases to address domestic problems when such questions potentially affect several companies (across potentially different sectors). In other words, is the nature of the dispute also a variable to consider in determining why states adjudicate?

Thirdly, some WTO cases are filed in order to lay the groundwork for further litigation. How does this affect Davis's overall argument? In some cases, challenges have been initiated in order to begin the process of dismantling contested regulatory frameworks. These per se cases represent larger policy concerns rather than a specific industry or sector (i.e., the Section 301 Case and the Section 129 Case). Other legal challenges are initiated in order to establish a precedent to restrict another government's options. It was an open secret, for example, that New Zealand brought the Milk and Dairy Case against Canada to set a precedent to effectively block the European Union from adopting similar supply-management systems for products such as sugar. Still other disputes are brought forward as test cases, the first of many to come. In these challenges, a government brings a case forward in order to learn how best to frame other legal disputes that are similar in nature and coming down the pipeline (e.g., Lead Bars Case).

The questions set out here, as well as the single concern regarding the evidence used in Chapter 6, do not detract from the overall merit of this outstanding scholarly analysis. Rather, they underscore that Davis has written a truly enlightening and thought-provoking study. Indeed, Why Adjudicate? is an invaluable resource that addresses a real gap in the existing literature on international trade law. Moreover, it makes a major contribution to several fields, including international relations, law, and political economy. It is an excellent study and one that should be highly recommended to colleagues and students.