Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed a surge of social movements led by young people across the world, including the Color Revolutions in post-Soviet countries (Diuk Reference Diuk2012; Nikolayenko Reference Nikolayenko2007); the Arab Spring uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (Herrera Reference Herrera2012; Jules and Barton Reference Jules and Barton2018); the Occupy Movement in the United States (Catalano Reference Catalano2013); the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong (Menefee Reference Menefee2015; Schiavenza Reference Schiavenz2014); and the Euromaidan movement (henceforth the Euromaidan) in Ukraine (Onuch and Sasse Reference Onuch and Sasse2016). Growing socioeconomic inequalities, unbridled authoritarianism, and violations of political, civic, and social rights led young people to rise up against political authorities in their home countries, challenge government policies and decisions, and advocate for democratic changes (Han Reference Han, Vickers and Kumar2015; Herrera and Mansour Reference Herrera, Mansour, Ghazal and Hanssen2015; Jules and Barton Reference Jules and Barton2018; Onuch Reference Onuch2014a). These social movements became a channel for young people to express their discontent and resistance to the political and social institutions that had ignored their rights and to speak out in the struggle for change (Epstein Reference Epstein2015; Kiwan Reference Kiwan, Isin and Nyers2014; Sarfati Reference Sarfati and Epstein2015).
Existing research has extensively examined social movements within their national boundaries and the participation of young people in them (Epstein Reference Epstein2015; Han Reference Han, Vickers and Kumar2015; Herrera and Mansour Reference Herrera, Mansour, Ghazal and Hanssen2015; Jules and Barton Reference Jules and Barton2018; Onuch Reference Onuch2014a; Sarfati Reference Sarfati and Epstein2015). Even though numerous studies have documented the powerful influence of immigrants on the political development of their homelands (Guarnizo and Smith Reference Guarnizo, Smith, Smith and Guarnizo1998; Levitt and Jaworsky Reference Levitt and Jaworsky2007), research has rarely explored the expansion of social movements beyond their national boundaries and the engagement of young immigrants in these movements. Researchers exploring social movements also consistently note a lack of documentation of young people’s motivations in joining and staying in transnational movements (Del Felice and Solheim Reference Del Felice and Solheim2011; Onuch Reference Onuch, Marples and Mills2015a).
Immigrants influence the political development of their homelands through participation in electoral voting, support of political parties, cooperation with civil society, and financial contributions to various causes (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller Reference Guarnizo, Portes and Haller2003). Immigrants, especially those from less democratic countries who have lived in established democracies, also facilitate political development through the diffusion of democratic ideas, norms, and practices in their homeland (Chankseliani Reference Chankseliani2018; Itzigsohn and Villacrés Reference Itzigsohn and Villacrés2008; Koinova Reference Koinova2009). Further, they contribute to political development in their homelands through petitioning and lobbying host governments (Paul and Paul Reference Paul and Paul2009). Thus, young immigrants represent an intriguing subject of research, as they constitute a generational replacement in both their homeland and their immigrant communities. Inquiries into their collective action can shed light on the role they can play in the development of their respective homelands.
This article examines the motivations of young Ukrainian, US-residing immigrants to join the Euromaidan, which emerged in their homeland during the fall of 2013 and winter of 2014. It also compares the motivations of these immigrants to those of the protestors in Ukraine as documented in existing research. The Euromaidan represents a unique opportunity to investigate the topic because as a social movement it transcended national boundaries and brought together Ukrainian immigrants, who organized protests and rallies in their host communities around the world (e.g. Cipko Reference Cipko, Black and Johns2016; Korniychuk, Patalong, and Steinberg Reference Korniychuk, Patalong, Steinberg, Beichelt and Worschech2017; Oleksiyenko Reference Oleksiyenko2015). Further, Ukrainian immigrants represent a compelling subject of research, as they have played an active role in the development of Ukraine, especially since the proclamation of its independence (Koinova Reference Koinova2009; Satzewich Reference Satzewich2002; Yekelchyk Reference Yekelchyk2015).
In this article, we argue that the motivations of young Ukrainian immigrants to support the Euromaidan from abroad manifested themselves in symbolic or psychological causes rather than economic or instrumental causes, as explained by the rational choice theory. As our findings demonstrate, individuals were driven by an ideological commitment to systemic change in Ukraine, manifested in young Ukrainian immigrants’ desire to end injustice, solidarity with fellow Ukrainians, moral obligation to raise awareness among the US public, and, most prominently, sense of agency to contribute to the long-awaited change in the homeland. Our findings also show that motivations of young Ukrainian immigrants to join the movement were similar to those of the protestors in Ukraine.
In what follows, we situate our study in a conceptual framework that draws on existing theories of individual motivations in social movements. Next, we outline the research design and methodology of our study. Finally, we present our findings by highlighting the individual motivations that compelled young Ukrainian immigrants to engage in the Euromaidan from abroad. We conclude by highlighting key findings, reflecting on limitations, and proposing avenues for further research.
Conceptualizing the Study
Human and civil rights violations across the globe trigger responses from young people in the form of protests and social movements (Rossi Reference Rossi2009; Sarfati Reference Sarfati and Epstein2015). As the existing research (Epstein Reference Epstein2015) indicates, an ever-growing number of young people worldwide have been experiencing stark inequalities in accessing higher education and job opportunities. Feeling excluded from economic and political participation in their societies, young people in both authoritarian and nonauthoritarian societies protest against the neoliberal policies of defunding and privatizing public goods and services, as well as against the suppression of civic rights, through social movements (Catalano Reference Catalano2013; Epstein Reference Epstein2015; Herrera Reference Herrera2012). The protest movements of We Are All Khaled Said in Egypt, the Arab Spring uprising in Tunisia, Gezi Park in Turkey, Occupy Wall Street in the USA, the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong, and the Euromaidan in Ukraine demonstrate a direct link between civil rights violations perpetrated by governments and the mobilization of social movements by young people to show resistance to the institutions that ignore their rights and to speak out in the struggle for change (Catalano Reference Catalano2013; Epstein Reference Epstein2015; Kiwan Reference Kiwan, Isin and Nyers2014; Onuch Reference Onuch, Marples and Mills2015a; Sarfati Reference Sarfati and Epstein2015). In order to understand what motivates young people to participate in social movements, it is important to take note of how social movement motivations have been conceptualized in the literature to date.
While there is no consensus on the most salient motivational factors compelling individuals to collective action (Jost et al. Reference Jost, Barbera, Bonneau, Langer, Metzger, Nagler, Sterling and Tucker2018; Pinard Reference Pinard2011), social movement motivations can be categorized as instrumental (economic) and symbolic (psychological or ideational) causes of collective action (Jost et al. Reference Jost, Barbera, Bonneau, Langer, Metzger, Nagler, Sterling and Tucker2018). The instrumental school of thought argues that individual motivations can be explained by the rational choice theory, which posits that an individual carefully calculates the anticipated costs and benefits of participating in a social movement and pursues self-interested goals (Oberschall Reference Oberschall1973; Tilly Reference Tilly1978). The symbolic or ideational school of thought argues that social and psychological causes move individuals to collective action, such as grievances or moral outrage; ideological commitment; social identification or collective identity; moral obligation; aspirations; and individual agency, among others (Gamson Reference Gamson, Morris and Mueller1992; Jost et al. Reference Jost, Barbera, Bonneau, Langer, Metzger, Nagler, Sterling and Tucker2018; Pinard Reference Pinard2011; Wilson Reference Wilson2017).
Social movement theorists prior to the 1970s theorized individual motivations mobilizing collective behavior primarily as objective deprivations or felt grievances, also termed as the relative deprivation theory (Pinard Reference Pinard2011).Footnote 1 In the 1970s, social movement theories took a turn away from the internal motives of deprivations and grievances to emphasize structural approaches to collective action. In particular, the resource mobilization and the political process (or contentious politics approach) theories challenged the relative deprivation theory by bringing collective and selective incentives to the forefront of the debate (McCarthy and Zald Reference McCarthy and Zald1973; Tilly Reference Tilly1978, as cited in Pinard Reference Pinard2011). Rejecting the influence of the deprivation theory, the political process or contentious politics theory developed by Tilly focused on individual interests, articulated through claims, emerging within solidarity groups as motivating factors for collective action. Tilly defined interests as “gains and losses” (Reference Tilly1978, 7) or “the shared advantages and disadvantages” (Reference Tilly1978, 54) that social movement participants enjoy as a result of their collective action. Some scholars argued that Tilly’s theory of individual interests neglected the internal motives that can spur individuals to collective action before they can express their interests through various claims (Pinard Reference Pinard2011).
Contesting the overbearing focus on structural factors in the resource mobilization and contentious politics theories, the constructivist approach shed light on the ideational and psychological factors that shape collective behavior (Gamson Reference Gamson, Morris and Mueller1992; Snow et al. Reference Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford1986; Snow and McAdam Reference Snow, McAdam, Stryker, Owens and White2000). More specifically, those factors included framingFootnote 2 processes in collective action; emotional feelings in motivating participants (grievances); collective identity; and solidarity in mobilization processes. Further elaborating on the framing processes approach, Gamson (Reference Gamson, Morris and Mueller1992) identified three salient components of framing collective action: (1) injustice, accompanied by anger, moral indignation, or outrage; (2) agency, a sense of individual and collective efficacy in changing the situation; and (3) collective identity, noting that a sense of injustice precipitates agency and collective identity motivations. It is in the collective framing perspective that grievances were revived as a critical motivating factor in collective action (Pinard Reference Pinard2011).
In the 1990s, emotions became a central focus in theories on collective action, rejecting an earlier argument that emotions were irrational (Jasper Reference Jasper1998, Reference Jasper, Goodin and Tilly2006). Jasper distinguished between affective emotions—attachments, solidarities, and loyalties—and reactive responses to events and information—anger, indignation, and fear of danger—that mobilized collective action. Pinard (Reference Pinard2011), however, contended that Jasper and his colleagues failed to integrate emotions with deprivations and grievances into their theory of social movements.
Building on the relative deprivation, rational choice, and psychological theories, Pinard proposed a “multiplicative model of motivations” that included internal motives, such as grievances and emotions, moral obligations, and aspirations, as well as external incentives, representing potential goods and expectancy of success (Reference Pinard2011, 91–92). Pinard argued that grievances can be accompanied by aspirations for collective incentives or collective good, as well as combined with moral obligations rooted in values, norms, and ideologies informing individual contributions to collective action. In addition to the internal motives, social movement motivations can also be fueled by external incentives, such as altruistic and self-interested contributions. Finally, participants need to feel some expectancy of success in order for the collective action to take hold.
In our study we will be drawing on the constructivist approach and more specifically the ideational cause that helps explain how ideals or ideological commitment compel activists to rise up against repressive regimes in their home countries (Gamson Reference Gamson, Morris and Mueller1992; Wilson Reference Wilson2017). Indeed, as Pinard (Reference Pinard2011) argued, while altruistic ideological commitment alone may not be sufficient to mobilize individuals in large groups on a daily basis, ideological commitment is more likely to be a pronounced motivational cause in contentious collective action, particularly among the movement leaders and activists. This characteristic of ideological commitment is particularly important for our case study that focused on the cofounders and activists of the Euromaidan in the USA.
Contextualizing the Study
Young people and the Euromaidan in Ukraine
As in the case of the Revolution on Granite of 1990 and the Orange Revolution of 2004, young people were at the forefront of the Euromaidan movement of 2013–2014. While these revolutions were triggered by a turning point or critical juncture, be it the collapse of the Soviet Union, electoral fraud, or the nonsigning of the EU agreement, each of them was an outcome of larger political, economic, and social issues persisting in Ukraine. Each critical juncture created space for Ukrainian citizens to defend their political, civil, social, and human rights and vent their frustrations at political authorities (Onuch Reference Onuch2014b; Tucker Reference Tucker and D’Anieri2010).
Overall, the Euromaidan was characterized by changing actors and claims (Onuch and Sasse Reference Onuch and Sasse2016). At the very start of the Euromaidan, one of the main motivations to join the movement was to protest the then president’s refusal to sign a free trade agreement with the EU, which many Ukrainians associated with a higher quality of life. As Ryabchuk (Reference Ryabchuk2014) noted, while many protestors did not know much about the content of the agreement, they were driven to the streets by a utopian image of Europe that they associated with a more prosperous life and contrasted it to the anti-utopian image of Russia and its neocolonial aspirations. However, after the violence was unleashed against protesting students by the riot police on the Maidan Square, Ukrainians took to the streets in thousands and began to demand the protection of civic and human rights, which shifted the discourse from EU accession to democratic institutions and procedures (Onuch and Sasse Reference Onuch and Sasse2016).Footnote 3
Although the Euromaidan protestors were united by the common goals of protecting their rights and aspiring to a better future for Ukraine, their demands and motivations varied in focus. Onuch’s (Reference Onuch2014a) survey of the Euromaidan participants revealed that motivations across all protestors were similar, yet nuanced. Young people, including students, focused their claims around notions of freedom, rights, and democracy and viewed European integration as a means to meet their demands.Footnote 4 They also voiced their support of higher education quality improvement and better labor market opportunities. The demands of middle-age professionals included socioeconomic security, eradication of corruption, protection of civil and human rights, accountable government, and liberalization of EU-Ukraine travel. Lastly, the older population joined the movement out of concern for the future of their children, the country as a whole, and the overall poor living conditions in Ukraine. As these findings and those of other studies show, the Euromaidan protestors across all age groups took to the streets not only to protect human and civil rights but also to advocate socioeconomic well-being and the restoration of respect for their human dignity (Chebotariova Reference Chebotariova, Marples and Mills2015; Zelinska Reference Zelinska2017). Thus, while the refusal to sign the EU agreement fueled the protests, the deprivations and grievances behind them, which were deeply rooted in Ukrainian society, were the underlying causes.Footnote 5
As the above shows, while the nonsigning of the EU agreement triggered another social movement in Ukraine, the movement was caused by the socioeconomic and political deprivations, such as unaccountable political elites, rampant corruption, increasing socioeconomic inequalities, and growing unemployment. Firsthand experiences of these injustices compelled many people living in Ukraine to join the movement and exercise their personal agency in a hope to reset the broken system and restore respect for human dignity and rights.
Ukrainian Immigrants and the Euromaidan
The Ukrainian diaspora, or immigrants in Western Europe and North America, has played an important role in Ukraine’s political, economic, and social development, especially since the proclamation of its independence in 1991. For instance, during the early days of independence, the diaspora worked on multiple fronts to assist with the country’s democratization and nation-building. It lobbied foreign governments to adopt policies favorable to Ukraine’s interests; cooperated with the Ukrainian government to advance democratic transformations; sponsored and facilitated educational and cultural visits of civil servants and students to the USA and Canada; contributed to the electoral process by monitoring electoral campaigns, sending observers, and supporting public debates between party representatives; and, lastly, worked toward strengthening the status of the Ukrainian language (Koinova Reference Koinova2009; Satzewich Reference Satzewich2002).
The diaspora also supported social movements in Ukraine (Cipko Reference Cipko, Black and Johns2016; Koinova Reference Koinova2009; Wilson Reference Wilson2006, Reference Wilson, Roberts and Garton2009), which they generally viewed as another window of opportunity to further advance political, economic, and social transformation of the country. Like the Revolution on Granite and the Orange Revolution, the Euromaidan created an opportunity for immigrants to reengage with Ukraine beyond personal connections. As Satzewich noted, the Euromaidan and the events following it “reinvigorat[ed] the Ukrainian diaspora’s interest in and support of Ukraine from abroad—and put to the test their ability to leverage their global presence for the benefit of those in the country itself” (quoted in Cipko Reference Cipko, Black and Johns2016, 60). Ukrainians held rallies in major cities around the world in solidarity with the protesters; fundraised to support the protesters and the Ukrainian army; petitioned their host governments to impose sanctions on Russia and provide aid to Ukraine; and informed the global and local public about the unfolding events in Ukraine (Fujiwara Reference Fujiwara, Marples and Mills2015; Korniychuk, Patalong, and Steinberg Reference Korniychuk, Patalong, Steinberg, Beichelt and Worschech2017; Krasynska Reference Krasynska, Marples and Mills2015).
While existing research provides plentiful information about the actions of the Ukrainian diaspora during and after the Euromaidan, it rarely discusses the motivations of Ukrainians living abroad to join and support the Euromaidan compared to those living in Ukraine (e.g., Chebotariova Reference Chebotariova, Marples and Mills2015; Onuch Reference Onuch2014a; Zelinska Reference Zelinska2017). For instance, Krasynska’s (Reference Krasynska, Marples and Mills2015) study about the contributions made by Ukrainians abroad to the movement through social media networks shows that some immigrants created translation blogs and participated in Twitter storm campaigns. They did so in order to present accurate information in different languages about the events unfolding in Ukraine, to generate public awareness, and to put pressure on foreign governments to respond to the events of the Euromaidan. Krasynska’s study provides a glimpse into potential motivations of Ukrainian immigrants joining the Euromaidan from abroad. However, it does not examine these motivations in depth, especially the motivations of young Ukrainian immigrants. Like other studies, it describes Ukrainian immigrants in homogenous terms, despite the fact that existing research acknowledges political and cultural tensions among Ukrainians representing different waves of migration (Satzewich Reference Satzewich2002).
Our study addresses these issues by investigating the motivations of young Ukrainian, US residing immigrants to support and join the Euromaidan movement from abroad. These young immigrants, many of whom immigrated to the USA in the last two decades, were some of the key actors in the Ukrainian diaspora during the Euromaidan protests. They mobilized in New York City, Philadelphia, and Washington, DC, in support of the Euromaidan and rapidly transformed the movement into a nonprofit organization, Razom. What motivated young Ukrainian immigrants abroad to mobilize and join the movement in the USA will be explored below.
Research Design and Methodology
Our research project adopted a qualitative case study approach, within which the social movement turned nonprofit organization Razom constituted a case (Yin Reference Yin2014). The participants in the study were founders and volunteers of Razom, interviewed over the summer and fall of 2015 in person or via Skype. For the purposes of this article, we included data we had collected from 24 young peopleFootnote 6 as part of our larger sample of 30 participants in total. We recruited the study participants using an opportunistic purposive sampling approach based on three criteria: (1) the participants were members of Razom; (2) they had a record of active participation in Razom activities (e.g., rallies and protests, cultural gatherings, fundraising events, and meetings with Ukrainian policy makers, public figures, activists, and artists visiting New York) and of assisting Razom with its activities (e.g., writing reports, monitoring media, organizing fundraising and other types of events, and providing expert advice); and (3) the participants of Ukrainian descent came from different geographical areas of Ukraine.
24 out of 30 study participants were born in Ukraine and had come to the USA within the past two decades. The median number of years they had lived in the USA was ten. The average age was 29, with the youngest being 21 years old and the oldest 35 at the time of the Euromaidan. The vast majority of the participants were young professionals working in such fields as finance, management, marketing, sales, information technology and computing, law, medicine, office administration, and construction. Four participants were full-time or part-time undergraduate or graduate students. We conducted interviews with Razom members in New York City, Washington, DC, and Philadelphia. The interviews were conducted in English, Ukrainian, or Russian.
We analyzed the data employing both inductive and deductive coding strategies; used a method of constant comparison to search for similarities and differences in the interview data; established patterns across our data; and constructed emerging themes. The study has three limitations. First, we interviewed only those who chose to support the Euromaidan and had joined Razom. We did not study young immigrants who did not support the Euromaidan, who did not have the opportunity to join organizations like Razom, or who decided to contribute to the Euromaidan in other ways. Second, the majority of individuals we interviewed represented the most active members of Razom, which has over 200 members. Lastly, we inquired about the study participants’ motivations to join the Euromaidan movement a year and a half after the end of the protests. As a result, our project falls into the category of studies that “rely on individuals recalling their reasons to, and patterns of, protest, months or even years after” (Onuch Reference Onuch2015b, 219). Thus, it does not capture immediate reflections on motivations to join the movement.
Findings
In what follows, we discuss the motivations of the study participants to support the Euromaidan movement in Ukraine from afar. The motivations of the 24 study participants can be conceptually represented by a cause of an ideological commitment (Pinard Reference Pinard2011; Wilson Reference Wilson2017) to systemic change in Ukraine, which manifested itself through the participants’ desire to end injustice; solidarity with the protestors in Ukraine; moral obligation to raise awareness among the US public; and, most prominently, sense of self-efficacy or agency to contribute to systemic change in Ukraine. In addition, our research findings demonstrate how the motivations of the young immigrants aligned with those of the protestors in Ukraine.
The emergence of the Euromaidan was a turning point that galvanized young Ukrainian immigrants’ activism abroad in support of their fellow Ukrainians, who demanded change in Ukraine. The 24 participants we interviewed witnessed how their long-term aspirations for Ukraine’s European future were shattered when the then president scrapped the EU association agreement, which, they believed, would have helped Ukraine to solidify its relationship with the West, for them a paragon of democracy and prosperity. Like their fellow Ukrainians (see Ryabchuk Reference Ryabchuk2014), some study participants associated Europe with a prosperous life and accountable politicians who serve people and respect their dignity and rights. They thought that the EU association would help Ukraine to break away from pandemic corruption, kleptocracy, lawlessness, and subsistence living standards, as well as from the neocolonial influence of Russia. Many participants spoke about how they would like Ukrainians to experience a better life, like what most of them enjoyed in the USA. Reflecting about the declining state of affairs in Ukraine, one of the participants stated, “The trigger was when I realized how many people came out on Maidan, how many people were actually thinking in their head this is something we need to fix in our system. Whatever was happening in Ukraine, it was a train wreck. This country is sort of killing itself. It is extremely corrupt, and the government is inefficient, and people don’t care. Seeing people come out and try to overcome the government made me realize they do care. They just needed this push; they needed a spark to come out” (June 16, 2015).
As Jasper (Reference Jasper1998) noted in the psychological theory of social movements, a critical event can trigger an array of emotions, particularly outrage, frustration, and anger, galvanizing individuals to collective action. Indeed, the study participants’ frustration with the failed EU association agreement was followed by another wave of outrage when the riot police brutally dispersed peacefully protesting students on the main square of Kyiv. Three of the 24 participants stated that it was their initial feeling of outrage triggering the desire to end injustice in Ukraine that compelled them to walk out onto the streets of New York City, Philadelphia, and Washington, DC, to protest: “I think [it was] injustice. I felt like it was a gross misunderstanding, and injustice was happening in Ukraine. The world saw us” (June 20, 2015). For some participants, this moral outrage was intensified by the presence of their close friends on the Maidan during the brutal dispersal of the protestors by the police: “For me, the beating of students on the main square was the breaking point. I kept watching the news that night and could not fall asleep. The next morning, I was at the White House gate” (June 18, 2015). These accounts illustrate moral outrage at injustice, or grievance, as a salient motivation propelling young people to collective action (Gamson Reference Gamson, Morris and Mueller1992; Jasper Reference Jasper1998; Jost et al. Reference Jost, Barbera, Bonneau, Langer, Metzger, Nagler, Sterling and Tucker2018), which Pinard (Reference Pinard2011) argued tends to be the underlying cause of any collective movement. Similarly, the moral outrage at the state repression in Ukraine and the desire to end injustice was one of the core motivations for Ukrainian cause lawyers, who mobilized to provide pro bono legal services to protestors in the Euromaidan movement in Kyiv (Wilson Reference Wilson2017).
Additional ideational cause that motivated the young Ukrainian immigrants to mobilize rallies in public squares and in front of the United Nations in New York City, the White House in Washington, DC, and in downtown Philadelphia included solidarity with their fellow citizens. Two participants noted that showing solidarity with their fellow Ukrainians on the main square in Kyiv was the reason why they joined the Euromaidan in the USA. One participant, for example, explained, “I was not in Ukraine then, but I thought it would help Ukrainians to know that we are doing the same because we are on the same page with them. That’s why we copied exactly the same things that they were doing in Kyiv here. Wherever we are—just to support them, show them that they are doing the right thing” (June 27, 2015).
A sense of solidarity was reinforced by autobiographical ties to the cause (Rossi Reference Rossi2009). All participants had existing familial ties to Ukraine and shared the vicarious experience of the socioeconomic and political issues that gave rise to the Euromaidan protests. The majority of our participants had migrated to the USA 10 to 15 years prior to the Euromaidan movement, and only a few of them had come to the USA as late as a few months before the movement began in Ukraine. Speaking about their connection to Ukraine, one participant noted, “I moved to the USA fairly recently, a few months before the Euromaidan started. So, I feel very much connected to Ukraine. When something like this happens at home, when people are suffering, and you are so far away from home, it is hard to be immune to it” (August 25, 2015).
In addition to showing solidarity with Ukrainians through weekly rallies across New York City, Washington, DC, and Philadelphia, five participants reported that the motivation to raise awareness about the unfolding events and injustices in Ukraine that were otherwise not covered by US media, especially in the early days of the Euromaidan movement, compelled them to join the social movement. As other research (Fujiwara Reference Fujiwara, Marples and Mills2015; Krasynska Reference Krasynska, Marples and Mills2015; Oleksiyenko Reference Oleksiyenko2015) shows, this motivation was very common among immigrants. They believed that lack of accurate information and awareness about the Euromaidan among Western observers and the general public would not allow them to bring attention to and garner support for Ukraine. Speaking about this issue, one of our participants stated, “It was to sort of raise awareness. Maybe if enough of us show up out there with our flags and our tridents, passersby will understand that there is something else going on at the other end of the world that needs to have their attention. Definitely raising awareness” (June 16, 2015).
In addition to holding protests and rallies, as well as organizing walks in public squares and parks, the young Ukrainian immigrants intentionally discussed the events unfolding in Ukraine with their coworkers and friends to raise awareness among the US public. One of the participants shared their experience: “I was just trying to raise the awareness of Americans. Even at that point the propaganda machine, the Russian propaganda machine, started working against Ukraine, and I just really wanted to raise awareness of what was happening in Ukraine. I was talking to my colleagues and my Americans, and they were asking me, ‘Hey, what’s going on in Ukraine?’ And I explained as much as I could” (June 19, 2015).
These accounts demonstrate that the desire to stand up in solidarity with Ukrainians and moral obligation to raise awareness about the unfolding events in Ukraine among the US public reflect a collective sense of identity conceptualized in the social psychology theory as a triggering factor to join a social movement (Gamson Reference Gamson, Morris and Mueller1992). Pinard defined collective identity as “sentiments among members of a group that they share much with one another regarding their values, goals, interests, and fate” (Reference Pinard2011, 115). Our 24 participants were born in Ukraine, self-identified as Ukrainian, and shared common goals for a democratic and prosperous Ukraine, which united them in their collective identity. A sense of collective identity fosters feelings of solidarity among members of the social movement in pursuit of their goals, and, as Jasper (Reference Jasper1998) noted, every form of identity carries certain moral and ideological obligations.
The most prominent motivational factor within the ideational cause that emerged in our findings was the young Ukrainian immigrants’ sense of agency or self-efficacy, a belief that collective action can be effective (Gamson Reference Gamson, Morris and Mueller1992; Pinard Reference Pinard2011; Wood Reference Wood2003), to change unjust social structures and contribute to systemic change in Ukraine. Of the 24 participants, 14 articulated that the motivation behind their participation in the Euromaidan movement was to help enact systemic change in Ukraine. From the perspectives of the participants, systemic change signified democratic governance, free of corruption, nepotism, lawlessness, and disrespect for human dignity, which would ultimately improve the well-being of Ukrainians. As one of the participants put it, “I would like to see Ukraine to be a successful country where people live free with dignity and are able to pursue their goals and interests … where the government isn’t kleptocratic and isn’t stealing from and impoverishing its people. So, that’s my core motivation, and I realize there is still a lot to be done in Ukraine. That it’s only the beginning … Every sphere in Ukraine needs to be reformed, and there is a lot of work to be done” (June 23, 2015). Similarly, another participant shared, “Help them [Ukrainians] change the system that got us all in this situation we find ourselves today. That was the moment when I said I cannot stand aside” (July 26, 2015).
In addition to an overhaul of the governance system, the participants believed in the need to change the paternalistic mindset and lack of personal responsibility among Ukrainians. More specifically, they thought that the Ukrainian people themselves needed to contribute to the success of the reform process rather than passively expect change to happen on its own. Indeed, they firmly believed that the public had to hold elected officials accountable and demand systemic reforms from the state rather than limit their demands to the provision of basic material goods and services. In other words, they recognized that any change starts with oneself and can be a vehicle of systemic social and political change thereafter. Just like the governance system, they were convinced that the public consciousness needed to be rebooted.
Lastly, the participants saw a strong civil society as a crucial component of systemic change in Ukraine. They believed that civil society could facilitate change through grassroots projects and create public pressure on the elected officials by demanding reforms and acting as watchdogs. As one participant asserted, “I have always believed that change starts with the grassroots movement, and this is what it comes down to. In order for change to happen, it cannot be born in the cabinets of the ministries and presidential administration in Kyiv. Change begins with such people as we are, who make a difference basically one project at a time. By growing more and doing bigger things, this is when we can expect the entire system to change” (June 16, 2015).
Feeling like they could make a difference in the state of affairs of Ukraine from afar, the young Ukrainian immigrants spoke about their sense of agency or self-efficacy as the pivotal motivation for their collective mobilization.Footnote 7 As Wood (Reference Wood2003) contended, in contexts where participants have limited experience with political efficacy, which was the case for most of our research participants who had no or limited experience with mobilizing collective action, a sense of agency serves as a motivating factor. It is also important to note here that our participants in the USA were not directly affected by the same deprivations or disadvantages, such as systemic inequalities, corruption, and suppression of civil rights, like their compatriots in Ukraine had been, and thus did not feel the need to calculate personal costs and benefits of their participation in the social movement, as the rational choice theory would posit.
Conclusions
The Euromaidan in Ukraine was a turning point that galvanized young Ukrainian, US-residing immigrants to support the movement from abroad. Just like their fellow compatriots in Ukraine, young Ukrainians in the USA were disappointed with the government’s last-minute decision to withdraw from the EU association agreement; they were frustrated with the unaccountable and corrupt political system and subsistence living standards in Ukraine; and they were outraged by the brutal violence unleashed against their peers and fellow citizens on the Maidan in Kyiv. Furthermore, a sense of collective identity—manifested in solidarity with Ukrainians—and moral obligation to raise awareness about the state of affairs in Ukraine intensified their motivations. However, most prominently, a deep-seated motivation for joining and supporting the movement was young immigrants’ sense of agency to bring about political, economic, and social change in Ukraine transnationally, to which they have been contributing through the nonprofit Razom for the past six years.
As our study shows, individual motivations to support the Euromaidan from abroad represent an ideational cause that can be explained by a constructivist approach. Our findings demonstrate that motivations of young Ukrainian immigrants to participate in the Euromaidan constitute an ideological commitment to systemic change, manifested in moral outrage at and desire to end injustice; solidarity and moral obligation to raise awareness; and self-efficacy or agency of participants to change the situation. Rational choice theory thus presents limitations in accounting for young Ukrainian immigrants’ motivations in the Euromaidan, as none of the participants reflected on the costs and benefits of their participation or calculated their individual participation based on their self-interest, a dynamic similarly found in Wood’s (Reference Wood2003) comprehensive study of insurgent collective action in El Salvador. Indeed, all of our participants were driven by ideational rather than economic or instrumental causes.
When we compare our findings with those of studies that have examined the motivations of protestors in Ukraine (Chebotariova Reference Chebotariova, Marples and Mills2015; Onuch Reference Onuch2014a; Zelinska Reference Zelinska2017), we see that young Ukrainian immigrants’ motivations to support the Euromaidan movement aligned with those of their compatriots in Ukraine. At the very beginning of the movement, their main motivation was to protest the then president’s refusal to sign a free trade agreement with the EU. As the movement progressed, they protested the violation of civic and human rights in Ukraine, advocated for respect of people’s dignity, and demanded systemic change. Similar to their peers in Ukraine, for young immigrants the Euromaidan was not only about European integration but about addressing the entrenched issues of unaccountable political elites, rampant corruption, and economic inequalities.
The study has several limitations. First, our study investigated the motivations of young Ukrainian immigrants in major US cities on the East Coast, where their participation was most prominent, and thus did not capture the motivations of young Ukrainian immigrants who resided in other cities. Second, the study focused only on young Ukrainian immigrants who chose to support the Euromaidan movement from abroad; we did not have the chance to speak with those who might have not had the time to participate in the movement, or opposed the movement and chose to participate in the anti-Euromaidan movement, which was present in Ukraine. Finally, as mentioned in our design and methodology section, we interviewed our participants a year and a half after the emergence of the Euromaidan. As such, one of the future lines of inquiry to consider is to study individual motivations at the outset of the social movement, when participants’ motives can be captured immediately. Despite these limitations, our study sheds light on the understudied group of young immigrants in the Ukrainian diaspora and their ideological commitment to mobilize the Euromaidan movement from abroad with the ultimate goal of effecting systemic change in Ukraine.
Disclosure
Authors have nothing to disclose. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors, and do not reflect the views of the institutions they represent.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for engaging with our manuscript and providing constructive feedback, which has further sharpened our manuscript.
