A characteristic shortcoming of studies that address political-philosophic themes in the work of literary writers is that readers learn much more about the writers than they do about politics. They will usually gain new appreciation for a writer's work and, often enough, for the scholar who interprets that work. Still, they may find themselves thinking that the philosophical takeaway is rather meager. This caveat applies in some measure to Nathaniel Hawthorne as Political Philosopher.
The larger part of the book consists, unsurprisingly, of interpretations of Hawthorne's works—to be sure, with an eye to questions of political-philosophic interest. But John Alvis has done something more by including sections given over to his own reflections on the American Declaration of Independence (the “Revolutionary Principles” of the subtitle). His interpretations show the cross-pollinating effects of two distinct bodies of scholarly literature. (The book includes a bibliographic essay in two parts, one devoted to the Declaration of Independence and the other to Hawthorne.) As Alvis concedes, his interest in the Declaration for its own sake is one feature that makes his book unusual among studies of its kind, but it does recommend the work to political scientists. Another unusual feature is his willingness to aver that he views the Declaration in a positive light, as expressing the principles of “a founding uncommonly well devised” and worthy of being defended (p. 4).
Why Hawthorne? Alvis identifies him with a set of mid-nineteenth-century writers—James Fenimore Cooper and Herman Melville are also named—who “took upon themselves the project of defining America, the polity” (p. 1). For reasons that might well have been spelled out in greater detail, he finds Hawthorne's work to be most suitable for examination: “[S]uch ambivalences as one encounters in Hawthorne's fiction owe to his honest confrontations with certain tensions inseparable from the principles he attributes to his countrymen past and present, tensions identical with those one can perceive in Jefferson's Declaration” (p. 3). So far as I have been able to discover from Alvis's presentation, Hawthorne nowhere directly refers to the Declaration in his published work, except in a book written for children where the reference appears in a straightforward historical context. Moreover, the decision to focus on the Declaration implies an estimate of its importance for later generations of Americans that accords better with Abraham Lincoln's speeches of the 1850s than with views current in Hawthorne's own Democratic Party. Lincoln had to make an argument for the continuing importance of the Declaration because so many Americans were inclined to deny it. (Though not narrowly partisan in his politics, Hawthorne did write a campaign biography for his friend and Bowdoin College classmate Franklin Pierce, in which he defended Pierce's temporizing policy toward slavery.) On the strength of a somewhat shaky premise, Alvis is willing to “try the chances of mutual illumination” by examining Hawthorne's work in conjunction with that state paper (p. 5).
The author gives detailed consideration to a number of Hawthorne's short stories and to his three “impaired romances” (The Blithedale Romance, The House of the Seven Gables, and The Marble Faun), as well as to his masterpiece, The Scarlet Letter. As Alvis regards the last-named work as Hawthorne's “definitive statement upon matters moral and political” (p. 206), however, I pass directly to the parts of the book that treat The Scarlet Letter. Here, I must find fault with one point in Alvis's interpretation.
Readers of the novel will remember the scene in which Hester Prynne, the wearer of the scarlet letter, contrives to meet her lover Arthur Dimmesdale in the forest some seven years after the birth of their daughter had made it impossible to conceal her adultery. There she tries to persuade him to go away with her—and seems for a time to have succeeded, until Dimmesdale recovers his sense of the sin she would invite him to disregard. Between Hester's idea of their love as a private “consecration”—her word—superior in dignity to both the code of the commonwealth and traditional Christian doctrine, and Dimmesdale's idea of the same love as a grave and culpable violation of human and divine law, Hawthorne, while not denying the attractiveness of the former idea, clearly finds the latter one to be sounder. He thus anticipates the modern reader's question: What is this thing called sin, and why should it prevent two nice people from having a happy life together? The freedom Hester offers her lover—to begin their lives anew in a distant place—resembles the modern solution of divorce and remarriage, and indeed there is evidence that Hester has contemplated institutional reform along these lines.
While noting Hawthorne's skepticism about reform of this kind, Alvis discerns a more practicable solution. It is likely that the Boston authorities, had they known all the facts, would have declared the Prynnes' marriage dissolved, thereby freeing Hester to marry Dimmesdale, restoring Pearl to her father, and incidentally foiling Roger Chillingworth's scheme of revenge (pp. 231–32, 257–58). The couple might have escaped further penalty for the wrong they had done and rejoined the community as a family. However, one cannot take such a possibility seriously without depriving Hawthorne's story of its tragic quality—introducing a note of Jeffersonian optimism quite foreign to it. In respect to this element of his story, it is difficult to see how Hawthorne could have approved the reinterpretation of Christianity in Jefferson's spirit, “in the direction of non-doctrinal humanitarianism” (p. 236), as Alvis supposes.
Indeed, as Alvis brings out in another part of the book, Hawthorne seems to have viewed his contemporaries as facing a temptation that was dangerous in a manner similar to Hester's proposal of flight. In two of his stories in particular, “The Celestial Railroad” and “Earth's Holocaust,” Hawthorne effectively satirizes the effort to substitute social progress, or large-scale reform, for individual moral and spiritual discipline. One cannot imagine that Jefferson, believer in progress as he was, found much to admire in Puritan ways. In a famous letter from 1822 that Alvis cites, Jefferson looked forward with satisfaction to the prospect that Unitarianism would supplant traditional Christianity in America. But the Puritans' severity attracted Hawthorne's admiration in part, not only his criticism. The sections of Hawthorne as Political Philosopher that take up these stories (pp. 68–82) strike me as the most valuable in the book. In “The Celestial Railroad,” Hawthorne's target is his contemporaries' complacency about the moral effects of technical progress; in “Earth's Holocaust,” his target is zealotry directed against vestiges of the unreformed past, from the trappings of hereditary privilege to alcoholic drinks to statute books, fine literature, and finally the Bible itself.
Mid-nineteenth-century Americans fell far below the standard of their Puritan forebears in strictness of discipline, but, as Hawthorne makes terrifyingly clear, in some respects they were prepared to go much further in intolerance. In these stories, on Alvis's own account, Hawthorne shows himself to be as much a critic of the Declaration's progressivism as a defender of it.
