Introduction
Compared to other European countries, far-right political parties are relatively new to Ireland and have had minimal electoral success. While they do not currently challenge Ireland’s three established left-wing and center-right political parties (Sinn Féin, Fine Gael, and Fianna Fáil), understanding how they frame issues is important because even peripheral parties and activist ideas can influence mainstream political rhetoric and policy (Lamour Reference Lamour2024; Mondon and Winter Reference Mondon and Winter2020; Newth et al. Reference Newth, Brown and Mondon2025).
Much recent Irish research literature on the far-right has pointed towards the influence of social media platforms and influencers in propagating far-right ideas (Dikwal-Bot and McIntyre Reference Dikwal-Bot and McIntyre2025; Fattibene et al. Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2024, Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2026; Gallagher and O’Connor, Reference Gallagher and O’Connor2021; Kirk Reference Kirk, Herkman and Palnen2024; Lynch et al. Reference Lynch, Fattibene, Windle and Ahmed2025; Phelan and Kerrigan Reference Phelan and Kerrigan2023), including through “multi-directional exchanges of ideas,” and conspiracies, between the US and Ireland (Fattibene et al. Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2024; Sweeney Reference Sweeney and Ahmed2025). While many of these transnational ideas are adapted to fit local cultures, they broadly conform to corresponding categories designed to spread far-right ideas surreptitiously to a broader audience (McSwiney et al. Reference McSwiney, Vaughan, Heft and Hoffman2021). Research on social media is useful; however, political party websites are an under-researched area of political communication (Kruikemeier et al. Reference Kruikemeier, Aparaschivei, Boomgaarden, Van Noort and Vliegenthart2015). Many studies examining political websites are more than a decade old (i.e. Conway and Dorner Reference Conway and Dorner2004; Pedersen Reference Pedersen2005; Sudulich and Wall Reference Sudulich and Wall2010), and more recent studies focus on the political parties of specific countries (i.e. Cepernich and Fubini Reference Cepernich and Fubini2020; Correa et al. Reference Correa, Rodríguez-Teruel and Barberà2025; Kruikemeier et al. Reference Kruikemeier, Aparaschivei, Boomgaarden, Van Noort and Vliegenthart2015), rather than examining specific parties of a particular political leaning, such as the far-right. There is just one study of Irish far-right websites, and this narrowly focused on fundraising activities (Schenk and Windle Reference Schenk, Windle and Ahmed2025).
To fill this gap, this exploratory study offers a thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke Reference Braun and Clarke2022) of the official websites of two political parties commonly identified by media outlets as far-right: The National Party and Ireland First. The aim was to better understand the issue focus and ownership of these party websites and determine how closely these issues reflect typical far-right ideology. Mindful that the sample of political parties is small, the paper proposes three core propositions. First, websites can serve multifaceted purposes in exploring the political ideologies of far-right political parties, including by identifying issues that political parties wish to publicly own. Second, parties identified as far-right are not homogenous and may diverge on common issues. Third, while immigration has not been a core issue for Irish voters, both parties sought to ‘own’ immigration and exhibited a high degree of nationalism, but there were varying degrees of Euroscepticism.
This is the first study of far-right party websites in the Republic of Ireland and contributes to the growing body of literature on far-right political communication. As websites are used by political parties to promote issues, and the far-right are often framed as single-issue parties, the next section will discuss issue ownership theory. This is followed by context on Ireland’s political landscape, then our methodology and results of the thematic analysis.
Agenda-Setting and Issue Ownership
Most political parties use websites to communicate with their supporters and promote their policies on two levels. Internally, party websites are used to recruit new members and voters, spread party matters to members, collect membership fees, fundraise, and foster internal participation (Kruikemeier et al. Reference Kruikemeier, Aparaschivei, Boomgaarden, Van Noort and Vliegenthart2015). Externally, party websites communicate relevant information to members and non-members, frame relevant political issues, and support political campaigning (Correa et al. Reference Correa, Rodríguez-Teruel and Barberà2024; Gibson and Ward Reference Gibson and Ward2000). Websites often interact with social and traditional media in what Chadwick (Reference Chadwick2017) calls hybrid media systems. Social media often out-links to websites for further information (Macdonald et al. Reference Macdonald, Yilmaz, Herath, Berger, Lakhani, Nouri and Conway2022; O’Connor Reference O’Connor2024), and material posted on social media and websites can be picked up by media outlets, generating even wider coverage (Benkler et al. Reference Benkler, Farris and Roberts2018) and influencing wider agenda-setting (Shaw Reference Shaw1979). Websites remain an integral part of political parties’ online activity. A survey by the Irish Electoral Commission (2024) found that information taken directly from parties or candidates, including through websites, is more often used by voters than information from social media, and voters expressed greater levels of trust in these mediums than social media. Furthermore, studies have shown that websites can positively impact voting preference (see Gibson and McAllister Reference Gibson and McAllister2015; Sudulich and Wall Reference Sudulich and Wall2010).
Political websites offer opportunities to communicate issue ownership or attempts at issue ownership. While the definition of issue ownership is contested (Budge Reference Budge2015), Lefevere and colleagues (2015:755) frame it as ‘the idea that voters consider specific parties to be better able to deal with some issues’. Ownership can make an issue profitable for the party by indicating credibility within the area (Budge Reference Budge2015; Lefevere et al. Reference Lefevere, Tresch and Walgrave2015). This said, some parties may be tied to an issue rather than owning it (Budge Reference Budge2015) and ownership can be negative if a party secures a reputation for managing an issue poorly (Wagner and Meyer Reference Wagner and Meyer2015).
Issue ownership is an important element of party politics. Parties compete to own issues they believe will secure votes (Green-Pedersen and Little Reference Green-Pedersen and Little2023) and promote ‘issues which they would like to see dominate electoral competition’. This can involve a party, or independent politician, ‘forcing political opponents to pay attention to issues they would rather see disappear’ and engaging in issues which may not be ‘attractive in electoral terms’ (Green-Pedersen Reference Green-Pedersen2007: 609). Successful competition can result in an issue being placed high on the agenda, ensuring it secures attention from politicians and other actors (Little Reference Little2023). Indeed, drawing public focus and attention to issues can influence the importance people attach to public matters (Shaw Reference Shaw1979). In short, this approach emphasizes how different parties interact within a party system to attract votes and ensure that salient issues remain on the political agenda.
While some parties have clear issue ownership, such as far-right parties owning immigration issues (Lefevere et al. Reference Lefevere, Tresch and Walgrave2015), successful parties are often generalists, able to compete on issues they own and those owned by competing parties (Green-Pedersen and Little Reference Green-Pedersen and Little2023).Footnote 1 Far-right or far-left parties, as actors in a national party system, must attempt to appear credible on the issues they own and build political capital by competing on issues more closely connected to other parties. More centrist parties may then seek to compete with far-right parties over their issues. In competing with far-right parties, the center or left can place issues such as immigration higher on the political agenda, ensuring they receive extensive media coverage, which can result in changes in government policies or institutional practice (see Brown and Mondon Reference Brown and Mondon2021), such as more restrictive immigration policies (Mondon and Winters, 2020).
Immigration and Anti-Immigration Sentiment in Ireland
Research on Ireland’s far-right politics is important because the country is at an inflection point. Ireland has largely avoided the escalation of far-right populism seen across Europe and the country has tended to hold amongst the most positive perceptions of migrants within EU countries (Laurence et al. Reference Laurence, McGinnity and Murphy2024). How people view immigrants is an important consideration for agenda setting because far-right parties seek not only to win parliamentary seats but to spread opposition. A recent survey by Laurence et al. (Reference Laurence, McGinnity and Murphy2024: viii) found that 73% of respondents reported “very positive attitudes towards immigration,” three-quarters agreed that Ireland should support “migrants seeking protection,” and many felt immigration was good for Ireland’s economy and cultural life. The study also found that Irish “attitudes towards immigration” had improved since the mid-2010s, but had started to decline somewhat between 2020 and 2023. The authors concluded that:
“While the overall trend in the last ten years remains positive, this mirrors similar declines in positivity towards immigration across the EU27, and it is too early to tell if it will continue, plateau, or reverse (Laurence et al. Reference Laurence, McGinnity and Murphy2024: viii).”
Indeed, the report found a “substantial rise” in respondents who thought that immigration was one of the most important political issues facing Ireland, and 7% of respondents were less comfortable with asylum seekers and Indian migrants than European migrants (Laurence et al. Reference Laurence, McGinnity and Murphy2024: viii). This said, in a 2024 exit poll of 1,101 voters by The Electoral Commission (2024), just 8% identified immigration as the most important issue and 65% felt that immigrants were good for the economy, but 73% agreed on strict limits on the number of immigrants. Some studies have found fluctuating attitudes are correlated with economic conditions and job markets. For example, Laurence et al. (Reference Laurence, McGinnity and Murphy2024) found that individuals feeling financial strain, and with lower levels of education, were less positive about immigration and more likely to feel that protesting against asylum seekers was acceptable (also Gusciute et al. Reference Gusciute, Mühlau and Layte2022).
Immigration was low in Ireland until around 2004, when visa requirements for new European Union (EU) member states were removed (Fanning and Michael Reference Fanning and Michael2018). Immigration fluctuated over the next two decades but increased to unprecedented levels after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine (Central Statistics Office 2025). Between April 2024 and April 2025, Ireland received 125,300 immigrants. Of these, roughly one-quarter (N = 31,500) were returning Irish citizens, 24% (N = 25,790) were United Kingdom (UK) or other EU citizens, and the remaining half (N = 63,600) came from outside of the EU and UK (Central Statistics Office 2025). The 2022 national census shows that non-Irish citizens accounted for 12% of the population. The largest group of non-Irish citizens residing in Ireland came from Poland (15%) and the UK (13%), followed by India (7%), Romania (7%), and Lithuania (5%). The largest arrival of migrants that year were from India (N = 9,687) and Brazil (N = 5,175). The 18,566 people who arrived from Ukraine were not counted in the census (Central Statistics Office 2022).
The last seven years have witnessed increased online and offline far-right protests, underpinned by anti-immigration sentiment (Ahmed Reference Ahmed and Ahmed2025). These have focused in three broad directions. Initially, there were protests against Ukrainian refugees, which morphed into a general objection to all those entering Ireland applying for international protection. Such protests were often directed at buildings housing, or rumored to be housing, international protection applicants, or refugees (see Ahmed Reference Ahmed and Ahmed2025; Cannon et al. Reference Cannon, King, Joseph and el-Moslemany2022). While many protests were non-violent, there were two riots in Dublin (2023 and 2025) and the Hope and Courage Collective (2025: 2) counted, between 2018 and 2025, at least 38 arson attacks on these buildings and found many “incidents were preceded or accompanied by anti-immigrant protests, online disinformation, and far-right agitation.” The second includes online campaigns of harassment against left-wing politicians and various minority groups (see Ahmed Reference Ahmed and Ahmed2025; Cannon et al. Reference Cannon, King, Joseph and el-Moslemany2022). The third, more recent trend, has involved an upsurge in racist violence, notably but not exclusively, directed at people from South Asia (see Lobo Reference Lobo2025; Pollak and Gallagher Reference Pollak and Gallagher2025). For example, Madhavan (Reference Madhavan2025) wrote about feeling accepted when she came to rural Ireland in the 1980s but more recently felt threatened by racism and racist violence. It is commonly identified that “anti-immigrant activists” have seized opportunities “to agitate in communities and [are] trying to raise the national salience of immigration as a political issue” (Laurence et al. Reference Laurence, McGinnity and Murphy2024: 1; also Dikwal-Bot and McIntyre Reference Dikwal-Bot and McIntyre2025).
Far-Right Politics in Ireland
This article follows Mudde’s (Reference Mudde2002, Reference Mudde2014) identification of the far-right as an umbrella term within which more and less extreme versions sit but sharing an ideological core of authoritarianism, nativism, and populism. Pirro (Reference Pirro2023) further developed Mudde’s umbrella term to argue that nativism and authoritarianism represent the “ideological core” of the far-right. Nativism combines nationalism with xenophobia and calls for nation-states to comprise only the native ethnic group, and “targets ‘non-natives’ in ways that, at the minimum, run counter to the liberal constitutional principle of rights and freedoms for all” (Pirro Reference Pirro2023: 105). This is justified by the belief that non-native people fundamentally threaten the monocultural nation–state (Golder Reference Golder2016; Mudde Reference Mudde2007). Newth et al. (Reference Newth, Brown and Mondon2025: 821) have, however, been critical of framing nativism as “the core feature of” far-right parties as the term has “capacity to minimize the exclusionary nature of such politics and become a ‘fuzzy’ word for the racism inherent to far-right ideology.” They also argue that populism often boils down to the exclusionary politics within which authoritarianism is grounded, including advocating for more “traditional values.”
Mudde (Reference Mudde2002, Reference Mudde2014) acknowledges that some parties border the far-right and center-right and can drift between the two on distinct topics. The Irish far-right reflects this observation and includes parties with more and less extreme positions. Clearly identifiable Irish far-right parties, and independent candidates, have failed to dent a political environment traditionally dominated by three mainstream parties who were all founded upon, and continue to maintain, nationalist ideals drawn from Ireland’s history of resistance to British colonialism (Arlow Reference Arlow2020; Garner Reference Garner2007; O’Malley Reference O’Malley2008; O’Malley and Fitzgibbon Reference O’Malley, Fitzgibbon, Kriesi and Pappas2014). This does not mean that Ireland should be complacent. The experience of the National Rally in France shows how parties with limited electoral success can rebrand to become contenders for government (Lamour Reference Lamour2024), while the UK shows that even more peripheral parties can influence mainstream policies (Newth et al. Reference Newth, Brown and Mondon2025). Indeed, McDonnell (Reference McDonnell, Albertazzi and McDonnell2008:199) argued that Ireland possesses the structural conditions which have facilitated the rise of the right across Europe: “plummeting levels of party identification, an increasingly anti-political media, unprecedented immigration, a swift decline of the Chruch’s influence” coupled now with a housing crisis.
In Ireland, right- and left-wing have competed on the issue of nationalism. Sinn Féin has enjoyed significant electoral success, built on a strategy that has been described as left-wing populism (Charalambous and Lamprianou Reference Charalambous and Lamprianou2016; Suiter Reference Suiter, Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck and Vreese2016). Several commentators have argued that Sinn Féin’s ownership of nationalist issues have limited the appeal of far-right parties in Ireland (Arlow Reference Arlow2020; O’Malley Reference O’Malley2008): that inclusivity has been “a key component of Sinn Féin’s ideology,” and the party has repeatedly stressed opposition to all forms of discrimination, means that Ireland’s main populist nationalist party stands upon a pro-immigration foundation (Fattibene et al. Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2024: 23; also Arlow and O’Malley Reference Arlow and O’Malley2024).
While Ireland has long been viewed as a country with minimal far-right presence (Arlow Reference Arlow2020; Fanning and Michael Reference Fanning and Michael2018; Garner Reference Garner2007; O’Malley Reference O’Malley2008; O’Malley and Fitzgibbon Reference O’Malley, Fitzgibbon, Kriesi and Pappas2014), far-right activism has long featured in Irish politics, if often focused on single issues such as abortion (Lynch et al. Reference Lynch, Fattibene, Windle and Ahmed2025). Ireland did, however, witness a rise in both far-right activism and politics from around 2018 (Ahmed Reference Ahmed and Ahmed2025; Lynch et al. Reference Lynch, Fattibene, Windle and Ahmed2025). The origins of this trend may partly be traced to the 2008 Global Recession and grievances associated with austerity measures (Cannon and Murphy Reference Cannon and Murphy2024; Cannon et al. Reference Cannon, King, Joseph and el-Moslemany2022; Dikwal-Bot and McIntyre Reference Dikwal-Bot and McIntyre2025). Various conspiracy theories, some linked to far-right networks, emerged during the economic crash (Sweeney Reference Sweeney and Ahmed2025), and some individuals and groups were emboldened and motivated by the 2016 UK Brexit movement and 2017 election of Trump in America (Kirk Reference Kirk, Herkman and Palnen2024). Simmering anger at the government was then heightened during the COVID-19 pandemic (Ahmed Reference Ahmed and Ahmed2025; Cannon et al. Reference Cannon, King, Joseph and el-Moslemany2022; Fattibene et al. Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2024; Gallagher and O’Connor Reference Gallagher and O’Connor2021). Then, as the pandemic eased, the country witnessed an ongoing housing crisis, further aggravated by an unprecedented growth in immigration and those seeking international protection (Ahmed Reference Ahmed and Ahmed2025; Arlow and O’Malley Reference Arlow and O’Malley2024; Cannon and Murphy Reference Cannon and Murphy2024; Cannon et al. Reference Cannon, King, Joseph and el-Moslemany2022; Kirk Reference Kirk, Herkman and Palnen2024; Laurence et al. Reference Laurence, McGinnity and Murphy2024; Lynch et al. Reference Lynch, Fattibene, Windle and Ahmed2025).
Around this time, social media “influencers” begun propagating anti-immigration sentiments, including far-right conspiracy theories such as the Great Replacement (see Dikwal-Bot and McIntyre Reference Dikwal-Bot and McIntyre2025; Fattibene et al. Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2024, Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2026; Gallagher and O’Connor Reference Gallagher and O’Connor2021; Kirk Reference Kirk, Herkman and Palnen2024; Phelan and Kerrigan Reference Phelan and Kerrigan2023). Versions of the Great Replacement theory have been used across Europe (see Lamour Reference Lamour2024) but were framed specifically for Irish culture as a “new plantation” (Cannon and Murphy Reference Cannon and Murphy2024) with social media posts positing “Irishness” as a “node within transnational whiteness projects” and a betrayal of an “authentic people” by “elites” and malign foreign influences (Dikwal-Bot and McIntyre Reference Dikwal-Bot and McIntyre2025: 3; Kirk and Powers Reference Kirk, Powers, Flynn and McGill2025). There has been somewhat of a surge in scholarship on the far-right in Ireland, much of which has focused on the online ecosystem. A series of papers by Fattibene et al. (Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2024, Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2026, Lynch et al. Reference Lynch, Fattibene, Windle and Ahmed2025) analyzed 422,256 social media posts across several platforms connected to far-right influencers. The study found the most popular themes were conspiracy theories followed by anti-left, anti-black, and anti-government sentiments before concluding that Ireland has an extreme far-right with its own “online ecosystem aimed towards creating division and spreading ideologies of hate and, in some instances, a call to action” (Fattibene et al. Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2024: 21). Siapera (Reference Siapera2019: 1) conducted a case study of how some social media accounts, which connected a stabbing in Dundalk to terrorism, exhibited a “blending of supremacist and everyday, ambient racist discourses.” Hamilton (Reference Hamilton2024) compared 89 tweets from The National Party and Irish Freedom Party to find the two parties trying to evoke emotional (fear, anger, shame) responses to the murder of Ashling Murphy. Phelan and Kerrigan (Reference Phelan and Kerrigan2023) examined The National Party and Irish Freedom Party Twitter accounts before the 2020 general election to find three central themes revolving around nationalism: anti-establishment, anti-immigration, and the evoking a version of Irish history. Lucek and Phelan (Reference Lucek and Phelan2024) analyzed 974 tweets, of which 210 were considered far-right. The study concluded that the far-right was rising in Ireland and was framing migrants as a disease, criminals, and/or favored by elites. Kirk (Reference Kirk, Herkman and Palnen2024: 180) analyzed 10,446 tweets from 582 Twitter accounts by political actors to find that the most popular themes from the “new right-wing populist parties” were unfair taxation systems, leaving Europe and “the promotion of the ‘pro-life’ agenda,” often employing language which has the “hallmarks of extreme-right ideologies, Euroscepticism and conspiracy theories.” Some of these studies demonstrate how some individuals active in far-right political parties are also active social media influencers.
While there is much online agitation, Ireland has thus far avoided the sharp rise in far-right electoral success witnessed in some European countries (see Lamour Reference Lamour2024; Newth et al. Reference Newth, Brown and Mondon2025). The far-right has not “spread like wildfire and became key political players” in the country (Aktas Reference Aktas2024: 592). In the June 2024 local elections, the far-right secured, depending on perspective, just five (Ryan Reference Ryan2024) or four of 949 local authority seats, all in Dublin. This can be compared to 20 politicians from migrant backgrounds securing local authority seats. No far-right candidate was elected in the European Elections (O’Keeffe Reference O’Keeffe2024). In August 2024, the National Alliance voting pact was created between anti-immigration parties, and some independents, including parties such as Ireland First, The Irish People and The National Party (Gallagher Reference Gallagher2024; Murphy Reference Murphy2024). Sources estimated that 60 (Gallagher Reference Gallagher2024) to 70 far-right candidates stood for election in the 2024 general election (McDermott Reference McDermott2025), but none of the 32 candidates connected to the National Alliance were elected (Gallagher Reference Gallagher2024; see House of Oireachtas 2024). In short, “the anticipated rise of the far right failed to materialize” (Keenan Reference Keenan, Gallagher, O’Malley and Reidy2025: 36). This said, while there have been attempts to identify and categorize far-right parties by objective criteria (i.e. GPAHE 2025), it can be difficult to uncover who is a far-right candidate in Ireland. This is because some contest the label (Cannon and Murphy Reference Cannon and Murphy2024), and just under 10% of seats go to independent politicians whose positions are sometimes difficult to gauge (see Arlow and O’Malley Reference Arlow, O’Malley, Gallagher, O’Malley and Reidy2025).
Nonetheless, Irish far-right parties, and independent candidates, did make modest inroads. Some Sinn Féin voters opted to support more right-wing independents and smaller parties, partly due to Sinn Féin’s pro-immigration stance (Arlow and O’Malley Reference Arlow and O’Malley2024; Cunningham Reference Cunningham2024; Dikwal-Bot and McIntyre Reference Dikwal-Bot and McIntyre2025). While votes for these parties and candidates increased by approximately 7%, this did not translate into an increase in parliamentary seats (Cunningham Reference Cunningham2024). The lack of official representation may, therefore, have masked a somewhat muted rise in popularity.
Method
Two Irish political parties were chosen as case studies: The National Party and Ireland First. Following Stake (Reference Stake, Denzin and Lincoln2005: 451), we chose those cases which “we feel we can learn the most” about far-right politics in Ireland while acknowledging the importance of “balance and variety,” this included varied length of existence and electoral success: Ireland First were established just before the 2024 election, with a leadership who had been actively engaged in online anti-immigrant protests (Arlow and O’Malley Reference Arlow, O’Malley, Gallagher, O’Malley and Reidy2025), while The National Party is more established with a leadership with a long history of activism (Larkin Reference Larkin2016). We began case selection by reviewing media coverage of parties registered with the Electoral Commission who ran in the 2024 elections and were identified by the media as far-right. We aimed to include those parties which showed some form of success, if only by gaining social traction. The National Party and Ireland First are commonly identified in the Irish media as far-right parties (see BBC 2023; Carroll Reference Carroll2023; Gallagher Reference Gallagher2023, Reference Gallagher2024; Larkin Reference Larkin2016; McDermott Reference McDermott2025; McQuinn Reference McQuinn2024; Murphy Reference Murphy2024; O’Keeffe Reference O’Keeffe2024b; Raymond Reference Raymond2024; Ryan Reference Ryan2024) and by some academics (Ahmed Reference Ahmed and Ahmed2025; Keenan Reference Keenan, Gallagher, O’Malley and Reidy2025; Phelan and Kerrigan Reference Phelan and Kerrigan2023) were included in the GPAHE (2025) list of “far-right hate and extremist groups” and were aligned with The National Alliance voting pact (McQuinn Reference McQuinn2024; Ryan Reference Ryan2024). Representatives from both parties have also been involved in online activism and anti-immigration protests (Arlow and O’Malley Reference Arlow, O’Malley, Gallagher, O’Malley and Reidy2025; Gallagher and O’Connor Reference Gallagher and O’Connor2021; McAuley Reference McAuley2022; Roche Reference Roche2023). The leaders of Ireland First have, however, rejected the far-right label, calling themselves conservative or center-right.
The collected data are the main websites of these two political parties, identified by the Irish media as sitting on the far-right spectrum, and consist of screen recordings of every textual and visual component of these websites. Audio and visual recordings were transcribed into textual data for coding. The data were collected in early-July 2024 and serves as a snapshot of a period of standard politics, rather than during election campaigns, of these websites. Indeed, July 2024 was sandwiched between the June 2024 European and local elections, and November 2024 general election. This was a period when the main far-right parties celebrated making modest inroads, in local constituencies, and began planning for a predicted general election. The transcribed data, from the two websites, amounted to 6,947 words and 98 images in total, broken down as: Ireland First (674 words, 43 images) and The National Party (6,290 words, 55 images).
Data were analyzed using Braun and Clarke’s (Reference Braun and Clarke2022) reflexive thematic analysis which follows a six-step guideline for identifying, analyzing, and reporting found patterns of meaning (themes) within the examined data. Themes refer to the specific patterns of meaning found in data which can contain either manifest content (directly observable themes) or latent content (implied themes). Thematic analyses tend to use both types for its analysis as manifest themes often point to more implicit ones (Joffe Reference Joffe, Harper and Thompson2011). Following Braun and Clarke’s (Reference Braun and Clarke2022) six-step process, the data were first transcribed from recordings and initial impressions were noted. The transcriptions were then coded, and relevant and meaningful data segments identified. Coding began deductively, drawing from Mudde’s (Reference Mudde2002, Reference Mudde2014) conceptualization of the far-right, but then became more inductive as we immersed ourselves in the data. The first themes were generated based on shared meanings of the segments, after which the initial themes were assessed in relation to the codes and full data set. Here the wider research context was considered to re-examine and finalize themes.
Results
A total of 19 comparable codes were developed prior and during the transcription process for both parties. We then developed additional codes representing individual party policies. In total, the codes amounted to 32 for Ireland First and 30 for The National Party. The codes were then grouped into themes. The following section will discuss the five most frequently occurring themes:
-
1. Immigration
-
2. Opposition to the EU
-
3. Support for the agri-food sector
-
4. Support for (United) Ireland
-
5. Libertarian reform of government policies.
Issue ownership means that some political parties are associated with specific issues mainly in ideological and strategic sources closely connected to their ideology, and can influence both citizen and party behaviors. Voters choose by evaluating parties dealing with issues important to them, while parties are expected to focus on their “owned” issues (Walgrave et al. Reference Walgrave, Tresch and Lefevere2015). These five themes were examined to determine how closely the websites reflect common far-right ideology or the issues the far-right commonly “own.”
Immigration
As immigration, or more precisely anti-immigration, was the only common issue found amongst both parties, it can be considered the core issue linking them together. The National Party mentioned immigration some 24 times while Ireland First mentioned immigration 15 times. While this shows a difference in the frequency of immigration being discussed across both parties’ websites, the content is broadly similar. Both parties expressed unhappiness with Ireland’s immigration system and policies. Mentions of immigration often aligned with other common far-right beliefs, especially Euroscepticism and opposition to the current government.
The National Party said they opposed “mass migration,” were committed to “remigration” to “secure Ireland as the homeland of the Irish people” and were “best known” for advocating for Ireland to “remain a homeland for the Irish people.” Furthermore, they used the phrase “replacement level immigration” twice, declaring that migration will “completely destroy Irish nationality” and is being “pushed” by “the corrupt and amoral establishment.” This appears a reference towards the Great Replacement Theory—a conspiracy theory which has been popular amongst the wider European (Lamour Reference Lamour2024) and Irish far-right, both online and at protests, in which a shadowy elite tries to engineer the replacement of white Christians with foreign ‘others’ (Fattibene et al. Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2024).
Comparably, Ireland First said they “advocate for strong borders, responsible immigration,” criticized the asylum system, called for laws that “require immigrants to respect our customs and laws,” and proposed the “immediate revocation of citizenship and mandatory deportation” if “foreign-born nationals” are charged with criminal offenses. Immigration was identified as one of their core principles, declaring they “support immigration policies that benefit our country rather than burden our welfare system” while proposing the “non-Irish population” should “not exceed 10%” but “government corruption has allowed this threshold to be surpassed.”
While immigration policy reforms are not specific to far-right ideology, and are part of many conservative political agendas, the way immigration is discussed in relation to reforms gives the impression that far-right parties are more anti-immigration (Natter et al. Reference Natter, Czaika and de Haas2020). In this case, the National Party implies that immigrants are replacing white Christians while Ireland First suggests that immigrants are disrespectful of existing laws and therefore more likely to commit crimes. Both frame immigration as a conspiracy enacted by corrupt political elites.
Immigration was often related to other issues, such as the housing crisis or economy (also Kirk Reference Kirk, Herkman and Palnen2024). For example, Ireland First stated that “the housing crisis […] can be attributed to irresponsible immigration policies” while The National Party posted pictures of people protesting while holding signs and banners calling for housing to go to “the Irish” rather than immigrants and stating it “continues to campaign for the preferencing of Irish nationals in areas such as housing.” Similarly, Ireland First called for “immigration policies that benefit our country rather than burden our welfare system,” and The National Party claimed that the international movement of “cheap labor” benefits the globalized economy while erasing national communities: another nod to the Great Replacement theory. Overall, even when other issues are mentioned by the two parties, the discussion frequently and quickly returned to migration issues. Continuously pushing immigration into the center of other issues may reflect a deep-rooted anti-immigration stance and represent attempts to revolve other issues around that which they attempt to own.
Opposition to European Union
Ireland has traditionally been one of “the most enthusiastic supporters of European integration.” Support for the EU has remained consistently strong, even after the fallout from the Great Recession and then the UK Brexit movement (a fledgling Irexit movement failed to materialize) (Simpson Reference Simpson2019: 507). Indeed, Holmes and Simpson (Reference Holmes and Simpson2025) found that the “eurozone crisis reinforced the opposition of the groups regularly critical of the EU” but “had little impact on public opinion.” Euroscepticism is often presented as a key feature of European far-right parties (Szöcsik and Polyakova Reference Szöcsik and Polyakova2019) and has been identified in analysis of Irish far-right parties’ social media (Kirk Reference Kirk, Herkman and Palnen2024). Many European far-right parties, however, have a more ambiguous conception of Europe and the EU, and the extent of Euroscepticism is influenced by the complexity of the EU structure, ideological flexibility, variety of far-right parties across Europe and their responsiveness to national and local context (Lorimer Reference Lorimer2021). This diversity of opinion, and sometimes ambivalence towards the EU, is noticeable in our sample of Irish websites; however, both parties frame Europe as a vehicle for promoting liberal ideals which are harming Irish interests.
Oppositional views on the EU were found in both parties, to differing extents. The National Party was the most outspoken about the EU. It defines itself as “a Eurosceptic Party” and proclaims standing against “the project of a federated European Superstate,” that voters cannot “trust the EU,” and advocates for Ireland to immediately withdraw from the EU and restore Irish currency or, at a minimum, create a “nationalist block” within Europe. Their stance on the issue of Europe is clear.
Ireland First showed more ambiguity and contradiction. It proposed that Ireland both leave the EU and reform its relationship with the EU. They were critical of the EU, and “globalization,” for having too much influence on Irish government policy, especially agricultural and immigration policies. They expressed concern that, because of EU laws and regulations, Ireland could become “just a province of Europe as opposed to the self-regulating, independent nation of Ireland,” and proposed regaining “national and fiscal sovereignty” to be more independent, by leaving the EU, while maintaining Ireland’s position within the EU as a “trading bloc.” They argued that the current trade relationship between Ireland and the EU was not in Ireland’s best interest. Ireland First seemed to view the EU as offering some economic value while disagreeing with “liberal” EU laws and regulations being imposed on Ireland. It wanted to enjoy trade benefits while removing EU laws and regulations identified as limiting Ireland’s economic and cultural interests.
Support for the Agri-Food Sector
Ireland First expressed support for, and concern with, Ireland’s agri-food sector. This position was partly conveyed through pictures (i.e. a farmer herding cattle down a narrow road), but also through proposed policies. They identified the agri-food sector as a pressing concern and expressed their determination to place “farmers back at the heart of our food supply,” their skepticism of EU laws and regulations governing the Irish agri-food sector, and that they would support local agriculture to “promote self-sufficiency” and “safeguard our nation’s food sovereignty.” While agriculture was a less common theme for The National Party, the joint leader of the party claimed he had “always fought for rural Ireland” and was critical of the “cozy consensus” between the Irish Farmers Association and “meat-processing cartel.” Rural issues are not unique to the far-right, and many people involved in agriculture and fisheries are feeling significant pressure on their ‘lives and livelihoods’ (Murphy et al. Reference Murphy, Cannon and Walsh2022: 150). The agricultural and fishing industries continue to play an integral part in the wider Irish economy (Economics and Planning Division 2024), employing around 8.5% of the working-age population (Teagasc 2024) and offering important cultural markers of identity in rural areas.
Nationalism and (United) Ireland
Nationalism is a common ideological feature of many political parties, and central to Ireland’s three primary mainstream parties (O’Malley Reference O’Malley2008). As there are different varieties of nationalism, including civic and ethnic nationalism (Golder Reference Golder2016), the term nativism is often used to differentiate between mainstream parties and far-right parties’ forms of nationalism (Golder Reference Golder2016; Mudde Reference Mudde2007). Both parties call themselves nationalists. Indeed, the first core principle of Ireland First is “the nation of Ireland belongs to the Irish people.”
Both parties mentioned Ireland often or provided positive images of Ireland. For Ireland First, discussions of Ireland often revolved around a perception that the country was changing. They declared that they would “improve the lives of Ireland” and “contribute to building a stronger, more prosperous Ireland” at the upcoming elections. Many of the images used on their websites are patriotic: the Irish flag waving on a flagpole and depictions of famous Irish landmarks. This invokes a closeness and connection to Ireland with a sense of nationalism. When talking about Ireland, most of the language used by the two parties was positive. Adjectives such as “prosperous,” “strong,” “passionate,” and “unwavering” were all used to describe Ireland. Taken together with the framing of immigration, this suggests the two parties view Ireland as a positive country that needs to be protected from outside institutions (i.e. the EU), inside institutions (i.e. the sitting government), and outside influences (i.e. immigration, globalization).
For The National Party, discussing Ireland was done in the context of a united Ireland that is “Gaelic and free.” They assert that the territory of Ireland consists of the entire island—including Northern Ireland—and are determined to keep “the fight” going as long as “there is an Ireland to defend and love and unite.”. Ireland First also proposed the reunification of Ireland, but The National Party was more stringent in their proposal. This position is not unique: Ireland’s three main parties all publicly support the reunification of Ireland.
The Irish language is often seen as “a symbol of Ireland and Irishness, nation and nationhood” as “the English language was imposed, by various means, by British colonialism (Posocco and Watson Reference Posocco and Watson2024: 2620). Both parties proposed promoting the Irish language, although this was a more common theme in The National Party website, with the “revival of the Irish language” one of their 11 “principles.” This said, both websites were written in English, with Irish being limited to party names and/or words or phrases that are commonly written in Irish. Despite both parties showing a sense of nationalism, and sometimes nativism, neither party used the Irish language in a broader context outside of a few chosen words. This reflects the general system of bilingualism in Ireland whereby many speak little Irish, but Irish is used in institutional names and taught at school. Only The National Party took up reviving the Irish language as a policy by proposing the revival of the Irish language in a broader community context and emphasizing how the Irish language and cultural inheritance are important to the definition of Ireland and its people.
(Libertarian) Reform of Government Policies
A broad general theme concerns reforming existing government policies or specific sectors. Restrictions imposed by the government on liberty in different areas were the focus of both parties. That is, while a strong state is often identified as a defining feature of the far-right (Mudde Reference Mudde2002), the two parties were critical of what they perceived as governmental encroachment on civil liberties. For example, COVID-19 lockdowns were criticized by both parties. This often related to, and was linked with, broader far-right concerns, especially immigration. The National Party “condemned” the “importation of hundreds of foreign workers” to work in agriculture, during the COVID-19 lockdown, whereas Irish citizens were “under virtual house arrest.” Similarly, Ireland First expressed opposition to “the lockdowns and the draconian restrictions on individual freedoms enforced by this government.” Opposition to lockdown restrictions was a common issue amongst far-right parties and activists across Europe (Kaltwasser and Taggart Reference Kaltwasser and Taggart2024), who quickly linked the pandemic to immigration issues (Wondreys and Mudde Reference Wondreys and Mudde2022; see Fattibene et al. Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2024, Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2026; Phelan and Kerrigan Reference Phelan and Kerrigan2023).
Other criticisms of government policies and past events included The National Party highlighting the “failure of governmental policies” during the 2008 financial crisis, where the government bailed out banks and left the “mortgage holder hanging dry.” Ireland First claimed that current and proposed climate laws were “completely unnecessary” and proposed changing laws that “impose disproportionate penalties” for minor versus serious crimes. The National Party proposed restoring the death penalty.
Both parties tended to use emotive negative language when discussing the current government. Ireland First called previous governments “short-sighted” parties who implemented “dubious, dangerous,” and “naive and self-serving” policies. The National Party called governmental establishments “corrupt and amoral” and financial institutions “criminal” and responsible for “enslaving future generations” of Irish citizens. They also situated themselves as defending Ireland against “that assembly of traitors called Dáil Éirann” who support the “international liberalism which infects the whole western world.” While criticizing competing parties is part of all party politics, several of these themes converged around a belief that mainstream parties were corrupt and/or encroaching on individual freedom. That is, elements of these far-right websites veer towards libertarianism, an ideology increasingly associated with some far-right parties (Arlow Reference Arlow2025).
Discussion and Conclusion
The aim of this study was to determine how two parties identified in the national media as far-right present their websites in terms of issues and policy representation, and how closely the websites reflect far-right ideology. According to issue ownership, far-right parties are expected to have immigration at the core of their policies (Lefevere et al. Reference Lefevere, Tresch and Walgrave2015; Walgrave et al. Reference Walgrave, Tresch and Lefevere2015; van Spanje Reference van Spanje2010), and they did. Both parties expressed their unhappiness with Ireland’s current immigration system and policies, and called for more repressive controls. Immigration was both a central issue in itself and interwoven through, or linked with, other issues, including Euroscepticism, opposition to the current government, the housing crisis, COVID-19, and the economy. Indeed, most issues were brought back to immigration at some point (see also Hamilton Reference Hamilton2024; Kirk Reference Kirk, Herkman and Palnen2024; Lucek and Phelan Reference Lucek and Phelan2024). In terms of issue ownership and agenda setting, if people vote for far-right parties because of their association with immigration, associating all issues with immigration may be an attempt to ensure the party remains relevant and avoids having to compete with other parties on issues where they may have less capacity to convince even the most ardent supporter. Furthermore, the objective of framing migration as a threat, through emotive language (Hamilton Reference Hamilton2024), may be about more than votes—keeping immigration on the political agenda (Shaw Reference Shaw1979) can influence how people feel about immigration and immigrants.
Opposition to the EU was another policy issue mentioned by both parties that is closely associated with far-right parties across Europe (Szöcsik and Polyakova Reference Szöcsik and Polyakova2019) and has been identified in far-right social media analysis in Ireland (Kirk Reference Kirk, Herkman and Palnen2024; Phelan and Kerrigan Reference Phelan and Kerrigan2023). Again, both parties expressed oppositional views, to different extents. The National Party took the strongest stance against the EU, referring to themselves as Eurosceptic and advocating for Ireland to leave the EU. While Ireland First largely shared this sentiment, it took a softer position of reforming the relationship between Ireland and the EU to remain trading partners. The issue of Europe most strongly shows how the two parties differ on key policy areas. In terms of issue ownership, the National Party clearly sought to own the issue of moving away from the EU. This may suggest some issue competition between far-right parties in Ireland.
Ireland First expressed legitimate concerns with the Irish agri-food sector, and implied that Irish mainstream parties were ignoring these sectors and unable to protect them from harmful European policy. As expected, Ireland was frequently mentioned by both parties. They employed multiple images depicting Ireland, and situated themselves as Irish nationalists, including using images of an idealized rural Ireland (see Schenk et al. Reference Schenk, Windle and Ahmed2025). The defense of farming and fishing can, therefore, be placed in a context of identifying Ireland as a predominantly rural country. The tone of the images and text were often one of nostalgic myth-making where an idealized, often rural, local community could exist isolated from the vagrancies of a globalized world. As Garland and Chakraborti (Reference Garland and Chakraborti2006) argued, in the British context, rurality is often portrayed as homogenous and white, as opposed to the multiculturalism of urban area. Kirk (Reference Kirk, Powers, Flynn and McGill2025: 97) found online far-right actors framing the Irish people as ‘defiant defenders’ of a homogenous, white and Catholic culture (see also Hamilton Reference Hamilton2024).
The reunification of Ireland was The National Party’s second most frequently mentioned issue. In terms of agenda-setting, a united Ireland is rhetorically on every Irish political party’s agenda but most closely associated with Sinn Féin. The focus on reunifying Ireland could, therefore, be viewed as an attempt to steal issue ownership from Sinn Féin, who are nationalist but pro-immigration. Indeed, The National Party called Sinn Féin “anti-nationalist” and insinuated they represent a barrier to reunification. Interestingly, Ireland First expressed nationalism but avoided placing the unification of Ireland high on their agenda.
Both parties discussed the need to reform government and/or state institutions. These were often linked back to immigration, but not always. Negative language was always used when discussing the current government. Again, this is not uncommon in competitive party-political systems. During COVID-19, there was much support amongst the two main parties for lock-down restrictions, and far-right activists emerged in opposition, first online and later amongst protests (also Fattibene et al. Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2024, Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2026; Gallagher and O’Connor Reference Gallagher and O’Connor2021; Lucek and Phelan Reference Lucek and Phelan2024). The pandemic had waned by 2024, but The National Party kept the issue high on their agenda. This may have been because lockdowns remained a convenient means to frame the issue of immigration, or that the party leaders felt they owned the issue and, therefore, their supporters would expect it to be mentioned.
What was missing, or underplayed, can also be insightful. Some research identifies exclusionary discourses to be part of far-right ideology (Mondon and Winter Reference Mondon and Winter2020; Newth et al. Reference Newth, Brown and Mondon2025), but these were less prominent in our sample. Ireland First was the only party to reference gender ideology or LGBTQ + issues. Of the four mentions of gender or sexuality, they declared that the party is not transphobic, and they view all as equal before the law, independent of sexual orientation or gender, and the party is committed to equality. They also, however, advocated for parent’s rights to teach children about gender identity, TQ + topics, and sex education. Otherwise, no further mention of gender ideology was found amongst either party. While this could suggest that gender and LGBTQ + issues are unimportant, Irish far-right actors have been involved in physical and online aggression against LGBTQ + communities (see Ahmed Reference Ahmed and Ahmed2025; Cronin Reference Cronin and Ahmed2025). It is possible that any strong position on LGBTQ + would be too risky an issue to publicly own on a website. Ireland First and The National Party also professed being “pro-life,” an issue which has traditionally been at the forefront of the Irish far-right (Ahmed Reference Ahmed and Ahmed2025; Lynch et al. Reference Lynch, Fattibene, Windle and Ahmed2025), with The National Party reframing this as nationalist cause: “The future of Ireland depends on her future generations of men and women. United by blood and by spirit.”
Based on the themes discussed above, the far-rightness of each party can be determined to some extent. First, both parties exhibited high degrees of nationalism, but then so do many other Irish parties; and Sinn Féin shows that parties can be both nationalist and inclusive. The National Party and Ireland First, however, exhibited an ultra-nationalism that often veered into nativism. Some phrases echoed far-right conspiracy theories (i.e. The Great Replacement) that stoke fear that immigrants will replace the native white Christian population (also Dikwal-Bot and McIntyre Reference Dikwal-Bot and McIntyre2025; Fattibene et al. Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2024, Reference Fattibene, Windle, Lynch, Helm, Purvis and Seppa2026; Gallagher and O’Connor Reference Gallagher and O’Connor2021; Kirk Reference Kirk, Herkman and Palnen2024; Phelan and Kerrigan Reference Phelan and Kerrigan2023). The National Party appeared most aligned with far-right ideology based on their two most common policy issues being immigration and EU opposition, a tendency to relate almost all issues back to immigration, and general exclusionary language.
Ireland is an interesting case. Contrary to European trends (see Lamour Reference Lamour2024; Newth et al. Reference Newth, Brown and Mondon2025), Irish far-right parties are struggling to establish themselves as viable alternatives to mainstream center-right and far-left parties. Irish citizens express some of the most positive attitude towards migrants across Europe (Laurence et al. Reference Laurence, McGinnity and Murphy2024), it has a mainstream party which is both nationalistic and inclusive (Arlow and O’Malley Reference Arlow and O’Malley2024; Lynch et al. Reference Lynch, Fattibene, Windle and Ahmed2025), and it is often difficult to delineate between left- and right-wing political parties and independents. The two parties analyzed do, however, attempt to own issues which suggest they can be categorized as far-right, according to Mudde’s definition.
Limitations and Further Research
This study was intended as exploratory by comparing two cases. Exploratory research attempts to understand what is happening by researching emerging issues which have minimal existing literature (Robson Reference Robson1993) to provide a foundation for more in-depth research. The data collected covered one specific moment in time between local and European and general elections. Newth et al. (Reference Newth, Brown and Mondon2025: 823) argue that “far-right politics can be used by a variety of different actors,” including those representing mainstream parties. As such, a focus on two parties identified as being amongst the most conservative ignores the potential far-rightness of more mainstream Irish political parties. A broader comparative study could monitor several parties’ websites, from across the political spectrum, over a longer period to allow insights into how parties adapt to changing political landscapes and issues, as well as voter preferences and behavior.
One reviewer proposed comparing the findings of the thematic analysis of political party websites and the growing body of research on social media use by far-right actors. While space prevented the development of this avenue of research, it does identify the need to move from the current focus on individual elements of political communication towards the whole system (see Chadwick Reference Chadwick2017), including the online (websites, social media) and offline (campaign leaflets and posters, protest attendance, speeches). For example, it would be interesting to see if some views are expressed more stringently on some social media platforms than websites.
Funding statement
This research did not receive any specific financial support. Clara Schenk’s PhD study is supported by the Luxemburg Ministry of Research and Higher Education state financial aid (AideFi). This is a general grant available to all citizens of Luxemburg.
Competing interests
The authors report there are no competing interests to declare.
Open access
