Migration and Democracy: How Remittances Undermine Dictatorships represents a generation of scholarly work engaged in the debate on the effect of migrant remittances on political regimes. Abel Escribà-Folch, Covadonga Meseguer, and Joseph Wright incorporate important questions about democratization and authoritarian persistence to explore how migrant remittances contribute to regime change. They center their theories and analyses on the households receiving remittances in the home country instead of the migrants abroad, which is often the case in the work on diaspora politics. Thus, the authors focus on how migration, and the consequent remittances that follow, politically transforms recipients in the country of origin. To put it succinctly, they argue that the economic autonomy from remittances will produce political autonomy.

The book uses Hirschman’s “Exit, Voice, Loyalty” (EVL) framework to explain how the increase in private income through remittances will weaken dictatorships and pave the way for democratization. The theory (ch. 3) is composed of two arguments based on the outcomes they are studying: protest (voice) and voting (loyalty). With the increase in income as the point of departure, the authors present two causal processes to show how remittances undermine authoritarian rule. Receiving remittances lowers the costs and increases the capacity for recipients to participate in protests. This relationship between remittances and protests is observable in places where opposition to the regime is strong. Remittances will also weaken dictatorships through disengagement in elections. The rise in income allows recipients to break away from clientelistic relationships and, thus, discourages voter turnout. While abstaining from voting could be interpreted as not democratic, the authors are correct to argue that declining voter turnout could also be a signal of weakened loyalty to an autocratic regime.

The empirical chapters (3–7) are rich in analyses that use both cross-country data and survey data from Afrobarometer. These chapters highlight the challenges of and strategies to test the effect of remittances on politics. I appreciate the substantial attention given to rival theories (chaps. 3 and 7). Given the empirical richness in the book, the authors could have dedicated space to addressing the limitations of remittance data from cross-national and survey sources. There are changes in measurement for remittances inflow that may (or may not) affect the country-level analysis (Michael Clemens and David McKenzie, “Why don’t remittances appear to affect growth?” The Economic Journal 128[612], 2018). Often with survey data, researchers use frequency of receiving remittances or a binary variable for receiving remittances, which means we are not sure how important remittances are in household income. Nevertheless, the use of Afrobarometer provides refreshing insight about remittance recipients in a context outside Latin America and young democracies. The case studies on Senegal and Cambodia (ch. 6) persuasively highlight the mechanisms that lead remittances to produce democratic behavior in cases in which democratization was successful and not successful, respectively.

The theory makes some underlying assumptions about remittances and politics, which are not exclusive to the book but rather to this field of research. I want to highlight four underlying issues in the arguments and analyses. First, if remittances increase protests among opposition areas, what is the role of prior migration decisions from opposition and nonopposition areas? Increased resource capacity is a mechanism that the authors propose to link remittances to protest. They show in Chapter 4 that protests will be higher in opposition areas and among recipients with lower socioeconomic status. Is the resource capacity mechanism from remittances a legacy from a grievance-driven decision to migrate? If so, does that earlier grievance facilitate collective action among recipients? Addressing these questions would require information about migrants and remittance senders, and their views on home country politics from abroad.

Second, for remittance recipients to opt out of clientelistic relationships, the presumption is that a private market exists to substitute government goods. The substitution effect is a common mechanism used by scholars to show the democratic and nondemocratic effects from remittances. Chapter 5 shows that we observe remittances undermining clientelism through decreasing turnout in swing districts, highlighting the importance of local political contexts. Given the focus on underdeveloped countries and individuals with low socioeconomic status, there needs to be additional research on local economic contexts that would facilitate the substitution effect. Otherwise, there needs to be some coordinated effort among recipients to pool their resources to substitute government goods.

Third, the authors, as do many scholars in this field, overlook the migration option that remittance recipients have. Remittances and emigration are highly correlated. The work on remittances and politics assume that recipients will not emigrate, even though recipients are credible migration candidates. Remittances not only lower the costs of migration but also, recipients have access to migrant networks abroad. The immobility assumption is important when considering the use of remittances as a political investment. However, if the costs of political participation and opting out of government goods remain high, then emigration should be a rational option for recipients.

Fourth, not all remittances come from wealthy democracies in the Global North. Chapter 7 is a valuable chapter where the authors analyze “democratic” remittances against “autocratic” remittances to test the social remittances theory. This chapter can serve as a model to understand different variations among remittance source countries. The authors use survey data from African cases in which migration can be intracontinental as much as intercontinental. The weight of remittances may vary given the level of economic of development of the remittance source country. Furthermore, immigration policy where migrants reside can also play a role in the relationship between remittances and politics. For example, higher barriers for family reunification may sway remittance recipients to invest in local politics.

What happens after democratization? The authors set the discussion in the concluding chapter, which also serves as a call for new research. Young democracies face several challenges and democratic backsliding has grown among them. Will remittances save democracies from backsliding? The case of El Salvador and Nicaragua provide interesting perspectives. El Salvador is among the most remittance-dependent countries in Latin America and has recently seen its two-party system collapse with the rise of an aspiring autocrat in Nayib Bukele. Nicaragua has regressed into a dictatorship under Daniel Ortega as the country becomes more dependent on remittances from the United States and Costa Rica.

Migration and Democracy is required reading for scholars interested in the role of migration in the political economy of globalization. The authors center their theories and empirical analyses on remittance recipients who are often labeled as “those left behind.” Yet, we learn from this book that these citizens are vital in undermining dictatorships—and the ability to bring forth democratic regimes.

Remittances continue to grow globally and have proven to be resilient during the COVID-19 pandemic. The authors show that this external income, which bypasses governments, can lead to political change. This book should serve as a springboard to a new generation of research on the political economy of remittances.