No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 April 2006
In his 1987 presidential address to the American Political ScienceAssociation,” One Soul at a Time: Political Science and PoliticalReform,” Samuel P. Huntington (1988, 3–10)argued at some length that “political science … is not just anintellectual discipline (but) also a moral one,” and that “theimpetus to do good in the sense of promoting political reform is …embedded in our profession.” Therefore, “it is impossible to havepolitical scientists in the absence of political participation, andpolitical science has only developed with the expansion of politicalparticipation. In a society in which there is no participation—nocompetition for power—political scientists would have nothing todo.” It logically follows that “the connection between democracy hasbeen a close and continuing one.”
In his 1987 presidential address to the American Political Science Association,” One Soul at a Time: Political Science and Political Reform,” Samuel P. Huntington (1988, 3–10) argued at some length that “political science … is not just an intellectual discipline (but) also a moral one,” and that “the impetus to do good in the sense of promoting political reform is … embedded in our profession.” Therefore, “it is impossible to have political scientists in the absence of political participation, and political science has only developed with the expansion of political participation. In a society in which there is no participation—no competition for power—political scientists would have nothing to do.” It logically follows that “the connection between democracy has been a close and continuing one.”
And this leads Huntington to his central proposition:
Where democracy is strong, political science is strong; where democracy is weak, political science is weak. Authoritarian societies may produce and in some cases have produced Nobel Prize-winning physicists, biologists, novelists and statesmen; they do not produce great political scientists. The emergence of democracy encourages the development of political science and the development of political science can and has in small ways contributed to the emergence and stabilization of democracy.
Theodore Lowi took up this same theme, arguing that
political science is usually the first discipline to be suppressed and the last to be revived when authoritarian regimes rule and then inevitably fail. Political science can be compared to the canary in the coal mines, whose sensitivity to poisonous fumes is an early warning that all individuals in that vicinity are in danger.” (Lowi 2003)1
For Lowi's earlier views on political scientists and their discipline, see Lowi 1992.
There is, of course, plenty of empirical evidence to confirm these propositions, and presumably it is not a coincidence that political science has flourished especially in one of the largest and most vigorous democracies in the world, i.e., the United States, whereas, say, a country like China, whatever its successes in the fields of sports or the arts, is not especially well-known for its political science scholarship. Something similar could be said about the state of the discipline in most Western European countries in comparison with what we find in the countries East of the Elbe before 1989 (now, of course, it is a totally different picture). Dictators, as a rule, don't like political scientists (at least not in their capacity as independent, and often critical, scholars—they have been known to rely on them as advisors), whereas democratic leaders at least show a healthy tolerance for them.
It is, then, almost a truism to say that a discipline that, by definition, tends to be critical of those in power, will be suppressed under dictatorial rule, whatever its forms, and that is in fact what happens, at least most of the time. However, on the basis of the Chilean experience, I argue that the relationship between authoritarianism and political science is more complex than it appears at first sight. We need a more differentiated approach to grasp this relationship in all its nuances.
Chilean political science presents us with a curious paradox. The Chilean regime after the military coup led by General Pinochet on September 11, 1973, was the most brutal (and the longest-lasting) regime Chile has ever had, with thousands of people killed, disappeared, and tortured. Books were burned and universities (and even some high schools) were “intervened,” as the euphemism had it, meaning that most institutions of higher education were ruled by military officers, some of which were setting foot in such places for the first time. Parliament was closed, as were many newspapers, radio, and television stations. Strict press censorship became the order of the day.
Yet, in 1990, at the end of 17 years of military rule, Chilean political science found itself not only on a much stronger footing than it did in 1970, but also in a position arguably better than the discipline in almost any other Latin American country, with the exception of Brazil. Chilean political science had all of the marks of a flourishing profession: three master's programs (two at the University of Chile, one at Catholic University); five professional journals (Estudios Internacionales, 1966–; Política, 1982–; Revista de Ciencia Política, 1984–; Opciones, 1983–1992; and Cono Sur, 1984–1992), plus several others which published political science work (Estudios Públicos 1984–; and Estudios Sociales 1980–); a professional association that at one point had several hundred members; multiple invitations extended to Chilean political scientists to join the faculty as visiting professors at some of the world's leading universities, including Harvard, Oxford, Columbia, Chicago, and Heidelberg; and the awarding of several Guggenheim and SSRC fellowships.
Beyond these strictly academic indicators, additional evidence about the vigor of the discipline comes from its contribution to the Chilean transition. Political scientists played key roles both in terms of the opposition strategy to military rule (even for such a critical question as whether to contest the 1988 plebiscite that was effectively to bring Pinochet's rule to an end) as well as in such nuts-and-bolts matters as public opinion polls and the management of the campaigns that led to the October 5, 1988, plebiscite and the presidential and parliamentary elections held on December 11, 1989, that led to the election of President Patricio Aylwin, head of the opposition coalition, Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia. Many were appointed to senior positions in the new democratic government, especially in ministries such as the Secretary General of the Presidency (equivalent to the president's chief of staff), Foreign Affairs, and Defense.
The reasons for which an incipient discipline, and one that was obviously affected by the traumatic changes that took place in Chile with the establishment of military rule, managed to emerge so well out of such a dark period in Chile's history constitutes one of the most fascinating chapters in Latin America's intellectual history, and one to which I will return. Before doing that, however, a short history of the birth and development of the discipline in Chile.
It is, of course, a standard tenet that political science is both a very old discipline, going back all the way to Aristotle, and a relatively new arrival to the academic scene (as compared to disciplines such as, say, history or philosophy). This is also very much true in Chile. On the one hand, political science goes back a long way in our comparatively short history. The first organic law of the University of Chile in 1842 established a “Faculty of Law and Political Science,” and José Victorino Lastarria, within the broader framework of public law, became, as it were, its first practitioner, publishing a volume called Lessons of Positive Politics; subsequently, Valentín Letelier, a rector of the University of Chile, followed in his footsteps, publishing About the State of Political Science in Chile in 1886. However, I would argue that some 80 years, that is, until the 1960s, would pass before political science would begin to establish itself as the modern discipline we conceive it today.2
For one of the very few works on the history of the discipline in Chile, see Fernández 1997.
Although before that there was a School of Political and Administrative Sciences at the University of Chile, it was really devoted to public administration more than anything else. The 1960s, which were to change so many things, not only in Chile, but worldwide, were to be absolutely critical for our discipline in its contemporary version—that is, as an empirically- and research-oriented social science, marking a radical break with the approaches that had been followed until then. Political science came out from its place in the shadows of other fields—be it either as a subfield of history (dedicated to the study of the evolution of Chile's political institutions), of philosophy (devoted to deliberations about what “the good society” should look like) or of the law (specializing in constitutional law)—to become a discipline of its own.
In substantive terms, of course, what motivates us as political scientists is the analysis of political behavior, be it at the mass or the elite level, and the ability to draw some generalizations about it. Chile in that regard has been very fortunate, and during the second half of the 20th century, the Chinese blessing (which also doubles as a curse) “may you live in interesting times” has been especially apposite for this long and narrow country near the end of the world. In this half century Chile has been torn by some of the great questions of our time—“Revolution in Liberty” (as an alternative to the Cuban Revolution) in the 1960s under President Frei Montalva, “The Peaceful Road to Socialism” under President Salvador Allende in the early 1970s, military dictatorship and repression thereafter, the neoliberal policies applied by the “Chicago School,” a highly successful transition to democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and nowadays the dilemmas of progressive politics and the Third Way in what is still a developing country (see Lagos 2005), are just some of them. This, naturally, provides rich material for political science, and it should not be surprising that some very good work has been produced as a result.3
If one scholar has systematically conceptualized the Chilean political process over the past 40 years, it is Arturo Valenzuela. See especially his Chile: Politics and Society, ed. with Samuel Valenzuela (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1972); Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized Polity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977); The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Opposition, ed. with Samuel Valenzuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Chile: Prospects for Democracy, with Mark Falcoff and Susan Kaufman Purcell (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988); and A Nation of Enemies: Chile under Pinochet, with Pamela Constable (New York: Norton, 1991).
The establishment of the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) in Santiago in 1960; the founding of the Institute of International Studies at the University of Chile in 1966; and the birth of the Institute of Political Science at the Catholic University of Chile in 1969 were three key events for this purpose. The first was crucial in bringing foreign specialists to Chile, especially sociologists with a strong positivist orientation who had a major impact in moving Chilean social science away from the more traditional, “essay-like” approaches that dominated until then. The notion that doing social science implied field work, public opinion polls, or at least elite interviews, rather than philosophic-literary ruminations about the future of society became widespread, if not fully dominant (Fuenzalida 1983). And, if political science has a sister discipline in Chile it is sociology, though the public perception of it, both at the mass and government level, has been strikingly different—with sociology being seen as the true bete noir by the Right in 1973, the “subversive science” by definition.4
The discipline of sociology as such in Chile has also benefited from much more systematic and sustained reflection than political science. See especially Brunner 1988; and Barrios and Brunner 1988.
The list of publications of both is extensive. For Manuel Antonio Garretón, see Hacia una nueva era política: Estudio sobre las democratizaciones (México City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995), and La sociedad en que viviremos: Introducción sociológica al cambio de siglo (Santiago: LOM, 2000). For Augusto Varas, see Chile, democracia, Fuerzas Armadas, with Felipe Agüero and Fernando Bustamante (Santiago: FLACSO, 1980), and Defensa Nacional, Chile 1990–1994: Modernización y desarrollo, with Claudio Fuentes (Santiago: FLACSO, 1994).
The founding of the Institute of International Studies gave a tremendous impetus to the study of international affairs in Chile (and on a more personal note, was absolutely decisive for my own vocation as a political scientist). Chile has had some very distinguished specialists in international law, but the trend at the time was more and more toward the study of world affairs from the perspective of international relations rather than from the law. The Institute of International Studies was modeled after Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, where its founder, historian Claudio Véliz, had been a scholar in residence. Véliz's bent was much more in the direction of history (and, in fact, the inaugural lecture at the Institute was given by none other than Arnold Toynbee). However, and proof positive that the original intentions of the founders of institutions do not always prevail, few would say that the Institute, which has published for 40 years now the oldest and most established journal of international affairs in Latin America, has made its most significant contributions in the field of history. Its impact has been in the field of international relations.
In fact, this is one area where Chilean political science has been especially fruitful.6
According to one study, of the 1,373 articles published in Chilean political science journals during 1980–2000, by far the largest share (43.3%) were in the field of international relations, far more than in any other subfield of the discipline. See Rehren and Fernández 2005.
Harking back to a more autobiographical vein, I still remember, as a 19-year old, second-year law student, sneaking into the remarkable seminars held at the Institute of International Studies in that old house, miraculously still standing, at Miguel Claro street in Providencia, where leading intellectuals like Celso Furtado, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Raúl Prebisch, Alain Joxe, and John Gittings elaborated on some of the key issues of the time. It was there and then that dependency theory was conceptualized and developed, and I remember promising myself, “when I grow up, I want to be like them and do what they are doing.”
Another key moment for the discipline in Chile came with the foundation of the Institute of Political Science at Catholic University. That institution had been at the forefront of university reform in Chile, and the establishment of a place where political science could stand on its own (rather than as part of other fields, as had been the practice until then) was so significant that it led to an antagonistic editorial in the conservative newspaper El Diario Ilustrado, as well as to objections from the Law School. It also meant, perhaps for the first time, that a significant number of scholars were sent abroad for graduate training in political science (some to England, mostly the University of Essex, and some to the U.S., mostly Georgetown University). The master's program that was started in the 1980s has by now formed some 20 generations of students, and the Licenciatura started in the 1990s another nine. One graduate, among many, is Chile's current head of the Army, General Juan Emilio Cheyre, who picked up his M.A. there before moving on to get his Ph.D. in international relations at the Universidad Complutense in Madrid.
It's first director, John Biehl (who did his graduate studies at the University of Essex), who before serving in the 1990s as Chile's ambassador to the U.S. and then in a key political portfolio in President Frei's cabinet, did something arguably much more significant. In the 1980s, as principal advisor to President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, he was the main intellectual driving force behind the Arias Peace Plan that eventually put an end to the spiral of violence that rocked Central America in that decade, an accomplishment that led to a Nobel Peace Prize for President Arias.
The 1960s, then, were a key period in the transition from the old-style, Continental approach to the “political sciences” embedded in law schools and considered, at most, as a picturesque distraction from the real business of hard-headed legal reasoning and analysis, to a discipline more akin to modern sociology, and to all that entails. But it should be obvious that the discipline was still in its infancy.7
For a broader assessment of the state of the discipline in Latin America at the time, see Kaplan 1970. For a contemporary evaluation, see the special issue of Revista de Ciencia Política (Santiago) 25 (2005), which includes several articles on Chile as well as on the situation of the field in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Salvador Allende's thousand days (1970–1973) embodied the most radical attempt to introduce widespread changes to Chilean society, as well as a political experiment that generated worldwide attention. As opposed to other such revolutionary efforts at the time (like the Cuban Revolution), this derived not only from the project's intrinsic appeal (however one may define it) but also from its potential relevance for other societies, including those of Mediterranean Europe, especially France and Italy. Francois Mitterrand, still in opposition then, visited Chile for two weeks in 1971, to see first-hand what it meant to have a ruling coalition like the Unidad Popular, that brought together Socialists, Communists, and Radicals, (much like the one he would later forge in France, and which led to his 14-year presidency) and Enrico Berlinguer, the then-leader of the Communist Party of Italy (PCI), gave some serious thought to “the lessons of Chile” by which he meant, of course, for Italy.8
See his series of articles “Il Cile, l'Italia e il compromiso storico,” Rinascita (Rome), 28 September, 5 October, and 12 October 1973.
The bibliography on Chile's Popular Unity government is extensive. Ironically, though, the impact on the development of political science in Chile was mixed. On the one hand, there were these incredibly exciting events occurring—the nationalization of the copper mines and of industry, a massive land reform program, mass mobilization, and workers' participation in the decision-making processes in factories and businesses of all kinds. On the other hand, a young discipline, still without fully defined contours, saw in its “politicization” the way to legitimation. In many ways, ideology rather than dispassionate observation and analysis became its leitmotiv (Lechner 1990).
The September 11, 1973, military coup remains the single most traumatic event in Chilean history, one that 30 years later continues to arouse enormous passions. The repression unleashed on the Left had as one of its objectives the dismantling of the academic structures that were considered to have fostered Marxism and socialism. Universities were closed for two weeks with some, like the Universidad Técnica del Estado and some campuses of the University of Chile and the Universidad de Concepción, becoming veritable battle grounds between militant Unidad Popular students and faculty on one side and the military on the other.
After that, the purges started. According to some estimates, 1,058 faculty members were expelled from the University of Chile and Catholic University. The social sciences were especially targeted, and at the University of Chile 255 faculty were terminated at the Faculty of Social Sciences (Lladser 1988, 221–222). The departments of sociology at the University of Chile and the University of Concepción were closed altogether, and at Catholic University, intermittently so. Many other research centers, department, and teaching units were closed, and there was a drastic reduction in university enrollments with the introduction of university fees.
One might think that with such an onslaught, the state of the social sciences in general and of political science in particular would suffer some irreparable damage from which it would be very difficult to recover—which is exactly what happened to the Chilean labor movement, which to this day is only a pale shadow of its former self in the pre-1973 period, with the percentage of the active labor force enrolled in trade unions only half of its historic high of some 33% in the pre-coup years. Yet, after 17 years of military rule, far from being emaciated or debilitated Chilean political science was a much stronger discipline than ever before. Although no data are available for political science per se, a broader set of statistics is quite eloquent:
When the coup took place, the country had only three such [private social science research] centers; by 1988 it had, by one count, forty nine of them employing 664 professionals, 134 of whom had done graduate work in Europe or in the United States. They were publishing more than twenty periodical journals or bulletins and had produced hundreds of academic books. By contrast, only some two hundred social scientists were carrying out research at Chilean universities in 1988. (Puryear 1994, 43)
What happened? Any effort to answer that question must start by disaggregating those long 17 years of military rule into a number of critical periods.
There are at least three significant periods in the evolution of the discipline during 1973–1989:
These first years were basically ones of taking shelter and looking for ways to survive. On the one hand, this meant the creation of alternative structures that could host the many fired faculty members and researchers. The creation of private research centers, or the reconversion of previously existing ones, like FLACSO or CIEPLAN, provided one way to cope. Often under the auspices of the Catholic Church, they provided an institutional protection of sorts, while foreign donors came up with the financing. As Puryear (1994, 39) puts it, “politics was flatly prohibited, while research was, despite serious restrictions, generally legal.” On the other hand, many went abroad, either in forced or voluntary exile (“The Pinochet scholarship” as it was ironically dubbed at the time) to do graduate studies, largely in Europe or the U.S.9
According to one study, out of a total of 199 researchers at social science study centres in Chile in 1987, 59 had done their graduate studies in Chile or some other Latin American country, 49 in the United States and 85 in Europe (Lladser 1988, 252).
At Catholic University's Political Science Institute, a Diploma in International Relations (initiated in 1972) attended by this writer in 1974, was ultimately cancelled half-way through by the university authorities as it was deemed too controversial, and the Institute entered into a period of “hibernation,” in which only a few service courses for other faculties were undertaken. The Institute of International Studies at the University of Chile, on the other hand, seen as less problematic because of the apparently less threatening nature of the study of international relations, and with no pedagogic mission, suffered the loss of some Chilean and foreign researchers, but otherwise continued with its regular program and the publication of its journal, Estudios Internacionales.
Once the worst waves of repression (largely concentrated in the first year after the coup) passed, and people slowly started to return to Chile with their graduate degrees in hand, the subject of “the causes of the coup” started to recede from research agendas and priorities to be replaced by projects focusing on the nature of the military regime, its rationality, and dynamics. The development of an international network of Chilean and foreign scholars interested in the country's problematique led to a number of conferences abroad that provided an important intellectual stimulus for local political scientists, who suddenly saw themselves in heavy demand to write for foreign publications and give papers at conferences abroad on topics that would have been taboo in Santiago.10
Perhaps one of the most significant of these was the one held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., from May 15–17, 1980, “Six Years of Military Rule in Chile,” which gave rise to Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1986). Although edited by U.S.-based Chilean scholars, most of the contributors to the book were based in Chile at the time. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Latin American Program of the Wilson Center, with which this writer was associated for a time, was especially hospitable to Chilean political scientists and social scientists more generally: Genaro Arriagada, Manuel Antonio Garretón, Arturo Valenzuela, and Augusto Varas were all Fellows in those years. This was also the time when the project on transitions from authoritarianism led by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead that would culminate in the four volume-edition edited by them, (1986) was launched.
Again, this implied a delicate balancing act. International relations was seen as a subfield somewhat removed from political contingency, and therefore more “acceptable” than other, more controversial areas. Not surprisingly, all of the political science projects approved for funding by FONDECYT, the program of CONICYT (the state-funded, Chilean equivalent to the National Science Foundation, established in 1982) in the 1980s were in IR. Alternativas, the academic journal of a private research center, the Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea (CERC), was banned after a couple of years in the early 1980s, but was soon replaced by another publication, Opciones, which continued to publish much the same material and only ceased publication in 1992.
This period also saw the founding of the Institute of Political Science of the University of Chile in 1982, at the initiative of the then-rector, General Alejandro Medina Lois, who had an interest in geopolitics, and who was strongly committed to its study.11
Although generally staffed by pro-government faculty, there was also a measure of pluralism at the Institute, which gave it some credibility. The very establishment of the Institute showed the ambiguous relationship of the Chilean military with political science, something related in turn to the longstanding interest of the Southern Cone military in geopolitics. General Augusto Pinochet had even written a book on the subject.
In this context, the economic crash of 1982 (when the Chilean economy had a negative growth rate of 14%) opened the final phase of the military regime. Under severe pressure from the first open mass demonstrations against the government, some exiles were allowed to return (many of them came to or established their own independent academic research centers) and book censorship was lifted.12
On the Chilean exile issue more generally, see Angell and Carstairs 1987.
For an interesting reflection on Chilean and Latin American political science more generally in this period, see Huneeus 1983.
On this, see Walker 1990.
A good statement of his views on this can be found in Flisfisch 1991.
Ironically, for much of this period the traditional relationship between intellectuals and politicians was reversed, as the latter came to depend more and more on the former, not only for ideas and proposals, but also for material support. Foreign foundations could not fund political activities, but they could finance academic research, and many a former parliamentarian had to be retrained into the ways of modern social science research to earn a living.16
On the international dimension of social science work in Chile, see Garretón 1989.
A key issue here is that of censorship. On the face of it, it seems odd that seminars could be held, working papers disseminated, and books published on matters as contentious as those Chilean political scientists used to focus on at the time under a military dictatorship as harsh as that of Pinochet. Yet, it may be worth noting that the military rulers realized that extreme censorship served little purpose, and over time became more flexible. A ranking in terms of the likely impact of the various media outlets thus emerged. Television, seen as by far the most “dangerous,” remained off-limits to the opposition and any critical voices, such as those of political scientists, at least until 1986; radio, regarded as less inflammatory, was “opened up” sooner, although certain limits had to be observed; and books, considered the most “inoffensive” of all, were freed of all censorship in 1982, thus making it possible to publish them with no restrictions. The same held for academic journals.17
Thus, two journals published by two leading research centers, Estudios Cieplan, published by CIEPLAN, and Opciones, published by CERC, came into being and made significant contributions to the political and economic debates in Chile. Both ceased publication in the early 1990s.
In the endgame of the dictatorship, political scientists were to play a key role in persuading opposition parties to participate in the 1988 plebiscite called by General Pinochet, to register to vote, and to spread the word that it was actually possible to defeat the regime at its own game.18
On the 1988 plebiscite, see Constable and Valenzuela 1988.
In the 1990s, Chilean political scientists continued to play a key role on the national scene. In 2002–2003, the three political ministers whose offices are situated in La Moneda, Chile's presidential palace, were all political scientists—one with an M.A. from the University of Michigan and the other two with doctorates from Heidelberg and the University of Denver, respectively. Political scientists have been decisive in the design and implementation of many of the innovative public policies that have become such distinguishing features of the Chilean transition. In fact, if the engineer was the emblematic professional of the 1940s and 1950s (the era of Chile's industrialization), the sociologist of the 1960s (that period of upheaval and revolution), and the economist (especially if trained at Chicago) of the neoliberal 1970s and 1980s, then Chile's challenges of the 1990s and beyond are those of the political scientist: the issues of democratic transition and consolidation, Chile's role in a rapidly changing world, the reform of the state, and constitutional reform.
Yet, the question remains: What led political science to flourish to such a degree (thus making possible its current “pole position”) under a military regime? There are, of course, a number of possible explanations. One of which could be simple, straightforward “scientific progress.” Time goes by, knowledge accumulates, institutions develop, and, in the end, disciplines advance. Still, this did not happen in many other Latin American countries also under military rule, so this is an inadequate response to our puzzle. A second possibility is that Pinochet was not such a harsh dictator after all, that his regime was more of a dictablanda than a dictadura, and that the net result was an environment not that unfriendly to academic pursuits. This was an authoritarian rather than a totalitarian regime, but being a political scientist in Pinochet's Chile was far from easy. One example should suffice. The first Congress of the Chilean Political Science Association was to hold its opening ceremony at the Hotel Acacias in Santiago on a Monday in September 1986, but was prevented from doing so by the government after a failed assassination attempt on General Pinochet's life that weekend.19
The Congress was postponed and took place six months later in March 1987, devoted to the theme “Politics and Democracy.”
I would argue that, rather, a special (but not necessarily unique) combination of circumstances made it possible for Chilean political science to “take off” and mature not under the “normal” state of affairs, i.e., an open, democratic system, but under a dictatorship. These circumstances include the following:
For a variety of complex reasons political science (unlike, say, economics, or the natural sciences) has not traditionally been a priority for graduate scholarships and study abroad, in Chile or elsewhere. Yet in the mid- and late 1970s and the early 1980s, a number of Chileans from a variety of professional backgrounds were able to channel their interest in politics (whose practice was banned in their homeland) into the study of political science at some of the world's leading universities. A combination of “push” (a harsh local environment) and “pull” (an attractive intellectual milieux at Princeton or Paris, with an active interest in Chile's situation) factors thus led to the creation of a critical mass of scholars that was able to create a professional community.
The counterpart of studying without government support was having no commitment to return to Chile after finishing their degrees, and many stayed abroad (and some continue to do so to this day)20
There are Chilean political scientists on the faculties of the Universities of Georgetown, Miami, Missouri, Notre Dame, Vanderbilt, Liverpool, Bradford, and Leiden, among others.
At one point, however, with the lifting of the ban for exiles to return to Chile and the groundswell of opposition to the military government, many political scientists decided to return to Chile. This was made possible by the existence of a large number of private research centers, many of them in the social sciences,21
Lladser (1988, 253) lists 49 research centers in the social sciences in 1987, with a total of 664 professionals. By far the largest number was sociologists (118), educators (66), economists (61), and lawyers (60). The number of political scientists was 13.
Until 1973, Chilean universities, though able to stand on their own in regional comparisons, were somewhat removed from the research pressures placed on faculty members in many higher education institutions in the Northern Hemisphere. It was perfectly possible to have a career as a university lecturer without publishing much, something which the existence of in-house (rather than peer-reviewed) journals only exacerbated by removing publication decisions from strict external scrutiny and confining them to a cozy group of “insiders.” This changed with the new dynamics of the independent research centers. Gaining international funding means submitting research proposals that withstand critical scrutiny by foundation staff and that result in research papers, professional journal articles, and books. Those scholars who could not adapt to these new mandates quickly found themselves out of their paycheck. In many ways, the realities of international social science practices came to Chile with a vengeance, cutting much of the slack traditionally found at Latin American universities (Brunner and Barrios 1987).
The military government's diagnosis was that much of the trouble generated by the Unidad Popular government and its socialist ideology could be traced back to subversive teaching at the universities, whose reform movements in the 1960s were seen as a hotbed of radicalism. This provided one reason for the massive purges that took place in various waves in the 1970s and continued intermittently until the late 1980s, as special laws allowed university authorities to dismiss faculty by simply citing “institutional needs” without having to show cause.22
Incredibly, these laws are still on the books and are even still occasionally used by university authorities.
It was during those long 17 years of military rule that Chilean political science “took off,” as it were, and with the restoration of democracy in 1990 (a process to which the discipline made a significant contribution) was to play a key role in furthering the objectives of the country's transition and consolidation of democratic institutions. Whereas in 1973 there was only one or two Chileans with a Ph.D. in political science, nowadays there are at least a dozen with an established international reputation, and at least 30 with Ph.D.s.23
According to one study, of those teaching in political science programs in Chile today, 24 have a doctorate in political science, of which 15 obtained it at European universities and eight at U.S. higher education institutions. There may be another half dozen or so political scientists with earned doctorates who are not university-affiliated (Fuentes and Santana 2005, Table 6).
Relatively speaking, of course, and compared to, say, sociology, political science in Chile continues to be a relatively small field (which is why its impact on the country's politics and public policies is even more remarkable). Of the 400,000 higher education students in Chile, there are probably no more than 500 enrolled in political science programs, both at the graduate and undergraduate levels.
One cannot have one's cake and eat it too, and the downside of the exodus of political scientists into government has been that the “hard core” of our activity, that is, basic research, has been weakened. And here comes another paradox, which would also seem to run counter to Huntington's thesis. After 15 years of democratic rule, fewer monographs, books, and articles are being published by Chilean political scientists today than in the 1980s, at the height of the dictatorship.24
It is obviously difficult to quantify an indicator such as the number of books published, but Rehren and Fernández (2005, Figure 2) conclude that, counterintuitively, fewer political science articles were published in the 1990s (that is, under the newly regained democratic rule inaugurated in March of 1990) than in the 1980s, under the military regime.
Only 1% of the 6,542 research projects approved by FONDECYT between 1982 and 2000 have been in political science, out of total of 11.1% approved in the social and legal sciences (Rehren and Fernández 2005, Figure 6).
As Altman (2005) has pointed out, another reason for this state of affairs may be related to “the pressures of punditry.” The enormous growth of private universities in Chile (and of political science programs) increases competition and places a premium on raising their profiles. Op-ed pieces and appearances on radio and television programs by faculty come in very handily for this purpose, and are therefore especially incentivized by these institutions, which otherwise do very little to provide the conditions for proper research.
It is, I suppose, no coincidence, and something that confirms the failure of the institutional framework extant to support solid political science work, that some of the best work is not being done by independent or university-affiliated scholars, as one might normally expect, but rather by a group sponsored jointly by the government and the UNDP. Over the past six years this group has published four Human Development Reports (UNDP 1998; 2000; 2002; 2004) that have set a new standard for political analysis. Under the leadership of the (late) political scientist Norbert Lechner and sociologist Pedro Guell, the group used public opinion polls especially designed for their project, as well as material culled from focus groups, in-depth interviews, and, in some cases, content analysis of various historical and literary texts, to provide the most sophisticated analysis of Chilean society and its politics at the turn of the century—its achievements, but also its travails and tribulations.27
For a review of the 2002 report, see Heine 2002.
To recreate an environment that stimulates and rewards basic research and the type of long-term investment of time and money demanded by the writing of monographs and books should be one of the imperatives of political science in Chile today, although how to go about that would entail another sort of paper altogether.
Counterintuitively, then, and against Huntington's thesis about political science needing a democratic environment to flourish and develop, Chile would seem to go against the grain. Not only did political science as a discipline come into its own during a 17 year dictatorship, but scholarly output and productivity has declined, according to some indicators, with the restoration of democracy. It would seem, then, that Huntington's thesis needs an amendment of sorts. There may well be cases when a dictatorial environment may not only not hinder, but in fact foster the development of political science, which, in turn, can play a major role in democratization and in bringing about the end of authoritarian rule. Needless to say, this would have significant implications for international strategies designed to promote and support democratic transitions.
This, of course, does not apply urbi et orbi. Some conditions need to be met for political science to take on such responsibilities. A totalitarian environment that leaves no room for independent research of any kind and blocks access to foreign funding and travel of any sort may not fall in this category. More generally speaking, the special conditions identified by Puryear (1994, 162–165) for intellectual and social scientists in general (not just political scientists) to take on such a role give us a good starting point for further analysis. They include the following:
There is little doubt that political science in Chile not only came into its own in the 1970s and 1980s, but also that it made and continues to make a substantial contribution to Chile's political development. That it did so would seem to demonstrate that Samuel P. Huntington (1988) was only partially right in his assessment that “the connection between democracy and political science has been a close and continuing one.” There may be occasions when “the advantages of adversity” and the trauma of dictatorship can also give a powerful impetus to “the master science.”
Jorge Heine is the Ambassador of Chile to India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. He was previously professor of political science at Diego Portales University in Santiago, Chile.