I would like to thank John Mueller for his review and appreciate the opportunity to engage with him in this dialogue. I share Mueller’s optimism that the American public is currently receptive to dovish arguments. I worry, however, that much as with Vietnam Syndrome—in which public opinion opposed large-scale US uses of force in the wake of the Vietnam War—this current reluctance to use force will not last. Nor do I believe that the Vietnam Syndrome was only broken by the horrific events of 9/11, though clearly that event greatly increased Americans’ appetite for force. Rather, the US public’s resistance to the use of force eroded roughly a decade earlier. From 1989 to 2001 the United States used force in Panama, Kuwait, Iraq, Haiti, the Balkans, Sudan, Somalia, and Afghanistan. Although most of these actions were small, the pitfalls of the uses of force are as likely to bedevil small deployments as large ones, as illustrated by the recent US military misadventure in Libya. This frequent use of force in the 1990s suggests that hangovers from military debacles are temporary. It also implies that the public’s current reluctance to use force in the aftermath of the Iraq War may not last.

Because resistance to the use of force is prone to wearing off, dovish arguments, such as Mueller’s and mine, are needed to ward off the temptation to use force. Such arguments must be made in ways consistent with American values, or they will not resonate with the public (pp. 23–25). Indeed, Mueller raises this same point in his book to help explain why opposition to the Vietnam War was initially unsuccessful (p. 55). Further, I argue that dovish arguments are most successful when they focus on effectiveness rather than costs or trade-offs (pp. 14–19). In other words, doves are at their most persuasive when they show that nonmilitary tools do a better job at advancing US interests and values than does force. Doves lose policy debates when they focus solely on costs or impugn American motives.

Regarding the culpability of the US military in American uses of force and its failures, Mueller is correct that I am hesitant to criticize enlisted personnel. They are not the ones making the crucial decisions. The higher levels of the military, however, very much do influence whether and how the United States uses force. As such, I agree with Mueller that it is more than fair to criticize US military leadership. Indeed, I cite the military’s failure to link tactical operations to political goals as a major reason why force fails (pp. 58–59). Further, I argue that military leaders are just as susceptible as civilian leaders to cognitive biases, such as the illusion of control, which push decision makers toward the use of force (p. 67). Last, I also criticize the Defense Department’s tendency to assume control of nonmilitary projects, such as redevelopment initiatives and local diplomatic efforts, which would best be left in civilian hands (p. 79–80). The US military has convinced Americans that it is always the most capable agency for tackling problems, when in fact many other agencies, such as USAID and the State Department, are better suited to carry out noncombat foreign policy tasks. Defense budgets clearly benefit from this tendency to use the military to perform nonmilitary tasks. This expansion of the Defense Department at the expense of other agencies increases the likelihood that force will be used because it reduces the capacity and influence of nonmilitary agencies, leaving the military as the most obvious, although not the best, tool available (pp. 131–32).

The key points—on which Mueller and I agree—are that the United States would benefit from using force less often and that this can be done without retreating into isolationism. There is no need for the United States to actively engage in frequent combat operations, because they often do more harm than good. An internationalist foreign policy far less reliant on force would benefit the United States and is better suited for defending the existing liberal international order.