In a sobering analysis of our post-whatever-it-is world, Rowan Williams states that there is an ever-widening gap or wound in the North Atlantic body politic ‘which neither conventional right nor conventional left are currently doing much to recognise or repair’. In place of shared patterns of judging human behaviour and relationship that allow people to determine what they can reasonably do and say together to foster a just and equitable common life and language, the ruling consortium of nation-states and global markets offers forms of political discourse that are dominated by the marketing of slogans and sound bites, and the calculation of short-term advantage, which are incapable of sustained deliberations about the basic conditions of our humanity.Footnote 1
The significance of this social wound is not hard to discern. Life together in any sort of association is sustained by the assumption that its members are, by and large, able to interpret the words and actions of others reasonably well. They can go about their business assuming that error, deception, self-deception, irony and ambiguity, though everywhere present in these interactions, will not finally render reliable reasoning and coherent action impossible.Footnote 2 The long-term coherence and intelligibility of human existence in all of its particularity and contingency depends on shared activities, judgements and institutions that constitute a common life and language. These practices, judgements and institutions come together to form an inter-pretative art,Footnote 3 that is, a set of performative prescriptions for common or at least continuous shared activity, that allows humans to make inferences about future behaviour and present intentions from premises about past behaviour.
For better or worse, the shared judgements and activities that over the last seventeen hundred years sustained the common life of both ‘Old’ and ‘New Worlds’, i.e. of Western Christendom, were supplied largely by the church. However deficient we might finally judge this social arrangement to be theologically, it did provide a measure of moral coherence and direction to a long succession of regimes that ordered a fallen world. But the nations and peoples who formed the heart of Christendom have divested themselves of the old, old story, and reinvested the accumulated social capital in a series of political, economic and cultural projects that did not depend on any explicit connection with the church or the Christian tradition. Radically new configurations of world and self were ushered in, in accordance with which human beings learned to think, feel and act quite differently in every sphere of life.
These new modes of life, initially conceived in Europe but first realised in North America,Footnote 4 sought to maintain faith in an underlying reality of human life while disassociating itself from the God who had been the beginning and end of that faith, and from the community, narrative and tradition that bore witness to this God.Footnote 5 Freeing women and men from the social conventions and mores of a so-called Christian civilisation has not, however, resulted in what could reasonably be called human flourishing. To be sure, our technological powers have increased exponentially, the ability to manipulate our physical environment is unprecedented, and the wealth that has been amassed is almost beyond comprehension. But to war and the rumours of war there has been no end, the poor are still with us, and a silicon web has supplanted Max Weber's iron cage, reducing those ensnared within it to the status of mere economic units, integers of aimless production and conspicuous consumption.Footnote 6 Many wonder whether there is anything at all genuinely and intrinsically human beyond their momentary appetites and desires, and any identity they might share resides not in a positive good that commands their assent, but in suspicion of and hatred for their enemies, both real and imagined.
In a time when ‘overarching and abiding appeals to be thoughtful, humane, and ethical beings no longer exist or are swept away in favor of appeals to be greedy, acquisitive, and inhumane’,Footnote 7 the church is summoned by its mission to be ‘the “sacrament”, the epiphany, of the new creation’,Footnote 8 to cultivate a mode of life and language that can address a word of judgement and redemption to a world that has come under the thrall of das Nichts, the nothingness, which according to Dietrich Bonhoeffer names ‘all the forces opposed to God’, engulfing life, history, family, people, language, and faith, blowing ‘its anti-God breath into all that exists’. The nothingness ‘creates the illusion of waking it to new life, and at the same time sucks out its true essence until it soon disintegrates into an empty husk and is discarded’.Footnote 9
Bonhoeffer offers profound insight into a world that does not find in God its beginning and end, and discerns something of what is required in such a world to make and to keep human life human. There are two themes in his writings that pertain especially to this task. In the first part of this essay I shall examine his understanding of the last things, the things before the last and what binds them together. Over against the dominant tendencies of most modern conceptions of what makes human life human, Bonhoeffer argues that the things before the last or penultimate do not possess a separate, autonomous existence, and that the positing of such a breach has had disastrous effects on human beings and the world they inhabit.
In the second part I shall examine Bonhoeffer's account of the divine mandates as the conceptual basis for coping with and bearing witness to a world that, in its misguided efforts to make and keep human life human, has taken leave of God.Footnote 10 Though this account has much to commend it, it is hindered by problematic habits of interpretation that leave it vacillating between what are finally incommensurable positions. I therefore argue that his profound but incomplete insights be subsumed within Augustine's understanding of the two orders of human society that he formulates in City of God.Footnote 11
Ultimate, penultimate and the natural
Modern conceptions of what constitutes a truly human existence have a complex genealogy, and not all of their assumptions and assertions can or should be dismissed out of hand. Many of the efforts to correlate the gospel with the nobler aspirations of the post-Reformation world have been and continue to be worthwhile endeavours. Bonhoeffer himself declares that ‘The human and the good should not be made into self-sufficient values, but they may and should be claimed for Jesus Christ’.Footnote 12 But as with any subject of inquiry the devil is in the details, and we would do well to look more closely at these details.
One in particular can be traced to the late medieval world, when an understanding of human nature developed which eventually led in the modern period to the claim that the social mediation of transcendence was no longer needed to discern what made and kept human life human. In our day and time it is still widely assumed that nothing vital is lost when the surplus baggage of ‘religion’ is removed from the domain of what is purely human. This represents a departure from the mainstream of the Christian tradition, which taught that human beings ‘cannot live except by the vision of God – and that vision of God depends totally on God's good pleasure’.Footnote 13 Human beings are created with a natural desire to see and participate in God, but that desire can only be realised by God's gracious initiative. Apart from participation in the divine, the human being – that creature created in God's image and in possession of reason that reflects the very Word himself – effectively disappears, and the work of God is undone.Footnote 14
But in an effort to protect the gratuity of grace, certain late medieval Catholic theologians, notably Denys the Carthusian (1402–71), Cajetan (1469–1547), Baius (1513–89), Suarez (1548–1617), and Jansenius (1585–1638) proposed a radical separation of human nature and the covenant or mystery of grace. It was Cajetan in particular who, to protect the integrity of fallen human nature from Protestant attacks, championed the concept of a human nature that was ‘a closed and self-sufficient whole’, created with an end that is proportionate to humankind's natural powers.Footnote 15 Though it was never their intention, this doctrinal innovation has in the long run had the effect of rendering the supernatural work of grace superfluous.
The Protestant Reformation contributed to this reconfiguration of human nature, beginning with Martin Luther's radical division of every human being into an inner and outer person, the former standing solely before God (coram deo) in conscience, and the latter in the historical sequence of particular acts, as one stands before one's fellow human beings (coram hominibus). He writes, in his famous essay on the freedom of the Christian, that human beings have a twofold nature, one spiritual and other bodily. The spiritual nature is no longer that which has to do with the Spirit, as in the New Testament, but what is juxtaposed to the body, that is, the ‘spiritual, inner, or new man’. The bodily nature is the ‘carnal, outward, or old man’. And though it is true that ‘in the sight of men a man is made good or evil by his work’, we must take care not to think that in doing these works that we are ‘justified before God by them, for faith, which alone is righteousness before God, cannot endure that erroneous opinion’.Footnote 16
With the division of the human being into two natures, a hard and fast dichotomy between faith and works soon becomes canonised in Protestant life, such that ‘law’ (in virtually any sense of the term) and ‘works’ are by definition outside of grace. Nevertheless, keeping the law and doing good works are necessary to the maintenance of the earthly city if not to true faith. Separate spheres of life are therefore identified, one for each of the two natures. The temporal world, where goods and services are bought and sold, rewards and punishments are meted out, wars are fought and enemies subjected and women and men are forced to seek their own individual interests, can be understood etsi deus non daretur, even if God does not exist. It therefore does not depend on grace for understanding and adds little or nothing to it; the spiritual world of hidden faith has little or nothing to add to the course of the temporal world, save, of course, for the general sentiment that it too is ultimately subject to the sovereignty of God.
The seeds of Luther's division of the human being into two discrete selves germinated in Puritan piety of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. According to Charles Taylor, the English Puritans thoroughly rejected the late medieval conception of contemplation, in which matters of the ‘spirit’ were reserved for those in religious communities and thus divorced from everyday life, ‘i.e., those aspects of human life concerned with production and reproduction’.Footnote 17 Their rejection of contemplation in favour of everyday life involved a commitment to social levelling and to the belief that the good life is something that everyone can achieve. The virtues of commerce and the knowledges that serve the new regime of capitalist accumulation displace those which attended the medieval hierarchical ordering of society. A new conception of vocation results that is no longer connected to the priesthood or monastery, but which sanctifies any kind of employment that is deemed useful and imputed to use by God. All such callings were thus equal, and one's participation in them was to be judged not by the activity itself, because the temporal sphere is relatively autonomous, but by ‘the spirit in which one lives what everyone lives, even the most mundane existence’.Footnote 18
In a response to William Paton's book, The Church and the New Order, written in 1941, Bonhoeffer unequivocally rejects the idea that the social realm occupies its own autonomous sphere separate from the activity of the triune God:
Christ is the King to whom all powers are subjected. Because the world is created ‘for him’ (Col. 1:16), we dare not consider it as a domain which lives by itself, quite apart from God's plan. The commandments of God indicate the limits which dare not be transgressed, if Christ is to be Lord. And the Church is to remind the world of these limits.
Though he concedes that many Christians held that the church has nothing to do with so-called ‘secular problems’, others were beginning to see ‘that the Church is truly the salt of the earth and that the discarding of God's commandments means death for nations as well as individuals’.Footnote 19
Bonhoeffer develops his understanding of the social realm in Ethics when he takes up the question of the last things, the things before the last and the relationship that binds them together. He begins by characterising this ultimate or last word in good Lutheran fashion:
The origin and essence of all Christian life are consummated in the one event that the Reformation has called justification of the sinner by grace alone. It is not what a person is per se, but what a person is in this event, that gives us insight into the Christian life. Here the whole length and breadth of human life is concentrated in one moment, one point.
In this event, and as a consequence of it, human beings are free for God and for each other. We become aware that there is a God who loves us, that our brothers and sisters are standing at our sides, whom God loves as God loves us, and that we have a future with the triune God, together with the church.Footnote 20
These two worlds do not exist by themselves, writes Bonhoeffer, each hermetically sealed in a sterile environment to protect them from contamination, as it were. The ultimate or last word stands rather in a generative relationship with the things before the last, the penultimate. The things before the last, which he defines as being human (Menschsein) and being good (Gutsein), possess no separate, autonomous existence: ‘There is no penultimate as such, as if something or other could justify itself as being in itself penultimate; but the penultimate becomes what it is only through the ultimate, that is, in the moment when it has already lost its own self-sufficiency.’ But it is equally the case that the penultimate precedes the ultimate temporally, and so ‘it is the case that being human precedes being justified, and seen from the perspective of the ultimate must precede it’. Any arbitrary destruction of the penultimate, for example, when a human life is denied the goods that are proper to it, does serious harm to the ultimate, and hinders a life of grace and faith.Footnote 21 For the sake of the ultimate the penultimate must be preserved, for as Bonhoeffer puts it in one of his prison letters, ‘it is only when one loves life and the earth so much that without them everything seems to be over that one may believe in the resurrection and a new world’.Footnote 22
In connection with the relationship between ultimate and penultimate, Bonhoeffer proposes a recovery of the concept of the natural. He invokes it as a mediating concept, treating it as distinct from the created, in order to take into account the fallenness of humankind, and also from the sinful, to include in it the created. The natural is that which, after the fall, is directed towards the coming of Christ, while the unnatural is that which has closed itself off against the coming of Christ. He thus uses the mediating categories of natural and unnatural typologically, as anticipations and refusals, respectively, of justification. Bonhoeffer then asserts, in terms that are reminiscent of the tradition up to the time of Aquinas, that ‘The natural does not compel the coming of Christ’, and hence it is truly unmerited grace, nor does ‘the unnatural make it impossible; in both cases the real coming is an act of grace’,Footnote 23 an act which, as he says elsewhere, is the ultimate.Footnote 24
Bonhoeffer notes that some would justify theologically the notion that human nature can somehow be defined or understood apart from the event of grace, by appealing to the incarnation as God's affirmation of the human being as defined in abstraction from crucifixion and resurrection, but he rejects this move unequivocally. The humanity of Jesus Christ does not mean simply the ratification of the established world and of the human as it is. There can be no greater error, he argues, than to separate the three elements of the event of grace: ‘In the becoming human we recognize God's love toward God's creation; in the crucifixion of God's judgment on all flesh; and in the resurrection God's purpose for a new world.’Footnote 25 In the Word made flesh God judges our predefined conceptions of what it takes to make and to keep human life human, and offers in their place the decisive definition in the life, work, and passion of Jesus.Footnote 26 According to Bonhoeffer, then, genuine creatureliness is intelligible only within the social idiom established by the relationship between penultimate and ultimate and thus between nature and grace, a relationship that is only made visible by the proclamation and discipline of the church, Christ existing as community.
Bonhoeffer is equally scathing in his assessment of the damage to the quest for human flourishing that the secularising impulses of modernity have caused, including those values that are embraced by many as sacrosanct. He contends that the desire for absolute freedom ‘leads people into deepest servitude. The master of the machine becomes its slave; the machine becomes an enemy of the human being. What is created turns against its creator – a strange repetition of the biblical fall!’Footnote 27 He also questions the ability of liberal statecraft, particularly its enchantment with an untethered notion of freedom, to hold in check the omnipotence of the state and assigns to it responsibility for the movement towards state absolutism.Footnote 28
Separated from its source and goal in God, all creation perpetually stands on the brink of nothingness, das Nichts. Speaking in apocalyptic tones that seem calculated to make his readers extremely nervous, Bonhoeffer declares that ‘Everything that exists is threatened with annihilation. This is not one crisis among others, but a conflict of ultimate seriousness.’Footnote 29 In face of das Nichts, he adds:
the question about a historical heritage that we must make our own, use in the present, and pass on to the future is snuffed out. There is no future and no past. There remains only the present moment rescued from nothingness and the desire to grasp the next moment. Already yesterday's concerns are consigned to forgetfulness, and tomorrow's are too far away to obligate us today.Footnote 30
Bonhoeffer concludes, perhaps with a touch of irony, that, ‘Nothingness binds itself to us and nothingness puts us in its debt.’Footnote 31
A modern corpus christianum?
Bonhoeffer's conception of the relationship between the penultimate and the ultimate has much to commend itself, as Christians seek to cultivate human flourishing in a world that no longer even gestures towards God as the beginning and end of all things. That said, however, he struggles to the end of his life with problematic habits of mind bequeathed to him by his Protestant forebears that leave his thinking vacillating between two poles, one holding the institutions and habits of Christendom at arm's length, the other continuing to presuppose the desirability of a ‘Christian civilisation’.
In certain respects, Bonhoeffer is very critical of certain key concepts underwriting the form of Christendom that prevailed in the Germany of his day. He is especially unrelenting in his criticism of the idea of the orders of creation. With this concept, he writes,
just about everything can be defended. . . One need only hold out something to be God-willed and God-created for it to be vindicated forever, the division of man into nations, national struggles, war, class struggle, the exploitation of the weak by the strong, the cutthroat competition of economics. Nothing is simpler than to describe all this – because it is there – as God-willed and therefore to sanction it.
What this apparently simple and straightforward account neglects, however, is the factor that makes it theologically untenable: ‘It is not realized in all seriousness that the world is fallen and that now sin prevails and the creation and sin are so bound up together that no human eye can any longer separate the one from the other, that each human order is an order of the fallen world and not an order of creation.’Footnote 32
In an even more candid assessment and critique of the idea of Christendom, located in a lecture given to his students at Finkenwalde on the interpretation of the New Testament, Bonhoeffer criticises the way Martin Luther's doctrine of grace ‘confirms Constantine's covenant with the church. As a result, a minimal ethic prevailed.’ He acknowledges that this was, of course, not what Luther wanted, that he was looking for a complete ethic for everyone, not just for the religious orders. But the result was nevertheless the belief that the church should live in the world and in its ordinances. ‘Thus the existence of the Christian became the existence of the citizen. The nature of the church vanished into the invisible realm. But in this way the New Testament message was fundamentally misunderstood [and] inner-worldliness became a principle.’Footnote 33
Later in this same lecture Bonhoeffer makes it clear, as he does elsewhere, that the visibility of the church in a fallen world is crucial to the work of the gospel:
According to the witness of the New Testament, the church is the city on the hill. . . It has to define its limits. It has to sever heresy from its body. It has to make itself distinct and to be a community which hears the Apocalypse. . . Friendship between the church and the world is not normal, but abnormal. The community must suffer like Christ, without wonderment. The cross stands visibly over the community. This is the proclamation of the whole Christ, witness to the whole presentation of the message.Footnote 34
Such observations confirm his oft-repeated insistence on the visibility of the church, such as the following from Sanctorum Communio: ‘The church is God's new will and purpose for humanity. God's will is always directed toward the concrete, historical human being. But this means that it begins to be implemented in history. God's will must become visible and comprehensible at some point in history.’Footnote 35
At other times, however, Bonhoeffer seems to presuppose that there still exists in some form a coherent corpus christianum, a Christian civilisation and culture. In a section in Ethics entitled ‘Guilt, Justification, Renewal’, for example, he refers to a wound inflicted among the nations of the Western world. This wound, inflicted when the West fell away from the one who, as the form of our true humanity ‘would take form in us and to lead us to our own true form’, manifests itself in violence, avarice and injustice. According to Bonhoeffer, the cicatrisation of this wound, though not the removal and forgiveness of the guilt that is the result of ‘falling away from Christ’, will only take place through the justification and renewal of the West, a process that will unfold indirectly, through the faith of the church in its submission to, and participation in, the form of Christ.Footnote 36
Bonhoeffer's assumption that a Christian civilisation is still something to be sought is most evident in his experimentationFootnote 37 with the concept of the divine mandates in Ethics. These mandates name four tasks that God has imposed upon the world to bind all human beings to their beginning and end in Christ: work (which includes the realm of ‘culture’), marriage and the family, government and the church. The theological warrants for the mandates are, first, the incarnation of God in Christ, in whose ecclesial body ‘all humanity is accepted, included, and borne, and the church-community of believers is to make this known to the world by word and life’, and second, the doctrine of creation, explicated from the standpoint of the incarnation, however, and not as ‘determinate forms of being’ (he specifically cites John 1:10 and Col. 1:16 in this regard).Footnote 38
We dare not overlook the profound wisdom in Bonhoeffer's account of the mandates. With them he decisively rules out any suggestion of an autonomous secular sphere that lies beyond the authority of God's self-disclosing activity in Christ. Our everyday activities, relationships and habits find their significance only in their origin, continuance and goal in Jesus Christ. This means, in turn, that for Christians there can be no retreating from a secular into a ‘spiritual’ sphere, for the whole human being stands indivisibly before the world (coram hominibus) and before God (coram deo). He condemns, in his discussion of the mandates, the concept of the orders of creation that can lead ‘all too easily to a divine sanctioning of all existing orders per se, and thus to a romantic conservatism’ that is entirely at variance with the purposes of God.Footnote 39 Bonhoeffer is clearly working hard to find a way to indicate that the life and language of the church do not operate at the margins of life, where the institutions of state and market would love to confine them, but impinge on the practices, habits and relationships that take place, as he puts it in one of his prison letters, ‘in the middle of the village’.Footnote 40
Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer's discussion of the mandates fails to escape from the gravitational pull of suppositions that kept such notions as the orders of creation firmly in a Constantinian orbit. He still assumes, for example, that theologians ought to provide a principled account for the state of its role in God's providential ordering of things (as though the power brokers in New York, Washington, London, Beijing or Tokyo care any longer what theologians think). Of course, in the minds of some the failure to offer such an account, or even merely to ask why we should presume to provide it, immediately constitutes prima facie evidence that one is advocating some sort of ‘withdrawal’ from the world. As I shall note in more detail shortly, the mature Augustine does not think that this is self-evident, and yet he is rarely accused of being a sectarian or fideist.
The one habit of mind that more than any other reveals a residual Constantinianism at work in Bonhoeffer's discussion of the mandates is the assumption that I mentioned at the outset, that there exists but one all-encompassing ‘Society’ within which the church functions as a subsystem. What tips us off is his cataloguing of the church as one mandate alongside the others, all of which operate in coordinated fashion within a comprehensive life-world. This assumption makes sense, however, only if one also assumes either that virtually everyone in this society is Christian or that the Christian and the non-Christian share essentially the same (minimal and ever shrinking) set of moral ends and virtues. And since everyone is a Christian, at least implicitly, one can then ask what may seem like natural and commonplace questions, but which in fact are elitist, namely, what is the proper role of the state, and which regime is most likely to fulfil that role? They are elitist, for they suppose that those who ask them have such power and sufficient leisure that it falls to them to assess the merits of alternative forms of governance and select one, which, since they adhere to the ends and virtues of this society, will invariably be one in which they share the rule.Footnote 41
When positioned as one of the mandates, the church cannot help but be reduced to one of many social subsystems that operates in reciprocal relation with the others, and for which economic metaphors constitute the normative grammar. ‘Society’ (again always in the singular) has limited ‘capital’ that it must ‘invest’ cautiously and ‘spend’ wisely. The function of these societal subsystems, from religious and educational institutions to the family, is to maintain society's principles and directives by cultivating ‘happy, useful, productive, and safe subjects, in the social and political sense of the term: they will be cunningly “subjected”’.Footnote 42 In such circumstances Christian identity and witness will invariably be transvalued into ‘religion’, a set of habits and expectations that is useful both for depicting this mysterious and invisible whole, and also for conserving social energies in a numinous ether called ‘values’, which at the appropriate time can be put to a ‘real’ social use.Footnote 43 The spectre of religion that Bonhoeffer elsewhere tries to exorcise from the church's life and language returns with a vengeance to haunt its every move.Footnote 44
Preserved for Christ
The discussion of the mandates in Ethics is not Bonhoeffer's last word on the subject of a viable and faithful mode of life and language in a world governed by the postmodern swords of consumption and coercion. Larry Rasmussen notes that in his later prison correspondence Bonhoeffer moves once again away from Constantinian suppositions. He points to the ‘Outline for a Book’ as evidence that Bonhoeffer abandons ‘the conception of the postwar order as “Christian civilization”’. Rasmussen also cites Bonhoeffer's decision not to work immediately on Ethics when he takes up again his theological labours in 1944, but instead to sketch an outline for another book in which a ‘vastly altered mood has replaced the self-confident effort of Ethics to lay the foundations and structures of a future order’.Footnote 45
We should also attend to two salient points (among many) that Bonhoeffer makes in a letter that he writes from Tegel prison to his godson on the occasion of his baptism. First, he states that his generation deceived itself when it thought all that was needed to make and to keep human life human was reason and justice. When these failed, women and men found themselves at the end of their tether. The generation of his godson, by contrast, would know that ‘the world is controlled by forces against which reason can do nothing; and so you will be able to cope with those forces more successfully’.Footnote 46 Second, Bonhoeffer employs in this letter exilic imagery from the Old Testament to describe the status of the church in a post-Christendom world:
We may have to face events and changes that take no account of our wishes and our rights. But if so, we shall not give way to embittered and barren pride, but consciously submit to divine judgment, and so prove ourselves worthy to survive by identifying ourselves generously and unselfishly with the life of the community and the sufferings of our fellow-men.
He then cites several passages from the prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah to the effect that the chosen people of God should learn how to cope with a world in which they are no longer in charge without losing their souls.Footnote 47 Bonhoeffer seems to be thinking of a church with a very different relationship to the secular world than the one that had existed for centuries.
We need not look beyond Ethics, however, to realise that Bonhoeffer is still wrestling with the best way to address these matters. Eberhard Bethge has written that, due to its misuse by others, Bonhoeffer completely abandons after 1933 a concept that figures prominently in Creation and Fall: the ‘orders of preservation’.Footnote 48 I would contend, however, that this is not entirely accurate. Though Bonhoeffer no longer employs the term Erhaltungsordnungen in his later writings, the idea of preservation continues to pervade his thinking. In his discussion of the mandates, for example, he writes that government is not creative, that by itself it cannot produce life or values. Instead it preserves (halten) what is created. ‘By establishing justice and by the power of the sword’, he writes, ‘government preserves (bewahren) the world for the reality of Jesus Christ’. And the notion of preservation is strongly implied when he states that through the mandate of work ‘a world should emerge that – knowingly or unknowingly – expects Christ, is directed toward Christ, is open for Christ, and serves and glorifies Christ’.Footnote 49
The emphasis on preservation is even more pronounced in his discussion of the concepts of the natural and reason. ‘The natural’, he writes, ‘is that form of life preserved (erhalten) by God for the fallen world that is directed towards justification, salvation and renewal through Christ’. Formally the natural is determined by God's intention to preserve the world and direct it towards Christ, and hence in this aspect can only be discerned in relation to Christ. Materially the natural is itself the form of preserved life, embracing the whole of humanity. Reason belongs to the material dimension of the natural as the source of knowledge of itself. It is not a divine principle of knowledge and order that can raise human beings above the natural, but is itself a part of creation that has been preserved by God and thus wholly embedded in the natural. Its function is to take in (vernehmen) as a unity that which is whole and universal in reality. The natural and reason are thus correlated with each other, the former as the form of being of the preserved life, the latter as the form of its awareness. Reason is suited to this task because it too is fully implicated in the fall, hence it ‘perceives only what is given in the fallen world, and, indeed, exclusively according to its content’.Footnote 50
In what are perhaps the most intriguing statements he makes in connection with the preservative function of the mandates, Bonhoeffer mentions a ‘deep’ or ‘dark shadow’ that is cast over work and marriage. With respect to marriage he writes ‘in marriage new persons are created to serve Jesus Christ. But because the first son of the first human beings, Cain, was born far from paradise and became the murderer of his brother, here, too, a dark shadow falls over marriage and family in this our world.’ He makes a similar qualification of labour, noting that the descendants of Cain are the ones who ‘should fulfill this mandate casts a deep shadow over all human work’. This tacit reference to the fall amplifies an earlier observation by Bonhoeffer that seems to be a clear allusion to Augustine's City of God, which is that the city was the first product of Cain's labor, forming the earthly contrast (Gegenbild) to the eternal city of God.Footnote 51
Had Bonhoeffer followed up on what I take to be these, his own (admittedly brief, almost cryptic) clues, his efforts to articulate a modus vivendi with a truly post-Christendom world might have taken a very different form. Instead of including the church among the mandates (which cannot help but reduce it to a ‘religious’ supplement to the ruling consortium of state and market), he could have wedded the emphasis on the divine preservation of the fallen institutions and practices of the ‘natural’ world to Augustine's understanding of the two orders of human society. This move would have provided him with a theological framework for deliberating about the fruitful use of the legitimate goods that constitute the penultimate in the ways that they are open to Christ, but at the same time without inadvertently rendering the ultimate a function of the penultimate.
Of course, to assert that there are two orders of human society in the world invokes an apocalyptic frame of mind that, as Bonhoeffer observes at one point, could be construed as the mark of a pure otherworldliness. This path, if followed, would necessarily entail an impossible withdrawal from the everyday world where people deal with the necessities of eating, drinking, acquiring and disposing of property, marrying and giving in marriage, having children, burying parents and the like. But he also states that such a frame of mind can ‘have the more salutary effect of making us realise that the kingdom of God has its own history which does not depend on political events, and that the life of the Church has its own God-given laws which are different from those which govern the life of the world’. An apocalyptic stance can make us ‘acutely conscious of the fact that the future is in God's hands and that no human planning, however intelligent and however well-intentioned, can make men masters of their own fate’.Footnote 52
I shall conclude by naming briefly what I take to be some of the benefits of realigning Bonhoeffer's emphasis on preserving function of the natural with an Augustinian conception of two orders of human society, each visibly embodied in a set of practices ordered around competing and incommensurable conceptions of the highest good, each constituting a substantially different interpretation of human existence.Footnote 53 First, this realignment is able to acknowledge that the institutions of the earthly city are governed to one extent or another by what Augustine calls the libido dominandi, the lust to mastery,Footnote 54 with its claim to moral authority, its right to determine the kinds and order of goods men and women shall pursue, an authority and a right predicated on the possession, threat and use of coercive force, and thus on death and the fear of death, while at the same time permitting relative distinctions between nations and rulers.Footnote 55 Christians are thus free to acknowledge that certain forms of domination, for example, liberal oligopolies such as the United States or the European Union, tend to be less oppressive in their pursuit of the goods necessary for natural life, without succumbing to the false claim that they constitute a fundamentally new kind of political and economic regime.
Second, Augustine's scheme allows us to distinguish between the fact of domination and after-the-fact justifications employed by the civil authorities to persuade their subjects that they are acting in their best interests. This distinction opens up the space to judge how to make fruitful use both of the goods over which the authorities of the earthly city have charge and their vocabularies of legitimation (‘We hold these truths to be self-evident. . .’). When Christians no longer assume that there is one all-encompassing ‘Society’ in which everyone subscribes to the same ethical ends and virtues (thus positing a homogeneity of means and ends that never existed even in the heyday of Christendom, and which certainly does not exist now), then neither shall we assume that it is up to us to run the world. We shall instead be free to engage in the vital and yet difficult practice of discerning which among the many practices and products of the earthly city are ‘natural’, that is, open to the messianic reign of God, and which are ‘unnatural’. This is indeed a difficult task. For example, when Christians practise certain professions, they may find themselves pressed at some point between incompatible claims to their allegiance. Augustine, for example, decided that with his baptism he would need to abandon his position as a teacher of rhetoric, which in classical Roman society set forth the path to political success, because the tools of rhetoric were not being devoted to God's law but used as weapons for ‘lying follies and legal battles’. Indeed, he writes in Confessions that some may judge that he had sinned in this matter ‘by allowing myself to remain even for an hour in a professional chair of lying once my heart was fully intent on our service’.Footnote 56
With respect to the rhetoric of legitimation used by the earthly city to justify their domination, Christians are free to use it to influence its rulers to act in ways that are more conducive to becoming and staying human in the penultimate, but without needing to affirm that the institutions over which these agents preside are doing anything other than preserving a semblance – real but imperfect – of what is good, true and beautiful about the world, with a view to the end of the age, when all things will be recapitulated in Christ. For example, though Augustine explicitly refuses the opportunity to speculate about the best type of regime,Footnote 57 he does remind those wielding the earthly sword that their rule is temporal and encourages them to exercise their authority in accordance with the virtues of humility, magnanimity, generosity and justice tempered by mercy.Footnote 58
Finally, when Christians set aside the notion that ‘Society’ is or should be Christian, then the elitist supposition that those who occupy positions of political, economic or domestic power are naturally the paradigmatic agents for moral vision and ethical deliberation is also rendered suspect. To learn ‘to see the great events of history from below, from the perspective of the outcast, the suspects, the maltreated, the powerless, the oppressed, the reviled –in short, from the perspective of those who suffer’Footnote 59 is in part to learn to ask different sorts of questions. The civil rights movement in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s did not originate among the power brokers of the white majority, but in the marginalised black churches of the American South. These sisters and brothers, whose imaginations had been formed by the Bible's apocalyptic imagery, did not ask which was the best regime. They asked instead, ‘If there is no segregation in the hereafter, why should we submit to it in the here-and-now?’ It is this sort of question that motivated Rosa Parks's refusal to go to the back of the bus and inspired the dreams of Martin Luther King, Jr.
