1. The debate about the economic impact of guilds
There is a lively ongoing debate, led by Stephen EpsteinFootnote 1 and Sheilagh Ogilvie, about the economic effects of institutions (particularly guilds) on the pre-industrial economies.Footnote 2 The focus of the controversy is an article published by Ogilvie (Reference Ogilvie2004)Footnote 3 in which she points out that there is a new trend, as Epstein puts it, a ‘modern consensus’,Footnote 4 aimed at the ‘rehabilitation of guilds’. Based on her study of the Württemberg worsted industry and supplemented with a variety of examples from all over Europe, she develops a theoretical framework outlining the reasons for the economic inefficiency of the guilds. She challenges the view that guilds had a tangible effect on market failures with regard to (1) product quality, (2) innovation and (3) training. She also examines (4) the link between guilds and social capital.Footnote 5 This article suggests that the first two issues are the most relevant for an analysis of the economic effects of the activities of the Silesian merchant guilds on regional growth in the eighteenth century. The focal point of this argument is the difference between craft guilds and merchant guilds and thus refers back to the earliest studies by Ogilvie (Reference Ogilvie, Ogilvie and Cerman1996b) on corporative institutions.
With regard to product quality, the rehabilitation literature claims that guilds overcame asymmetries of information and problems of delegated monitoring. According to this argument, information asymmetries between producers and consumers in pre-industrial economies were greater than those in modern economies. Guilds would have corrected this by regulating raw materials and production processes, by controlling output quality using trademarks or a sealing system, and by collective contracting with merchants. Ulrich Pfister (Reference Pfister and Núñez1998) is one of the researchers who subscribes to the rehabilitation theory and has analysed collective contracting. Looking at Silesia and various other regions, he concludes that a major benefit of guild organisation was the reduction of transaction costs with respect to monitoring quality in a rural industry with dispersed producers.Footnote 6 As will be argued in the text, Pfister's conclusion is based on a specific institutional setting which characterised Silesia until well into the sixteenth century. When the regional analysis is extended into the eighteenth century, significant changes in the setting become evident.
Furthermore, the rehabilitation literature claims that guilds overcame the imperfections of markets by encouraging specialisation and by promoting clustering, thus facilitating technology transfer with a positive effect on innovation. These positive examples are mostly found in craft guilds and for individual towns. Epstein (Reference Epstein1998) postulates the theory that craft guilds innovated and promoted technological change. Based on German-speaking regions, Roland Reith (Reference Reith, Kaufhold and Reininghaus2000) adds a number of examples of how craft guilds looked to innovation with regard to processes and products. Ogilvie (Reference Ogilvie2004) questions this view by giving examples of guilds failing to transfer technology and thus having no positive effect on innovation. This text will enlarge on the issue by adding a systematic analysis of cases in which the economic effects of guild regulations went beyond the limited territory of the town where merchant guilds dominated the institutional setting of entire regions.
The remaining two issues raised by Ogilvie (Reference Ogilvie2004), the role of social capital and the guilds' impact on training, are less contentious. In this context, social capital can be defined as the ability of the guilds to preserve their position in international trade using their networking capabilities. Ann Carlos and Stephen Nicholas (Reference Carlos and Nicholas1996) have hypothesised the idea that chartered companies were able to solve information asymmetries by collective action on foreign trade places.Footnote 7 Their arguments, which are controversial,Footnote 8 cannot be applied to the Silesian case because those guilds did not act in a collective way. In fact, the Silesian guilds' membership was highly differentiated and included linen traders ranging from the humble trader to the established merchant houses. Only the latter, because of their wealth, were able to keep in direct contact with trade centres further afield and use the help of agents who mostly lived in the town of Hamburg.Footnote 9 The less powerful guild members had no link to agents and conducted their trade by visiting the surrounding fairs in Leipzig, Breslau and Frankfurt/Oder. In any case, the Silesian city-based merchants acted as individuals and, in this regard, did not differ from merchants in other European proto-industrial export trades that were not members of guilds.
The impact on training can be assessed in a similar way. Only the wealthy Silesian merchants benefited from their contacts with distant merchant houses, e.g. in England, promoting the training of their successors. In the eighteenth century, they frequently established their sons in foreign places, where they acquired important knowledge about long-distance trade. Only the big merchant houses had this advantage because they could reap economies of scale. This benefit was not accessible to every guild member, nor was it an effect of being a member of a guild. Again, the guild members acted as individuals in supra-regional trade affairs. In this context, the effect of the guild was neutral: it did not prepare the ground for the enlargement of trade contacts, but at the same time, it did not prevent individual merchants from expanding. After all, the framework for our argument is the inner-regional context, which should be analysed more closely.
Could the rise of individual merchants have contributed to the economic development of whole regions? How did the influence that merchants had on institutions outside the town affect the situation? To find an answer to these questions, this article systematically compares the results of extensive research in the Silesian linen-producing region with similar examples throughout Europe. Three aspects of the discussion about guilds will be analysed: the attempt by merchants to secure monopoly rents, the introduction of innovations, and the enforcement of quality control.Footnote 10
(a) Many authors have been engaged in the monopoly discussion that dates back to times prior to Adam Smith.Footnote 11 The question of how the merchants managed to obtain monopoly rents is discussed at the beginning of this article. The prerequisite for this seems to have been that they extended their monopoly beyond the limits of the town to the whole of the proto-industrialised region. In this context, the role of the state is important with regard to the enforcement of the economics aims of merchant guilds.Footnote 12
(b) In accordance with the distinction made in economics, product innovation, such as the improvement of product quality, and process innovation, such as the development of a putting-out system and the question in how far the diffusion of innovation was dependent on a specific institutional setting, will also be examined. Both types of innovation were imperative for successful development of specific sectors such as the textile industry towards the end of the eighteenth century.
(c) The question of quality control is linked to monitoring costs. In this context, the argument focuses on the controlling of output qualities using trademarks or a sealing system. Linen inspection was organised differently in the regions. The way in which the control of goods was carried out and its impact on the regional economic performance depended on the institutional setting. This challenges the claim that linen inspection necessarily meant an improvement in output quality.Footnote 13
This reappraisal of the Silesian case is based on records from Polish archives that have not been used for research before, including the archives of the merchant guilds of Hirschberg (Jelenia Góra) and Landeshut (Kamienna Góra), the two most important linen-exporting towns.Footnote 14 The archives contain records which had been considered lost in the Berlin and Breslau (Wrocław) archives.Footnote 15 Historical descriptive literature written before the loss of records at the state level occurred has been taken into consideration as well.Footnote 16
2. The Silesian institutional framework
From the Middle Ages onwards, linen was produced in Silesian towns by weavers associated with craft guilds. Until the seventeenth century, the producers' guilds signed contracts with foreign merchants, residing mostly in Nuremberg, guaranteeing sale for at least one year. For this period, Ulrich Pfister analyses an institutional setting that is characterised by the lowering of transaction costs by collective contracting.Footnote 17 From this research, it becomes clear that in the long run the setting discussed cannot be taken as an analysis of Silesia's proto-industrial setting.
At the threshold of the seventeenth century, the Silesian town authorities were important mediators in the conclusion of monopoly contracts and, occasionally, in creating new craft guilds suitable to such contracts. Quality control was carried out by an inspector, usually a guild official, who supervised cloth production. The town authorities were paid by the foreign merchants for the cost of establishing a monitoring system. This arrangement meant that the Nuremberg merchants, who sometimes instituted factors as commissioners, were generally able to save the expense of transaction costs.
The institutions underwent changes in the course of time as resistance towards the privileged position of foreign merchants increased. As Silesia was part of the Habsburg Empire until the middle of the eighteenth century, small local traders not yet organised in guilds petitioned the Imperial court in Vienna to discriminate against foreign linen buyers and their factors. They claimed that the activities of the Nuremberg merchants were a serious impediment to the expansion of their own trade.Footnote 18 Although Vienna imposed an increase in duties for foreign merchants, the turnover of local traders was too small at that time to embark on long-distance trade. However, in 1602, foreign merchants were restricted to buying linen from local traders and retailers, unless they became citizens of a Silesian town.
After the Thirty Years' War, the situation became more favourable for local merchants. The number of foreign buyers had diminished during the war. As a result, the system of collective contracting between, for example, Nuremberg merchants and local craft guilds collapsed. Meanwhile linen production in the countryside expanded quickly and new market towns were founded. In 1658, the merchant class in Hirschberg grew so much that it split from the all-craftsmen guild (Vielhandwerkerzunft), which had previously included all kinds of crafts; other towns such as Landeshut and Greifenberg (Gryfów Śląski) followed suit. The authorities prohibited offices of foreign exporters in Silesian towns.Footnote 19 For foreigners, the only chance to maintain their business now was to settle in one of the trade towns.
The existence of merchant towns in Silesia with a steadily growing number of local linen merchants fundamentally changed the institutional setting in Silesia. At the same time, the process of formation of independent merchant guilds started in the towns of Hirschberg, Landeshut and Greifenberg. As the most dynamic element of the town economy, the Silesian exporters were able to avoid the constraints included in the all-craftsmen guild's regulations, which, in this case, would have hindered their economic development more than it would have protected it. In the long run, the local craft guilds were weakened.
Ignoring the positive effects of being outside a guild, the linen merchants established new guild regulations, which suited their commercial needs. The merchant guilds drew up a catalogue of rules which were very similar to those for all-craftsmen. This kind of behaviour can be considered typical of corporative groups of merchants.Footnote 20 According to the new regulations, the guilds' assemblies took place quarterly under the supervision of the town council. The merchants chose aldermen, who had to be highly respected members of the community as they had jurisdiction over offences against guild affairs. For members of the guilds, solidity and reliability were required as well as the rejection of competition within the guild and the duty to buy only well-fabricated goods on the linen market. Membership of the guild was not free, high fees having to be paid to acquire the right to trade linen. Using these regulations, the three export guilds prevented competition from new merchants until 1730.Footnote 21 Membership in the Hirschberg and Landeshut guilds did not change significantly over time, numbering little more than 100 merchants, some of them very wealthy. Until the end of the eighteenth century, only two additional export guilds were established in Silesian towns, in Schmiedeberg (Kovary) and Waldenburg (Wałbrzych). Only members of these guilds were legally entitled to engage in foreign trade.
Whilst the number of export towns did not increase significantly, linen markets also existed in smaller towns for the turnover of goods from nearby villages. By the end of the eighteenth century, 15 linen markets had emerged in the region, which were attended weekly by export merchants or their employees. Some local merchants bought linen in bulk and sold it to export merchants. The organisation of the Silesian linen markets complied with the requirements of the guilds to maintain their export monopoly. At the same time, it strengthened the position of smaller towns, which were assigned the task of intermediate regional trade. Thus, the developments in Silesia differed considerably from the developments in many other European regions where proto-industrial development resulted in a weakening of the economic power of small towns.Footnote 22
To safeguard their regional supremacy, the town merchants were eager to be aligned with the royal court, initially in Vienna, and after 1740 in the Prussian capital of Berlin.Footnote 23 Furthermore, intermarriage between merchant families and mutual economic interests led to closer cooperation between the guilds in Silesian towns. The wealthiest merchants formed a supra-guild, the Gebirgshandelsstand. This institution tried to secure its authority using political influence. The merchants not only claimed control of exports but also of trade within the linen district, by means of various socio-economic institutions, i.e. ‘the set of established rules and practices through which people organised their economic, social, demographic, political and cultural activities’.Footnote 24 Belonging to this set of rules were the market regulations of linen towns, which were in accordance with the requirements of the guilds, as well as the linen ordinance decreed for the whole of the country by the Habsburg government, starting with the first decree of 1724. The ordinance, which was renewed in 1742 at the time of the Prussian annexion and again in 1788, laid down exclusive rights for the merchants.Footnote 25 Many of the issues regulated in the ordinances will now be discussed, such as the restrictions on yarn and linen trade to persons holding licences, which were selected and controlled by the guilds. Generally, the regulations were aimed at preventing the rise of competition from outside the towns.
In this particular setting, the power of the towns grew stronger as profits increased, whilst the feudal nobility's power weakened. In the course of a considerable rise in the number of rural producers, the amount of serf labour decreased and was replaced by a tax system with payments made to the overlords.Footnote 26 The imposition of the so-called weavers' dues (Weberzins) corresponds to similar measures in the neighbouring textile regions of Bohemia and Upper Lusatia.Footnote 27 Without putting strain on the individual weaver's budget,Footnote 28 the increase in weaving boosted the income of the overlords, at the same time forcing them to forbear demands for compulsory service. Other privileges of the feudal overlords, such as the erstwhile privilege of pre-emption for all linen produced, were curtailed. As a consequence, agrarian institutions no longer constrained the development of manufacture.Footnote 29
3. Protection of monopoly rents
How did the guilds manage to secure monopoly rents for the proto-industrial district as a whole? For the guild members, the town market was the most important means of controlling trade. The details were arranged by market ordinances, of which few records have survived. A surviving copy for the export-trading town of Landeshut in 1770 can be regarded as exemplary for the regulations in larger Silesian towns.Footnote 30 The Landeshut market ordinance constituted the workshop system (Kaufsystem) that commonly characterised interregional linen trade, in accordance with the merchants' interests.Footnote 31 Ideally, it was characterised by the absence of intermediate traders acting as middlemen: the weavers went to the market in person and sold their pieces directly to the town-based merchant.
A description of a typical Silesian market can be found in Alfred Zimmermann's history of Silesian linen industry written in the nineteenth century.Footnote 32 The market regulations provided an institutional framework that restricted the time for purchasing to a few hours. When the striking of the clock opened the market in midmorning, hundreds of weavers rushed to the central market square. The houses of the wealthiest merchants were situated around the square, where they sat in front of their houses on high chairs overlooking the crowd. The sellers came to the foot of the chairs to offer their pieces. From above, the merchant checked the piece with a short glance and gave their price. If the weaver agreed, a chalk mark was made on the linen. A few hours later, as soon as the market ended, the weaver went to the merchant's house or to an inn to receive the agreed price.Footnote 33
The described market setup was of advantage to the purchasers, i.e. the town-based merchants, only. The markets were too large to have set prices. It can be estimated that the largest markets in Hirschberg or Landeshut were attended by more than 2,000, sometimes 3,000 weavers on any one-market day.Footnote 34 Besides, the merchant guilds wanted to keep prices flexible so that they could reduce prices within a week. The market descriptions show consensus: the weavers had little chance to get a good deal given the level of activity on the market square. They flocked to the merchants' chairs by the dozen and had to accept the prices offered quickly. By agreement within the guild, no merchant was allowed to make an offer for a piece once it was signed with chalk.Footnote 35 As the chalk mark could only be removed by washing the cloth, which was impossible given the restricted market time, once a piece was marked, the weaver could not invite alternative offers from other merchants. Postponing the sale of a piece for a week was usually impossible because the weavers very often lived from hand to mouth and were unable to store their linen. Thus, the guild members prevented competition within their ranks.
The competitive advantage that this system provided the merchants with can be estimated by a more theoretical approach. The structural inequality created by the regulations of the merchant guilds lowered market prices considerably.Footnote 36 The Silesian linen markets were imperfect in the sense that the merchants formed an oligopsony, i.e. many small sellers facing a restricted number of buyers. It is likely that average prices on the type of market described will therefore be below the prices on a free market. The individual seller did not have the market power to force a higher price. This argument is borne out by the practices at the linen markets: (a) the ad hoc prices set by the merchants; (b) the limited time available to the weaver for negotiating a price; (c) his reduced leeway for choosing the best purchaser.Footnote 37 It was therefore in the merchants' interest to maintain the established market regulations.
The structural inequality is also borne out by the existence of Mäkler, known as forestallers at the early modern English markets.Footnote 38 They were intermediate traders who offered their services to the weavers at the town gates. These advance sales endangered the merchants' oligopsony. Therefore, market ordinances like the Landeshut ordinance from 1770 prohibited the purchase of linen outside the market.Footnote 39 This ban applied to place as well as time: pieces were not to be sold outside the gates of the city nor prior to the specified market hours in order to guarantee common terms and conditions for purchases. Many town regulations and government decrees tried to put an end to the advance sale of the Mäkler, never succeeding in abolishing the phenomenon altogether.
In 1788, the Landeshut guild complained that a large number of intermediate traders were to be found in the areas surrounding the linen markets, who flouted even the most elementary market regulations.Footnote 40 Intermediate traders stopped the weavers outside the confines of the town and offered to buy their pieces. According to the merchants of the Landeshut guild, they even tried to pressurise the weavers into selling their goods. The intermediate traders did not even limit their activities to the regular market day. This undermined the merchants' market monopoly, as selling was now possible at any time, allowing the weavers considerable flexibility. The town municipalities as well as the Silesian government repeatedly took disciplinary action against unauthorised Mäkler in all Silesian towns.Footnote 41
On the other hand, the weavers profited considerably from the existence of the Mäkler, especially if the walk to the market was long and arduous. The notion of saving time was of crucial importance to the weavers. Weavers often had to leave their village early in the morning with their piece on their back and march to the nearest town market.Footnote 42 This could take several hours, a loss of valuable working time. If they were able to reduce the time spent in the town, this reduced the overall journey time. Their transaction costs fell considerably if they took advantage of the services of intermediate traders.
The merchants claimed that this kind of advance sale increased the price of linen and reduced profits for all parties involved – weavers and merchants. In fact, the intermediate traders only put an end to the privileges the merchants gained from the restrictive conditions on the market. The intermediate traders meant that the weavers were spared the effort of finding their bearings at the market, which considerably decreased their search costs and information costs. In contrast to the merchants' claim, the weavers knew that dealing with an intermediate trader was to their advantage and that therefore the fee charged by the intermediate trader was acceptable.
During the course of a single market morning, the Mäkler bought and resold several times, sometimes carrying a small number of pieces at a time. By group buying, the intermediate traders had more market power than the weavers when dealing with the merchants. They were selling larger volumes of cloth, enabling them to set a higher price than individual sellers. The intermediate traders usually also had in-depth knowledge of market conditions which helped them to find merchants ready to offer the best prices.
The existence of intermediate traders thus led to price rises at the markets. This increase only affected the merchants, reducing their profits. When merchants pointed out that the weavers also lost part of their income due to the existence of intermediate traders, they failed to recognise that the services of a middleman decreased the weavers' transaction costs considerably and therefore the weavers benefited from the advance sale. The Landeshut merchants' view of 1788, namely that the intermediate traders forced the weavers into advance sale, shows that they ignored the disadvantaged position the weavers found themselves in at the market.Footnote 43 That was at least how they tried to win over the authorities; their main objection was that the existence of intermediate traders harmed their own personal interests.
Even though the market ordinances of Silesian towns strictly prohibited any kind of advance sales, they could not be stopped. From time to time, cases have been uncovered where the merchants themselves were found guilty of facilitating advance sales, thus violating the guild's regulations by buying pieces prior to the opening of the market. This can be regarded as typical cartel behaviour, with individual cartel members having a strong incentive to freeride on the cartel. Acting individually, they were able to buy at a cheaper price by competing with the offers of the intermediate traders. Exemplary evidence for this can be found in an investigation of 1776 when the Landeshut town council carried out a search of the merchants' houses and uncovered several cases of illegal purchase.Footnote 44
Despite strict controls, breaches of the law occurred. If anyone sought to buy or sell linen for export outside the licensed hours and places he was prosecuted, as the case of the Landeshut merchants in 1776 shows. Several incidents involving breaches of the market regulations were also recorded in the towns of Hirschberg and Greifenberg.Footnote 45 In the 1790s, the Silesian province minister von Hoym emphasised that cases of advance sale would be punished by expulsion from the merchant guild, which included a trading ban for the entire province because of the harm caused to the institution of the linen market.Footnote 46 The municipal authorities wanted to prevent rejection of the established rules, which were deemed indispensable to the welfare of the town as a whole. From the evidence, it appears that ordinances were sufficiently and effectively enforced and complied with, meaning that it was worthwhile for the merchant guilds' to invest time and resources in seeking to maintain them and to put pressure on the authorities to do so.
4. The failure of the putting-out system
The guilds had an interest in enforcing the regulations for the protection of the town markets even beyond the town precinct, the main difficulty being the institution of adequate monitoring mechanisms to detect illegal purchases. As a response to the advance sale procedures at the town's gates, small traders endeavoured to relocate business to the countryside. Originally, the organisation of the evolving trade was characterised by the division of Silesia into two distinct areas.Footnote 47 Whereas the fertile soil of the Odra plain yielded a profit with grain and flax cultivation, the mountainous regions were considerably less fertile; however, wood, which was required for bleaching, was abundant in the mountains. The comparative advantage of the mountainous regions was based on its specialisation in weaving. The commercial relations between the two parts of Silesia were mostly in the yarn trade.Footnote 48
Small traders transported the yarn from the producing areas to the mountainous region where it was woven. Alongside the production of raw materials, i.e. the cultivation of flax, the spinning of flax was carried out in the Odra plain as ancillary work by the peasants. The linen yarn spun was then sold at yarn markets, such as the great yarn markets of Frankenstein (Ząbkowice Śląskie) and Neisse (Nysa), away from the weaving areas in the mountains. This separation favoured the emergence of a yarn trade as the weavers could not make the journey to the distant yarn markets themselves.Footnote 49 It was less costly for them when so-called yarn collectors brought the yarn to the linen markets in the mountains, which usually included small sections for the trading of yarn. In rare cases, the yarn was delivered directly to the weavers in the villages. This kind of trade could have been the basis for the development of a putting-out system.
Very specific problems arose regarding the transport of linen within the region. As discussed above with regard to the Silesian workshop system as a whole, transaction costs were a decisive factor, consisting almost exclusively of transport costs. The extensive growth of the linen region was based on its large size, where weaving would spread to villages which were quite remote from the market places.Footnote 50 If the weavers then had to travel a long and arduous road to the market, they lost valuable time, sometimes as much as a whole working day. Additional expenses for food or long hours of waiting might arise. It is evident that the price the intermediate trader paid at the weaver's village could be lower than the price the weaver could expect at the market. From the weaver's point of view, the commissioning of an intermediate trader was beneficial as soon as his opportunity costs were higher than the transport price, i.e. the difference between the price he received at home and the price he could expect at the market.
This point has been closely examined with regard to the Lower Silesian central area of weaving, the Hirschberg district.Footnote 51 Its centre was the town of Hirschberg itself, which was a trade leader until the middle of the eighteenth century. In the second half of the century, other areas of importance developed as weaving spread to an increasing number of villages. Quantitatively, this extensive growth was mainly perceptible in two neighbouring regions of Hirschberg: between 1750 and 1800 the number of looms in the Landeshut district increased from 1,869 to 4,481, and in the Schweidnitz district from 1,427 to 3,945.Footnote 52
This expansion had a positive effect on intermediate trade. Even before this period of increased growth, proof of intermediate trade exists. The earliest linen ordinance of 1724 already included regulations on rural trade.Footnote 53 It permitted a certain number of linen collectors, who were to limit their trade to the transport of pieces from the villages to the town markets. Their activity was solely meant to facilitate purchase by the town-based merchants. The ordinance of 1724 gives a reason why this small number of traders was permitted at all; namely, that in certain specific cases the remoteness of villages or the situation of the weavers excluded the possibility of a personal sale of pieces at the market. Most of these so-called linen collectors could be found in the Hirschberg region.Footnote 54 Even though trade in the villages was thus tolerated under specific conditions, the ordinance confirms that the weavers were to be encouraged to deliver their goods to the markets in person, if at all possible. This shows that even at a very early stage of development the demand for a transport system existed.
Because the collection and transport of linen generated higher profits than production of linen itself, many weavers, as well as other occupational groups, were very interested in becoming linen collectors. To contain the unchecked spread of these rural traders, the Gebirgshandelsstand put pressure on the chambers of Breslau and Glogau (Głogów) to introduce a licensing process.Footnote 55 Only linen collectors holding a licence were allowed to sell at the markets. In this way, the regulation ensured that a limited number of linen collectors existed who sold linen exclusively to the town-based merchants. The issue of a licence also obliged its holder not to engage in any kind of export trade.
The town merchants were in charge of the issuing of licences and in that way monitored the spread of intermediate trade. How the system of licence control was put into effect can be clearly seen from events in 1764. After a period of considerable growth in intermediate trade in rural areas during the Seven Years' War, the Prussian provincial government carried out an extensive investigation into licensing. It proceeded to limit the reissue of licences to those linen collectors who had been admitted to the trade before the war started. At the same time, the collection of linen in rural areas was completely banned,Footnote 56 only allowing it to be transported from smaller to larger markets. However, this regulation could not be enforced because the remoter areas were too dependent on the existence of intermediate trade. The regional authorities, both the Gebirgshandelsstand and the Prussian chambers of Breslau and Glogau, were working towards a system of effective control of the number of rural traders. There were few opportunities for the linen collectors to develop into putting-out traders, combining the lucrative delivery of yarn with linen collection.
Jürgen Schlumbohm's article has given rise to a certain degree of scepticism towards the effectiveness of the laws in the early modern period.Footnote 57 The exertion of control by the towns did of course depend on enforcement of regulations in the countryside. In Silesia, control could be exerted because of the close cooperation between the guilds and the state. If a linen collector built up a depot in the countryside, he risked having his goods confiscated. Tax officers, the so-called Fabriquen Steuer-Rendanten, were active in the countryside checking the licences of the collectors.Footnote 58 In some areas, revision commissions were formed to control trade outside the towns, e.g. in the Schweidnitz district in 1770.Footnote 59 Offenders discovered in the countryside were prosecuted by the town's municipality.Footnote 60 In 1789, control was increased by the institution of supreme sealing administrations (Oberschauämter), which were set up in various towns.Footnote 61 They were responsible for regular controls on market days and had the right to check the depots of merchants. They also had to visit the weaving areas on a quarterly basis. Overall, the laws and restrictions in Silesia appear to have been highly effective.
In eighteenth-century Lower Silesia the existence of a putting-out system can be found in one case only. In 1774, the Landeshut town council investigated the case of a number of linen collectors charged with employing village weavers.Footnote 62 The traders had delivered the yarn and bought the finished pieces at a price agreed on in advance. The amended regulations of the 1742 linen ordinance had forbidden this kind of trade and allowed for punishment of offenders. Despite this explicit ban, the case was settled in favour of the traders in this particular incident on the basis of social criteria. The weavers in the villages concerned were in fact too poor to raise the money to buy yarn for even one week. These weavers were entirely dependent on some kind of intermediate trade; left to their own devices they would have suffered to a degree that would have threatened their very survival. This decision by the magistrates is, however, the only evidence available that a putting-out system ever existed in Lower Silesia, and its toleration was tied to an onus on the weavers to buy yarn independently and sell the linen at the market personally as soon as they had the financial means to do so.
The region of linen production in Lower Silesia distinguishes itself from other proto-industrialised areas by the prohibition of a putting-out system. As research on other regions has shown, the putting-out system can be regarded as process innovation.Footnote 63 The lack of putting-out traders gave rise to a lack of entrepreneurs taking care of the diffusion of product innovation. As these rural traders took advantage of any possibility to increase profits, they introduced new villages to weaving by recruiting weavers.Footnote 64 Furthermore, they followed the latest trends in textile production, which supported the development of an ‘economy of quality’.Footnote 65 In order to satisfy the production demands of these new textiles, they provided the weavers with specialised looms, enabling them to produce higher-quality textiles. This was usually made possible by means of an advance that the putting-out traders themselves provided, so that the weavers could afford new means of production. The production of fine linen, for example damask, usually depended on orders and thus involved regular purchasing by the putting-out trader, which led of course to regular contact between him and the weavers. The lack of innovation in the linen-producing region of Lower Silesia can largely be attributed to the prevention of the development of a putting-out system by the merchant guilds in cooperation with the regional authorities in order to maintain the monopoly rents of the merchants organised in guilds.
5. Quality control and mass purchase
The dominant view in the pre-industrialised period was that a swift and unhindered sale was dependent on a preceding linen inspection. A system of linen inspection was introduced to Silesia as early as 1662 by an imperial charter of the Habsburg authorities.Footnote 66 Initially, the inspection was a municipal institution checking the linen produced in the town and its surroundings.Footnote 67 A so-called sealmaster inspected length, width and quality of the pieces of cloth. The inspection not only provided immediate control but a long-term confidence in quality. Provided with a seal as a kind of trademark, the marketing of goods in distant trading places was easier. Until the end of the eighteenth century, this kind of trademark system remained very common in European trade.Footnote 68
As soon as the purchase of goods produced in the surrounding areas gained importance, a system had to be developed to monitor the rural producers as the town-based method of inspection reached its limits. The guilds solved this problem by extending the regulations of the town to the rural industries, namely the traditional linen inspection practised in the towns.Footnote 69 As a result, two imperial charters in 1718 and 1724 introduced linen inspection to every village where linen was produced.Footnote 70 The sealmasters were appointed by the government, but paid by the weavers for each piece of linen inspected. Thus, the institution traditionally limited to town craftsmen was transferred to the countryside. This marked the beginning of a line-up characteristic for Silesia: the defence of the interests of the guilds by state intervention, which was typical for many German and Austrian regions.Footnote 71
In the eyes of the Gebirgshandelsstand, extending the municipal linen inspection to the villages presented problems, which can be attributed to the principal−agent approach.Footnote 72 The conflict occurred at two levels: at the local level, the sealmasters were principals and the weavers were agents; at the regional level, the town-based merchants were principals and the sealmasters agents. If the distinct interests of the three groups involved are considered, the following can be assumed: (1) The weavers were interested in a quick inspection, i.e. quick sealing of their goods and a high profit. (2) The local sealmaster was also interested in a quick inspection in order to seal more pieces and make higher profits. (3) The town-based merchants' priority was high-quality linen, i.e. the conscientious examination of the goods, as well as bargain prices.
At the local level, the sealmaster's income depended on the advance payment of the weavers, which secured his livelihood as he usually was no better off than his customers. Therefore, sealmasters and weavers had far more in common than sealmasters and merchants. This asymmetry led to quick inspections, often conducted carelessly.Footnote 73 At the regional level, the town-based merchants did not have enough influence over the village sealmasters to impose their will. Moreover, the merchants refused to invest in improved monitoring. They relied on state sanctions to enforce the required standards. The guidelines for linen inspection were revised several times, but not as effectively as they could have been. One effective option would have been the employment of inspectors with a fixed income, as a Prussian official remarked in 1810 with hindsight.Footnote 74
As a consequence, the weavers only produced linen of a minimum standard, their sole aim being to get their pieces sealed quickly. There were several ways of doing this cheaply, which from the merchants' point of view were dishonest; for example, weavers frequently installed narrower warps on their looms, which came from the neighbouring region of Bohemia.Footnote 75 The use of these warps reduced the width of the piece and less yarn was required. In order to meet the requirements for size, the piece was wetted and stretched to the right size. In this way, the weavers tried to increase profit by reducing quality. This recalls the system of monopoly contracting in Württemberg, where the weavers reduced the quality of the product to the lowest acceptable level in order to obtain the guild-fixed price for a product that had been produced in less time.Footnote 76
Widespread linen inspection no longer offered real proof of quality but had become a test for the most basic requirements. This distinguishes the Lower Silesian system of sealing fundamentally from other municipal inspections, which were primarily aimed at improving the quality of the produce.Footnote 77 Obviously, the Silesian guilds were not able to reduce the transaction costs of monitoring quality in a rural industry with dispersed producers.Footnote 78 There was no incentive for the weavers to produce well-fabricated pieces because they could not sell them at higher prices. Even though the merchants were interested in improvements on the shortcomings described, they did not take the time to unroll the cloth and examine closely the product's quality. The prevailing system of linen inspection in Lower Silesia was suitable for bulk market purchasing. As long as the overseas trade with low-quality goods was profitable, any kind of change to the existing market setup involved an incalculable risk for the export merchants.
In contrast to many of their European colleagues, it was a matter of principle to the Silesian merchant guilds to oppose technological and organisational changes aimed at increased productivity.Footnote 79 This was a consequence of the specific institutional setting. If diversified processes of production that provided opportunities for earning money had spread regionally, it could have been expected that the weavers would have turned towards these lines of production.Footnote 80 The choice between different types of production would have initiated local competition, which would have reduced the incentive for the weavers to produce coarse linen. In turn, this would have put at risk the export monopoly of the town merchants as a whole. This explains why the merchant guilds complained that the introduction of new products would damage their old and traditional linen and veil fabrication.Footnote 81
This line of argument exemplifies the defence of the status quo by the guilds against the state's attempts to introduce damask. As part of the mercantilist policy, the Silesian regional government was instructed by Berlin to organise the immigration of skilled weavers from Saxony in the 1740s and again in the 1760s.Footnote 82 The task of exporting damask was allocated to the guilds, who refused to comply. They claimed that the goods could not be sold at a profit and that diversification of the product range was harmful to the existing workshop system. The traditional Silesian linen inspection proved unsuitable for the marketability of damask. As can be shown from other European regions, for instance Northern Ireland, the production of damask depended on the introduction of a reliable putting-out system.Footnote 83 This was boycotted by the merchant guilds in various ways. They even appealed to the king of Prussia.Footnote 84 In the end, their persistent refusal led to the failure of the governmental promotion of damask production.
The Silesian linen inspection as an institution was in the interests of the merchants because it led to a decrease in their transaction costs; it did, however, prove hostile to any kind of innovation. In contrast to the claim made by Epstein, the system remained immobile and no change in patterns of production and specialisation occurred.Footnote 85 The guilds were an efficient institution for guaranteeing a certain standard, but they did not induce a rise in quality.Footnote 86 Still, the Silesian regulations were confirmed by the linen ordinance of 1788 and their continuation was demanded by the Schmiedeberg guild in 1810, even though freedom of trade was already imminent.Footnote 87 This implies that because guild regulations were sufficiently enforceable and created monopoly rents for merchants, they were regarded as being worthy of preservation.
6. Guilds as a barrier to economic development
The economic development of Lower Silesia was strongly influenced by the area's particular institutional setting. The decisive institution in Lower Silesia was not the manorial system, as in other regions east of the river Elbe, but the merchant guilds. After having gained influence in town politics, they expanded their control to the surrounding areas of rural linen production. Supported by the Habsburg and then the Prussian state, they co-ordinated their interests in the first half of the eighteenth century in the Gebirgshandelsstand and shaped regional trade according to their own needs. The most important institutions for the implementation of the guilds' interests were the regulated markets, which they maintained as institutions for monopolised purchase, the monopoly on linen export, and the state's support.
With the assistance of the state, the merchant guilds developed institutional arrangements suited to shape the trade in their interests. They implemented the sale at weekly markets as this meant minimum transaction costs for the merchants themselves. This paved the way in preventing the development of a putting-out system, which had a lasting and detrimental effect on the growth of the Lower Silesian linen region. Although the regulations were effective in maintaining the merchants' monopoly on exports, they did not encourage innovation. In contrast to Epstein's claim, the competition of rural manufacture did not lead to an extension of handicraft activities in the towns.Footnote 88
The evolution of the merchant guilds into mere agents of their monopolies had a lasting effect on the development of the economy in Lower Silesia towards the end of the eighteenth century. Their existence gave crucial negative impulses to the region, albeit to a lesser extent when exports are considered. On the contrary, the guilds' trade relations with the sea trade of Hamburg and other cities was well established, which suggests that they made good use of social capital. Despite this, foreign trade collapsed during the Continental blockade and the Napoleonic Wars, when the global demand for coarse Silesian linen decreased significantly. Because of the lack of innovation, the Silesian linen industry was unable to tap new markets, which led to the deindustrialisation of the region and the ensuing plight of the weavers in the 1830s and 1840s and to social upheaval such as the weavers' uprising of 1844.
7. Representativeness of the Lower Silesian development
Finally, it is necessary to take a look at the question of what wider lesson can be drawn from this case study on the role of guilds in economic development. Did Lower Silesia constitute a special case or can it be considered representative in a European context? Guilds were a frequent phenomenon in Europe until the modern age; only in England and the Netherlands did they continually lose power from the sixteenth century onwards.Footnote 89 In Europe, the course of economic development differs depending on the phase of development in which the strength or weakness of the relevant institutions manifested itself. Here, a sample has been taken of some appropriate European examples – referring mostly to export-oriented linen-producing regions in the eighteenth century. This selection of regions provides a constant factor indispensable for the validity of the comparison, because the regional introduction of cotton could be regarded as a significant innovation in itself.
Examples of areas ruled by a strong system of guilds can be found as early as the sixteenth century, such as the Republic of Genoa in northern Italy.Footnote 90 In the following centuries, especially in Prussian and Habsburg regions, the government and the guilds formed symbiotic relationships.Footnote 91 Ehmer gives a convincing reason for this phenomenon. In Prussia and Habsburg, state authority was fragmented to such a degree that the state government had to go to great lengths to enforce its economic and regulatory policies. The municipal corporations were one of the few institutions the state could rely on in its effort to centralise.Footnote 92
A strong influence of state on proto-industrial development can be identified in the case of the Prussian and Habsburg regions in Central Europe. This is evident in the case of Flanders, i.e. the Habsburg South of the Netherlands. In the eighteenth century, it was one of the most important European linen regions and home to especially powerful merchant guilds.Footnote 93 These groups of export merchants purchased linen from the local weavers at weekly markets. Of specific importance was the market of Ghent, already a town of 50,000 inhabitants at that time. In 1786, the town authorities renewed a set of rules for organising the proceedings at the weekly yarn and linen markets.Footnote 94 In addition to that, the Habsburg Ordonnance de l'Impératrice concernant la fabrication de toiles specified restrictive rules for rural linen producers. Compared with Silesia, a number of regulations were less restrictive; for instance, the local linen inspection was missing. The regulations still standardised the production regionwide at a specified low level. Thus, the institutional setting in Flanders can also be regarded as being adverse to innovation.
Major parts of Flanders, fertile and urbanised at the same time, were marked by a mixture of spinning and weaving manufacture. In contrast to the development of specialised subregions for spinning or weaving, the regional transport of yarn was of minor importance. Besides, linen markets were located in the midst of the production area; the weavers were therefore able to go to the market and sell their linen themselves. According to Aerts and Delbeke (Reference Aerts and Delbeke1983) no putting-out system worth mentioning existed in the countryside. Only closer to the towns did decentralised manufacture that was very similar to a putting-out system occur.Footnote 95 When the wages of town weavers began to decrease to the level of the income of rural weavers in the second half of the eighteenth century, the merchants started to employ town weavers in the production of high-quality linen. The monitoring costs were less for manufacturers in the local neighbourhood, and this compensated for the slightly more advantageous level of costs in rural areas. Although the rural industries were widespread, only a few industrial centres developed in Flanders.
A counter-example would be the aspiring linen region in Northern Ireland in the eighteenth century. The province of Ulster was largely characterised by an absence of the restrictions discussed above. The Ulster linen traders, the so-called drapers, did not succeed in forming a guild despite several attempts to do so.Footnote 96 In the British Isles, institutions called trade guilds and craft guilds existed in the old towns, such as London, York, Edinburgh or Dublin, but not in the new manufacturing towns.Footnote 97 In large areas of Northern Ireland the workshop system persisted, but the linen triangle, i.e. the centre of the linen-producing region, was marked by more competition, where, ever since the mid eighteenth century, putting-out systems had developed and the production of damask spread as well as the weaving of cotton.Footnote 98
Even though the institutional regulations such as the linen ordinances had names similar to the regulations in Continental Europe, they did not guarantee the safeguarding of the merchants' privileges in the same way. The drapers tried to convince the Dublin Linen Board to institute a standardised and obligatory system of linen inspection, but they did not succeed. There were no higher authorities such as the state supervising inspection, which would have been capable of instituting a monopoly position for sealmasters and of preventing private lapping (linen inspection). Time and time again, drapers or bleachers performed the task of linen inspection themselves.Footnote 99 The seal was meant to provide a basis for improved export sales and was not, as in Silesia, an obstacle to the diversification of regional production. The institutions in Northern Ireland were far more flexible than their counterparts in Continental Europe, which precluded development beyond the production of coarse linen.
The detailed analysis of linen regions shows how institutional regulations had a strong impact on economic performance. In Prussian East Westphalia as well as in the adjoining region of Osnabrück, obligatory linen inspection was established under state control, which was geared towards the interests of the merchant guilds.Footnote 100 Only one of those institutions, in the town of Bielefeld, was also capable of inspecting high-quality goods, and as a result only the county of Ravensberg, which surrounded Bielefeld, specialised in the production of high-quality linen. As the Prussian chamber of commerce in Minden realised in retrospect, the adjoining regions continued to produce coarse linen, due to the existence of the local sealing authorities (Landleggen). Once again the elements of the institutional setting are recognisable: the safeguarding of the privileges of the merchants as well as the prevention of product innovation.
In the case of the ribbon industry of Lusatia, the abolition of a monopoly safeguarded by the state was a significant contribution to economic development. The region adjoining Silesia was one of the old Central European linen regions and merchant guilds dominated the town trade, for example in Zittau and Löbau.Footnote 101 In 1765, the monopoly of controlling the production of linen ribbons held by the merchant guilds collapsed, which led to the development of a putting-out system.Footnote 102 The intermediate traders of Lusatia, who had started out as mere linen collectors selling their goods in the towns, combined the purchase of linen with the supply of yarn. In doing so, many of them developed into wholesale traders, resident not in the towns but in rural areas. An increasing number of weavers became part of this emerging class of traders.Footnote 103 The institution of linen inspection as described in the case of Lower Silesia never asserted itself, because the town-based merchants did not deem it necessary. As a consequence, not only the production of damask but also of cotton was established. By specialising in cloth for the production of skirts and trousers, several industrial centres developed after 1800.
On the basis of a close examination of the institutional setting, the factors that hindered innovation become clear. Only very rarely were the regulations promoted by merchant guilds of advantage to industrial development. In particular, the regions adhering to linen production show the longevity of traditional structures: putting-out systems hardly ever developed. But in cases where a putting-out system was established, it usually resulted in the spread of product innovation. Therefore, an early conquest of institutional barriers tended to be a prerequisite for successful development, at least in the textile sector. In those cases, an entrepreneurial potential emerged in the rural weaving areas. On the eve of the age of factories, these structures, which had developed in the course of time, were decisive for the successful onset of industrialisation.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Christine Seuring, Bärbel Rischbieter and Carl Jordan for their careful proofreading of the text.
