A substantial number of published monographs have already emerged on the general topic of “the Russian Orthodox Church and politics.” Irina Papkova explicitly restricts her goal to identifying the extent to which the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has been able to translate its political preferences into outcomes at the federal level (11). Papkova defines political impact as the ability of an institution to influence votes and the passage of legislation (200). Thus, she is able to sort out all possible side-topics, such as paraecclesiastical political movements (although the topic of “informal Orthodoxy” is slightly touched upon) and shadow politics. Papkova's formal criteria of political influence are better adjusted to mature democracies and the use of such criteria narrows the focus of the book. At the same time, she is able to concentrate on her stated goal and to get innovative results.

Papkova presents the ROC as essentially anti-liberal and xenophobic. She distinguishes not just between three ideological positions within the ROC (traditionalist, liberal, and fundamentalist), but identifies the official position of the Moscow Patriarchate (meaning the formal administrative structures) as a fourth ideology. To describe the political platform of the Moscow Patriarchate, Papkova analyses its central documents, such as the Basis of the Social Concept. She demonstrates that the ROC does not intend to make Orthodoxy the state religion and that it is not anti-democratic: “the Social Concept was written clearly with democracy in mind” (25).

Papkova lists no significant differences between the Patriarchate's official position and traditionalism, except a somewhat higher degree of anti-Westernism and “veiled anti-Semitism” (51). However, she quotes no sources revealing the presence of (veiled) anti-Semitism apart from expressions like “backstage government” and “international financial capital” as “a clear subtext” for the “Judeo-Masonic cabal” (52). The author admits that traditionalism is the political position among the majority of clergy, active laypeople and even bishops. If this is so, is traditionalism not just the mainstream position articulated by the Patriarchate and diluted with some share of fundamentalist and even liberal ideas? Obviously, liberal ideas are the least represented ones; only liberals had to establish their own theological institutions. A study of clandestine ideological tensions within the Patriarchate would be of use, but it is definitely not the author's research task.

Papkova's work includes innovative field research on liberal Orthodoxy, including interviews and participant observation (she attended a liberal vespers service in the Russian language). She concludes that the liberal Orthodox have pro-Western political opinions (56). In contrast, Papkova's analysis of fundamentalism looks superficial and is based exclusively on the views of Konstantin Dushenov and Zhanna Bichevskaia, which are in no way representative. The emphasis on the redemptive role of the last tsar is represented in the book as the defining characteristic of political fundamentalism (63) but this position has been questioned by many fundamentalist authors. Also unclear is the author's use of the Muslim term “jihad” instead of its Christian analogy “holy war” to describe fundamentalist political campaigns. And she writes that newly-ordained priests having no proper theological education “developed along fundamentalist models of thinking about their religion” (68), although it remains unclear why they do not develop liberal models instead.

The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics disproves a widespread opinion that the ROC is a successful agent of “the clericalization” of Russian politics. Papkova demonstrates that its only successful case of lobbying (the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations) was a result of the exceptional political conditions of the mid-1990s, namely, support from public opinion and the state bureaucracy (93). Papkova also shows that the 1997 Law is not (contrary to many Western publications) “pro-Orthodox.” What is even more impressive is that programs of the four major political parties, foundational documents of the state, and presidential addresses from 1994 to 2005 simply do not refer to Orthodoxy or religion in general (169). Papkova concludes that in spite of its high public visibility the Church is politically much less powerful than it is usually assumed by outside analysts (200). This conclusion is absolutely correct if one uses the above-listed formal criteria of political influence and remains on the federal level (the ROC's power may vary regionally).Irina Papkova's book is well written, concise and innovative; it makes . Its analytical approach makes a valuable contribution to the study of Orthodoxy and politics.