For all its utopianism, Dreamworlds of Race is an anxious book. This third of Bell's “loose trilogy dedicated to analyzing the metropolitan settler imaginary” (3) captures the peculiar blend of fear, fantasy, and reactionism surrounding the British empire's sunset, and the grasping at rejuvenation—maybe rebirth—through the (re)constitution of a single Anglo-world. Bell is well entrenched among our foremost intellectual historians of Victorian and Edwardian imperialism, having done more than most over the last decade to illuminate its imaginative cartography. Dreamworlds expands the effort and is characteristically brilliant: erudite, lucid, and exhaustive in its coverage of the racial utopianism at its center.
The book's vitality lies in its unconventional range and texture, telescoping between focused treatments of Andrew Carnegie, H. G. Wells, Cecil Rhodes, and W. T. Stead, a broad sampling of the period's speculative fiction, and their surrounding political and theoretical terrain. Underlying it all is a core preoccupation, the fin-de-siècle dream of Anglo-American union leading to perpetual global peace. The political integration of white, English-speaking peoples, beacons of human progress and unassailable in their technological, civilizational, and political supremacy, would herald the end of history, a familiar flight of fancy sandwiched between that of Hegel a half century earlier and of Fukuyama a century later.
It would be a fool's errand to try to convey the book's richness and detail, so I will sketch each chapter's themes before moving on to the bigger picture. Chapter 2 chronicles Carnegie's tireless efforts to advance a “Federation of English-speaking peoples” (42), an ambition underwritten by a crude grasp of Herbert Spencer's evolutionary social theory, a boundless confidence in Anglo-Saxon historical destiny, and a persistent opacity regarding such a union's political form. Where Carnegie's Anglosphere entailed his resistance to empire, Stead and Rhodes took the English race's “mission to civilize, colonize, Christianize, conquer, [and] police the world” (109) as self-evident. Chapter 3 depicts their Anglo-fantasy tag team, with Stead, a well-regarded publisher and journalist, as the brains, proselytizer, and mouthpiece, working to curb public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic toward unification on the American constitutional model, and Rhodes—an unabashed imperialist and virulent white supremacist—as the lightning rod, more Stead's megaphone than his intellectual partner. Chapter 4 centers on Wells, who, despite strong antipathies toward nationalism, jingoism, and overt racism, located humanity's salvation in a “New Republic” spanning Britain, the settler colonies, and the United States (153), stitched together by linguistic commonality. As with Carnegie, Wells's Darwinism underpinned a teleological evolutionism, an obsession with social efficiency, and a eugenist concern to create a better species of—white—man.
Chapter 5 widens out to the efflorescence of “future-war” science fiction between the 1870s and the outbreak of the First World War, which understood cataclysmic violence as initiating a global reshuffling inevitably concluding in Anglo-American entente. Chapter 6 focuses on isopolitan citizenship, a form of equal standing spanning Anglo-America that would shift political membership from territorial to “racial patriotism,” which Carnegie, Stead, Wells, and Rhodes all saw as “a constitutive element of deeper union” (287). Chapter 7 complicates liberal shibboleths—the democratic peace thesis and the ideal of perpetual peace—by unearthing their racialized moorings, as the period's thinkers argued that imperial federation would abolish war, “an intra-racial peace project” (330) secured by the twin horns of Anglo-American force and moral example. Chapter 8 concludes by disrupting the Anglosphere's geographical and temporal touchpoints, turning to steampunk and African-American critique as alternative mappings of the overlay of race and empire.
Anglotopians diverged over three principal questions. First was the basis of Anglo-Americanism, conceptualized in terms of Anglo-Saxon, Aryan and/or Teutonic filiation; a common history, culture, or tradition of law; linguistic unity; moral, technological, or civilizational superiority; commitments to freedom, liberty, and self-government; or some combination thereof. Second was the precise nature of British-American union, from affiliation by treaty or arbitration, to federation or confederation, to naval alliance, to common citizenship, to imperial mega-power, to the absorption of one into the other (who absorbed whom depended on which side of the ocean one inhabited). Finally, there were disagreements on how to get there. Some saw empire as leading to union, others as impeding it; nationalism might serve the project, or detract from it; war nearly always figured somewhere, as did electrical communications networks; states were sometimes preserved, sometimes dissolved. The end, though, was as predictable as it was unswerving. Race served as “the basic ontological category of politics” (240), as a white Anglo-America would pave the way for global peace.
Beyond its historical and theoretical insights, the book's engagement with fiction is a felicitous reminder that political thought emanates from a wider range of sources than we often consider. Intellectual history here stretches the parameters of political theory by contextualizing the period's political utopianisms within the rich worlds of fiction surrounding them. More depressing is how readily compatible race thinking was with every possible standpoint. Imperialists and anti-imperialists, journalists and fiction writers, socialists and liberals, Darwinists and Providentialists, nationalists and globalists, none questioned the presumptive superiority of whites, or that political membership should be drawn along racial lines.
Ultimately, what Bell captures here is less a broad set of ideas than a snapshot of an end-of-century skittishness. Where Reordering the World is panoramic, Dreamworlds burrows in on a very particular and very dangerous moment. It is a moment of profound instability populated by visions of cataclysmic transformation, where the hegemon's baton is being passed across the Atlantic, class inequality is sharpened by an untethered capitalism, technology holds the promise of global connection and destruction alike, and race resurges as the “real” ground of politics. This is, of course, by design. Because like the best critical histories, Dreamworlds shines a light on our own precarious moment, as a thin internationalism loses ground to global retrenchment, climate change is only just beginning to incinerate some states and drown others, technology has migrated from our environments into our bodies, and political mandarins, as a century ago, assert the racial foundations of politics against pious liberals intent on renaming streets, tearing down monuments, and denigrating Western glories. Dreamworlds addresses the past but is about our present.
And like in our present, the political ideas in question are not nuanced, edifying, or democratic. If there is a criticism here, it is neither of Bell nor of his riveting study, but of the one-dimensional, often superficial, frequently impracticable, and universally hubristic political visions advanced by the book's principal protagonists. What they represent is undoubtedly fascinating, but their machinations mostly are not. Where Bell's other books canvassed sophisticated political thinkers, we are here faced with the Nigel Farages and Steve Bannons of a century past. What's interesting aren't Carnegie's half-baked plans for Anglo-American unification or Rhodes's self-aggrandizing fantasies of cosmological imperialism, but what they show us about the politics of the moment.
Because if their ambitions were outsize, their ideas tended to be rather small. Bell generously characterizes them as dreamers, but we might also read them as monomaniacs who mistook themselves for avatars of future global order. Like today's world-shaping Silicon Valley royalty, Rhodes, Carnegie, and Stead took their successes in one realm as portents of their visionariness in another, a confusion made only too evident by their proximity to the utter daydreams of science fiction. Power and influence are no proxy for depth and complexity, as none dug far beneath the surface to bridge the gulf between American and British constitutional forms, work through the details of unification, or consider the global instability that a consolidated Anglo-America might, instead of peace, trigger. The only constant was the faith that mending fences a century after the fraternal schism of 1776 would, somehow, lead to a panacea. To be sure, this makes them no less remarkable: they are extraordinary figures reflecting the political landscape of an extraordinary juncture. But thinking big, we are reminded, has little relation to thinking deeply.
