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Disciplining Sholapur: the industrial city and its workers in the period of the Congress ministry, 1937–1939*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2009

MANJIRI KAMAT
MANJIRI KAMAT*
Affiliation:
Department of History, University of Mumbai, Vidyanagari, Santacruz (East), Mumbai 400 098, India E-mail: mnkamat@yahoo.com
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Abstract

The Congress, which had launched a satyagraha in 1930 to defy the Martial Law at Sholapur, had swept to power in the Bombay Presidency after the 1937 elections. However, once in power it started using a vocabulary of discipline in the industrial city. Its acceptance of power was greeted with a surge in labour activism led by the communists. The Congress initially relaxed many of the restrictions imposed by the earlier British administration and followed a strategy of accommodation. In a city like Sholapur, where government surveillance had increased following the violent popular unrest of 1930 in response to Mahatma Gandhi's call for Civil Disobedience, such temperate policies encouraged the articulation of submerged tensions, especially as the formation of a Congress government had raised expectations. Yet a combination of factors forced the ministry to adopt an uncompromising stance towards the labour activism of this period. Sholapur's turbulent record of unrest, the constraints imposed by class alliances, the trappings of labour recruitment from the criminal tribes settlement, the increasing influence of the communists, coupled with the bureaucracy and millowners' shared aversion to unbridled trade union activity, forced the ministry to adopt tougher disciplinary measures in the city. Therefore, when the labour agitation in Sholapur threatened to disrupt law and order, it brought about a shift in the government's response and the bureaucracy reasserted its power by reverting to repressive measures in the new Congress Raj.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 44 , Issue 1: The politics of work, family and community in India , January 2010 , pp. 99 - 119
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

Introduction

The Congress, which had started a satyagraha in 1930 to contest the military regulations at Sholapur, formed a government in the Bombay Presidency after the 1937 elections. After assuming office it started using a vocabulary of discipline with regard to the industrial city of Sholapur. K.M. Munshi, the newly appointed Congress Home Minister, visited the city in August 1937 and appealed for ‘a sense of discipline and order amongst the people of Sholapur and for a better understanding between the public and the Police.’Footnote 1 This remark was suggestive of the transformations that had taken place within the Congress during the course of the 1930s, and anticipated the progressive unfolding of events that characterized the Congress's tenure in office.

The nature of the Congress ministry has been a matter of significant debate. Some historians have referred to the pre-1937 administrative practices that persisted into the ministry period and have thereby underlined the ‘continuity’ of political procedures.Footnote 2 Others have argued that the Congress's accession to provincial power heralded a very real decline in the power and the ‘authority’ of the bureaucracy at all levels of the administration.Footnote 3 A study of the political developments within Sholapur, however, forces one to question both the assumptions.

The activities of the Congress in office were constrained by its varied support base. Indeed, the party was forced to perform an intricate balancing act, as it represented several interest groups, whose assistance had been integral to its electoral victory. The significant influence of business and propertied interests on Congress policy-making caused the legislation passed between 1937 and 1939 to be extremely moderate in tone, despite the radical promises made before the elections.Footnote 4

The Congress tenure in office also unleashed other related tensions. In Sholapur, its acceptance of power was almost immediately greeted with an increase in industrial activism.Footnote 5 This agitation was sponsored by the Lal Bawta Girni Kamgar Union, which had previously entered into an electoral alliance with the Congress. As a result, the senior party functionaries initially adopted a tolerant attitude towards the unrest and followed a policy of accommodation—through the formation of numerous Inquiry Committees—to try and resolve the tension.Footnote 6 This was accompanied by the relaxation of many of the disciplinary strictures imposed by the earlier government.

Sholapur, an industrial city in the Deccan region of western India witnessed widespread popular unrest in May 1930, in response to Mahatma Gandhi's call for a Civil Disobedience movement against the British government. The magnitude and scale of the violence in Sholapur took the district administration by surprise. The unrest led to a collapse of the civil administration and necessitated the imposition of Martial Law in May and June 1930. In the ensuing years, the colonial state followed a policy of repression in the Deccan city. At the same time there was a gradual transformation in the Congress as it drew closer to constitutional politics.Footnote 7

After the Congress assumed office in 1937, its temperate policies encouraged the articulation of submerged tensions in Sholapur, especially as the formation of a Congress government had raised expectations. Yet a combination of factors forced the ministry to gradually adopt an uncompromising stance towards the industrial activism of 1937–1939. Sholapur's turbulent record of unrest and the bureaucracy and millowners' shared aversion to unbridled trade union activity forced the ministry to take tougher disciplinary measures against the communists. Therefore, when unrest in the city threatened to disrupt law and order, the power of the government's executive officers increased despite the Congress being in office. The governance practices and enforcement systems which had earlier been utilized by the British to exercise control and discipline in the industrial city were readily deployed by the Congress ministry a few months after it had settled into office.

Strategy of accommodation

Having won the elections in 1937, the Congress was faced with the task of choosing a leader of the party in the Bombay provincial legislature. B.G. Kher, a solicitor from Bombay, was elected the leader in preference to K.F. Nariman, who had won the Bombay city (south) seat in the elections. The choice proved very controversial and the role played by provincial party bosses like Vallabhai Patel, Shankarrao Deo and Gangadharrao Deshpande in tilting the scales in favour of Kher's candidature has been the focus of detailed examination in the historiography dealing with the Congress ministry period.Footnote 8

All the behind-the-scene manoeuvrings between the British colonial authorities and the All India Congress Committee caused the Kher ministry to assume office six long months after the elections. The Governor had refused to comply with the All India Congress Committee's conditions regarding the exercise of his special powers and this forced the creation of an interim ministry—led by Dhanjishah Cooper—between February and July 1937.Footnote 9

In Sholapur city, the Congress won the election through an alliance with the local Lal Bawta Girni Kamgar Union,Footnote 10 started by B.T. Ranadive, a communist from Bombay, in 1934.Footnote 11 As Sholapur was a ‘labour constituency’, this electoral partnership yielded rich dividends, both for the Congress and for the union. However, following the election the Congress gradually distanced itself from the communist dominated union. The union, whose membership had risen owing to the electoral alliance with the Congress, was keen to maintain that unity and establish a firm base of power in the industrial city.Footnote 12 The anti-colonial rhetoric of the Congress was immensely beneficial to communist trade unions which pursued a consistent strategy of opposition to the state. In addition to granting legitimacy to the union, and access to Congress funds, the union could openly hold meetings without fear of prohibitory orders. The Congress and the trade unions in India had come closer to each other in 1936 and during the 1937 elections. The Sholapur union's need to maintain unity with the Congress reflected this all-India trend.Footnote 13 To a certain extent this semblance of unity was continued during the period of the interim ministry. The local Congressmen and the Lal Bawta leaders jointly waged a demonstration against Jamnadas Mehta, the Revenue and Finance Minister in the Cooper ministry, when he passed through Sholapur in April 1937.Footnote 14 Similarly, both participated in the ‘Anti-Constitution’ hartal scheduled for 1 April in the city. The mills voluntarily remained closed on that day. The union leaders G.D. Sane and S.G. Sardesai were consequently served with notices under the Bombay Special (Emergency) Powers Act externing them from Sholapur district. This led to a further wave of protest against the Cooper ministry.Footnote 15

Between February and July the union continued its efforts to unite with the Congress but did not make much headway. When the Maharashtra Provincial Congress Committee was consulted in the matter, it passed the verdict that the Congress was the only anti-imperialist organisation in the country and that other such institutions should work under its banner.Footnote 16 This monopolistic approach prepared the ground for union-sponsored agitation in Sholapur, once the Congress accepted office in July 1937.

The initial period of the Congress ministry saw a relaxation of the rules. Accordingly the ban on holding public meetings at the Hom Maidan was lifted. The externment orders against the communists, G.D. Sane and S.G. Sardesai, were cancelled. The security demanded from the union's newspaper Ekjut was returned.Footnote 17 These actions could also be construed as a reward for the help rendered by the union to the Congress prior to the elections. However, soon the ministry had to grapple with the uneasy task of dealing with industrial unrest in Sholapur. Probably one could argue that the relaxation of some of the restrictions facilitated this upsurge rather than impeded it.

On the heels of the Congress ministry assuming office the union leaders started an agitation for the liberation of the criminal tribes in the settlement at Sholapur.Footnote 18 Many of the settlers, about 700 in a settlement of over 3000, worked in the city's textile mills. This was one of the reasons why the largest criminal tribes settlement in the country was located at Sholapur.Footnote 19 It performed a useful function during the First World War when the Sholapur textile industry was experiencing a shortage of labour due to recurring plague epidemics.Footnote 20 Even later the mills of Sholapur continued to employ the settlers as this captive workforce served as the best guarantee for industrial peace. Their status was equivalent to that of the prisoners working in the jail industry. Not surprisingly the settlement workers remained conspicuously absent in the mill strikes at Sholapur in the 1920s and the early 1930s.Footnote 21 As the employers stood to gain from this informal contract they paid the government a capitation fee of 12 annas per month for each settler who worked in the mills at least 26 days a month.Footnote 22 This also in effect ensured their regular attendance in the mills. In return, the millowners could bank on government support and adequate police protection in the event of labour unrest. This nexus was exposed when the Lal Bawta Union launched an agitation in August 1937 for the repeal of the Criminal Tribes Act, an electoral promise made to the settlement workers prior to the Assembly elections.Footnote 23

The union leaders, prominently R.G. Karadkar, his wife Minakshi Karadkar and R.A. Khedgikar who had been elected to the Bombay Assembly from the Sholapur labour constituency, held daily meetings to highlight the grievances of the settlers. The arbitrary transfers of the settlers, their enforced captivity within the settlement enclosure and above all the management of the settlement by the American Marathi Mission were condemned.Footnote 24 The union proclaimed that it would launch a satyagraha if the government did not pass legislation cancelling the Criminal Tribes Act.Footnote 25 It is ironic that the union made use of Congress rhetoric by invoking techniques like the satyagraha against a Congress ministry. The main purpose of the union in starting the criminal tribes agitation was to mobilise support among a section of the Sholapur mill workers to whom they were denied access earlier. The use of settlers as blacklegs during strikesFootnote 26 directly affected the union's activities at Sholapur, the most recent experience being that of the 1934 strike which ended in failure.Footnote 27 The formation of a Congress ministry and the accompanying relaxation of several restrictions provided an ideal opportunity for launching such an agitation. The underlying aim of the exercise was to spread communist ideology among the settlement workers. Ultimately the union was looking for new recruits to strengthen its membership and worked with the illusion that ‘class formation’ would be easy in an industrial city like Sholapur. This was because Sholapur was a city with a predominantly working class population and its urban economy was heavily dependent on the cotton textile industry, that is, mills and handlooms.Footnote 28 The settlers on their part rallied round the union as it promised them freedom from the captivity of the settlement.Footnote 29

The Congress ministry reciprocated by appointing an Inquiry Committee to investigate and report on the changes necessary in the policy and law relating to the criminal tribes. The Chairman of the Committee was K.M. Munshi, the Congress Home Minister, and, among others, it included two Assembly members from Sholapur, namely Dr K.B. Antrolikar and Khan Bahadur Abdul Latif.Footnote 30 The appointment of an Inquiry Committee was a short-term strategy of the Congress to forestall criticism and control the agitation at Sholapur. It was also a part of the initial policy of accommodation followed by the ministry with regard to the working classes. Last but not least, the superimposition of an Inquiry Committee to redress the settlers' grievances was intended to steal the limelight from the Lal Bawta Union.

The composition of the Criminal Tribes Act Inquiry Committee met with renewed criticism and protest from the union leaders at Sholapur. It was branded as a ‘Committee of Rao Bahadurs and Khan Bahadurs’ at the union's meetings, the main grievance being that R.A. Khedgikar, who had been elected to the labour seat from Sholapur, had been excluded from the Committee.Footnote 31 In other words the agitation continued despite the formation of a committee by the Congress ministry. Here it is necessary to emphasize that prior to the Congress government, an agitation of this nature would have been suppressed right at the outset and the union leaders arrested under one pretext or another. The policy of accommodation of the ministry therefore escalated the tension at Sholapur rather than defused it.

The settlement workers attended the union's meetings in large numbers. After one such meeting there was a stone-throwing incident at the guard in the criminal tribes settlement. This action provided the excuse which the district bureaucracy was looking for in order to suppress the agitation. The District Magistrate immediately ordered the promulgation of Section 144 Criminal Procedure Code in early October 1937 prohibiting meetings in the settlement area. The district officials argued that the union's meetings were aimed at subverting discipline in the settlement and were undermining confidence in the newly appointed Inquiry Committee.Footnote 32 At this stage the Congress Home Minister had to sanction his approval for the District Magistrate's order at Sholapur. The past record of Sholapur necessitated a policy of caution when it came to incidents of violence which had the potential of escalating into a riot. The District Magistrate once again emerged powerful at Sholapur and the order under Section 144 was further extended until the end of October 1937. Thus when the situation showed signs of deterioration the Congress ministry was constrained by local officials to resort to tougher disciplinary measures in order to circumscribe the activities of the union at Sholapur.Footnote 33 The enforced peace was, however, short-lived.

Towards the end of October, the Lal Bawta leaders turned their attention to the grievances of the women workers in the local bidi industry. In the Sholapur mills, the communist dominated union had developed a strong following among Padmashali weavers. The foothold gained by the communists among the Padmashali mill workers appears to have been essential to the quick spread of unions in the handloom sector as well as the bidi industry, where women of the community provided much of the labour.Footnote 34 The main demand was for a wage increase from six annas to seven annas for every 1000 bidis manufactured. A new union called the Lal Bawta Bidi Kamgar Union was formed with Minakshi Karadkar as General Secretary and V.Y. Phalmari as President. The union gave a call for a strike on 28 October and daily meetings and processions of the women bidi workers were held in the city. Since the women workers in the bidi industry belonged to the Padmashali community and their husbands worked in the textile mills, the strike enabled the Lal Bawta Union to permeate the working-class households at Sholapur.Footnote 35 The extension of the union's activities to the bidi industry was a part of the overall strategy to increase its powerbase among the working classes of Sholapur.Footnote 36 An oversimplification of the attempt to homogenise the industrial workforce was seen when the union invited the settlement workers to attend a strike meeting of the women bidi workers. Due to existing social prejudices about the criminal tribes, the women strikers removed their ornaments when the settlers joined the meeting.Footnote 37 This shows that there were inherent difficulties in the union's attempt to construct a class identity enveloping different sectors of industrial labour. How did the Congress respond to the bidi workers strike? Seeing that the union was trying to fuel up an agitation once again, the local Congress arbitrated in the strike. As a result a compromise was achieved at the end of November whereby the bidi workshop owners agreed to increase the wages to six and a half annas and to reinstate all the strikers.Footnote 38 Although the Congress intervened successfully in the bidi workers strike, just as it had managed to control the criminal tribes agitation earlier, the union's status had by now tremendously increased in Sholapur.

The Congress attempt to sideline the union and exhibit a patronising concern for Sholapur's working classes was adequately demonstrated by Kher's visit to the criminal tribes settlement on 9 November 1937. In his address to the settlers, the Congress Prime Minister asked them ‘to observe discipline and to wait for the result of the Inquiry Committee set up by the Government’. He also emphasized that they should ‘not be led away by the Red Flag’ and were ‘to obey the settlement authorities’. Interestingly the union leaders were asked to wait outside the settlement enclosure while Kher interviewed the settlers accompanied by members of the local Congress Committee. Kher's visit, far from achieving the desired ‘tranquility and discipline’, culminated in a disturbance at the settlement on 10 November. The occasion was the transfer of three settlers who had been at the forefront of the agitation. Obviously the transfer to another settlement was a penalizing measure and was therefore resisted by the other settlers. The incident resulted in the promulgation of Section 144 which was to remain in force until mid-January 1938. This was the third time in a matter of two months that the District Magistrate had resorted to its promulgation.Footnote 39 The moderate tactics of the Congress government were looked upon with disfavour by the local district officials and the settlement staff. The timing of the settlers' transfer the day following Kher's visitFootnote 40 adds weight to this argument. Moreover, the managers of the Sholapur mills were getting impatient with the rise in absenteeism of the settlement workers and with the mounting criminal tribes agitation. They had communicated to the settlement authorities that if the government did not take any action to curtail the agitation they would have to reconsider their policy of employing the settlers in the mills.Footnote 41 The Sholapur criminal tribes settlement was dependent for its survival on the local mills. The government was not in a position to undertake the responsibility of maintaining the settlement without the co-operation of the mills.Footnote 42 In this situation the Congress ministry had to collaborate with the district bureaucracy in checking the agitation and restoring discipline in the settlement.

Given the context explained above it would have been unrealistic to expect any radical changes from the Inquiry Committee appointed by the Congress government to investigate into the working of the Criminal Tribes Act. In accordance with its recommendations published in August 1939 six criminal tribes were denotified for release. The incidence of criminality among other tribes was to be examined with a view to declaring them as ‘non-criminal’. Furthermore, it liberalized the procedure of discharge from the settlements. The management of the settlements was taken over from the missionaries by the government. The introduction of the Panchayat system and hand-spinning in the settlements suggested the application of the Gandhian model.Footnote 43 In other words the Committee's recommendations fell short of advocating the repeal of the Criminal Tribes Act for which the agitation at Sholapur had been started. The criminal tribes agitation thereby serves as a microcosm to illustrate what happened to Sholapur in general during the period of the Congress ministry.

The award of the Textile Labour Inquiry Committee in February 1938 marked the high point of the Congress policy of accommodation towards labour.Footnote 44 The Sholapur millowners made a strong case justifying the 12.5 per cent wage cut of 1934. They cited the depression, the fall in the cost of living, together with the competition from the mills in the Nizam's dominionsFootnote 45 as factors necessitating such a measure. However, the Committee discovered that the mills had continued to pay dividends and recover the managing agent's commission throughout the years of the depression. In fact the commission recovered was higher in 1934—the year of the wage cut and the textile strike.Footnote 46 Moreover, the Sholapur industry, though not expanding was in a strong financial position due to which the wage cut seemed unnecessary. The mills could have easily fallen back on their financial reserves rather than shifting the entire responsibility on to the workers.Footnote 47

The Textile Labour Inquiry Committee recommended a 14.35 per cent wage increase for the Sholapur mill workers.Footnote 48 Although on the surface this appeared to be a substantial gain, in reality it merely covered the ground lost during the depression. Two reasons can be given in support of this assertion. Firstly, the Labour Office enquiries had shown that the Sholapur workers had actually suffered a 20.5 per cent depreciation in their earnings since 1926, mainly because of the operation of the grain allowance in Sholapur's textile mills. The collapse in the prices of food grains had resulted in a decrease in the wages of workers by more than 12.5 per cent which was the official wage cut announced in 1934.Footnote 49 Secondly, the workers' wages at Sholapur were the lowest in comparison to other cities in the province like Bombay and AhmedabadFootnote 50 so that the recommended wage increase only served to redress this imbalance which had worsened owing to the depression. The wage increase sanctioned by the Congress ministry paradoxically increased the power of the Lal Bawta Union which had in its evidence strongly demanded a return to the wages prior to the wage cut.Footnote 51 Henceforth its renewed agitational activities brought the union at loggerheads with the ministry and opened up a new chapter of confrontation in the industrial city.

Shift to discipline

The ministry's response to the resumption of union-sponsored agitation in 1938 showed a sharp shift from its former vacillatory tactics to one of deliberate suppression with the bureaucracy regaining the upper hand at Sholapur. The formation of Inquiry Committees and a policy of accommodation towards the working classes had accomplished very little in terms of controlling industrial unrest in the city. It was increasingly apparent that the union's aim was to bring discredit to the Congress ministry. Apart from this, the extension of its activities to different sectors of Sholapur's working class population was beginning to erode the Congress presence in the industrial city. Moreover, it had other implications for the ministry in consideration of Sholapur's vulnerability to riots and violence. Finally from the standpoint of business interests, the ministry's initial policies, primarily the investigations of the Criminal Tribes Act Inquiry Committee and the wage increase recommended by the Textile Labour Inquiry Committee, seemed to tilt heavily in the direction of labour. The Congress being a party representing various interest groups it could not afford to alienate the employers as it had done thus far.Footnote 52 Additionally, the Sholapur industrial situation, with the trappings of a criminal tribes settlement, had put the millowners there in a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis the government.Footnote 53 Any further allowance to the union's agitational activities at Sholapur was therefore likely to prove problematic for the ministry. These factors enable us to analyze the shift in the Congress response and understand the justification for its repressive methods against the communists. Two instances when this became explicitly clear was at the demonstrations of 14 February 1938 to mark the Political Prisoners' Release DayFootnote 54 and during the strike to protest against the Industrial Disputes Bill later in that year.Footnote 55

The union decided to observe 14 February 1938 as the Political Prisoners' Release Day by organizing a one-day strike in the city. The strike was to be organized under the joint auspices of the Lal Bawta Girni Kamgar Union, the Lal Bawta Bidi Kamgar Union and the local Congress Socialist Party.Footnote 56 It is evident that this attempt was intended to display the union's clout amongst the working classes of Sholapur as it would involve the mill workers, the settlement workers and the bidi workers of the city.Footnote 57 The union had launched agitations at separate times to fight for the grievances of the workers in these sectors and hence it followed that they would support the union in this hartal. For example the settlement workers were indirectly committed to participate in the Political Prisoners' Release Day strike as the criminal tribes' agitation was still under way.Footnote 58 This in turn fulfilled the union's objective of ‘fraternizing the different sectors of the industrial workforce’.Footnote 59

A strike in the mills synchronizing with a strike in the settlement was a cause for concern to the district officials. This time, however, they had the full backing of the Congress government in their preparations to deal effectively with it. Their task was made much simpler when the local Congress Committee announced that it would not participate in the strike of 14 February but instead would observe 13 February as the Political Prisoners' Release Day. It should be noted that the day chosen by the Congress Committee was a mill holiday and hence presented no problems for the district bureaucracy.

The government had made it clear that it wanted to maintain discipline in the settlement at all costs. The Home Minister was personally in touch with the millowners to ensure that the settlers would not be obstructed on their way to work on 14 February. Criminal Intimidation had already been made a cognizable offence so that anyone engaging in obstructive tactics was liable to be prosecuted.Footnote 60 Moreover, the ‘Standing Mill Strike Scheme’ of the police was to be implemented in the mill area and more police were stationed in the settlement area on the day of the strike. In case the need arose permission had been granted to ask for an additional police force from Ahmednagar and Bijapur, as was done during the 1934 strike.Footnote 61 In the event of violence, the government had also sanctioned the use of Section 144 Criminal Procedure Code, although the Home Minister wanted to avoid its promulgation until after the Haripura session of the Congress.Footnote 62 The above arrangements increasingly resembled those adopted by the Sholapur District Magistrates in the years preceding the Congress ministry. This supports the contention that the power of the District Magistrate increased with the shift in government response to labour agitation at Sholapur.

On the day of the strike almost the entire union leadership was arrested on charges of criminal intimidation and rioting while they were engaged in picketing in front of the Laxmi, Vishnu Mills. These included R.G. Karadkar, S.G. Sardesai, Dattu Deshpande, K.K. Deshpande, Gangaram Chavan, A.G. Gaikwad, P.S. Khisti and local Congressmen like Channusing Kalyansing and Abdul Karim Lunje.Footnote 63 The latter could be counted as Congress dissidents who continued to flirt with the Lal Bawta activists long after the parting of ways between the City Congress Committee and the union.Footnote 64 The same afternoon the remaining union leaders namely Minakshi Karadkar, M.D. Vibhute, M.B. Vibhute and V.R. Madur were arrested as they waged a demonstration outside the Haribhai Deokaran High school urging the students to join the strike.Footnote 65

What was the response to the strike at Sholapur? Despite the efforts of the district officials, the settlement staff and the local Congressmen, the settlers stayed away from the mills on the day of the strike. This affected the working of the Laxmi, Vishnu Mills in which the proportion of settlers was quite high in comparison to the other mills.Footnote 66 Some settlers therefore faced prosecutions and others were transferred as a punitive measure by the settlement authorities.Footnote 67 The remaining mills of Sholapur continued to work on the day of the strike. Fifteen per cent of shops remained closed in certain localities of the city. From this it is evident that the most overwhelming response to the strike was from the workers of the criminal tribes settlement.Footnote 68

Following the arrest of the union leadership, nine of them were convicted to nine months imprisonment, and the remaining four to six months.Footnote 69 The strike provided a tailor-made opportunity for the district bureaucracy to remove the Lal Bawta Union leadership from the industrial landscape of Sholapur. It need not be added that in their view this action was long overdue and was delayed largely due to the Congress policy of tolerance in the initial months of the ministry.Footnote 70 In other words the union leaders were also being penalized for their agitational activities during the course of 1937.

The Congress ministry faced increasing criticism for this action and was inundated with petitions for the early release of the ‘Sholapur political prisoners’. The flogging of the Sholapur prisoner, Gangaram Chavan, in Bijapur jail led to a further wave of protest and 28 May 1938 was observed as the ‘Sholapur Prisoners' Day’ in several places in the Bombay province.Footnote 71 These developments have striking similarities with the events during the Civil Disobedience movement of 1930,Footnote 72 the only difference being that such ‘days’ were now being observed as a protest against a Congress ministry. The rituals initiated by the Congress were thereby being reinvented in a new context.

In the face of this criticism, the government reciprocated by appointing an Inquiry Committee to investigate into the flogging incident. This action was also precipitated by the commencement of a hunger-strike by the Sholapur prisoners in the Yeravda prison. The Committee came to the conclusion that under the existing rules, the flogging of Chavan was justified, though it recommended that, in future, such punishments were not to be inflicted without the prior consent of the government. Here it is necessary to emphasize that this was an official Committee with the Inspector General of Prisons being one of its members. The popular demand had been for a non-official Inquiry Committee, which was refused by the Congress government.Footnote 73

Regarding the main demand for the early release of the union leaders, the ministry remained adamant. A relevant consideration here was the ensuing election of the Sholapur Municipality in October 1938 in which the Congress stakes were quite high. After attaining power at the provincial level, the Congress was keen to gain control of the local self-governing bodies. The convictions of the principal union leaders had automatically disqualified them from standing as candidates for the municipal election and thereby removed the main competitors of the Congress candidates. Their premature release and, in consequence, a resumption of union sponsored agitation at Sholapur coinciding with the local municipal election, was neither in the best interests of the Congress nor that of the bureaucracy and the millowners. The Congress Home Minister did not sanction their early release and the 13 convicted persons served their full terms of imprisonment.Footnote 74

This was doubly advantageous to the government, as the principal union activists of Sholapur were in prison when the Industrial Disputes legislation was passed in late 1938. This bill, passed as a weapon against strikes, created an elaborate machinery of conciliation and arbitration to deal with industrial disputes.Footnote 75 In retaliation to this piece of legislation, the working classes held a strike on 7 November 1938, led by R.A. Khedgikar in Sholapur, which paradoxically passed off peacefully,Footnote 76 unlike the disturbances which occurred in other cities such as Bombay.Footnote 77 This turn of events should not, however, be misconstrued. It is highly possible that Khedgikar being elected to the Sholapur labour seat on a Congress ticket made him open to pressures from the district Congress and the bureaucracy for the maintenance of discipline during the strike. Secondly, Khedgikar himself clarified that he wanted to avoid a repetition of the 14 February episode, when all the union leaders were simultaneously arrested in a single day. He therefore acted as the ‘first dictator’ of the strike and ensured that it was conducted ‘peacefully and with discipline’.Footnote 78 Last, but not least, with the main union activists still behind bars,Footnote 79 the strike in Sholapur was unable to gather the momentum which it might otherwise have mustered. These factors worked to the advantage of the Congress ministry and the district administration with the result that only 22 workers were arrested on the day of the strike.Footnote 80 The government thus managed successfully to curtail the union's activities at Sholapur. A deliberate attempt was now made by the Congress to marginalize the Lal Bawta Union by the creation of a new union with more pliant leaders at its helm. The Congress started the Tirangi Bawta Girni Kamgar Union, under the stewardship of Dr Antrolikar, in August 1939 to circumscribe the communist-dominated union at Sholapur. Although this proved to be an abortive enterprise, one can locate in it the roots of the future Congress initiated Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh.Footnote 81

Conclusion

This paper reconstructs the ways in which the Congress's relationship with the working classes was transformed during the period 1937 to 1939: a policy of tolerance at the outset which gave way to increasing repression. It emphasizes the constraints imposed by class alliances and the bureaucracy on the decision-making of the Congress ministry. The case of Sholapur shows that in its 27 months in office these determinants forced the party to set aside certain alliances in order to cement others. Of particular significance was the Congress's parting of ways with the communist led union, which had been a significant electoral partner in the run-up to the 1937 elections. The initial relaxation of restrictions by the Congress ministry, coupled with a strategy of accommodation towards the workers, accelerated the union's agitational activities rather than curtailing them. The increasing popularity of the communists with the working classes was beginning to erode the Congress power-base in the industrial city. A matter of grave concern was the growing defiance of the workers from the criminal tribes settlement. The Sholapur settlement was dependent for its survival on the recruitment of its workers in the mills. This captive labour had thus far functioned as a bulwark against strikes. The earlier record of popular unrest in Sholapur heightened the anxiety of the district authorities who feared that, if the labour agitation was not controlled at this stage, it could spiral out of control. The Congress ministry came under concerted pressure from the district administration and the millowners to change its stance. This brought about a shift in the government's response, and the bureaucracy reasserted its power by resorting to repressive measures, despite a new Congress Raj.

References

1 H.T. Lambrick to Government of Bombay [GOB], 18 August 1937 in GOB, Home (Special), File 800 (74) (15) Pt I of 1935, p. 512, Maharashtra State Archives [MSA], Mumbai. H.T. Lambrick was the District Magistrate of Sholapur between 1937 and 1939.

2 Shankardass, Rani Dhavan, The First Congress Raj: Provincial Autonomy in Bombay (Macmillan, Delhi, 1982), pp. 257–267Google Scholar.

3 Epstein, Simon, ‘District Officers in Decline: The Erosion of British Authority in the Bombay Countryside, 1919 to 1947’, Modern Asian Studies [MAS], (1982), 16 (3): 493–518CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 For the Congress record in Bihar during this period, see Damodaran, Vineeta, Broken Promises: Popular Protest, Indian Nationalism and the Congress Party in Bihar, 1935–1946 (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1992), Chapters 1 and 2Google Scholar.

5 The late 1930s also saw an escalation of communist-led labour activism in Bombay, Kanpur and Calcutta. See Chandavarkar, Rajnarayan, The Origins of Industrial Capitalism in India: Business Strategies and the working classes in Bombay, 1900–1940 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994), Chapter 9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gooptu, Nandini, The Politics of the Urban Poor in Early-Twentieth Century India (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001), Chapter 9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Joshi, Chitra, Lost Worlds: Indian Labour and Its Forgotten Histories (Permanent Black, Delhi, 2003), Chapter 6Google Scholar; Sen, Samita, Women and Labour in Late Colonial India: The Bengal Jute Industry (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999), Chapter 6Google Scholar; Basu, Subho, Does Class Matter? Colonial Capital and Workers' Resistance in Bengal, 1890–1937 (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2004), Chapter 7Google Scholar; Chakrabarty, Dipesh, Rethinking Working-Class History: Bengal, 1890–1940 (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1996), Chapter 5Google Scholar.

6 For instance, the Criminal Tribes Act Inquiry Committee, and the Committee of Inquiry into the Flogging of Gangaram Chavan, a prisoner in Bijapur jail, were appointed by the Congress ministry in direct response to the agitation at Sholapur. The Textile Labour Inquiry Committee too had important implications for the working classes in the mill-town.

7 Manjiri N. Kamat, ‘Labour and Nationalism in Sholapur: conflict, confrontation and control in a Deccan city, western India, 1918–1939’ (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1997).

8 For details of the ‘Nariman episode’, see Shankardass, The First Congress Raj, pp. 37–40; Shankardass, Rani Dhavan, Vallabhai Patel: Power and Organisation in Indian Politics (Orient Longman, Delhi, 1988), pp. 153–164Google Scholar; Kamath, M.V., Kher, B.G.: The Gentleman Premier (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1989), pp. 200–218Google Scholar; Phadke, Y.D., Veesavya Shatakatil Maharashtra, Vol 4: 1930–39 (Srividya Prakashan, Poona, 1993), pp. 146–149Google Scholar; For a perspective of Sholapur Congressmen like T.S. Jadhav, see Andurkar, V.G., Chane Khave Lokhandache (Lokseva Sahakari Mudranalaya, Sholapur, 1985), p. 48Google Scholar.

9 Bombay 1936–37: A Review of the Administration of the Presidency (Bombay, 1938), pp. i–ii; Bombay 1937–38: A Review of the Administration of the Presidency (Bombay, 1939), pp. i–ii.

10 Sholapurcha Kamgar (Sholapur, 1944), p. 23.

11 GOB, Home (Special), File 550 (14) of 1933, p. 135, MSA. The File has information on 1934.

12 Intercepted letters, S.M. Joshi to R.G. Karadkar, 11 June 1937 and Shankarrao Deo to Dr K.B. Antrolikar, 12 June 1937, in Records of the Deputy Inspector General of Police; Criminal Investigation Department [Records of the DIGP; CID], Maharashtra, Mumbai, File 3/INC/37II, p. 421, Office of the Deputy Inspector General of Police; Criminal Investigation Department [Office of the DIGP; CID], Maharashtra, Mumbai; Lambrick to GOB, 10 June 1937, 16 June 1937 and 13 July 1937 in GOB, Home (Special), File 800 (74) (15) Pt I of 1935, MSA; M.K. Pandhe, ‘Labour Organizations in Sholapur City’ (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Poona, 1960), pp. 68–70: See Proceedings of the Textile Labour Inquiry Committee [Proceedings of the TLIC], Interim Inquiry, Oral evidence, S.G. Sardesai, Lal Bawta Girni Kamgar Union, Sholapur in File 42 of 1937–38, pp. 506–507, MSA.

13 Ibid; Chandavarkar, The Origins of Industrial Capitalism in India, p. 420; V.B. Karnik, Indian Trade Unions: A Survey (Popular Prakashan, Bombay 1978), Chapter IX.

14 Lambrick to GOB, 29 April 1937, 7 May 1937 in GOB, Home (Special), File 800 (74) (15) Pt I of 1935, pp. 315–321, MSA.

15 GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (78) of 1937 and File 543 (79) of 1937, MSA; Lambrick to GOB, 2 April 1937, 7 April 1937 and 7 May 1937 in GOB, Home (Special), File 800 (74) (15) Pt I of 1935, MSA.

16 Lambrick to GOB, 16 June 1937 in GOB, Home (Special), File 800 (74) (15) Pt I of 1935, p. 453, MSA; Intercepted letter, Deo to Antrolikar, 12 June 1937 in Records of the DIGP; CID, File 3/INC/37II, p. 425, Office of the DIGP; CID.

17 For the cancellation of the restriction to hold labour meetings at the Hom Maidan in August 1937, see reply of M.Y. Nurie to R.A. Khedgikar's question in the Bombay Legislative Assembly, Extract from the Bombay Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol 3, 4 May 1938, in GOB, Home (Special), File 800 (94) of 1935, MSA; for the removal of the externment order against G.D. Sane and S.G. Sardesai passed by the Congress ministry in October 1937, see GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (44) I of 1934, pp. 165–167, MSA; for the cancellation of the security demanded from the Ekjut newspaper, see Pandhe, ‘Labour Organizations in Sholapur City’, p. 69. Although the dates of the above files are 1935 and 1934 respectively, some of the information in them relates to the Congress ministry period.

18 See GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) of 1937, MSA pertaining to the criminal tribes agitation at Sholapur.

19 Annual Administration Report on the working of the Criminal Tribes Act in the Province of Bombay for the year ending 31 March 1939, Part I (Bombay, 1939), p. 2; GOB, Home (Special), File 543(82) of 1937, p. 87, MSA.

20 Royal Commission on Labour in India [RCLI], Evidence, Bombay, Mr H.H. Strutton (London, 1931), I(2): 451. According to Mr Strutton, who was the Manager of the Sholapur Industrial Settlement, ‘During plague epidemics the average millhand clears out of Sholapur. We do not allow our people to clear out. We inoculate them.’ The Bombay Chronicle, 11 April 1916; Land Revenue Administration Report, Part II of the Collectorate of Sholapur in GOB, Revenue Department, Compilation 511, Pt XII of 1915, p. 27, MSA.

21 The Bombay Chronicle, 19 February 1920; For instance Mr Strutton, in his evidence to the Royal Commission on Labour, clarified that had they joined the strike, ‘we would probably transfer them to another settlement where there is no mill work, but only as a matter of discipline’. See RCLI, Evidence, Bombay, Mr H.H. Strutton, I(2): 451; The settlement workers also abstained from going on strike in 1934 for the same reason. R.G. Karadkar, the General Secretary of the Lal Bawta Union who led the criminal tribes agitation in 1937 said that the 1934 strike had failed, as the millowners had engaged settlers to work in the mills. GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) of 1937, p. 219, MSA; Kamat, Labour and Nationalism in Sholapur, Chapters 1, 4.

22 RCLI, Evidence, Bombay, Mr H.H. Strutton, I(2): 450.

23 GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) of 1937, p. 3, MSA.

24 Sholapurcha Kamgar, pp. 30–31; Kirloskar, Shanta, Comrade Minatai Sane: Ek Bhuyichakra (Srimati Minakshibai Sane Smriti Samiti, Sholapur, 1991), pp. 29–30Google Scholar.

25 Telegram, Karadkar, General Secretary of the Lal Bawta Girni Kamgar Union to K.M. Munshi, Home Minister, 4 September 1937, in GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) of 1937, p. 19, MSA; Lambrick to GOB, 8 September 1937 in GOB, Home (Special), File 800 (74) (15) Pt I of 1935, p. 529–531, MSA; Ekjut, 9 September 1937.

26 Sholapurcha Kamgar, p. 30.

27 GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) of 1937, p. 219, MSA.

28 Pethe, V.P., Demographic Profiles of an Urban Population (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1964), p. 5Google Scholar.

29 Minakshi Sane, Tatakathit gunehgar zamatichya chalwalichya itihasatil kahi gahal zhaleli pane (Bombay, n.d.). This is a pamphlet written by Minakshi Sane (formerly Karadkar) who led the criminal tribes agitation at Sholapur launched by the Lal Bawta Union in 1937.

30 Note of Home (Special) Department in GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) of 1937, p. 131, MSA; This note refers to the appointment of an Inquiry Committee by the Congress ministry in September 1937 to investigate the policy and law relating to the criminal tribes. The Committee consisted of Narayanrao Joshi, Rao Bahadur Chitale, Khan Bahadur Abdul Latif, Dr K.B. Antrolikar and F.B. Dhabi all of whom were MLAs with Munshi, the Home Minister, acting as the Chairman. Mr D. Symington, the Backward Class Officer was appointed as the Secretary of the Inquiry Committee.

31 Ibid., p. 219. Meeting of the settlement workers behind the Vishnu Mill addressed by Karadkar, 28 September 1937.

32 Ibid., p. 215, 253. Lambrick to GOB, 29 September 1937; Order under Section 144 Criminal Procedure Code, 2 October 1937. Following the stone-throwing incident in the settlement, Lambrick, the District Magistrate of Sholapur, strongly recommended the promulgation of Section 144 in his letter to the Government of Bombay dated 29 September 1937. This request was sanctioned by the Congress ministry and the order was issued at Sholapur on 2 October 1937.

33 Ibid., p. 381. See Lambrick's Confidential Report, 21 October 1937. Another reason for extending the order under Section 144 besides the continuing agitation was the cancellation of the externment order against Sane and Sardesai sanctioned by the Congress ministry in October 1937. The District Magistrate feared that their arrival in Sholapur would escalate the agitation.

34 Pandhe, ‘Labour Organizations in Sholapur City’; Haynes, Douglas E., ‘The Labour Process in the Bombay Handloom Industry, 1880–1940’, MAS, (2008), 42 (1): 1–45Google Scholar.

35 Sholapurcha Kamgar, pp. 31–32; Pandhe, ‘Labour Organizations in Sholapur City’, pp. 73–75; GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) of 1937, pp. 447–487, MSA; Records of the DIGP; CID, Maharashtra, Mumbai, Bombay Presidency Police Secret Abstract of Intelligence [Police Abstract], Vol L, Number 44, 6 November 1937, pp. 368–369, Office of the DIGP; CID, Maharashtra, Mumbai; A.L. Irabatti, Mazhya Ayushyatil Tippane (Mazhya Ayushyatil Tippane Prakashan Samiti, Sholapur, 1970), pp. 47–48.

36 Sholapurcha Kamgar, pp. 31–32.

37 Interview, S.G. Sardesai, Talegaon, March 1992; GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) of 1937, pp. 465–491, MSA.

38 Lambrick to GOB, 3 December 1937 in GOB, Home (Special), File 800 (74) (15) Pt I of 1935, p. 623, MSA.

39 The Bombay Chronicle, 9 November 1937; Lambrick to GOB, 11 November 1937; Press Note, 15 November 1937; J.B. Irwin to Lambrick 15 November 1937; Bombay Sentinel, 30 November 1937 in GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) of 1937, pp. 535–639, MSA.

40 Ibid., pp. 537–542. Lambrick to GOB, 11 November 1937.

41 Ibid., pp. 540–542, 625. Manager, Narsinggirji Mill to Manager of the criminal tribes settlement, Sholapur, 9 November 1937 and Lambrick to GOB, 11 November 1937.

42 Annual Administration Report on the working of the Criminal Tribes Act in the Bombay Province for the year ending 31 March 1937, Part I (Bombay, 1937), pp. 2, 10, 11; Annual Administration Report on the working of the Criminal Tribes Act in the Province of Bombay for the year ending 31 March 1938, Part I (Bombay, 1938), pp. 2, 11.

43 Annual Administration Report on the working of the Criminal Tribes Act in the Province of Bombay for the year ending 31 March 1939, Part I (Bombay, 1939), p.11; Annual Administration Report on the working of the Criminal Tribes Act in the Bombay Province for the year ending 31 March 1940, Part I (Bombay, 1940), pp. 1, 4, 7; Report of the Criminal Tribes Act Enquiry Committee, 1939 (Bombay, 1939).

44 Report of the Textile Labour Inquiry Committee [Report of the TLIC], 1937–38, Vol I, Interim Report (Bombay, 1938).

45 Proceedings of the TLIC, Interim Inquiry, Oral evidence, Examination by V.L. Mehta of the representatives of the Lal Bawta Girni Kamgar Union, Sholapur in File 42 of 1937–38, p. 519, MSA.

46 Ibid., Interim Inquiry, Oral evidence, Examination by K.K. Desai of W.T. Cullen, Laxmi and Vishnu Mills, Sholapur in File 42, pp. 393–394.

47 Ibid., pp. 393–396.

48 Report of the TLIC, 1937–38, I, 93.

49 Proceedings of the TLIC, Interim Inquiry, Oral evidence, Examination by D.R. Gadgil of W.T. Cullen, Laxmi and Vishnu Mills, Sholapur in File 42 of 1937–38, pp. 369–373, MSA.

50 Ibid., Interim Inquiry, Oral evidence, Examination by K.K. Desai of W.T. Cullen, Laxmi and Vishnu Mills, Sholapur in File 42 of 1937–38, p. 387, MSA; Report of the TLIC, 1937–38, I, 94.

51 Proceedings of the TLIC, Interim Inquiry, Oral evidence, Examination by D.R. Gadgil of S.G. Sardesai, Lal Bawta Girni Kamgar Union, Sholapur in File 42 of 1937–38, p. 521, MSA.

52 For the business response to the Congress ministry's policies see Markovits, Claude, Indian Business and Nationalist Politics, 1931–39: The Indigenous Capitalist Class and the Rise of the Congress Party (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985), Chapter. 6, pp. 150–178CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

53 Lambrick to GOB, 11 November 1937 and Manager, Narsinggirji Mill to Manager of the criminal tribes settlement, Sholapur, 9 November 1937, in GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) of 1937, pp. 537–542, 625, MSA.

54 GOB to Lambrick, 12 February 1938 and Telegram, Lambrick to GOB, 14 February 1938 in GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) I of 1937–38, pp. 205, 217–221, MSA.

55 Sholapur Samachar, 9 November 1938.

56 G.D. Sane, President, Lal Bawta Girni Kamgar Union, Sholapur to Jawaharlal Nehru, Ex-President and Member of the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress, 12 May 1938, in All India Congress Committee Papers [AICC Papers], File G-38 of 1938, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library [NMML], New Delhi.

57 GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) I of 1937–38, pp. 99–135, MSA.

58 Ibid., p. 195. Reverend S.P. Hieb, Manager, Sholapur Industrial Settlement to C.S. Devadhar, Backward Class Officer, Poona, 8 February 1938. The criminal tribes settlement at Sholapur was also referred to as the Sholapur Industrial Settlement.

59 Interview, S.G. Sardesai, Talegaon, March 1992. The word ‘fraternizing’ was used by Sardesai in the interview.

60 GOB to Lambrick, 12 February 1938, in GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) I of 1937–38, p. 205, MSA.

61 Ibid., M.P. La Bouchardiere, District Superintendent of Police, [DSP], Sholapur to Lambrick, 14 February 1938, p. 259.

62 Ibid., GOB to Lambrick, 8 February 1938 and 12 February 1938, pp. 189, 205.

63 Sane to Nehru, 12 May 1938 in AICC Papers, File G-38 of 1938, NMML; La Bouchardiere, DSP, Sholapur to Lambrick, 14 February 1938 in GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) I of 1937–38, p. 257, MSA.

64 Kamat, Labour and Nationalism in Sholapur, Chapter 5.

65 Telegram, Lambrick to GOB, 14 February 1938 and letter, La Bouchardiere, DSP, Sholapur to Lambrick, 14 February 1938 in GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) I of 1937–38, pp. 221, 257, MSA.

66 Ibid., La Bouchardiere, DSP, Sholapur to Lambrick, 14 February 1938, pp. 255–259. Also see Appendix ‘A’ in the same letter for the attendance statistics in the Laxmi, Vishnu Mills and among the settlement workers in particular on 14 February 1938. The statistics show that the absenteeism was higher amongst the settlement workers of these mills on 14 February 1938.

67 Ibid., Telegram, C.S. Devadhar, Backward Class Officer, Poona to GOB, 14 February 1938. Over 300 settlers went on strike on this day, despite the advice given to them by the local authorities and the Congress leaders.

68 Ibid., La Bouchardiere, DSP, Sholapur to Lambrick, 14 February 1938, pp. 255–259.

69 Ibid., Extract from the Police Abstract, 26 March 1938, p. 375.

70 Ibid., Lambrick to J.W. Smyth, Commissioner of the Central Division, 2 April 1938; S.P. Hieb, Manager, Sholapur Industrial Settlement to C.S. Devadhar, Backward Class Officer, Poona, 21 February 1938; Devadhar to Manager, Laxmi Mills, Sholapur, 23 February 1938; The Bombay Sentinel, 23 March 1938, pp. 299, 301, 359, 421.

71 S.S. Mirajkar, Secretary, Bombay Provincial Trade Union Congress to General Secretary, Indian National Congress, Allahabad, 30 May 1938, in AICC Papers, File G-38 of 1938, NMML; The Bombay Sentinel, 13 May 1938; The Bombay Chronicle, 18 May 1938, in GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) II of 1938, pp. 1, 9, MSA; Letter to B.G. Kher by R.A. Khedgikar, S.V. Parulekar and others for the release of the 13 Sholapur prisoners mentioned in The Bombay Chronicle, 26 March 1938 in GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) I of 1937–38, p. 367, MSA.

72 Kamat, Labour and Nationalism in Sholapur, Chapter 3.

73 Government Resolution: Committee appointed to investigate into the circumstances of the whipping of Gangaram Chavan in Bijapur District Prison, 13 August 1938; Government Resolution, 28 May 1938; Also see Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Flogging of Gangaram Chavan, a prisoner in Bijapur Jail; Bombay Police Abstract, 4 June 1938 (Extract) in GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) II of 1938, pp. 115, 135, MSA.

74 Ibid., Home Department Notes, 12 July 1938; Bombay Provincial Weekly Letter, 16 July 1938; Inspector General of Prisons to GOB, 26 July 1938; Lambrick to GOB, 29 July 1938; GOB to Lambrick, 28 July 1938; Home Department Notes ending with the remark ‘No premature release’ signed by K.M. Munshi, Home Minister dated 1 September 1938; District Magistrate's Report pertaining to the ensuing municipal election, 7 August 1938, pp. 129–133, 135, 145–153.

75 Chandavarkar, Rajnarayan, Imperial Power and Popular Politics: Class, resistance and the state in India, c. 1850–1950 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998), p. 94Google Scholar; Markovits, Indian Business and Nationalist Politics, pp. 166–171; Shankardass, The First Congress Raj, pp. 160–188.

76 Sholapur Samachar, 8 November 1938.

77 Markovits, Indian Business and Nationalist Politics, pp. 168; Shankardass, The First Congress Raj, pp. 179–184.

78 Sholapur Samachar, 8 November 1938, 9 November 1938 and 10 November 1938.

79 Inspector General of Prisons to GOB, 26 July 1938, in GOB, Home (Special), File 543 (82) II of 1938, p. 147, MSA. The sentences of nine of the principal union activists were to expire at the end of November 1938, that is, a fortnight after the strike of 7 November 1938.

80 Sholapur Samachar, 10 November 1938.

81 Dr K.B. Antrolikar Papers, ‘Election manifesto of Dr Antrolikar for the Loksabha election of 1952’, in my possession; Sholapurcha Kamgar, p. 38; Kirloskar, Comrade Minatai Sane, pp. 39–40.