In this new book, Yaron Ayalon endeavors to look at state, communal, and individual responses to natural disasters in the Ottoman Empire beginning with the aftereffects of the black death in 1347–48 until the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of World War I. The work follows a number of recent books on the subject of environmental history and Ottoman responses to plague, including my own. Ayalon has drawn upon earlier, pioneering works on these topics by Michael Dols, Daniel Panzac, Nancy Gallagher, Heath Lowry, and a wide array of other secondary sources. He has also used Ottoman administrative materials, published primary sources, as well as a small number of unpublished Ottoman and Arabic manuscripts.
One main argument of the book is that the Ottoman state failed to respond in any proactive way to better the public health of its subjects until the 19th century: “The suffering of the people as such did not seem to be a major concern for the empire” (p. 71). Accordingly, the Sultanate might act out of administrative need to prevent rebellion, loss of revenue, or undermining the public order, yet it shied away from novel public health policies. Instead, “the Ottoman state preferred to reassert the centuries-old (ideals of?) social and political order and to restore the boundaries between public and private, state and subjects” (p. 62). This is seen in examples throughout the work, such as in the 16th century, when the Ottoman government condemned the flight of subjects who were approaching Alexandria during a plague outbreak in 1579. This was illustrative of the state's reluctance to obey the famous 16th century sheikh ül-Islam Ebussuud Efendi's prescription to avoid plague-infested areas in general. Later instances include a delayed Ottoman response to an earthquake, famines, and fires in Syria during the 1750s.
However, according to the author, local communities and individuals did take action on occasion even if the state did not. This was particularly true for non-Muslims who endorsed flight or even quarantines, first put into practice by Christian merchants and other European powers from the late 14th century onward. Charities were also critical to responding to disasters, as seen among Christians, Jews, and Muslims alike. Ayalon points to activity on the part of pious foundations of all faiths, be they Islamic waqf and imaret, Jewish hekdesh or Christian piae causae (p. 122).
These activities speak to Ayalon's thoughts on the role of religion, namely that the Ottomans generally reacted at a societal and even governmental level in a relatively nondiscriminatory way towards its subjects during a time of disaster. Yet he intimates that the government recognized the privileges of the Muslim community when it came to disaster relief regarding food, reassessing taxes and urban reconstruction. He acknowledged, however, that such discrimination did not belie the fact that the Ottomans were more tolerant than most Islamic states in history.
The modernizing reforms of the Tanzimat, Hamidian and Young Turk eras attempted to change the dynamics by adopting “innovations,” such as the quarantines reform of 1831, and even sanitary and other anti-infectionist medical reforms in the 1890s, albeit with very mediocre results, posits Ayalon. While the Ottoman authorities used maritime quarantines to protect its borders and trade, it failed to keep in line with up-to-date medical opinion. This left the Ottoman state fundamentally weakened when it entered military conflicts, such as the Balkan Wars and World War I. The results of death, destruction, and the alienation of the population from the government occurred at a time when total human mobilization was critical to survival.
Overall, I found a number of these arguments wanting. While Ayalon spoke at length about the passivity of the Ottoman state in response to plague, for example, he was too quick to dismiss the validity of Ottoman plague treatises, a source that at key points contradicted his arguments: “Plague treatises have their intrinsic value as mirrors of popular sentiments regarding events whose explanation evokes supernatural powers. But they are useless for understanding Ottoman policy on the question of flight” (p. 78). He later disregards Ebussuud and Taşköprüzade, both highly influential Ottoman religious authorities who condone if not endorse flight. This is important as they illustrate that the Ottoman state often endorsed public health policy measures intended to lessen plague fatalities.
Yet, Ayalon fails to discuss the rich number of Ottoman plague treatise manuscripts outside of collection of Ebussuud's fetvas. Thus, he omitted other key advocates of flight during the 16th century, such as İdris-i Bitlisi, a key intellectual authority during the reign of Selim the Grim, and the Şeyhülislam Kemal. Other sources he did not fully flesh out. Al-Yahudi, whom he cites as “offering simple medical advice,” actually endorsed flight from plague. And while there was certainly debate about flight from plague among these Ottoman writers, particularly later during the late 18th century, as Ayalon admittedly indicates with a citation from Ahmad Bin Ismaʿil, he discusses this material far too briefly.
He also neglects important medical treatises when he discusses the quarantine reform of 1831 as a belated attempt at reforming public health in the Ottoman Empire (pp. 82–87). Hamdan bin Osman Hoca, whose treatise he does not mention, may have advocated the reform in part as a tool to resist European commercial penetration. Nevertheless he also saw the devastation of the plague firsthand, as a victim himself, as well as the effectiveness of the French who first implemented it in his Algerian homeland. Behced Efendi, a key advocate of quarantine against cholera, is also never cited. These Ottoman writers, both in the 16th and 19th centuries, speak to a long tradition of Ottoman openness towards active measures to ward off plague that is not effectively rebutted by this book.
I likewise found Ayalon's discussion about alleged religious discrimination largely moot. Certainly, almost all premodern states in Europe and the Middle East discriminated in some fashion given their reliance on monotheistic justifications for monarchies, whether Christian or Islamic. The issue in my mind was not whether discrimination existed, but rather religious toleration, for which the Ottomans were famous. One should not forget that many Sephardic Jews, such as al-Yahudi, fled to the Ottoman Empire for that very reason. Indeed it was not unheard of for religious minorities to be targeted in Europe during epidemic outbreaks or other maladies. I found it surprising that Ayalon did not touch on the important role that doctors of Jewish origin played in the Ottoman Empire as medical treatise writers or chief court doctors (hekimbaşı).
Finally, I would qualify the author's argument about the ineffectiveness of late Ottoman public health reform in the 19th century. While I agree that the failure of sanitary reform in the Empire played a role in its ultimate defeat in World War I, such as in distant provinces like the Hijaz when water supplies were cut, the reason I found was not insincerity on the government's part. Instead the Ottomans relied upon British technology and overseas logistics, which was disrupted when the war broke out.
