The Aristotelian treatment of emotions has been a fertile field of study for many decades. From the pioneering works of W.W. Fortenbaugh in the 1970s, this path has been paved by important scholars, such as J. Cooper, D. Frede, M. Nussbaum and, more recently, by D. Konstan, D. Cairns and also C. Rapp from the rhetorical perspective. This attention to Aristotelian emotions is connected in turn with a sustained philosophical interest from beyond Classical Studies, as part of what has sometimes been called an ‘emotional turn’.
J.'s book is an original contribution to the field of Aristotelian studies on emotions; at the same time it has the virtue of taking into account and engaging with those contemporary theories and discussions. She studies the emotion of shame from a specific normative perspective and for this reason concentrates mostly on Aristotle's discussions within the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics (more specifically, shame as a praiseworthy emotion in NE 4.9 and EE 3.7, the place of shame in moral development in NE 10.9, 1179b4–16 and – very interestingly – the role of shame within the discussion of courage in NE 3.8 and EE 3.1). For the most part, and for good reasons, she leaves aside the longer treatment found in Rhetoric 2.6, which takes a somewhat descriptive approach.
J.'s general aim is to defend the reading that shame plays a crucial role in moral development, by showing that it helps provide a satisfactory answer to the puzzle raised by Aristotle in NE 2.4 about the way in which we become virtuous by doing virtuous actions. On her reading, if the habituation through which we acquire ethical virtue is to be understood as a continuous process, then it should involve not only performing virtuous actions, but also performing them well, and this means with the right motivation, i.e. on account of their nobility. This is convincingly argued in Chapter 1, against other readings that tend to disregard the motivational aspect that should be involved in ethical habituation. Subsequent chapters build an argument to defend the view that shame is precisely the emotion that enables learners to occasionally appreciate the nobility of virtuous activities, even before they have acquired fully-fledged virtue; therefore, shame is essential to the Aristotelian account of moral upbringing as is described in NE 2. For this reason, J. argues, shame is a proto-virtue that allows the agent to experience the pleasures of the noble (see esp. Chapter 4), as part of the process of becoming fully virtuous.
As readers might anticipate from the title of the book, J. is avowedly inspired by M. Burnyeat's seminal article (‘Aristotle on Learning to Be Good’, in A.O. Rorty [ed.], Essays on Aristotle's Ethics [1980]), and her book can be read in part as a long defence and development of Burnyeat's reading against some of his critics (cf. esp. Chapter 2). Her book does much more than that, however. J. develops an original reading of shame as an emotion sui generis, she specifies its role as a proto-virtue, and she advances suggestive and interesting readings that have consequences for the role of cognitive and motivational aspects within virtue. She also departs from Burnyeat on a crucial point: while he identifies the noble (to kalon) as the object of thymos (Burnyeat [1980], pp. 86–7; followed by J. Cooper, ‘Reason, Moral Virtue, and Moral Value’, in M. Frede and G. Striker [edd.], Rationality in Greek Thought [1996]), J. argues in Chapter 4 that the noble is actually a value tracked by shame. This is precisely what allows this emotion sui generis to play a relevant role in moral development. Even while one might raise some doubts about the noble being the object of shame (it would seem that the formal object of this emotion is rather the shameful, as Rh. 2.6, 1383b16–18 appears to suggest), it seems clear that the noble, being the opposite of the shameful, must be tracked by the same emotion. In defending this thesis, J. also takes a position against scholars and theorists of emotions who raise the worry that shame is morally superficial and heteronomous. I found particularly attractive her view that the feeling of shame, as an expression of the agent's concerns with moral issues, guarantees the preservation of autonomy.
The status of shame in Aristotle's moral psychology is also peculiar, as J. shows in Chapter 5, where she argues that it is an emotion sui generis that is ‘in between’ emotions (pathos) and dispositions (hexis) as they are described in NE 2.5. Indeed, shame has features of the emotions (it is bodily and not completely stable, for it is, or should be, absent in virtuous adults), and, as a means, it has in common with dispositions that it is praiseworthy and more stable than most emotions. J.'s analysis on this point is persuasive, and her proposal is that, as regards praiseworthy emotions such as shame, Aristotle is consciously bending the rigid distinctions made in NE 2.5, because shame is conceived of as a middle path towards virtue. The place of indignation (nemesis) as a praiseworthy emotion is not tackled by J. (probably because nemesis is not discussed in NE); so the questions remain open whether it should also be understood as an emotion sui generis and whether it has a role in moral upbringing or later in virtue, as is suggested by some passages in Rh. 2.9 (see esp. 1386b9–15).
The thorough discussion in Chapter 3 of non-virtuous (or pseudo-virtuous) forms of courage in NE 3.8 and EE 3.1, and of the role of shame in civic courage, is of value in itself. For reasons of space, I cannot go into the details, but readers will find many points of interest there.
I mention briefly just one point that seems somewhat puzzling, although it does not affect the central tenets of the book. In some places, especially in the initial chapters, J. claims that shame is a natural tendency, inclination or condition towards the noble (cf. for instance pp. 15, 52, 54, 74), and yet in other places, especially in the discussion of NE 10.9 in Chapter 6, she leans towards the idea that shame requires some sort of early education. The problem with shame being strictly ‘natural’ is evident: the noble and its opposite, the shameful, are values that cannot be tracked without some sort of cultural or social mediation, and they are constituent elements of shame (one cannot feel shame without perceiving something as shameful). It seems, then, that some sort of ethical training is already present in someone who can experience shame appropriately. Perhaps it is for this reason that J. drops the language of shame as a ‘natural’ tendency in Chapter 6 (esp. pp. 171ff.) and instead draws a contrast with natural virtue, which is indeed innate. In light of this, it seems that it would be better to say that there might be a natural tendency towards shame (i.e. some sort of receptivity for praise and blame that shame seems to presuppose). One might suspect then that the acquisition of a well-tuned sense of shame is an essential part of moral education (a training of shame of this sort is proposed by Plato, for instance, in Laws 1), and perhaps a couple of indications about this matter would have been helpful in J.'s discussion of this emotion and its role in moral upbringing, since, in the end, shame is not a ‘given’ in learners.
Finally, I felt a slight dismay at the almost complete absence of works in languages other than English in the bibliography, even though this is not an uncommon trend. I believe that dialogue with high-quality literature written in other languages is a potential source of enrichment and a practice worth cultivating in the Anglo-American tradition.
This volume is a valuable contribution both to studies of Aristotelian emotions and to the literature on Aristotelian ethics. It is well informed, very well argued, and it will be of profit also for readers outside Aristotelian and Classical studies who are interested in the emotions and in their role in education. The emotion of shame, which is often seen in a rather gloomy light, appears in J.'s reading of Aristotle as a positive trait and one that sets the agent on the path to what is more valuable: one's own excellence.
