2. THE INSTITUTIONS

The custom or institution of syssitia, that is, citizens taking a meal daily in public together, is most closely associated with Sparta and Crete, where it also seems to have lasted the longest.Footnote ¹ In matters of organization, Spartan and Cretan syssitia differed considerably from each other, as we shall see in section 3. However, the social purpose of this institution is largely uniform. Dosiadas Cydonius is reported to have described the Cretan syssitia, which included all citizens (with separate syssitia for foreign visitors), as a preamble to ‘deliberating about common affairs’ (βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν κοινῶν), commemorating actions in war and praising ‘good men’ (ἄνδρας ἀγαθούς) with a view to directing the younger toward ‘manly virtue’ (ἀνδραγαθίαν) (FHG 4.399, fr. 1). As for the Spartan syssitia, Xenophon describes them as customarily having the participants discuss the action someone performed ‘well in the polis’ (λέγεσθαι ὅ τι ἂν καλῶς τις ἐν τῇ πόλει ποιήσῃ) (Lac. 5.6). Similarly, Plutarch says that the Spartan syssitia included conversations on politics (but also ‘jesting’: σκώπτειν) (Lyc. 12.4).

Discussing these texts, inter alia, Węcowski has recently argued that the conversations (and drinking habits) characterizing the Cretan and Spartan syssitia should be sharply distinguished from, and should in fact be viewed as direct reformative reactions to, those of the symposium.Footnote ² Unlike the ‘egalitarian atmosphere’ of the symposium, the topics of conversation at the Cretan syssitia were ‘predetermined and conventional in their patriotic and moralizing flavour’,Footnote ³ while Spartan syssitia were designed ‘to curb the circulation of wine and conversation within the dining-hall’.Footnote ⁴ Restrictive or confining though these features of syssitia may seem, ancient authors saw in this institution the potential for engendering true character virtue among participating individuals. Plutarch compares the attendance of children at these syssitia to attending ‘a school for temperance’ (διδασκαλεῖα σωφροσύνης) (Lyc. 12.4.1–2). In Plato's Laws, discussing Spartan and Cretan practices and institutions, Megillos describes syssitia as bringing forth both temperance and courage (the Athenian agrees, with one reservation concerning the danger of syssitia at times of stasis) (1, 635e–636b).Footnote ⁵ Thus, though some later accounts emphasize the role of syssitia in promoting social cohesion, national identity and/or a sense of equality,Footnote ⁶ the ancient accounts all seem to focus on the instilling of virtue as the main function of (both Spartan and Cretan) syssitia (which may well itself have a socially cohesive effect).

Aristotle, for his part, recommends establishing in the best city syssitia, which he says are generally agreed to be useful for ‘well-constructed poleis’ (Pol. 7.10, 1330a3–4). Though he promises to (but does not) explain his own reasons for joining in on this consensus (1330a4–5),Footnote ⁷ which may therefore be expected to differ somewhat from the traditional accounts given above, there are reasons for thinking that he, too, thinks of syssitia as being conducive to virtue and virtuous activity. In Pol. 5.11, he proposes the elimination of syssitia as a means of preserving a tyranny. He lists this strategy in between getting rid of ‘superior’ (ὑπερέχοντας) and ‘high-thinking’ (φρονηματίας) individuals and guarding against the development of ‘high-thought and trust’ (φρόνημά τε καὶ πίστις) (1313a39–b4). Indeed, Aristotle's specific recommendation for the tyrant is to allow ‘neither syssitia nor association (ἑταιρίαν) nor education (παιδείαν) nor anything else of that sort (μήτε ἄλλο μηθὲν τοιοῦτον)’ (1313a41–b1). Aristotle thinks that syssitia are akin to education and, though he does not say so explicitly, the reason seems to be that both syssitia and education are conducive to virtue and virtuous activity, which makes them detrimental in a tyranny and, for the very same reasons, useful under correct constitutions.

Apart from this passage, Kraut brings up Pol. 7.17, 1336b21–2 and 2.5, 1263b31–1264a1, respectively, as indications that Aristotle thinks of syssitia as ‘contribut[ing] in some way to virtue’ and as having a ‘unifying and educational role’.Footnote ⁸ At Pol. 7.17, 1336b21–2, discussing the education of children in the ideal polis, Aristotle mentions in passing the age at which one would be able to partake of ‘reclining and drunkenness’ (κατακλίσεως … καὶ μέθης), indicating that he envisages the syssitia in his ideal polis as including symposia, which would presumably feature activities of leisure.Footnote ⁹ These activities would certainly include the performance of music, which Aristotle describes as ‘fit for the free, and beautiful’ (ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν), relying on Homer (8.3, 1338a21–37). It is hard to imagine that the symposia of the ideal polis would not include, in addition, political discussions as well as philosophical discussions, to the extent that the citizens can have them. For Aristotle, it is a matter of fact that natural masters capable of affording a ‘trustee’ (ἐπίτροπος) are freed (and, he seems to mean, should be freed) to ‘practise politics and philosophy’ (1.7, 1255b35–7). At 2.5, 1263b31–1264a1, in criticizing Plato's view of political unity, Aristotle brings up the importance of unifying the city by means of education. Specifically, ‘habits, philosophy and laws’ should be used for that purpose, ‘just as the lawgiver in Sparta and Crete made the possessions common by means of the syssitia’ (ibid.). It may well be that the term ‘philosophy’ in this occurrence should ‘be understood fairly loosely’,Footnote ¹⁰ especially since Aristotle later makes the point that the education and laws in Crete and Sparta are established ‘with a view to wars’ (πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους) (7.2, 1324b7–9). This assessment agrees with the picture drawn above of the Cretan and Spartan syssitia as having only limited conversations, and those centering primarily on issues of war and the enhancement of courage. However, Aristotle criticizes Crete and Sparta on just this point (1324b41–1325a5):

The aim of Aristotle's ideal polis is happiness, as opposed to war, and its education, laws and customs would correspond to that aim. The Spartans, by overemphasizing the importance of war, fail at achieving the proper end of political communities, and are in fact ‘not happy’ (7.14, 1333b22–3: οὐκ εὐδαίμονες). Instead of celebrating courageous acts on the battlefield, citizens in Aristotle's polis gathered at the syssitia would celebrate, and presumably exhibit, virtues of thought, and especially theoretical wisdom (to the extent that they possess it).Footnote ¹¹ This is probably what Aristotle has in mind when he recommends placing the syssitia of the mature and elderly citizens at a place having ‘an appearance directed at establishing virtue’ (7.12, 1331a28–9).

The agora was of course ubiquitous in the Greek world, and Aristotle does not feel the need to argue for its usefulness, for example, by appealing to ancient tradition, as he does in the case of the syssitia (cf. 2.5, 1264a1–11). To his necessary agora he assigns institutions generally thought to be featured in the ancient agora, like the marketplace and public offices (1331b6–12).Footnote ¹² To his free agora, on the other hand, he assigns gymnasia, which tended to be located outside the city walls (for example in Classical Athens), and only began to be standardly located in the vicinity of the agora in the Hellenistic period onward (1331a35–7).Footnote ¹³ Aristotle emphasizes the role of gymnasia in the ‘free agora’, saying that, if suitably divided into age-groups, they would be conducive to generating ‘true shame and the fear belonging to the free’ (1331a35–b1). ‘True shame’ here must correspond to that feeling for having which one must be praised, since it is an intermediate between excessive feelings similarly to character virtue (Eth. Nic. 2.7, 1108a30–5). Similarly, by ‘the fear belonging to the free’, Aristotle must mean fear appropriate and conducive to virtuous behaviour. He may have in mind the fear which is ‘of virtue’, that is, that which one feels ‘when one should, and concerning those, and toward those, and for the sake of what one should’ (Eth. Nic. 2.6, 1106b16–23), and which is associated with courage.Footnote ¹⁴ In any event, he clearly thinks that gymnastics, which would be practised in his free agora, is conducive to courage (Pol. 8.3, 1337b26–7). The tasks assigned to the ‘necessary agora’, and to a large extent also the public buildings Aristotle assigns to that agora, are of rather evident usefulness, as they ensure the continued existence of the members of the political community by providing the relevant external goods and circumstances (primarily, food and safety).

3. DIVISIONS

In his ideal polis, Aristotle recommends several divisions regarding the institutions discussed above. First, there are to be distinct syssitia for soldiers, officials and priests. Second, there are to be two agorai, the ‘free’ and the ‘necessary’. Third, within the ‘free agora’, gymnasia are to be divided based on age-groups. These divisions do not correspond to standard practices of the time, and demand an explanation.

The threefold division of syssitia corresponds to the three stages of a citizen's life in Aristotle's ideal polis. In that society, as Aristotle envisages it, young citizens would function as soldiers, mature citizens as councillors and judges, and the elderly as priests (Pol. 7.9). It has been argued that Aristotle assigns to each of these groups its own syssition, because syssitia in general are meant to foster friendship, and friendship is most easily achieved among people of the same age-cohort.Footnote ¹⁵ One may wonder, though, whether such a sharp division of syssitia would be required for that purpose. On the Cretan model of syssitia, all citizens dine together and, on the Spartan model, syssitia are divided into groups, each consisting of members of various ages. In both cases, the younger are to benefit by being in the presence of the older, and the older still enjoy the company of their peers. The reason Aristotle deviates from these models seems to be related to his deviation from the functions standardly attributed to the syssitia of Sparta and Crete. This deviation is based on (a) his expectation of citizens in his ideal polis (or some of them) to engage in activities of the highest kind, activities which were not characteristic of Spartans and Cretans, and (b) his view of human development, habituation and education. Specifically, since at syssitia the citizens of Aristotle's best polis are expected to celebrate and engage in virtuous activity of the highest kind and degree available to them, and since citizens are capable of different kinds and degrees of virtuous activity based on their age, syssitia would have to be divided based on age-groups reflecting different capabilities to act virtuously.

The young, whose function requires not (practical) wisdom (φρόνησις) but rather strength (δύναμις) (1329a8–9), would not be able to discuss politics (let alone philosophy) at the syssitia as much as older citizens could. Being preoccupied with military affairs, the syssitia of soldiers would most likely resemble those of the Cretans, which, as we have seen, included discussions praising courageous actions in war. In contrast to the ‘necessary and beneficial’ actions of the soldiers, both mature citizens and the elderly would be able to perform those actions for the sake of which necessary actions are performed, that is, ‘beautiful actions’ done in ‘leisure’ (7.14, 1333a33–b3). The ‘beautiful’ actions Aristotle has in mind are those involving ‘intellect’ (νοῦς) (7.15, 1334b25–8), that is, political action and deliberation or theoretical contemplation (7.2, 1324a23–35).Footnote ¹⁶ The reason for separating the syssitia of mature citizens and of the elderly, which nevertheless remain in close proximity to each other, is most probably due to the fact that the elderly citizens are, as Kraut puts it, ‘past their mental prime’.Footnote ¹⁷ As citizens who have had the experience of performing virtuous activities in maturity, and who are certainly no longer expected to serve as soldiers, the elderly could spend their time of leisure discussing politics or philosophy at their own pace, without having to keep up with (or slow down) younger and abler minds.

Aristotle's unusual division of the agora, which becomes frequent in the Hellenistic period,Footnote ¹⁸ is also based on considerations pertaining to function. It is often assumed that Aristotle envisions the ‘free’ agora as ‘a place for the enjoyment of leisure’,Footnote ¹⁹ or as the place where ‘philosophy and politics are debated’.Footnote ²⁰ What Aristotle in fact says is that ‘we lay down the upper [agora] [for citizens] to be in leisure, and this [that is, the ‘necessary’ agora] with a view to the necessary actions’ (1331b12–13: ἐνσχολάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἄνω τίθεμεν, ταύτην δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις). The infinitive, ἐνσχολάζειν, merely indicates the ultimate purpose for which activities in the ‘free’ agora are to take place, and not necessarily the type of activity to be characteristically performed at that place.Footnote ²¹ It is more reasonable to assume that the ‘free’ agora would host activities intended to build character and virtue. On this assumption, each of the major institutions of Aristotle's ideal city is given a separate geographical location at which its function is to be achieved: securing of necessities at the necessary agora, preparation for virtuous activity at the free agora, and fully fledged virtuous activity at the acropolis. Aristotle does not specify which preparatory activities would take place at the free agora, except for physical exercise and social interactions at the gymnasia, to which we now turn.

Finally, then, Aristotle recommends dividing the gymnasia in his ideal polis ‘according to age’, and having the ‘rulers’ (that is, the mature citizens) spend time with both the younger citizens and the elderly (1331a37–40). Though it is sometimes assumed that the ‘free agora’ would include ‘only the gymnasium of the elder men’,Footnote ²² Aristotle simply says that it should ‘also include the gymnasia of the older’ (1331a36: καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων), presumably in addition to those of the younger citizens and the rulers. The mingling of the rulers with both the young and the elderly at the gymnasia, and quite possibly at the ‘free’ agora in general, distinguishes the institutions of that agora from the syssitia, where citizens seem to be expected to stay within their cohort. The permission (indeed, recommendation) for inter-group interaction at the gymnasia is due to the benefit in spending one's time with rulers. As we have seen, that practice is supposed to produce or strengthen proper feeling and character virtue. In developing such features, citizens are not engaging in virtuous activity as much as preparing for such an activity. It is fitting for such a preparation to be assigned to such institutions as the gymnasia. For Aristotle thinks that the state one's body should be in is that which is gained ‘with a view to the actions of the free’ (7.16, 1335b8–11), but he also thinks that those ‘actions of the free’, which are essentially rational, should be practised at a different time, since ‘exercise of the body stifles thought, and [exercise] of it [sc. of thought] [stifles] the body’ (8.4, 1339a9–10).

4. LOCATIONS

We are now in a position to assess Aristotle's reasons for allocating specific parts of the land to the institutions he describes in Pol. 7.12. It is instructive, first, to compare his plan to the known organization of the Greek societies influencing him and having similar institutions, namely Sparta and Crete. In Sparta, the agora was (probably) situated ‘to the east of and lower than the acropolis’.Footnote ²³ Its syssitia, however, were not held at either of those places, but rather took place outside the city limits, on the Hyacinthian Road linking Sparta to Amyclae.Footnote ²⁴ According to the fragment discussed above from Dosiadas, Cretan poleis characteristically had two buildings designated for syssitia, an ‘andreion’ for the (entire) citizenry and a ‘koimētērion’ for foreign visitors (FHG 4.399, fr. 1).Footnote ²⁵ The evidence with regard to the locations of institutions on Crete is shaky.Footnote ²⁶ However, Prent suggests, based especially on evidence pertaining to three sites (Dreros, Prinias and Oaxos), that ‘for the EIA [ = Early Iron Age] buildings that may have served as andreia, a location on the very summit of the settlement hill may constitute a recurrent feature’, with Prytaneia established in ‘an open area or agora at a central place—not necessarily at the highest point of a settlement’.Footnote ²⁷ Drawing support from these findings, Erickson has recently supported the contention by Haggis et al. that the Cretan public building at Azoria, excavated in the early 2000s, and which ‘sits near the top of the hill’, is in fact an andreion.Footnote ²⁸

The planned positioning of institutions in Aristotle's ideal polis combines and develops elements from both the Spartan and the Cretan models. Like all citizens of Cretan poleis, mature and elderly citizens in Aristotle's best polis would meet at the highest location in the city to share their meals. Like Spartan citizens, the younger citizens of Aristotle's best polis would meet outside the city centre (at the city walls, however, rather than entirely outside the city, as was the case in Sparta). The function Aristotle assigns to the syssitia of mature and elderly citizens is different from the function he assigns to the syssitia of the soldiers (see section [3]), and the different location allocated to each syssition reflects this difference in function. As it seems, all citizens capable of exhibiting political (and possibly theoretical) virtue will have their syssitia at the acropolis. It has been suggested that lower-ranked officials would have their syssitia at or near the necessary agora.Footnote ²⁹ But, as Newman recognizes, Aristotle speaks of the syssitia to be held at the acropolis as the ‘highest syssitia of the magistrates’ (τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχείων συσσίτια), rather than as ‘the syssitia of the highest magistrates’ (1331a25).Footnote ³⁰ Since the context is his comparison between the syssitia of these people and the syssitia of the younger soldiers and the elderly priests, Aristotle likely means to refer to the syssitia of all magistrates as superior to the syssitia of non-magistrates, since it is in the former that virtuous activity will be exhibited to the highest degree. Again, when Aristotle introduces at 1331b6 the locations at the necessary agora to be assigned to various officials, he merely speaks of ‘those of the magistrates …’ (τῶν δ’ ἀρχείων …). Though τῶν at 1331b6 is sometimes taken to refer to the συσσίτια of the priests mentioned in the previous line (1331b5),Footnote ³¹ all that we can safely infer from the text is that it refers to buildings to be used by these officials (for whichever purpose).Footnote ³² By default, it is reasonable to assume that all citizens of the same age-cohort would have their syssitia at a common location.

According to the plan Aristotle envisages for his ideal polis in Pol. 7.12, then, the syssitia of older citizens, hosting activities of virtue and nobility, will be held at the topmost location, followed by a ‘free agora’ with gymnasia intended to develop and nurture virtue among citizens at a lower location, and a ‘necessary agora’ with a marketplace and administrative buildings at the very bottom.Footnote ³³ As has been recognized, Aristotle clearly intends the physical structure of his best city to reflect the hierarchy between its various institutions.Footnote ³⁴ It has also been suggested, rightly in my view, that Aristotle expects this specific physical structure, precisely by matching features of the city with the locations that best represent their rank, to contribute to the appreciation or ‘celebration’ of the goals and essence of the city.Footnote ³⁵ Zucker surely exaggerates, then, when he says that

But, while Aristotle is certainly concerned with the appearance of the ideal polis, I would argue that this is principally so because of his commitment to the principles of his natural theory. Davis compares Aristotle's best city, including its physical plan, to ‘a poem’, since in it ‘all things external and bodily—geography, age, place, property, even the walls of the city—are really images for other things’.Footnote ³⁷ I would like to suggest, instead, that Aristotle's preference for a correspondence between the physical elevation of an institution and the rank of its function follows from the fact that, for him, the ideal polis is the optimal instantiation of a natural kind.

Aristotle thinks that the polis exists ‘by nature’ (φύσει: Pol. 1.2, 1252b30, 1253a2). And given this view, as scholars have pointed out, he must view the physical features of the ideal polis (or some of them) as natural as well.Footnote ³⁸ It is more difficult, however, to explain just how the specific physical plan he recommends for his ideal polis is grounded in his natural theory. Newman suggests the following possible explanation:Footnote ³⁹

Newman's suggestion of mapping the natural places of the basic elements onto the natural places of the institutions of the ideal polis is appealing, but it is ultimately unsatisfactory for at least three reasons. First, in order for the analogy to successfully explain the naturalness of the physical structure of the ideal polis, reflecting the hierarchy between the functions of its institutions, it would have to be the case that the elements in Aristotle's theory display a hierarchy, with fire on top as the most honourable and earth at the bottom as the least honourable element. But there is no good reason for thinking that Aristotle's view of the elements supports any such hierarchy (nor does Newman's quote above suggest that there is).Footnote ⁴⁰ And so, one could at most speak of a figurative connection between the weight of fire and of earth and the honourableness of the syssitia at the acropolis and of the necessary agora respectively. In that case, the naturalness of the physical structure of the ideal city would be grounded merely in a metaphor.

Second, though Aristotle thinks that the polis (including the ideal one) has its own form as its directive principle, and may therefore count as having its own nature understood, as it is in Physics Book 2, as an internal principle of change and being at rest,Footnote ⁴¹ it is doubtful that he thinks the cosmos should be understood in similar terms. Indeed, it has been persuasively argued that the efficient cause and directing principle of the cosmos (the prime mover) is neither a part of the cosmosFootnote ⁴² nor its form.Footnote ⁴³

Finally, even if the cosmos could be regarded as having its own nature in the relevant sense in Aristotle's view, it would of course be unique, and would not admit of species, for him. And so, it is doubtful that it could teach us much about the naturalness of the ideal polis (or its physical structure), which would presumably be best understood by comparison to other species of the same natural kind (that is, poleis with other correct, but non-ideal, constitutions).

For all these reasons, it is more promising to compare Aristotle's view of the naturalness of the polis and its physical structure to his view of the naturalness of other natural kinds, admitting of a variety of species. The clear choice are living things and their parts, to which Aristotle himself compares poleis and their natural parts, for example in Pol. 4.1. More importantly for our purposes, and as Newman in fact notes, at Part. an. 3.7, 670a22–6 Aristotle says that the heart, which is necessarily present in all animals because it functions as the starting point of bodily heat, must be ‘well-guarded, just as if it were an acropolis of the body’.Footnote ⁴⁴ Newman uses this source in arguing that the reason for locating (some) temples and the syssitia of older citizens at the acropolis in Pol. 7.12 is ‘Aristotle's wish (…) to gather together in one easily defensible spot the animating forces of his state’.Footnote ⁴⁵

Aristotle's own plan is only partly motivated by considerations pertaining to the issue of security, however. In Pol. 7.12, he recommends placing the institutions discussed above at the acropolis not only because they would then be ‘more strongly positioned than the neighbouring parts of the city’ but also because they would have ‘an appearance directed at establishing virtue’ (1331a28–30). The reason why Aristotle thinks it is the topmost place that would be not only the safest but also the fittest for virtuous activity can be found in his biology. And clarifying this feature of his theory would enable us to understand why he thinks that, as a matter of natural fact, the physical structure of an ideal polis should have institutions with superior functions located above those having inferior functions.

Aristotle considers the upper parts of organisms naturally superior to their lower parts (Part. an. 3.3, 665a22–6):Footnote ⁴⁶

As Aristotle explains in IA 4, 705a26–b8, the ‘upper’ part of an organism is its starting point of ingestion and growth, and its ‘lower’ part is the endpoint of these processes. The part intermediate between the two, according to Aristotle, is the locale of ‘the principle of life’ (Part. an. 2.10, 655b36–7: ἡ ἀρχή … ἡ τῆς ζωῆς). In IA 5, Aristotle goes on to argue that, though it is natural for the ‘upper’ parts of organisms to correspond to the upper part of the universe—that is, to be highest absolutely—that is in fact not what happens in most species (IA 5, 706b3–16; cf. Hist. an. 1.15, 494a26–9):

It is only in bipeds that the ‘upper’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘lower’ parts correspond to the ‘upper’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘lower’ parts of the universe. This correspondence is most perfectly realized in human beings, who therefore count as the bipeds most in accordance with nature. For Aristotle, the ‘upper’ regions of the universe contain the most perfect material substances in existence, namely the heavenly bodies, which are also constituted by the best material element (ether).Footnote ⁴⁷ Though these beings are more divine than any sublunary substance, including us (Eth. Nic. 6.7, 1141a33–b2), we alone of all mortal species possess reason and the ability to (potentially) engage in the divine activity of theoretical contemplation. This uniquely human feature dictates the unique physical structure we have. For instance, Aristotle (Part. an. 4.10, 686a27–32) says that

The status of human beings as the only mortal rational living things explains their special anatomy. Human beings stand upright both because this posture is beneficial for performing rational activity and because it is the most natural arrangement of physical features, allowing for the most honourable features, performing the most significant functions, to be appropriately located on top.Footnote ⁴⁸

Though Aristotle thinks that the polis is natural, generally speaking, he also thinks that poleis with correct constitutions (for him: kingship, aristocracy and polity) are natural, whereas those having deviant constitutions (for him: tyranny, oligarchy and democracy) are unnatural (Pol. 3.17, 1287b36–41). As Miller notes, based on this passage and others, this view takes the degree of naturalness of poleis to correspond to the degree to which they are in ‘a condition of justice’.Footnote ⁴⁹ The ideal city which Aristotle describes in Politics Books 7–8 as the most virtuous and happy community, whose citizens are ‘men who are just without qualification’ (δικαίους ἄνδρας ἁπλῶς: 7.9, 1328b38), would be the most just, and hence the most natural, polis, just as a human being is the most natural biped. And so, the best polis, again similarly to humans, must be endowed with the most natural physical structure, which would be most in tune with its honourable status and dominant activities. In both cases, the physical structure in question amounts to the vertical ordering of parts (organs, institutions), with the least significant ones at the bottom and the most important ones on top.Footnote ⁵⁰

As has emerged from the discussion above, Aristotle pays careful attention to the way in which his ideal polis will be physically structured. However, in doing so he is concerned not with art or poetry but rather with describing that constitution which would best conform to the standards of nature. Aristotle often employs in the Politics an analogy between poleis (and their various natural features), on the one hand, and organisms (and their natural features), on the other hand. In 1.2, he illustrates the priority of the polis to the individual using the example of the body and its organs (a foot, a hand) (1253a18–25). In 4.4, he compares the different types of constitution, arranging the necessary parts of the polis in different ways, to the different species of animals, in which the necessary biological features of animals are arranged in different ways (1290b25–39). Also in 4.4, he compares the soul of animals to the ‘war-making’, ‘judging’ and ‘deliberating’ parts of the polis (1291a24–8). In 4.11, he says that a constitution resembles a ‘life of a polis’ (4.11, 1295a40–b1). These are, by and large, analogies. The city is not literally an organism, and does not really possess a soul. However, at least on one prominent line of interpretation Aristotle does think that the polis has its own internal principle of change and being at rest.Footnote ⁵¹ This interpretation makes sense in the light of, and is in fact supported by, Pol. 7.12. For there, as we have seen, Aristotle (though he does not state so explicitly) treats the topic of the physical structure of the ideal polis under the assumption that this polis belongs to a natural kind and is, indeed, the most natural of its kind.Footnote ⁵²