The European Union (EU) recognizes all twenty-four languages of the twenty-seven member states as official languages. Although this power-sharing language regime promotes equality on paper, we would expect such multilingualism, per the literature, to be disruptive and divisive. Yet, in The Language(s) of Politics, Nils Ringe challenges this assertion. He argues it is this precise linguistic arrangement that tempers the conflict and contentiousness in politics and policy-making through three mechanisms. First, the use of multiple vernaculars by any one individual EU actor forces everyone to employ neutral language. Second, as the EU actors come to rely on a commonly used set of vocabulary and grammar—often borrowed from different languages— this standardizes the discourse across ideologies. And third, when EU actors rely on interpreters and translators, they must simplify their language into short sentence structures. This neutralization, standardization, and simplification strips language of its politicized character, and what is left is simply a pragmatic vehicle of communication. Thus, EU actors are better able to understand, take positions, and even tolerate (and gloss over) politically charged words when engaging with each other—all with positive externalities for politics and policy making. Ringe empirically tests and convincingly demonstrates his argument by drawing on a range of methods from qualitative interviews to statistical analyses to text scraping.

The book begins with an extensive discussion of the linguistic arrangements in the EU. Although the purpose of chapter 2 is “descriptive” (p. 22), it demonstrates how the concept of “multilingualism” is far from uniform; each EU institution employs a different subset of languages from the recognized twenty-four in its daily functions. It also highlights how language regimes, as political institutions, can embody both the de jure set of laws and the de facto set of behaviors that follow from said legal parameters. Chapter 3 examines the origin of the EU’s multilingual arrangement, noting that the language regime aims to balance four competing constraints: symbolism, representation, legality, and functionality. The next three chapters examine how multilingualism has depoliticized EU politics from the use of non-native languages (chapter 4) to “EU English” (chapter 5) to interpreters and translators (chapter 6).

The Language(s) of Politics makes several important contributions. There is no doubt this book is about EU politics, but it is also about political institutions. It highlights how an institution can be both stable in equilibrium and endogenously change from within. The book also draws on the political psychology literature by highlighting how the language we speak— whether it is neutral words in a non-native language, a standardized lingua franca, or a native language in simplified form—affects how we engage with others. And finally, the book speaks to the language politics literature; it contributes to an “agenda that looks at language as more than ‘just’ an identity marker” (p. 13). As such, The Language(s) of Politics advances the language politics scholarship in at least three distinct ways.

First, it shows that power-sharing multilingual language regimes can facilitate both equality and efficiency. We know at the individual level that people can have multiple languages in their repertoire: which language they use depends on the circumstances. For example, people code-switch to identify with or to signal to a certain group. But other works tend to focus on the rhetoric; that is, what people say when they code-switch. In contrast, Ringe looks at the sentence structures: how people talk when they alternate between languages. And as such, he demonstrates—contrary to what other language politics scholars argue—that there need not be a trade-off between equality and efficiency

Second, Ringe shows that just because a language is not designated as official does not mean it is not one. In fact, the absence of a title may itself be the product of a very political calculation. The Language(s) of Politics shows that EU English is the institution’s (possibly) first-among-equals working language. The discussion of EU English and its distinction from standard English highlights the day-to-day dominance of the former vernacular. Additionally, the lack of a tacit acknowledgment of EU English as the institution’s working language is further evidence of its status: recall, to avoid arousing suspicions and objections, that the veil of formal language equality has always been and must always remain intact. But just because something is not explicitly spoken does not mean it is not known. Consider the United States, for example. Although the country does not have an official language, English is the language from the courtrooms to the classrooms. Likewise, even if it is politically impossible to designate EU English as the EU’s working language, it may turn out that the silence and continued use of the vernacular will further institutionalize the EU and possibly serve as another marker of the organization’s identity.

Third, we know languages are dynamic; they evolve with the advent of technology, demographic shifts, and globalization. Ringe calls attention to one example of the fluidity of language: Creole is a vernacular that brings together different languages in a simplified manner. The attention to creole has been sorely absent in political science—from the language politics scholarship to immigration literature. And when there is attention to it, the narrative often renders creole as something less than a language and inferior to whatever is the official language. This attitude can have devastating political implications, as we saw with the 2010 Haiti earthquake relief efforts. Although the vast majority of the population (more than 90%) spoke Haitian Creole, international relief agencies showed up erroneously believing that standard French was sufficient. Creole, however, is by no means a phenomenon of the Global South. In fact, as Ringe demonstrates, EU English is “a simple, utilitarian, specialized, and standardized language” (p. 158). It short, it is an example of a creole language—an empirical phenomenon that warrants more attention.

Although the premise of the book is that the multilingual arrangement has depoliticized EU politics, the book raises several questions. The first is about the theoretical mechanisms. Ringe identifies three mechanisms for how this depoliticization manifests. Absent, however, is a discussion of how the three mechanisms relate to one another. Does one beget the other? The emergence and evolution of EU English seem to be the byproduct of regularized code-switching or the repeated use of interpreters and translators. Likewise, is one of the three mechanisms more important than the other two? Alternatively, what happens when one of the mechanisms fails to depoliticize politics? For example, the use of multiple languages can temper conflict because it forces two speakers to use neutral, non-native languages to communicate. However, the use of multiple languages means it increases the odds that someone’s native language does appear in the repertoire. The ease with which that speaker can resort to their native language can undermine this language-is-neutral mechanism. Likewise, the use of EU English—a lingua franca (note that Ringe is careful to explain why he does not use this phrase)—decultures the discussion. However, languages and cultures evolve. As EU English becomes more standardized, certain terminologies can start carrying more cultured, non-neutral meaning. And finally, the use of interpreters and translators can force native speakers to simplify their sentence structures. However, this constraint—that is, thinking about the challenges of the multilingual specialists— is less likely to manifest when the individual is monolingual. The self-constraint can also be absent when the individual is very ideological and unwilling to water down their language.

The second question is about generalizability. Ringe calls for future comparisons to multilingual states and multilingual international organizations, although he notes that the EU case may be more likened to the former than the latter (p. 16). From a theoretical standpoint, Ringe is correct. Empirically, however, one is hard-pressed to find another instance of an [insert institution] [insert language] like EU English. What makes the EU unique from a linguistic standpoint is not just that it recognizes multiple languages but also that the many politicians themselves can speak multiple languages. This is not the case (or at least less likely to be the case) for other international organizations like ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). What also makes the EU unique is that the repeated interactions in these multiple languages result in a creole language against a backdrop of substantial interpretation and translation support. Again, this is likely to be an outlier for other international organizations.

The third question is about the intended recipient of the depoliticization. There is a normative assumption throughout the book that EU leaders see depoliticizing politics as something to be desired. But this raises the question of how the domestic constituents in each member state see these policies. It is possible that the general public will not care whether EU actors call refugees “illegal immigrants” (p. 11) or not. Their focus will not be on the process—that the debates in the EU Parliament were depoliticized—but strictly on the outcomes (i.e., a bad policy was forced on a country). And if the focus is on the nondeliberate, nonstrategic depoliticization, this means that the public can see and scrutinize even less of the process. This is of concern because we know that when people start caring more about the outcomes than the process, this undermines diffuse support and thereby institutional legitimacy.

The Language(s) of Politics is a must read—and a must assign for graduate courses on political institutions, political psychology, and European studies. The book demonstrates convincingly that, contrary to conventional wisdom in the political science literature, language regimes can be both equal and efficient.