There has been a recent trend in ancient military scholarship to try and reconstruct the human face of ancient Greek and Roman warfare, from social bonds within armies to combat trauma and PTSD – albeit sometimes with mixed success. However, only infrequently have these issues been taken further to consider their impact on soldiers both collectively and individually on the battlefield, an area in which more research is sorely needed. This volume goes some way towards addressing this understudied area, exploring the specific issue of unit cohesion within armies of the ancient world, considering how it was created and supported within socio-military institutions, how it affected performance in battle – and what happened when it failed.

The book contains nine chapters addressing different aspects of the volume's theme, temporally spanning from the classical Greek world to the late Roman period, and presented broadly in chronological order. Some of the papers focus on elements of unit cohesion within a specific time period, others take a wider view and address a particular aspect of cohesion within a ‘Greek’, ‘Roman’ or ‘ancient’ scope. From the outset it is clear that the volume overall is not hesitant to incorporate modern theories of social and military cohesion, in a way that may appeal to scholars of modernity looking to the ancient world for validation of their theories.

An introduction by Hall sets up the general context of the individual chapters, discussing in brief ancient references to unit cohesion and providing a short overview of each paper. Hall also defines the terminology of unit cohesion as it will be used throughout the volume. Modern military terminology, particularly from the post-WW2 United States, is particularly referenced in terms of providing a basic theoretical framework. The volume then moves on to three papers themed around Greek warfare. R. Konijnendijk opens with considerations of unit cohesion in the context of the classical Athenian phalanx, addressing the issue of how it could be both fostered and maintained in what was essentially an amateur army, which underwent remarkably little training before being unleashed on the battlefield. Konijnendijk discusses the contribution of comradeship to cohesion and, consequently, effectiveness and resilience in battle as well as the importance of the will to fight and attempts to prepare Athenian hoplites for the experience of battle. The next paper, by C.W. Marshall, takes a much narrower focus, exploring cohesion among the Rhodian slingers among the mercenary Ten Thousand, as described in Xenophon's Anabasis. An overview of the use of slingers in ancient warfare follows a brief introduction to the Rhodian slingers of the Anabasis, after which Marshall presents an analysis of the interrelationship between technology, cohesion and tactics in the case of the slingers, with a particularly useful discussion of the impact this had on their effectiveness in skirmishing.

The Greek section of the volume is rounded off with a paper that is also the first of two on siege warfare, with A. Schofield's examination of unit cohesion among defensive armies in ancient Greek siege warfare as viewed through Aeneas Tacticus’ How to Survive Siege Warfare. Moving away from the open battlefields of the two previous chapters, Schofield addresses the challenges of maintaining cohesion in a conflict horizon in which non-combatants (women, children, slaves and those physically unable to fight) were also present, and the divided loyalties this may have created within the besieged army, with particularly interesting insights into how higher levels of combat motivation among individual soldiers (in defence of family and home) may have had a negative impact on unit cohesion. The next chapter, by G. Baker, switches the perspective to consider cohesion from within besieging armies, drawing examples from both Greek and Roman contexts. The focus in this chapter is on the period after a city's fortifications had been breached, which, as is clear from ancient sources, could be a problematic time in terms of discipline. After noting potential hazards linked to the formulaic nature of ancient siege narratives, Baker discusses the dangers of urban fighting and their impact on cohesion, and the importance of military leaders in maintaining discipline within a captured city, preventing (uncommanded) looting or massacre.

The next chapter presents a further move in time and place to the only contribution that does not focus on the Greek or Roman military, with Hall and Rawlings's co-written paper on the Carthaginian army. The chapter focuses on challenges to cohesion presented by the multi-ethnic and mercenary nature of the Carthaginian army, in which close bonds within a particular unit could have come to have primacy over any loyalty or duty its soldiers felt towards the overall Punic cause. Hall and Rawlings discuss the importance of officers in maintaining cohesion both within and between units, reinforced by exploitation of existing social bonds.

The next three chapters focus specifically on Roman warfare. A. Anders presents considerations of how cohesion was maintained on the battlefield through the use of military standards and trumpets, emphasising the importance of communication for cohesion both across the army as a whole and within individual units. Anders first discusses how standards and trumpets were used to communicate on the battlefield, and then considers the importance of effective communication in battle, in terms of both commanders being able to react rapidly to circumstances and soldiers maintaining trust in the command structure, reducing the likelihood of panic or other potentially damaging behaviours. The following chapter, by B. Greet, explores the connection of the legionary standards and unit cohesion from a different perspective, that of their religious significance. Greet suggests that religious cohesion within the Roman army, given the range of deities worshipped by recruits depending on their native region, was achieved by using the military standards as a symbol of universal worship, creating bonds between the soldiers more widely. In the penultimate chapter C. Whately considers unit cohesion in the late antique Roman army, an area that has previously been particularly neglected. Using a wide range of historical evidence, Whately discusses the declining importance of small-group bonding for unit cohesion in this later period, while noting that more research is needed on military communities in this period.

The volume finishes with a paper by Rawlings, which explores how and why unit cohesion could fail in both Greek and Roman contexts. Drawing on a wide range of historical examples, Rawlings argues that breakdown on the battlefield could be influenced by pre-existing (‘predispositional’) attitudes as well as events that occurred during the battle itself (‘precipitating’), highlighting a number of different factors, followed by a brief discussion of how loss of cohesion could spread through a beleaguered army.

The book is a welcome addition to the literature considering psychological aspects of the ancient military, and it does a good job of relating the abstract concept of unit cohesion to its impact on the battlefield. However, as several contributors note, the Greek and Roman historical sources are not always suited to this sort of interrogation, particularly those impacted by formulaic battle-narrative topoi. The volume would have benefited from some use of archaeological data, including battlefield and conflict archaeology, particularly in the context of the loss of cohesion, most vividly illustrated in the excavations at the site of the 9 ce ‘Varus Disaster’ Roman defeat at Kalkriese (Germany). However, the omission of archaeological data is the only real criticism of a volume that otherwise engages well with the question of what unit cohesion was in the ancient world, how it functioned and, most importantly, the impact it had on the battlefield; it can only be hoped that it inspires more research in this neglected area.