Introduction
As a result of the failure of international negotiations to force the former Serbian President Slobodan Milošević to stop the war in Kosovo, NATO waged an offensive campaign in March 1999, forcing the Serbian military and police to withdraw from Kosovo. Based on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244, in June 1999 the United Nations Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) was deployed to Kosovo and began its protracted international administration, aiming at restoring order and consolidating a democratic and multi-ethnic society through power-sharing mechanisms. UNMIK consisted of four pillars—the UN, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE), and the European Union (EU). Its mandate was threefold: “to establish a functioning interim civil administration, to promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government; and finally, to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future international status” (Lemay-Hebert Reference Lemay-Hébert2009, 67). Unlike in East Timor, where the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was mandated to build and empower the local institutions to be capable of leading their political life and expressing political will through a referendum, UNMIK left Kosovo with no exit strategy. Nevertheless, “no international administration can function without having an implied or stated political vision, for the society it is administering” (Caplan Reference Caplan2002, 76). UNMIK operated without a political vision regarding Kosovo’s final status and it failed to fulfill its mandate to build a peaceful and multiethnic society.
Kosovo’s political transition after 1999 was complex and multifaceted. As a prominent Kosovo commentator Veton Surroi put it: “The Kosovars will have to make the transition from communism to democracy, from apartheid to majority rule, and from conditions of violence to non-violence. Far from being benign and obvious, these three processes are actually very wrenching and painful—and, moreover, will have to take place at the same time” (2000, 32). This transition was done is some way by international participants for Kosovars, but without Kosovars. In other words, the role of Kosovars was minor during the process of building a new democracy. Kosovo’s new democracy was almost completely conceived by foreign actors. UNMIK claimed unprecedented powers in the history of international administration in judiciary, executive, and legislative sectors, and thus scholars did not hesitate to define its administration model over Kosovo as a “benevolent autocracy” (Chesterman Reference Chesterman2004; Narten Reference Narten2009; Muharremi Reference Muharremi2003; King and Mason Reference King and Mason2006).
After its deployment, instead of confronting a supposed political and institutional vacuum, UNMIK faced different political and institutional actors and practices. UNMIK’s authority began immediately to be contested by local political actors who followed an incompatible political agenda. Thus, backed by Serbia, the Serbs that remained in Kosovo built parallel institutional structures in their enclaves challenging the legality and legitimacy of UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo and boycotting the democratic processes. UNMIK considered the Serbian parallel structures as illegal institutions as their scope was not mandated by the UNSC Resolution 1244 (Van der Borgh Reference Van der Borgh2012; OSCE 2003). On the other hand, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), an Albanian party, established a network of institutions labeled as the Institutions of the Republic of Kosovo, and considered them as the sole legitimate institutions, whereas the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), which considered itself the successor to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UÇK), built its own institutions designated as Interim Government. Political clashes and antagonisms between the PDK and the LDK were very large after the war, given that both pursued similar strategies for solving the Kosovo problem and were competing for political repositioning and consolidation of their power. UNMIK held greater political considerations for LDK, considering it as a moderate party due to its nonviolent approach to solving the Kosovo problem pursued during the period of the 1990s in which Kosovo was occupied by Serbia under the rule of Milošević.
UNMIK established consultative mechanisms, trying to co-opt the Albanian and Serbian leaders in these mechanisms, and providing a platform for cooperation between the LDK and PDK, aiming to convey the message that only moderate political actors could count on UNMIK’s support. As argued by Besnik Pula, the interethnic relations and political polarization were two hurdles that challenged Kosovo’s democratization (2003, 206). UNMIK aimed at building a political system that would guarantee two elements: political stability and ethnic inclusiveness in the institutions emerging from democratic elections. Consultative mechanisms, local institutions, a constitutional framework, and an electoral system imposed internationally on Kosovo were intended to build a consociational democracy. However, the mechanisms of power-sharing in Kosovo were imposed prior to its final political status, in an absence of inter-ethnic reconciliation and a full consensus between the ethnic communities in Kosovo. According to Florian Bieber and Sören Keil, power-sharing arrangements in Kosovo, as in the case of Macedonia and Bosnia, were a result of violent conflict and international intervention in which “the power-sharing arrangements have emerged out of the competing commitment to the territorial integrity of the republic that emerged from Yugoslavia (with the exception of Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo) and the need to recognize and include nations and groups at the state level” (2009, 343). However, as argued by them, unlike Bosnia and Macedonia, Kosovo is a unique case as far as a power-sharing arrangement is concerned, as it “not only was the internal organization of the state subject to negotiations, but so was its external status” (Bieber and Keil Reference Bieber and Keil2009, 344).
The new consociational democracy in Kosovo was built taking into account the basic ideas of Arendt Lijphart. This article focuses on two of his ideas, namely the grand coalition government and the proportional electoral system. The article is divided into four sections. The first section deals with the academic debate about consociational democracy. The second analyzes the determining factors and considerations that led UNMIK to decide to build a network of institutions prior to the first local elections. The other two sections examine the electoral and constitutional instruments implemented in Kosovo to build a consociational democracy, the paradigm of stability and general elections. The article concludes with an outline of the conditions and constraints under which the consociational democracy in Kosovo was conceived and implemented.
Consociational Democracy: Institutional and Electoral Engineering
Consociationalism as a form of institutional engineering aims at reducing and solving conflicts and building consensual democracy in societies divided on ethnic, religious, or confessional grounds. Consociationalism is inclusive in so far as it includes all ethnic groups in the institutions (O’Flyn Reference O’Flynn2005). These arrangements are designed to mitigate or prevent ethnic conflict through inclusion of major groups “in a grand coalition, created by election through proportional representation” (Sriram 2008, 18). According to Chandra L. Sriram, the success of power-sharing arrangements depends on the degree it includes and addresses four dimensions—security, territory, politics, and economy. An adequate electoral system is considered to be one of the key instruments of ethnic conflict regulation and implementation of power-sharing arrangements.
Even though scholars agree that ethnic divisions threaten stability and democracy, the approaches proposed to institutionally address these problems and stabilize democracy in countries with deep ethnic divisions, are different. There are two theoretical approaches on engineering a society emerging from war and fragmented on ethnic grounds: the centripetalist and the consociational approaches. Pippa Norris argues against power-concentrating regimes which “offer rival communities a zero-sum game” and uses the concept of “power-sharing regimes” to depict the idea that “in multi-ethnic societies divided into different linguistic, religious, or national communities, power-sharing institutions and procedures turn political opponents into cooperative partners, by providing communal leaders with a guaranteed stake in the democratic process” (2008, 4).
The centripetalist model of power-sharing is characterized by five mechanisms:
(1) dispersion of power so as to take the heat off of a single focal point; (2) devolution of power and reservation of offices on an ethnic basis in an effort to foster intra-ethnic competition at the local level; (3) inducements for interethnic cooperation, such as electoral law that effectively promote pre-election electoral coalition through vote pooling; (4) policies to encourage alternative social alignment, such as social class or territory, by placing political emphasis on crosscutting cleavages; and (5) reducing disparities between groups through managed distribution of resources (Sisk Reference Sisk1999, 40).
The basic premise of the centripetalist approach is that the rules of the electoral system should be designed in ways that create incentives for politicians to seek votes outside their own ethnic group (Horowitz Reference Horowitz1993). Donald Horowitz has criticized Lijphart’s approach that maintains that political leaders of different ethnic groups are rational, share power, and have a motive to settle and resolve ethnic differences due to the risk of joint destruction. On the contrary, according to Horowtiz, “why should majority-group leaders, with 60 percent support, and the ability to gain all of political power in a majoritarian democracy, be so self-abnegating as to give some of it to minority group leaders” (Horowitz Reference Horowitz2002, 20). When elites compromise on ethnic lines, political counter-elites within ethnic groups use sensitive issues that have been compromised and seek support within the same group. Horowitz defends the argument that the presidential form of government, accompanied by multi-ethnic parties, is the best form to suit ethnically divided or other segregation societies.
Arendt Lijphart’s model of consociational democracy is considered a breakthrough in thinking about democracy in post-conflict divided societies. His model is judged suitable for deeply divided societies as the power is shared among elites rather than monopolized (Bogard Reference Bogaard2006). “Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented culture into a stable democracy” (Lijphart Reference Lijphart1969, 216). According to this approach, consociationalism is presented as a formula for allocating power among different ethnic groups, enabling a coexistence of different ethnic groups in local and central governing institutions. Minority communities vote their representatives at institutions and protect their own vital interests. Since minority community representatives are interested in participating in governance, they are willing to cooperate with political representatives of other ethnic groups, make compromises in order to guarantee governance stability, and retain power (Lijphart Reference Lijphart2002). Though Lijphart’s consosiationalism has undergone various changes over the years, what has remained unchanged is the idea that at the center of consociationalism is the grand coalition requirement, which implies joint political decision-making by all the important groups. As Stephan Wolff has examined, the revision of Lijphart’s initial approaches has resulted from his debate with his critics and he now “offers a substantive revision of his original approach, now describing power sharing and autonomy (i.e. grand coalition government and segmental autonomy) as primary characteristics, while proportionality and minority veto are relegated to ‘secondary characteristics’” (Wolff Reference Wolff2011, 1782).
For Lijphart’s consociational democracy to be implemented in deeply-divided societies, constitutional engineers have to put in place four institutions: “(1) grand coalition governments that include representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups, (2) cultural autonomy for these groups, (3) proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments, and (4) a minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy” (Lijphart Reference Lijphart2008, 42). The elite cooperation plays a tremendous role in diminishing the inter-ethnic tensions and making these institutions work. In accordance with consociational democracy, the proportional election system is adequate and flexible for representation of minority communities. “PR [proportional representation] is clearly preferable to majoritarian methods like plurality, the majority-run-off, and the alternative vote” (Lijphart Reference Lijphart2002, 52).
There are several important pre-conditions which led the western consociational model to be successful: (1) the number and the size of oppressed groups; (2) the culture of human rights deep-rooted in the western model, especially in Europe and America; (3) minorities mobilizing themselves through democratic culture (Kymlicka Reference Kymlikca2002). It should be noted that none of these pre-conditions were entirely fulfilled in Kosovo. Minority communities (especially Serbs) did not mobilize themselves through democratic means, as they boycotted the newly provisional institutions of Kosovo and established parallel structures in violation of the UNSC Resolution 1244. The culture of human rights was not deep-rooted in Kosovar society bearing in mind Kosovo’s former Communist and conflict legacy. Last but not least, the minority communities in Kosovo were smaller than in Belgium, Italy, Fiji, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Rwanda. They comprised only 10 percent of the overall population of Kosovo. Even though power-sharing arrangements of consociational democracy in Kosovo aimed to satisfy and safeguard the needs and interests of minority communities in Kosovo and promote moderation among political actors, the reason why it has had a very limited success in bringing sustainable peace and tackling the deep-rooted causes of conflict was the undefined political status of Kosovo and incompatible political goals among Kosovar Serbs and Albanians about Kosovo’s final status. As Reilly and Reynold have emphasized, for power-sharing arrangements to succeed, a strong legitimate state is needed (2005, 323).
“Institutions First” and Local Elections
Introducing and implementing power-sharing arrangements to reduce ethnic and national disadvantages and to provide the loyalty of ethnic communities to the newly established political system has proven to be the most difficult task of international administration in Kosovo. Bemond, Manwaring, and Reynolds state “it is probably in divided societies that institutional arrangements have the greatest impact” (2002, 3). Building a set of fair and recognized institutions for settling ethnic divisions and ensuring public security before elections is vital to conflict prevention. Nevertheless, the trilema posed in the case of Kosovo was whether these institutions were being built in an internationally administered post-conflict society, or in a society that was being built and empowered on the basis of multi-ethnicity to prepare it for full independence from Serbia, or in an entity that would enjoy substantial autonomy within Serbia.
The uncertainty surrounding the final status was the main obstacle to international administration in Kosovo. “The uncertainty over the final status of Kosovo has been a major handicap. It exacerbates the intractability or decision by the international administration has been interpreted by Kosovo Albanians and Serbs as promoting either independence or the return to Serb rule, and contested or undermined by one side or the other” (Yannis Reference Yannis2001, 34). Notwithstanding these dilemmas, free, fair, and democratic elections in Kosovo were considered by UNMIK as indicators of success. Organizing elections was considered an indicator “of a successful transition from conflict and so they act as a baseline for post-conflict politics, determining the new legitimacy and deciding the structure and composition of political authority. By so doing, post-conflict elections (hopefully) lay the foundations for democratization and reconciliation” (Taylor Reference Taylor2002, 66). However, scholars like Larry Diamond (Reference Diamond2006), Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder (Reference Mansfield and Snyder2005), and Benjamin Reilly (Reference Reilly2002), have argued that early post-conflict elections are neither beneficial for peace nor for democracy. Held in the absence of the rule law mechanisms and strong institutions put in place, early elections in a post-conflict setting might nourish populist tendencies among politicians and undermine democratic consolidation. The timing of elections is of tremendous importance as “the sooner elections occur after a conflict the more likely they are to result in renewed fighting, especially when elections are held before demobilization and before the development of institutions needed to move politics beyond old cleavages line” (Brancati and Snyder Reference Brancati and Snyder2012, 13).
Having learned from the mistakes of the UN in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNMIK (i.e. the OSCE) initially put in place a minimalist institutional foundation in Kosovo, issuing a set of regulations before organizing the elections. Roland Paris argued that “peace builders should proceed with elections only when there is evidence that ‘moderate parties’ or those that seem genuinely committed to resolving disputes through peaceful negotiation and to inter-communal reconciliation—have sufficient popular support (as demonstrated by international sponsored opinion surveys) to prevail over ‘immoderate parties’ at the polls” (Paris Reference Paris2004, 189–190). As UNMIK had no exit strategy to deal with the quintessential question of Kosovo’s independence, and given that this question would be the key topic among the Kosovo Albanian political parties in the election campaign, by postponing as long as possible the announcement of the election date it was expected to minimize the success of the political forces emerging from the KLA (Mitchell Reference Mitchell2000; Tansey Reference Tansey2009). UNMIK refused to support KLA generals in becoming politicians to lead the country, as it happened in the case of Bosnia with former military generals.
UNMIK’s flawed assessment was based on their perception of the PDK as a more radical party, and of the LDK as a more moderate party. While this classification was correct in terms of the legacy of these political forces, when it came to the independence of Kosovo, all Albanian political parties in Kosovo were at least as “nationalist” as the PDK itself. All political parties in Kosovo, including moderate Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK, were committed to Kosovo’s full independence as a compromise option. Rightly, Roland Paris noted that the concept of political moderation in Kosovo is a relative one (Paris Reference Paris2004, 216). Several tensions arose between the local population and the interests of the international community about the time of elections in Kosovo.
The first tension concerns the impact elections would have on emerging political structures and personalities. In some circumstances, as in Bosnia, early elections may have the effect of turning generals into politicians, formalizing ethnic divisions into political fault lines. In less developed states lacking adequate bureaucratic institutions, elections held before those institutions can be created may hinder long-term democratic practices and stability. In other situations, however, early elections may lock in a peace process and provide tangible political gains to stakeholders in the peace. Kosovo’s elections were delayed, in part because of concerns about the impact that they had had in Bosnia (Chesterman Reference Chesterman2004, 208).
After the war in Kosovo, there were three kinds of parallel institutions with incompatible political agendas, all of which, however, lacked democratic legitimacy. During the time of UNMIK’s deployment in Kosovo, as noted by Fred Cocozzelli, “three alternative actors were seeking to assert local authority. The prior Yugoslav and Serbian government, which still maintained legal sovereignty over Kosovo; the Republic of Kosovo parallel regime, led by the LDK; and the ‘provisional government’ dominated by the KLA, were all potential rivals or alternatives to the international administration” (2009, 197). The first kind of institutions were the structures of the LDK, including the “shadow government and parliament,” and educational and health institutions built between 1989 and 1999, through which the LDK had built a non-violent strategy for opposing the undemocratic rule of the Serbian state in Kosovo. These structures considered themselves legitimate even after the end of the war. The second kind of institutions were formed by the PDK considered to be a successor party of the KLA. The PDK built an institutional network on the local level and established an “Interim Government” under the leadership of Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi. Against these two types of institutions, Kosovo Serbs re-established institutional structures, which were later known as parallel Serbian structures, with the direct support and funding from the Government of Serbia to contest and delegitimize the project of international state-building in Kosovo. Each of these actors competed for power and political control and intended to be recognized as the sole legitimate authority in the regions where they were located and held power (Van der Borgh Reference Van der Borgh2012, 32). UNMIK failed to extend its mission and it did not hold de facto control in the entire territory of Kosovo (Distler Reference Distler2017, 466). In order to act on its mandate as the final authority in Kosovo, UNMIK pursued a co-opting strategy toward these three types of parallel institutions. The political actors leading these institutions were incorporated in the consultative bodies aiming at their incremental dissolution after legitimate institutions would emerge from democratic elections.
In July 1999 under the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) UNMIK leader Bernard Kouchner, UNMIK established a consultative body labeled as the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC). It was intended that through this body cooperation would be built between the two postwar Albanian political forces, namely Ibrahim Rugova of the LDK on the one hand, and Hashim Thaci of the PDK, on the other, whose relationship was politically tense. At that time, Thaçi acted as a leader of the Provisional Government, whereas Rugova considered himself the President of Kosovo. Both structures rejected the authority of the other. However, the Council was dissolved due to the Serbs boycotting this mechanism and strengthening their parallel institutions. In addition, the Albanian political forces had built up their parallel institutions, notwithstanding that their resistance to UNMIK’s omnipresent authority and power was limited, given that both the abovementioned Albanian political parties were oriented toward the same goal: independence for Kosovo. Through a political agreement, in December 1999, UNMIK established the so-called Joint Interim Administrative Structures (JIAS), which foresaw the dissolution of Thaçi’s and Rugova’s institutional structures and co-opted them in this mechanism. The JIAS had greater authority than the KTC and included a number of Serb leaders. Nevertheless, it failed to disband the Serbian parallel structures (Yannis Reference Yannis2001, 40; Tansey Reference Tansey2007, 136). These mechanisms were designed as institutional foundations that would precede the organization of the first local elections.
Organizing the first elections was probably the most important political UNMIK task after its deployment in Kosovo. Scholars Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan argue that national elections should precede local elections in post-conflict societies (Linz and Stepan Reference Linz and Stepan1992, 123–139). However, Benjamin Reilly has noted:
In recent transitional elections in East Timor, as well as other postwar cases such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, the decision was made to start at the local level first: rather than leading with national elections, the preferred sequence was to hold local or municipal elections as a precursor to national ones, allowing steps toward democratization to be taken gradually. The relative success of these cases suggests that scholars such as Linz and Stepan are likely mistaken in advising that national elections should be held before local ones, at least if the aim is to inculcate voters in the routines of electoral politics and party politics in new democracies. (Reilly 2008, 170–171)
A similar sequence to the abovementioned cases was applied in Kosovo, initiating an incremental democratization from the local to the central level. UNMIK put in place the legal infrastructure for conducting elections, through special regulations on Registration and Operation of Political Parties in Kosovo (UNMIK/Reg/2000/16), on the Establishment of the Central Election Commission (UNMIK Regulation 2000/21), and on the Municipal Elections in Kosovo (UNMIK/Reg/2000/39). UNMIK’s Regulation on Municipal Elections in Kosovo specified that “the elections for municipal assemblies will be held under the system of proportional representation based on lists of candidates of political parties, citizens’ initiatives and coalitions and independent candidates” and that “each list of candidates must include at least 30% women candidates within the first 15 candidates” (UNMIK/Reg/2000/39, Article 4). From UNMIK’s point of view, the organization of local elections before the parliamentary ones was perceived to carry advantages with regard to assessing the configuration of power after the conflict in Kosovo, counterbalancing the political legitimacy of political structures emerging from the KLA and bringing Kosovo Serbs to newly established local institutions.
Holding local elections prior to the parliamentary ones was justified by UNMIK on “the well-founded fear that a fully elected and internationally recognized Kosovo parliament would promptly proclaim complete independence from the province, without even calling a referendum on the issues” (Mitchel 2000, 258). Sixteen months after its deployment in Kosovo, in October 2000, UNMIK organized the first local elections in Kosovo. Although the election platforms of the political parties were supposed to deal with local economic development and local democracy, all Albanian political parties campaigned for independence. The Central Election Commission registered 49 political parties to compete in the elections. The main political rivalry took place between LDK, on one side, and PDK and AAK on the other. Despite pessimistic international projections of a PDK victory, the local elections of October 2000 were won by the LDK with 58% of the votes, followed by 27% for PDK, and 7.7% for AAK. The turnout rate was very high: 79% of citizens participated in the first local elections. Since the LDK emerged as the winner of the election with high citizen participation in the elections, for UNMIK the result was an indicator of success and a go-ahead for the incremental creation of power-sharing mechanisms in Kosovo, for building central institutions, and organizing parliamentary elections. The strengthening of LDK after the deployment of UNMIK in Kosovo was more due to the failure of PDK and AAK to act as modern political parties. Ingimundarson points out the following: “What strengthened the LDK after the UN took control over Kosovo was PDK’s authoritarian exercise of power after UÇK elements gained political and economic spoils. Many Kosovar Albanians resented the UÇK’s use of the mythology of resistance to grant privileges and to tolerate corruption—often through violence—in a poverty-stricken society” (2007, 102).
Nonetheless, the problem waiting to be addressed immediately after these elections was the boycott by the Kosovo Serbs of the elections. Despite the fact that the elections were seen as an instrument of deepening stability and inclusiveness through bringing different ethnic communities leadership in a joint government, the policy of boycott pursued by Kosovo Serbs and supported by the Serbian government raised doubts on all international efforts to build a consociational democracy after the conflict. On the other hand, the Albanian political elites immediately urged that power be transferred quickly and without delay to the newly established local Kosovar institutions. Three years after the local elections, UNMIK retained all discretionary powers in accordance with Regulation 2000/45 on Self-Government of Municipalities in Kosovo. As UNMIK had monarchic like power and unlimited authority, there was a tension between the autocratic means and the democratic ends in its policy of “building democracy through benevolent autocracy” in Kosovo (Chesterman Reference Chesterman2004, 126).
Electoral and Constitutional Engineering for “Consensual Democracy”
The new consensual democracy in postwar Kosovo had limited success, because it was not based on a wide inter-ethnic consensus. “Ideally,” Anna Jarstad argues, “power-sharing is the result of agreement after negotiations among the parties to the conflict. However, the present form of power-sharing in Kosovo as an international protectorate was imposed by UN provisions, without a consensus among the former warring parties” (2007, 232). Although this democracy aimed at reducing the dominance of the majority Albanian community, increasing institutional security for Kosovo Serbs, promoting political moderation, and interethnic reconciliation, this goal was not fully achieved, since Albanians and Serbs had incompatible ethnic agendas regarding Kosovo’s final status. While for UNMIK and other international actors, the maintenance of stability and the functionalization of institutions was considered a strategic priority during its administration in Kosovo, “Serbian political elites in Kosovo chose the politics of boycott to resist the internationally mediated statebuilding, and avoid the exploitation of power-sharing mechanisms as pretext for ethnic peace and reconciliation in Kosovo” (Visoka Reference Visoka2017, 14). However, Albanian elites and the population pursued a different goal. “For the Kosovo–Albanian elite it was clear from the very beginning of the protectorate that the goal of statebuilding meant building an independent state” (Ernst Reference Ernst2013, 130). As a strategy to build a minimal consensus between the Albanian and Serbian political actors, the international state-builders and OSCE technocrats imposed a proportional electoral system. The proportional electoral system and parliamentarization was envisaged as the most appropriate system for Kosovo’s society characterized by deep ethnic and political divisions. This system was based on Lijphart’s consociational democracy model, which has argued that “for divided societies, ensuring the election of a broadly representative legislature should be the crucial consideration, and PR is undoubtedly the optimal way of doing so” and, parallel to this, a parliamentary system “offers the optimal setting for forming a broad power sharing executive” which introduce a strong element of a non-zero-sum game (Lijphart Reference Lijphart2008, 78–80). The aim of this system was to guarantee stability and inclusiveness. As the electoral system was imposed and not built from below with consensus and wide intern-community acceptance in Kosovo, the stability and all-inclusiveness of the new political system in Kosovo was maintained through the omnipotent UN mission in Kosovo.
For two consecutive months, from May until July 2000, discussions about the electoral system were held between the OSCE representatives and Kosovo political parties. In July 2000, the Central Election Commission, headed by UNMIK, unilaterally imposed the proportional representation electoral system. LDK and PDK had different preferences regarding the electoral system. The latter backed a pure majoritarian electoral system for Kosovo, calculating that with such a system it would win the election and acquire more influence, while the former proposed a mixed electoral system (with features from both majoritarian and proportional systems). Thus the LDK and PDK calculations were based on different grounds. The PDK proposed a majoritarian electoral system believing it would be able to gain votes on the support it enjoyed among the population as a political force that emerged from the war of KLA, and thus would win a majority of votes in Kosovo as the main political force. On the other hand, the LDK feared the loss of political influence on the ground and hoped that such a proposal would put it in a better position on the political scene. However, beyond these considerations, UNMIK imposed a proportional electoral system with a single electoral zone. This electoral system anticipated the prevention of any political party from running the country on its own and producing a political zero-sum game with winners on one side and the losers on the other. The proportional representation of minority communities in Kosovo became central to the fundamental document on which the institutions of Kosovo would exercise authority. Under the administration of Hans Haekkerup, in May 2001, UNMIK promulgated Regulation 2001/9, known as the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, “which describes the institutions which will put in the hands of Kosovo’s leaders and civil servants after general election, on 17 November 2001” (UNMIK Reg/2001/9).
The purpose of the Constitutional Framework was “the establishment of a party system in Kosovo that would keep a balance between creating manageable coalitions, effective government and a multi-ethnic governance” (Taylor Reference Taylor2005, 456). The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government internalized a political system with power-sharing. This document provided minority communities in Kosovo with vested political participation rights by reserving 20 seats for non-Albanian communities in the 120-seat Assembly of Kosovo. “In order to encourage minority representation, this minimum—which already represented a numerical overrepresentation compared to their share of the population—was guaranteed even in the case of a minority boycott. This meant that minority parties would be tempted to break out of any attempt at a concerted boycott” (Simonsen Reference Simonsen2004, 298). The distributions of seats amongst minority communities are based on proportional representation: ten seats for Kosovo Serbs and ten to other communities: Roma, Ashkalia, and Egyptian community (four seats); Bosniaks community (three seats); Turkish (two seats); and Gorani (one seat) (Stahn Reference Stahn2001, 556; Jarstad Reference Jarstad2007, 234).
The Presidency of the Kosovo Assembly was designed as an eight-member collective body to safeguard the interests of minorities. Minority communities were represented in this body with two members; one Serb and one from other communities. To the minority communities was also granted the right to motion any law that potentially violates their rights. The motion could be raised by any member of the Assembly with the backing of five other members, and could be referred to the Presidency within 48 hours from the moment of approval by the Assembly. Ethnic representation and appointment of two ministers, one Serb and the other from other communities, was also established in the government (UNMIK Reg. 2001/9). These institutional arrangements with mandatory power-sharing in the assembly and government “contained significant elements of the consociational model of democracy” (Tansey Reference Tansey2007, 137). Beyond these mechanisms, Chapter 4 of the Constitutional Framework assigned to the SRSG an unlimited power to veto laws in conflict with the rights of minority communities.
Guaranteeing reserved seats and over-representation of minority communities in the Assembly and Government were designed as tools to integrate minority communities into Kosovo institutions. This meant that if minority communities were to take part in elections, in addition to the reserved seats, they could gain additional seats, as happened in the 2001 elections, where 35 members of the minority communities were elected to the Assembly of Kosovo, 22 of them Serbs and 13 from other communities. Thus, minority communities, with less than a 10% share of the Kosovo population, became the second largest political force preceded by the LDK, which in these elections won 47 deputies. The allocation of seats for minority communities was made in line with the number of votes won by parties, coalitions, initiatives, or independent candidates that were initially registered as minority parties and declared as representatives of the minority communities in Kosovo. The use of these quotas was reserved only for mono-ethnic parties. Political parties of minority communities competing in parliamentary elections were registered as mono-ethnic political parties. Albanian political parties were left without an incentive to seek votes beyond their ethnic group. In order to utilize the representation quotas, likewise acted the political parties of the Serb, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, and Turkish communities, which did not require votes beyond their ethnic electorate. As noted by Reilly, “In societies divided along ethnic lines, for example, it is often easier for campaigning parties to attract voter support by appealing to ethnic allegiances rather than issues of class or ideology. This means that aspiring politicians have a strong incentive to mobilize followers along ethnic lines, and unscrupulous leaders who ‘play the ethnic card’ can be rewarded with electoral success” (Reilly Reference Reilly2006, 812). One of the reasons why the ethno-political culture was powerful and the civic culture weak was that the leadership of political parties in Kosovo—including Albanian and Serbian—came either from a Communist background, or peaceful or military resistance, and were characterized by a lack of a democratic culture and experience. These political parties did not really resemble modern Western parties.
Due to fragmentation of the Albanian political elite and lack of a common platform of this elite to face the first transition period in Kosovo, the political resistance of Albanian political parties to UNMIK’s unprecedented policies and power was limited. As Besnik Pula has noted, “If local elites are fragmented and do not enjoy mass support, resistance is likely to be limited” (2003, 200). However, the main reason why the Albanian political elite has not openly protested against these policies can be explained by the fact that power-sharing mechanisms were perceived as an instrument, as an “earned sovereignty” compromise. As argued by Paul R. Williams and Francesca Jannotti Pecci, “earned sovereignty is defined by three core elements: shared sovereignty, institution building, and a determination of final status” (2004, 350). During the first phase, UNMIK and the SRSG exercised absolute authority over all decisions taken in Kosovo, whereas the second phase implied the establishment of an institutional basis, the holding of elections and the transfer of a part of the powers from UNMIK to the provisional institutions. The opening of negotiations to discuss the undefined political status of Kosovo after it meets certain international standards, known as “standards before the status” policy, which in fact dealt with standards for democracy and multi-ethnicity, was considered a concluding stage. As Oisin Tansey notes: “A key element of Kosovo’s claim to independence, and the international support it received, was its rhetorical and practical support for democracy and multiethnicity” (2011, 1515). However, as put by Valur Ingimundarson:
The Kosovar Albanian political elite has never accepted attempts by UNMIK and the “international community” to make “multi-ethnicity” the defining political identity of Kosovars. Of course, they realize that without respecting minority rights, Kosovar Albanians will never receive full self-determination. But since 1999, they have used collective memory as a tool to stake their claim to majority rule and to develop a state identity. (Ingimundarson 2007, 98)
Notwithstanding the consociational arrangements of power-sharing installed in Kosovo designed to provide incentives for multi-ethnic cooperation, the political polarization was not limited between the Serbian and Albanian political elites only, but it was also present between the Albanian political elites. Whereas the former polarization was about Kosovo’s final status, the latter, especially between the LDK and the PDK, was about the legitimate governing leadership in postwar Kosovo and “became a question of deciding [who] had the moral authority to lead Kosovo towards independence” (Ingimundarson, Reference Ingimundarson2007, 100). In response to inter- and intra-ethnic polarization, the creation of grand coalitions for all postwar governments was intended to prevent not only inter-community but also intra-community political conflict.
The Paradigm of Stability and the 2001 “Landmark Elections”
The consensual democracy with power-sharing arrangements was built in postwar Kosovo for the protection and promotion of the rights of minority communities, in the conditions of a politically undefined, and internationally administered territory where all the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, even to dismantle Kosovo’s central institutions emerging from the elections, were reserved for UNMIK as an omnipotent peace-building mission. According to the Constitutional Framework, even after the elections, UNMIK remained the final authority in Kosovo. “The powers and responsibilities of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government shall not include certain reserved powers and responsibilities, which will remain exclusively in the hands of the SRSG,” was stipulated in the Framework (UNMIK Reg. 2001/9). The building of a consensual democracy was characterized by a paradox: UNMK sought the construction of a consociational democracy in Kosovo, but reserved all the power for itself. With the Constitutional Framework, a quasi-constitution that was drafted for regulating the scope of all Kosovo institutions, only a small part of the power was allocated to Kosovo institutions, whereas the major part was reserved for UNMIK. The Constitutional Framework did not set a date for when the powers would be delegated from UNMIK to Kosovo institutions, nor did it foresee when the final status of Kosovo would be determined. The Albanian political elite faced this paradox until 2008, when Kosovo declared its independence.
Considering the uncertain circumstances and interethnic incidents, the new political and electoral system aimed to guarantee stability of governance and ethnic inclusiveness. Stefan Wolff has defined stability as the capacity of political institutions to command authority, maintain order and security, and enforce legislation. This political system has to be inclusive and reflect the diversity of society. Wolff differentiates four ideal types of political processes that are reflected in multi-ethnic societies: (a) stable and inclusive multi-ethnic societies (Switzerland, Canada, Spain, Italy, Belgium, and Mauritius); (b) stable but noninclusive multi-ethnic societies (Israel, Northern Ireland); (c) inclusive but unstable multi-ethnic societies (Bosnia and Herzegovina); (d) unstable and noninclusive multi-ethnic societies (Soviet Union and Balkans). According to Wolff:
Apart from ending a conflict, these peace agreements thus aim to establish democratic forms of governance and/or improve existing political systems, both with a view towards greater stability and inclusiveness. There are two major obstacles in relation to these closely connected objectives. The first one is to encourage elites of conflict groups to give up violence as a means to pursue political power and rely on exclusively democratic means (including elections). The second one is how to deal with the wider legacy of a conflict in terms of the political culture it has created, the structures of civil society (or lack thereof) and a range of other dimensions normally necessary for sustaining democratic political processes (2003, 8).
Accordingly, postwar Kosovo can be classified as an unstable and noninclusive society. Although stability is very important in deeply divided societies such as Kosovo, the stability promoted and maintained by UNMIK and KFOR means maintaining the status quo and not providing a long-term solution to the conflict. Dominik Zaum (Reference Zaum2009) has noted that the international paradigm for maintaining stability in Kosovo, in the absence of a consensus for the country’s political future and an exit strategy “makes an international presence a condition of stability, rather than an instrument to attain self-sustaining peace” (2009, 5). Stability was a necessary but insufficient condition for the deeply divided Kosovar society, as the governments emerging from legitimate elections were not so efficient in delivering public services. “In terms of sequencing, ‘security first’ is,” as Stefan Wolff emphasizes, “by now an accepted paradigm of state building, but there is equally a realization that ‘security only’ cannot succeed in achieving the twin outcomes of peace and democracy after conflict” (2011, 1779).
Even though the UNMIK administration succeeded at establishing a modicum of stability in Kosovo, “the unresolved problems remained daunting: the inherent ambiguities and contradiction of the UN mandate; the diametrically opposed aspirations of Kosovo Albanians and Serbs; and continued vengeful violence by Albanians” (Yannis Reference Yannis2001, 31). The main obstacle to the creation of a multi-ethnic, stable, and inclusive democracy in Kosovo remained the undefined political status and the inability of the international community to give ownership and competencies to local institutions. In “Elections are what we do,” Simon Chesterman argued that UNMIK designed elections as an activity that would engage both Albanians and Serbs in political life, taking into account the fact that Kosovo’s independence was not on the table. “Elections will buy us three years of stability,” stated one of the senior officials of the OSCE (Chesterman Reference Chesterman2001, 20). Through these parliamentary elections, UNMIK bought the peace of the Albanian political elite by engaging them in the competition for political power and institution building and trying to postpone the issue of status. On the other hand, the eventual participation of Serbs in these elections was considered a great success for the UNMIK administration and for the legitimacy of Kosovo institutions emerging from the elections.
Since Serbs boycotted the local elections of 2000, the fall of the Milošević regime unlocked a new possibility to cooperate with Serbia, so that the latter would support the participation of the Kosovo Serbs in the elections. Kosovo Serbs had deep disagreements about participation in these elections. Those Serbs who were displaced in northern Kosovo were more rigid, since they had already created de facto several “parallel institutions” and, in violation of UNSCR Resolution 1244, enjoyed direct support from Serbia. Serbs from Graçanica/Gračanica were more pragmatic about participation in the elections (Sörensen 2013, 275). Serb participation in the parliamentary elections became possible after an agreement was signed on November 5, 2001 between the SRSG Hans Haekkerup and the President of Coordination Center for Kosovo of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Nebojša Čović. One of the conditions posed by Serbia to UNMIK for Serb participation in the elections was that the institutions emerging from the elections, in particular the Parliament, were not to take any step toward the declaration of independence of Kosovo (Ker-Lindsay Reference Ker-Lindsay2009, 149). After signing the agreement with Čović, without any consultation with Kosovo’s political leadership, Haekkerup lost his credibility among the Albanian political parties, and UNMIK was gradually seen as an obstacle to Kosovo independence.
The very first parliamentary elections in Kosovo were held on November 17, 2001. International organizations qualified the first 2001 parliamentary elections in Kosovo as a “landmark elections” (International Crisis Group 2001). With a turnout of 64%,14% lower than the local elections one year earlier, 26 political parties were registered to compete in these elections. As noted by the International Crisis Group:
[t]he campaign failed to raise as much enthusiasm as the campaign for the October 2000 municipal elections may in part have reflected the difficulty in distinguishing among the parties on substantive issues. While all three main parties assert their commitment to sound, democratic government, the rule of law, a market economy and so forth, given that none has any record of government there is no basis on which to assess their claims. On the key issue of the future status of Kosovo, all are committed to independence. To a considerable degree, preferences among the electorate are based on habit or regional factors, combined with the personalities of the party leaders (International Crisis Group 2001, 8).
LDK emerged as the winner of the election with 45.7% of the total vote. Compared with the 2000 local elections, when LDK garnered 58% of the vote, it marked a drop in popular support. PDK ranked second, with 25.7% of the vote, while AAK was third with 7.8% of the total vote. Serbs participated in the elections through a large coalition of several political parties (coalition “Povratak”). The coalition managed to win 11.3% of the total vote. Since the Constitutional Framework guaranteed ten seats for the Serb minority, another 12 seats were added, thus increasing the representation of Serbs in Kosovo with 22 seats in the Assembly (Tansey Reference Tansey2007; Natern 2008; King & Mason Reference King and Mason2006). Attentive to supporting a moderate political leadership, UNMIK SRSG and Diplomatic Offices accredited in Pristina held the “keys of power” and issued clear instructions on who could lead the government (Tansey Reference Tansey2009, 121). In UNMIK’s assessment, the PDK leader, the former KLA Political Director and Prime Minister of the “Provisional Government,” could not contribute to building a democratic, tolerant, and multi-ethnic society, due to the fact that Serbs regarded him as a “KLA man.” Likewise, LDK, the largest party and winner of the elections, could not easily accept a deal with Thaçi as prime minister, given the latter’s criticism of LDK and its leader for his peaceful approach toward solving Kosovo’s status within Yugoslavia during the 1990s.
After the elections, the LDK and the PDK harbored disagreements over the division of government positions and both parties negotiated for the seats of president and prime minister. UNMIK SRSG Hans Haekkerup’s patronizing approach to unlocking this situation failed to provide a remedy for the delay in the establishment of institutions (Choedon Reference Choedon2010, 52). Following Haekkerup’s resignation and his replacement in January 2002 by the new UNMIK SRSG Michael Steiner, the path was open for the establishment of central institutions and allocation of governing positions between PDK and LDK. In February 2002, the LDK, the PDK, and the AAK agreed to build a grand coalition with a “compromise candidate for the prime minister position, PDK politician Bajram Rexhepi, and sealed agreement on the new government, with Rugova as President” (Tansey Reference Tansey2007, 140). This grand coalition was expected to decrease the political polarity between the LDK and the PDK, include the Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions, and build a broad consensus to govern postwar Kosovo. On the other hand, given that the majority of these parties were built on ethnic grounds, with loyalty obtained and held through family and clan alliances in regions where parties had their electoral base, UNMIK aimed to increase its control over the territory of Kosovo and maintain the status quo by including all the parties in the ruling coalition. In other words, “the need for effective government came after the need for stability” (International Crisis Group 2003, 5).
With the establishment of the institutions, animosities arose between UNMIK and the PISG since the former resisted the transfer of powers to the local institutions that emerged from the elections. UNMIK’s reluctance to transfer its powers to the local institutions was due to the fear that such a transfer would be interpreted by the Serb coalition “Povratak” as a go ahead to a declaration of independence for Kosovo by the Albanian political elite. Delays in addressing the status of Kosovo began to erode the trust between Albanians and Serbs. An early warning with regard to Kosovo’s undefined political status was given, “as long as Albanian fears and Serb hopes of Kosovo’s eventual re-incorporation into Yugoslavia are left unanswered, efforts to develop normal, constructive relations between the two communities, either within Kosovo and between Kosovo and Serbia, are unlikely to bear fruit” (International Crisis Group 2002, 5).
Due to delays in defining the final status of Kosovo, support for UNMIK decreased dramatically in 2004 when the satisfaction rate scored only 21% (UNDP 2005, 8). Serbia continued to support parallel structures established in Kosovo since 1999, and the local Serbs continued their boycott to Kosovo’s institutions in the upcoming elections in 2004 and 2007. In October 2005, the Security Council authorized the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari as a Special Envoy to lead the negotiations on Kosovo’s status. After 17 rounds of talks over 14 months, the potential for further negotiations was exhausted (Weller Reference Weller2008; Kostovicova Reference Kostovicova2008). After this stage, Martti Ahtisaari followed an innovative approach, combining the strategy of mediation with arbitration, an approach that James Ker-Lindsay (Reference Ker-Lindsay2009) called “meditration.” On March 26, 2007, Ahtisaari unveiled his plan and recommended supervised independence for Kosovo explaining that the delay in determining the status would increase uncertainty and fear among Albanians. James Pettiffer commented that:
Ahtisaari’s report was intended to quell these fears and to provide a framework for a political solution. He attempted to do this by providing totemic ‘sovereignty’ to the Albanians, while maintaining the taboo of full independence with full sovereignty and a seat at the United Nations for the new state. However, as demonstrated in the world of academic anthropological discourse by Levi Strauss, the structure of taboo is associated with fear, in this case the fear of a truly independent Kosovo (Pettifer Reference Pettifer2007, 7).
Conclusion
The building of a consociational democracy was designed not only as a mechanism to address the causes of conflict and to engineer inclusive and multi-ethnic institutions, but also as a precondition for the initiation of international negotiations to determine Kosovo’s final status. Although this model of democracy was challenged on several grounds, it is not implied that the consociational approach to addressing inter-ethnic divisions was wrong and that another approach, the centripetalist, would have been more appropriate in the case of Kosovo. Rather, it was the unwillingness of the Albanian and Serbian political elites to cooperate in implementation of the mechanisms of consociational democracy that made such mechanisms ineffective.
The power-sharing mechanisms and arrangements in Kosovo have been developed under three specific circumstances. First, power-sharing arrangements were imposed in Kosovo without a broad inter-ethnic consensus and under the circumstances of an all-powerful international administration that had undertaken administration of Kosovo society directly. Second, unlike other states where power-sharing arrangements were implemented to mitigate conflict and build peace, Kosovo lacked an interethnic consensus around the issue of whether it were to become a state or not. The power-sharing mechanisms were imposed not only to regulate the internal territorial organization and governance in the country, but also as an “earned sovereignty” policy through which the international community would open discussions on Kosovo’s final status, and the latter would incrementally enhance its sovereignty depending on the degree of implementation of the mechanisms of consociational democracy. Third, although power-sharing mechanisms were meant to build a multi-ethnic and peaceful society, these mechanisms were also used to mitigate the tensions and political polarizations among the Albanian political actors themselves who had followed different paths (one peaceful and the other confrontational) to resolve the political status of Kosovo within the former Yugoslavia.
Due to these three circumstances, the building of consociational democracy by external actors in postwar Kosovo was incrementally designed from the bottom up through the following sequence of actions: building an institutional base, organizing local elections, and then establishing central institutions after the general elections. This logic of action was conditioned due to unfriendly inter-ethnic relations and intra-ethnic political polarization of Albanians. Proceeding along the “institutions first” approach, UNMIK installed the first consultative mechanisms which were thought to facilitate cooperation between parties and moderate their political positions. The Serbian political representatives boycotted these mechanisms and built parallel institutions to partially counter the legitimacy and authority of UNMIK, whereas the institutions that were built by the LDK during the 1990s and the PDK after 1999 were dissolved and their representatives were co-opted into UNMIK’s mechanisms. Institutions and consultative mechanisms that were built after the war in Kosovo laid the foundation on which the new democracy was modeled.
The “institutions first” approach demanded building an institutional base through power-sharing mechanisms and postponing elections to a stage where it was thought that the so-called moderate Albanian political forces would be able to gain power and pursue a peaceful and cooperative approach with minority communities toward resolving Kosovo’s political status. In pursuit of this goal, UNMIK imposed a proportional electoral system and a constitutional framework that would guarantee the stability and adequate representation of minorities in the institutions. However, as an omnipotent mission, UNMIK kept the key powers at all times even after the organization of general elections and central institutions were established and, paradoxically, intended to build democracy through autocratic means. Decisions about the timing of elections were designed for stability and in UNMIK’s view meant the maintenance of the status quo. UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo became a condition for maintaining stability until 2008 when Kosovo declared its independence. During the period of UNMIK administration, the independence for Kosovo was a totem for the Albanian political elite in which they strongly believed. However, the totem aroused fear and its discussion was a taboo among the Serbian political elite. Due to the diametrically opposing aims of the parties, the introduction of power-sharing mechanisms under circumstances where there was no political consensus between Albanian, Serbian, and international actors over the final status of Kosovo failed to produce the intended results to build a stable, inclusive, and effective political system.
