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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2004
The compatibility of political Islam with democracy is an enormously debated but slippery topic, often losing its balance over the definitions of the two elements. There are (at least) two ways to approach the topic—from the outside and from the inside. The usual approach is to stake out a definition of the two elements and then see whether they permit enough overlap to be compatible with each other. Variations are huge. If political Islam means consultation of the believers, and democracy is regular consultation of the governed, then they are compatible—at least, in a polity populated by Muslims. If political Islam means validation of rulers and their policies by vox Dei, and democracy means validation by vox populi, then they are not. In between are many variations.
The compatibility of political Islam with democracy is an enormously debated but slippery topic, often losing its balance over the definitions of the two elements. There are (at least) two ways to approach the topic—from the outside and from the inside. The usual approach is to stake out a definition of the two elements and then see whether they permit enough overlap to be compatible with each other. Variations are huge. If political Islam means consultation of the believers, and democracy is regular consultation of the governed, then they are compatible—at least, in a polity populated by Muslims. If political Islam means validation of rulers and their policies by vox Dei, and democracy means validation by vox populi, then they are not. In between are many variations.
The approach from the inside would be to choose a person who claims to incarnate both virtues and see how he does it. This is the approach adopted by the London-based historian Azzam Tamimi in his exegetical biography of the Tunisian Islamicist and (would-be) politician Rachid Ghannouchi (b. 1941). The result is an intelligent portrayal and analysis by a historian who is both admiring and honest about his subject. It is a doubly inside study—inside from the point of view of the subject but also in regard to the author, who is writing as a Muslim scholar who shares his subject's approach, even if not all his positions, and who analyses using the terms of Islamic discourse as his parameters. In so doing, he educates his Western audience (Oxford University Press's readers) in both Islamicist ideas and in Islamicist analysis of those ideas.
Ghannouchi is not only a complex and intelligent thinker but also an interesting social phenomenon. Born and raised in a traditional and believing family in a rural town near Gabes in southern Tunisia, he attended al-Zeitouna college but was alienated by both the irrelevant religion taught inside and the offensive secularism practiced in Bourguiba's Tunisia. He became a Nasserist and went to Cairo University and then to Damascus University, searching for an anchor and an identity. He found it in the “original, revealed Islam,” and when he next went to the Sorbonne it was as an Islamicist surrounded by a hostile alien society. He traveled to Algeria, where he met Malik Bennabi, who had a major influence on his thinking. He returned to Tunisia in 1970, joined a tablīgh group there as he had in his various other locations, and in l981 founded Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami, commonly know by its French initials MTI although better translated as the Movement of the Islamic Way (not Tendency). Thereupon he was put in prison for three years and then went into exile in London. The MTI was outlawed, and even after the fall of Bourguiba it was never allowed to take part in elections in Tunisia's pseudo-democracy.
This cursus not only tells a typical tale of a man adrift between tradition and modernity. It also explains something about its bearer's belief systems. Ghannouchi was continually reacting against his surroundings, be it the sterility of the religion as taught, the materialism of the secular world as lived, the invasiveness of French culture, or the imposition of American imperialism, especially in regard to the Palestinian question, as he saw it. In this context of negative socialization where he knew what he was against, he was searching for what he was for. It has been a torturous path, full of evolution and contradiction, assertions and ambiguities, standard stands and thoughtful attempts to work things out in his mind. In it all, pillars and concepts from orthodox Islam provide comfortable and accepted foundations and markers to lean on, ranging from

aqīda (creed) to maẓhar (appearance), down to the proper shape of the beard and length of the robe (p. 33).
The result is an interesting mixture of details and lacunae, often more satisfying to a religious thinker than to a political activist. The territorial state and the international order are obstacles to Ghannouchi's democracy. “Liberal, Western democracy” is undesirable but will produce Islamic democracy. Islam is “a comprehensive way of life and God is the Lord both in the mosque and the market;” however, some areas have been filled by divine commandments but others were intentionally left vacant to be filled “through ijtihād but within the framework of

aqīda” (p. 197). Yet there is no suggestion of how the community “may choose among various ijtihādāt or how a chosen ijtihād may become law” (p. 139). Presumably, this would take place “by an elected parliament in coordination with a council of legal experts,” a system that sounds very Iranian, yet Ghannouchi also rejects the Iranian system. So the content of the Islamic democratic system rests entirely on faith, the belief that somehow the community will be moved by righteousness to choose good leaders and good policies.
Yet that is all that “liberal Western democracy” relies on, too—faith that in the medium run (no guarantees in the short run), enlightened self-interest and right reason will move the governed to choose good leaders and good policies. The major difference is that Ghannouchi takes his faith on faith, having no empirical data to back up his belief (and much historical data to show the weakness of belief in philosopher kings), whereas those who believe in democracy have plenty of evidence, much of it highly ambiguous. His defense of Islamic democracy is on the conceptual level and his attacks on democracy as practiced on the empirical level.
Tamimi's work is an honest if sympathetic portrayal of these ideas. There is a fine chapter on Ghannouchi's views of civil society, another on the territorial state and the international system, and a balanced analysis of Ghannouchi's critics and his response to them. The book suffers from some stiff and repetitive writing and poor editing by Oxford. (Bernard Lewis comes across as a Spaniard [Luis; p. 174] and a Frenchman [Louis; p. 264] on occasion). This is a book well worth reading. It will not settle the debate, but it will move it to a higher, informed level. It will probably convince many readers that Ghannouchi was not as dangerous as Bourguiba imagined, because at the hustings his arguments were too philosophical and based on the righteousness of his audience. But you never know.